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The American Political Science Review

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A THEORY OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS*

OTTO A. DAVIS, M. A. H. DEMPSTER, AND AARON WILDAVSKY
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There are striking regularities in the budgetary process. The evidence from over half of the non-defense agencies indicates that the behavior of the budgetary process of the United States government results in aggregate decisions similar to those produced by a set of simple decision rules that are linear and temporally stable. For the agencies considered, certain equations are specified and compared with data composed of agency requests (through the Bureau of the Budget) and Congressional appropriations from 1947 through 1963. The comparison indicates that these equations summarize accurately aggregate outcomes of the budgetary process for each agency.

In the first section of the paper we present an analytic summary of the federal budgetary process, and we explain why basic features of the process lead us to believe that it can be represented by simple models which are stable over periods of time, linear, and stochastic.[1] In the second section we propose and discuss the alternative specifications for the agency-Budget Bureau and Congressional decision equations. The empirical results are presented in section three. In section four we provide evidence on deviant cases, discuss predictions, and future work to explore some of the problems indicated by this kind of analysis. An appendix contains informal definitions and a discussion of the statistical terminology used in the paper.

I. THE BUDGETARY PROCESS

Decisions depend upon calculation of which alternatives to consider and to choose.[2] A major clue toward understanding budgeting is the extraordinary complexity of the calculations involved. There are a huge number of items to be considered, many of which are of considerable technical difficulty. There is, however, little or no theory in most areas of policy which would enable practitioners to predict the consequences of alternative moves and the probability of their occurring. Nor has anyone solved the imposing problem of the inter-personal comparison of utilities. Outside of the political process, there is no agreed upon way of comparing and evaluating the merits of different programs for different people whose preferences vary in kind and in intensity.

Participants in budgeting deal with their overwhelming burdens by adopting aids to calculation. By far the most important aid to calculation is the incremental method. Budgets are almost never actively reviewed as a whole in the sense of considering at once the value of all existing programs as compared to all possible alternatives. Instead, this year's budget is

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* The research was sponsored by Resources for the Future. We received valuable criticism from Rufus Browning, Sam Cohn, W. W. Cooper, Richard Cyert, Nelson Polsby, Herbert Simon, and Oliver Williamson, research assistance from Rose Kelly, and editorial assistance from Jean Zorn. Mrs. E. Belton undertook the laborious task of compiling the raw data. We are grateful to Resources for the Future and to our colleagues, but the sole responsibility for what is said here is our own.

[1] See the Appendix for explanations of terms and concepts.

[2] The description which follows is taken from Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston, 1964). Portions of the comments on the House Appropriations Committee are from Richard Fenno, "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration," this REVIEW, 56 (1962), 310–324.

based on last year's budget, with special attention given to a narrow range of increases or decreases.

Incremental calculations proceed from an existing base. (By "base" we refer to commonly held expectations among participants in budgeting that programs will be carried out at close to the going level of expenditures.) The widespread sharing of deeply held expectations concerning the organization's base provides a powerful (although informal) means of securing stability.

The most effective coordinating mechanisms in budgeting undoubtedly stem from the roles adopted by the major participants. Roles (the expectations of behavior attached to institutional positions) are parts of the division of labor. They are calculating mechanisms. In American national government, the administrative agencies act as advocates of increased expenditure, the Bureau of the Budget acts as Presidential servant with a cutting bias, the House Appropriations Committee functions as a guardian of the Treasury, and the Senate Appropriations Committee as an appeals court to which agencies carry their disagreements with House action. The roles fit in with one another and set up patterns of mutual expectations which markedly reduce the burden of calculation for the participants. Since the agencies can be depended upon to advance all the programs for which there is prospect of support, the Budget Bureau and the Appropriations Committees respectively can concentrate on fitting them into the President's program or paring them down.

Possessing the greatest expertise and the largest numbers, working in the closest proximity to their policy problems and clientele groups, and desiring to expand their horizons, administrative agencies generate action through advocacy. But if they ask for amounts much larger than the appropriating bodies believe reasonable, the agencies' credibility will suffer a drastic decline. In such circumstances, the reviewing organs are likely to cut deeply, with the result that the agency gets much less than it might have with a more moderate request. So the first guide for decision is: do not come in *too* high. Yet the agencies must also not come in too low, for the reviewing bodies assume that if agency advocates do not ask for funds they do not need them. Thus, the agency decision rule might read: come in a little too high (padding), but not too high (loss of confidence).

Agencies engage in strategic planning to secure these budgetary goals. Strategies are the links between the goals of the agencies and their perceptions of the kinds of actions which will be effective in their political environment. Budget officers in American national government uniformly believe that being a good politician—cultivation of an active clientele, development of confidence by other officials (particularly the appropriations subcommittees), and skill in following strategies which exploit opportunities—is more important in obtaining funds than demonstration of agency efficiency.

In deciding how much money to recommend for specific purposes, the House Appropriations Committee breaks down into largely autonomous subcommittees in which the norm of reciprocity is carefully followed. Specialization is carried further as subcommittee members develop limited areas of competence and jurisdiction. Budgeting is both incremental and fragmented as the subcommittees deal with adjustments to the historical base of each agency. Fragmentation and specialization are increased through the appeals functions of the Senate Appropriations Committee, which deals with what has become (through House action) a fragment of a fragment. With so many participants continually engaged in taking others into account, a great many adjustments are made in the light of what others are likely to do.

This qualitative account of the budgetary process contains clear indications of the kind of quantitative models we wish to develop. It is evident, for example, that decision-makers in the budgetary process think in terms of percentages. Agencies talk of expanding their base by a certain percentage. The Bureau of the Budget is concerned about the growth rates for certain agencies and programs. The House Appropriations Committee deals with percentage cuts, and the Senate Appropriations Committee with the question of whether or not to restore percentage cuts. These considerations suggest that the quantitative relationships among the decisions of the participants in the budget process are linear in form.

The attitudes and calculations of participants in budgeting seem stable over time. The prominence of the agency's "base" is a sign of stability. The roles of the major participants are powerful, persistent, and strongly grounded in the expectations of others as well as in the internal requirements of the positions. Stabiltiy is also suggested by the specialization that occurs among the participants, the long service of committee members, the adoption of incremental practices such as comparisons with the previous year, the fragmentation of appropriations by program and item, the treatments of appropriations as continuously variable sums of money rather than as perpetual reconsiderations of the worth of programs, and the practice of allowing past decisions to stand while coordinating decision-making only if difficulties arise. Since the budgetary process appears to be stable over periods of time, it is reasonable to estimate the relationships in budgeting on the basis of time series data.

Special events that upset the apparent stability of the budgetary process can and do occur. Occasionally, world events take an unexpected turn, a new President occupies the White House, some agencies act with exceptional zeal, others suffer drastic losses of confidence on the part of the appropriations subcommittees, and so on. It seems plausible to represent such transient events as random shocks to an otherwise deterministic system. Therefore, our model is stochastic rather than deterministic.

The Politics of the Budgetary Process contains a description of strategies which various participants in budgeting use to further their aims. Some of these strategies are quite complicated. However, a large part of the process can be explained by some of the simpler strategies which are based on the relationship between agency requests for funds (through the Budget Bureau) and Congressional appropriations. Because these figures are made public and are known to all participants, because they are directly perceived and communicated without fear of information loss or bias, and because the participants react to these figures, they are ideal for feedback purposes. It is true that there are other indicators—special events, crises, technological developments, actions of clientele groups—which are attended to by participants in the budgetary process. But if these indicators have impact, they must quickly be reflected in the formal feedback mechanisms—the actions of departments, the Bureau of the Budget, and Congress—to which they are directed. Some of these indicators (see section IV) are represented by the stochastic disturbances. Furthermore, the formal indicators are more precise, more simple, more available, more easily interpreted than the others. They are, therefore, likely to be used by participants in the budgetary process year in and year out. Present decisions are based largely on past experience, and this lore is encapsulated in the amounts which the agencies receive as they go through the steps in the budgetary cycle.

For all the reasons discussed in this section, our models of the budgetary process are linear, stable over periods of time, stochastic, and strategic in character. They are "as if" models: an excellent fit for a given model means only that the actual behavior of the participants has an effect equivalent to the equations of the model. The models, taken as a whole, represent a set of decision rules for Congress and the agencies.

II. THE MODELS

In our models we aggregate elements of the decision-making structure. The Budget Bureau submissions for the agency are used instead of separate figures for the two kinds of organizations. Similarly, at this stage in our analysis, we use final Congressional appropriations instead of separating out committee action, floor action, conference committee recommendations, and so on. We wish to emphasize that although there may be some aggregation bias in the estimation of the postulated structure of decision, this does not affect the linearity of the aggregate relationships. If the decisions of an agency and the Bureau of the Budget with regard to that agency depend linearly upon the same variable (as we hypothesize), then the aggregated decision rule of the two, treated as a single entity, will depend linearly upon that variable. By a similar argument, the various Congressional participants can be grouped together so that Congress can be regarded as a single decision-making entity. While the aggregating procedure may result in grouping positive and negative influences together, this manifestly does not affect the legitimacy of the procedure; linearity is maintained.[3]

Our models concern only the requests presented in the President's budget for an individual agency and the behavior of Congress as a whole with regard to the agency's appropriation. The models do not attempt to estimate the complete decision-making structure for each agency from bureau requests to departments to submission through the Budget Bureau to possible final action in the Senate and House. There are several reasons for remaining content with the aggregated figures we use. First, the number of possible decision rules which must be considered grows rapidly as each new participant is added. We would soon be overwhelmed by the sheer number of rules invoked. Second, there are genuine restrictions placed on the number of structural parameters we can estimate because (a) some data, such as bureau requests to departments, are unavailable, and (b) only short time series are meaningful for most agencies. It would make no sense, for example, to go back in time beyond the end of World War II when most domestic activity was disrupted.[4]

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[3] See H. Thiel, *Linear Aggregation of Economic Relations* (Amsterdam, 1954).

[4] Our subsequent discussion of "shift" or "break" points should also make clear that it is

Since the agencies use various strategies and Congress may respond to them in various ways, we propose several alternative systems of equations. These equations represent alternative decision rules which may be followed by Congressional and agency-Budget Bureau participants in the budgetary process. One important piece of data for agency-Budget Bureau personnel who are formulating appropriations requests is the most recent Congressional appropriation. Thus, we make considerable use of the concept "base," operationally defined as the previous Congressional appropriation for an agency, in formulating our decision rules. Since the immediate past exercises such a heavy influence on budgetary outcomes, Markov (simultaneous; difference) equations are particularly useful. In these Markov processes, the value of certain variables at one point in time is dependent on their value at one or more immediately previous periods as well as on the particular circumstances of the time.

We postulate several decision rules for both the agency-Budget Bureau requests and for Congressional action on these requests. For each series of requests or appropriations, we select from the postulated decision rules that rule which most closely represents the behavior of the aggregated entities. We use the variables

y_t the appropriation passed by Congress for any given agency in the year t. Supplemental appropriations are not included in the y_t.

x_t the appropriation requested by the Bureau of the Budget for any given agency for the year t. The x_t constitutes the President's budget request for an agency.

We will also introduce certain symbols representing random disturbances of each of the postulated relationships. These symbols are explained as they are introduced.

A. Equations for Agency-Budget Bureau Decision Rules. The possibility that different agencies use different strategies makes it necessary to construct alternative equations representing these various strategies. Then, for each agency in our sample, we use time series data to select that equation which seems to describe best the budgetary decisions of that agency. In this section we present three simple models of agency requests. The first states agency requests as a function of the previous year's appropriation. The second states requests as a function of the previous appropriation as well as a function of the differences between the agency request and appropriation in the previous year. The third states requests as a function of the previous year's request. In all three linear models provision is made for a random variable to take into account the special circumstances of the time.

An agency, while convinced of the worth of its programs, tends to be aware that extraordinarily large or small requests are likely to be viewed with suspicion by Congress; an agency does not consider it desirable to make extraordinary requests, which might precipitate unfavorable Congressional reaction. Therefore, the agency usually requests a precentage (generally greater than one hundred percent) of its previous year's appropriation. This percentage is not fixed: in the event of favorable circumstances, the request is a larger percentage of the previous year's appropriation than would otherwise be the case; similarly, the percentage might be reduced in the event of unfavorable circumstances.

Decisions made in the manner described above may be represented by a simple equation. If we take the average of the percentages that are implicitly or explicitly used by budget officers, then any request can be represented by the sum of this average percentage of the previous year's appropriation plus the increment or decrement due to the favorable or unfavorable circumstances. Thus

$$x_t = \beta_0 y_{t-1} + \xi_t \qquad (1)$$

> The agency request (through the Budget Bureau) for a certain year is a fixed mean percentage of the Congressional appropriation for that agency in the previous year plus a random variable (normally distributed with mean zero and unknown but finite variance) for that year.

is an equation representing this type of behavior. The average or mean percentage is represented by β_0. The increment or decrement due to circumstances is represented by ξ_t, a variable which requires some special explanation. It is difficult to predict what circumstances will occur at what time to put an agency in a favorable or unfavorable position. Numerous events could influence Congress's (and the public's) perception of an agency and its programs—the occurrence of a destructive hurricane in the case of the Weather Bureau, the death by cancer of a friend of an influential congressman, in the case of the National Institutes of Health, the hiring (or losing) of an especially effective lobbyist by some interest group, the President's becoming especially interested in a program of some agency as Kennedy was in mental health, and so on. (Of course, some of them may be more or less "predictable" at certain times to an experienced observer, but this fact causes no

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not realistic to expect meaningful time series of great length to be accumulated for most agencies in the United States government.

difficulty here.) Following common statistical practice we may represent the sum of the effects of all such events by a random variable that is an increment or decrement to the usual percentage of the previous year's appropriation. In equation (1), then, ξ_t represents the value which this random variable assumes in year *t*.

We have chosen to view the special events of each year for each agency as random phenomena that are capable of being described by a probability density or distribution. We assume here that the random variable is normally distributed with mean zero and an unknown but finite variance. Given this specification of the random variable, the agency makes its budgeting decisions as if it were operating by the postulated decision rule given by equation (1).

An agency, although operating somewhat like the organizations described by equation (1), may wish to take into account an additional strategic consideration: while this agency makes a request which is roughly a fixed percentage of the previous year's appropriation, it also desires to smooth out its stream of appropriations by taking into account the difference between its request and appropriation for the previous year. If there were an unusually large cut in the previous year's request, the agency submits a "padded" estimate to make up for the loss in expected funds; an unusual increase is followed by a reduced estimate to avoid unspent appropriations. This behavior may be represented by equation or decision rule where

$$x_t = \beta_1 y_{t-1} + \beta_2(y_{t-1} - x_{t-1}) + \chi_t \tag{2}$$

> The agency request (through the Budget Bureau) for a certain year is a fixed mean percentage of the Congressional appropriation for that agency in the previous year plus a fixed mean percentage of the difference between the Congressional appropriation and the agency request for the previous year plus a stochastic disturbance.

χ_t is a stochastic disturbance, which plays the role described for the random variable in equation (1), the β's are variables reflecting the aspects of the previous year's request and appropriation that an agency takes into account: β_1 represents the mean percentage of the previous year's request which is taken into account, and β_2 represents the mean percentage of the difference between the previous year's appropriation and request $(y_{t-1} - x_{t-1})$ which is taken into account. Note that $\beta_2 < 0$ is anticipated so that a large cut will (in the absence of the events represented by the stochastic disturbance) be followed by a padded estimate and vice-versa.[5]

Finally, an agency (or the President through the Bureau of the Budget), convinced of the worth of its programs, may decide to make requests without regard to previous Congressional action. This strategy appeals especially when Congress has so much confidence in the agency that it tends to give an appropriation which is almost identical to the request. Aside from special circumstances represented by stochastic disturbances, the agency's request in any given year tends to be approximately a fixed percentage of its request for the previous year. This behavior may be represented by

$$x_t = \beta_3 x_{t-1} + \rho_t \tag{3}$$

> The agency request (through the Budget Bureau) for a certain year is a fixed mean percentage of the agency's request for the previous year plus a random variable (stochastic disturbance).

where ρ_t is a stochastic disturbance and β_3 is the average percentage. Note that if the agency believes its programs to be worthy, $\beta_3 > 1$ is expected.[6]

These three equations are not the only ones which may be capable of representing the actual behavior of the combined budgeting decisions of the agencies and the Bureau of the Budget. However, they represent the agency-

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[5] Since some readers may not be familiar with the notation we are using, a brief explanation may be in order. As a coefficient of the equation, β_2 is an unknown number that must be estimated from the data, and this coefficient multiplies another number $(y_{t-1} - x_{t-1})$ that may be computed by subtracting last year's request from last year's appropriation. We want the equation to say that the agency will try to counteract large changes in their appropriations by changing their normal requests in the next year. If the agency asks for much more than it thinks it will get and its request is cut, for example, the expression $(y_{t-1} - x_{t-1})$ will be a negative number written in symbolic form as $(y_{t-1} - x_{t-1}) < 0$. A rule of multiplication says that a negative number multiplied by another negative number gives a positive number. If an agency pads its request, however, it presumably follows a cut with a new request which incorporates an additional amount to make allowance for future cuts. In order to represent this behavior, that is to come out with a positive result incorporating the concept of padding, the unknown coefficient β_2 must be negative $(\beta_2 < 0)$.

[6] The agency that favors its own programs should increase its requests over time. In the absence of the stochastic disturbance (when the random variable is 0), the request in a given year should be larger than the request in the previous year so that $x_t > x_{t-1}$. Therefore, the unknown coefficient β_3 must be larger than one $(\beta_3 > 1)$ since it multiplies last year's request.

Budget Bureau budgeting behavior better than all other decision rules we tried.[7]

B. Equations for Congressional Decision Rules. In considering Congressional behavior, we again postulate three decision equations from which a selection must be made that best represents the behavior of Congress in regard to an agency's appropriations. Since Congress may use various strategies in determining appropriations for different agencies, different Congressional decision equations may be selected as best representing Congressional appropriations for each agency in our sample. Our first model states Congressional appropriations as a function of the agency's request (through the Budget Bureau) to Congress. The second states appropriations as a function of the agency's request as well as a function of the deviation from the usual relationship between Congress and the agency in the previous year. The third model states appropriations as a function of that segment of the agency's request that is not part of its appropriation or request for the previous year. Random variables are included to take account of special circumstances.

If Congress believes that an agency's request, after passing through the hands of the Budget Bureau, is a relatively stable index of the funds needed by the agency to carry out its programs, Congress responds by appropriating a relatively fixed percentage of the agency's request. The term "relatively fixed" is used because Congress is likely to alter this percentage somewhat from year to year because of special events and circumstances relevant to particular years. As in the case of agency requests, these special circumstances may be viewed as random phenomena. One can view this behavior as if it were the result of Congress' appropriating a fixed mean percentage of the agency requests; adding to the amount so derived a sum represented by a random variable. One may represent this behavior as if Congress were following the decision rule

$$y_t = a_0 x_t + \eta_t \tag{4}$$

The Congressional appropriation for an agency in a certain year is a fixed mean percentage of the agency's request in that year plus a stochastic disturbance.

where a_0 represents the fixed average percentage and n_t represents the stochastic disturbance.

Although Congress usually grants an agency a fixed percentage of its request, this request sometimes represents an extension of the agency's programs above (or below) the size desired by Congress. This can occur when the agency and the Bureau of the Budget follow Presidential aims differing from those of Congress, or when Congress suspects that the agency is padding the current year's request. In such a situation Congress usually appropriates a sum different from the usual percentage. If a_1 represents the mean of the usual percentages, this behavior can be represented by equation or decision rule

$$y_t = a_1 x_t + v_t \tag{5}$$

where v_t is a stochastic disturbance representing that part of the appropriations attributable to the special circumstances that cause Congress to deviate from a relatively fixed percentage. Therefore, when agency aims and Congressional desires markedly differ from usual (so that Congress may be said to depart from its usual rule) the stochastic disturbance takes on an unusually large positive or negative

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[7] Other gaming strategies are easily proposed. Suppose, for example, that a given agency believes that it knows the decision rule that Congress uses in dealing with it, and that this decision rule can be represented by one of (4), (7), or (8), above. Presume, for reasons analogous to those outlined for (8), that this agency desires to take into account that positive or negative portion of the previous year's appropriation y_{t-1} that was not based on the previous year's request x_{t-1}. This consideration suggests

$$x_t = \beta_4 y_{t-1} + \beta_5 \Delta_{t-1} + \delta_t$$

as an agency decision rule where Δ_{t-1} is a dummy variable representing in year $t-1$ the term not involving x_{t-1} in one of (4), (7) or (8) above. If one believes that agency and Bureau of the Budget personnel are sufficiently well acquainted with the senators and congressmen to be able to predict the value of the current stochastic disturbance, then it becomes reasonable to examine a decision rule of the form

$$x_t = \beta_6 y_{t-1} + \beta_7 \Delta_t + \sigma_t$$

where Δ_t is defined as above. No evidence of either form of behavior was found, however, among the agencies that were investigated. We also estimated the parameters of the third order autoregressive scheme for the requests of an individual agency

$$x_t = \beta_8 x_{t-1} + \beta_9 x_{t-2} + \beta_{10} x_{t-3} + \tau_t$$

in an attempt to discover if naive models would fit as well as those above. In no case did this occur and generally the fits for this model were very poor. A similar scheme was estimated for the appropriations y_t of an individual agency with similar results with respect to qeuations (4), (7) and (8) above. Since the "d" statistic suggests that no higher order Markov process would be successful, no other rules for agency behavior were tried.

value. In order to distingush this case from the previous one, more must be specified about the stochastic disturbance v_t. In a year following one in which agency aims and Congressional desires markedly differed, the agency makes a request closer to Congressional desires, and/or Congress shifts its desires closer to those of the agency (or the President). In the year after a deviation, then, assume that Congress will tend to make allowances to normalize the situation. Such behavior can be represented by having the stochastic disturbance v_t generated in accordance with a first order Markov scheme. The stochastic component in v_t is itself determined by a relation

(6) $$v_t = a_2 v_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$$

where ϵ_t is a random variable. The symbol v_t therefore stands for the stochastic disturbance in the previous year (v_{t-1}) as well as the new stochastic disturbance for the year involved (ϵ_t). Substituting (6) into (5) gives

(7) $$y_t = a_1 x_t + a_2 v_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$$

> The Congressional appropriation for an agency is a fixed mean percentage of the agency's request for that year plus a stochastic disturbance representing a deviation from the usual relationship between Congress and the agency in the previous year plus a random variable for the current year.

as a complete description of a second Congressional decision rule. If Congress never makes complete allowance for an initial "deviation," then $-1 < a_2 < 1$ is to be expected.

To complete the description of this second Congressional decision rule, we will suppose $0 < a_2 < 1$. Then, granted a deviation from its usual percentage, Congress tends to decrease subsequent deviations by moving steadily back toward its usual percentage (except for the unforeseeable events or special circumstances whose effects are represented by the random variable ϵ_t). For example, if in a particular year $v_{t-1} > 0$, and if in the following year there are no special circumstances so that $\xi_t = 0$, then $v_t = a_2 v_{t-1} < v_{t-1}$. The deviation in year t is smaller than the deviation in year $t-1$. However, if $-1 < a_2 < 0$, after an initial deviation, Congress tends to move back to its usual rule (apart from the disturbances represented by the random variable ϵ_t) by making successively smaller deviations which differ in sign. For example, if $v_{t-1} > 0$, then apart from the disturbance ϵ_t it is clear that $v_t = a_2 v_{t-1} < 0$, since $a_2 < 0$. Finally, if $a_2 = 0$, decision rule (7) is the same as the previous rule (4).

The specialization inherent in the appropriations process allows some members of Congress to have an intimate knowledge of the budgetary processes of the agencies and the Budget Bureau. Thus, Congress might consider that part of the agency's request (x_t) which is not based on the previous year's appropriation or request. This occurs when Congress believes that this positive or negative remainder represents padding or when it desires to smooth out the agency's rate of growth. If Congress knows the decision rule that an agency uses to formulate its budgetary request, we can let λ_t represent a dummy variable defined as $\lambda_t = \xi_t$ if the agency uses decision rule (1); $\lambda_t = \beta_2(y_{t-1} - x_{t-1}) + \chi_t$ if the agency uses decision rule (2); and, $\lambda_t = \rho_t$ if the agency uses decision rule (3). Suppose that Congress appropriates, on the average, an amount which is a relatively fixed percentage of the agency's request plus a percentage of this (positive or negative) remainder λ_t. This behavior can be represented by the "as if" decision rule

(8) $$y_t = a_3 x_t + a_4 \lambda_t + \nu_t$$

> The Congressional appropriation for an agency is a fixed mean percentage of the agency's request for a certain year plus a fixed mean percentage of a dummy variable which represents that part of the agency's request for the year at issue which is not part of the appropriation or request of the previous year plus a random variable representing the part of the appropriation attributable to the special circumstances of the year.

where ν_t is a stochastic disturbance whose value in any particular year represents the part of the appropriation attributable to the agency's special circumstances of the year. One might expect that Congress takes only "partial" account of the remainder represented by λ_t, so $0 < a_4 < 1$.

III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Times series data for the period 1947–1963 were studied for fifty-six non-defense agencies of the United States Government. The requests (x_t) of these agencies were taken to be the amounts presented to Congress in the President's budget. For eight sub-agencies from the National Institutes of Health, data for a shorter period of time were considered, and the requests (x_t) of these eight sub-agencies were taken to be their proposals to the Bureau of the Budget.[8] In all instances the Congressional decision variable (y_t) was taken to be the final appropriation before any supplemental additions. The total appropriations (without supplements) of the agencies studied amounted to approximately twenty-seven percent of the non-defense budget in 1963. Over one-half of all non-defense agencies were investigated; the major omissions being the Post Office and many independent agencies. A minimum of three agencies was examined from each of the Treasury, Justice, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and Health, Education and Welfare Departments.[9]

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[8] Agency proposals to the Bureau of the Budget are not reported to the public and could be obtained only for these eight sub-agencies.

If the agency-Budget Bureau disturbance is independent of Congressional disturbance,[10] the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate most of the possible combinations of the proposed decision equations is justified. OLS is identical to the simultaneous full information maximum likelihood (FIML) technique for most of the present systems. This is not so, however, for some systems of equations because of the presence of an auto-correlated disturbance in one equation of the two and the consequent non-linearity of the estimating equations. In equation (6) the stochastic disturbance for year t is a function of the value of the disturbance in the previous year. In a system of equations in which auto-correlation occurs in the first equation, an appropriate procedure is to use OLS to estimate the alternative proposals for the other equation, decide by the selection criteria which best specifies the data, use the knowledge of this structure to estimate the first equation, and then decide, through use of appropriate criteria, which version of the first equation best specifies the data.

The principal selection criterion we used is that of maximum (adjusted) correlation coefficient (R). For a given dependent variable this criterion leads one to select from alternative specifications of the explanatory variables, that specification which leads to the highest sample correlation coefficient. The estimations of the alternative specifications must, of course, be made from the same data.[11] The second criterion involves the use of the d-statistic test for serial correlation of the estimated residuals of a single equation.[12] This statistic tests the null hypothesis of residual independence against the alternative of serial correlation. We used the significance points for the d-statistic of Theil and Nagar.[13] When the d-statistic was found to be significant in fitting the Congressional decision equation (4) to an agency's data, it was always found that equation (7) best specified Congressional behavior with respect to the appropriations of that agency in the sense of yielding the maximum correlation coefficient. A third criterion is based on a test of the significance of the sample correlation between the residuals of (4) and the estimated λ_t of the equation selected previously for a given agency. David's significance points for this statistic were used to make a two-tailed test at the five percent level of the null hypothesis that the residuals are uncorrelated.[14] When significant

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[9] Three interrelated difficulties arise in the analysis of the time series data x_t, y_t for an agency. The first problem is the choice of a technique for estimating the parameters of the alternate schemes in some optimal fashion. Given these estimates and their associated statistics, the second problem is the choice of criteria for selecting the model best specifying the system underlying the data. Finally, one is faced with the problem of examining the variability of the underlying parameters of the best specification. We believe that our solution to these problems, while far from optimal, is satisfactory given the present state of econometric knowledge. See our presentation in "On the Process of Budgeting: An Empirical Study of Congressional Appropriations," by Otto Davis, M. A. H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky, to appear in Gordon Tullock (ed.), *Papers on Non-Market Decision Making*, Thomas Jefferson Center, University of Virginia. See especially section 4 and the appendix by Dempster, which contains discussions and derivations of estimation procedures, selection criteria and test statistics for the processes in Section II of this paper.

[10] We make the assumption that these two disturbances are independent throughout the paper. Notice, however, that dependence between the disturbances explicitly enters decision equation (8) of section II and those of footnote 7. For these equations, the assumption refers to the disturbance of the current year. That is, we allow the possibility that special circumstances may affect a single participant (Bureau of the Budget or Congress) as well as both. When the latter case occurred, our selection criteria resulted in the choice of equation (8) as best specifying Congressional behavior.

[11] We are estimating the unknown values of the coefficients (or parameters) of regression equations for each agency. All of our estimators are biased. We use biased estimators for the simple reason that no unbiased estimators are known. The property of consistency is at least a small comfort. All of our estimators are consistent. It might be noted that all unbiased estimators are consistent, but not all consistent estimators are unbiased.

[12] This statistic is known as the Durbin-Watson ratio. A description of the test may be found in J. Johnston, *Econometric Methods* (New York, 1963), p. 92.

[13] H. Theil and A. L. Nagar, "Testing the Independence of Regressional Disturbances," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 56 (1961), 793–806. These significance points were used to construct further significance points when necessary. See Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky, *op. cit.*

[14] The test is described in T. W. Anderson, *An Introduction to Multivariate Analysis* (New York,

TABLE 1. BEST SPECIFICATIONS FOR EACH AGENCY ARE HIGH

	Frequencies of Correlation Coefficients										
	1 – .995	.995 – .99	.99 – .98	.98 – .97	.97 – .96	.96 – .95	.95 – .94	.94 – .93	.93 – .90	.90 – .85	.85 – 0
Congressional	21	8	15	4	5	2	2	1	5	2	2
Agency-Bureau	9	2	2	8	5	2	4	3	5	11	10

correlation occurred, it was always found that Congressional decision equation (8), in which a function of the deviation from the usual relationship between request and the previous year's appropriation enters explicitly, best specified appropriation behavior with respect to the agency in question.

The statistical procedures were programmed for the Carnegie Institute of Technology's Control Data G-21 electronic computer in the 20-Gate algebraic compiling language. The selection among alternate specifications according to the criteria established was not done automatically; otherwise all computations were performed by machine. Since the results for each agency are described in detail elsewhere,[15] and a full rendition would double the length of the paper, we must restrict ourselves to summary statements.

The empirical results support the hypothesis that, up to a random error of reasonable magnitude, the budgetary process of the United States government is equivalent to a set of temporally stable linear decision rules. Estimated correlation coefficients for the best specifications of each agency are generally high. Although the calculated values of the multiple correlation coefficients (R's) tend to run higher in time series than in cross-sectional analysis, the results are good. We leave little of the variance statistically unexplained. Moreover the estimated standard deviations of the coefficients are usually, much smaller than one-half of the size of the estimated coefficients, a related indication of good results. Table 1 presents the frequencies of the correlation coefficients.

The fits between the decision rules and the time series data for the Congressional decision equations are, in general, better than those for the agency-Bureau of the Budget equations. Of the 64 agencies and sub-agencies studied, there are only 14 instances in which the correlation coefficient for the agency (or sub-agency) equation was higher than the one for the corresponding Congressional equation. We speculate that the estimated variances of the disturbances of the agency-Budget Bureau decision rules are usually larger because the agencies are closer than Congress to the actual sources that seek to add new programs or expand old ones.

Table 2 presents a summary of the combinations of the Agency-Bureau of the Budget and Congressional decision equations. For those agencies studied, the most popular combinations of behavior are the simple ones represented by equations (4) and (1) respectively. When Congress uses a sophisticated "gaming" strategy such as (7) or (8), the corresponding agency-Bureau of the Budget decision equation is the relatively simple (1). And, when Congress grants exactly or almost exactly the amount requested by an agency, the agency tends to use decision equation (3).

Our discussion thus far has assumed fixed values for the coefficients (parameters) of the equations we are using to explain the behavior underlying the budgetary process. In the light of the many important events occurring in the period from 1946 to 1963, however, it seems reasonable to suppose that the appropriations structure of many government agencies was altered. If this is correct, the coefficients of the equations—literally, in this context, the values represented by the on-the-average percentages requested by the agencies and granted by Congress—should change from one period of time to the next. The equations would then be temporally stable for a period, but not forever.

TABLE 2. BUDGETARY BEHAVIOR IS SIMPLE

Summary of Decision Equations				
Agency-Budget Bureau		1	2	3
	4	44*	1	8
Congress	7	1	0	0
	8	12	0	0

* including eight sub-agencies from the National Institutes of Health

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1958) pp. 69–71. See Dempster's appendix to Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, *op. cit.*, for some justification of the use of the test.

[15] See Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, *op. cit.*

The year when the coefficient of an equation changes from one value to another is termed the "shift point". The time series we are using are so short that it is possible to find only one meaningful shift point in each of the two equations that describe the budget request and appropriation best fitting an agency. We, therefore, broke each time series into two parts and used Chow's F-statistic[16] to determine temporal stability by testing the null hypothesis that the underlying coefficients did not shift (against all alternatives) for the individual equations. We used four categories for the coefficients of a decision equation defined as follows:

Temporally very stable: The F-statistic is small and the coefficients estimated from the first and last parts of the series are virtually the same.

Temporally stable: The F-statistic is small, but the coefficients estimated from the first and last parts of the series appear to be different.

Not temporally stable: The F-statistic is large but not significant at the ten percent level and the coefficients estimated from the first and last parts of series appear to be different.

Temporally unstable: The F-statistic is significant at the ten percent level.

Of the Congressional decision equations, six were temporally very stable, 12 were temporally stable, 12 were not temporally stable, and 28 were temporally unstable. Of the agency-Bureau of the Budget decision equations, four were temporally very stable, 18 were temporally stable, 18 were not temporally stable, and 18 were temporally unstable.[17] Since a substantial majority of cases fall into the not temporally stable and temporally unstable categories, it is evident that while the process is temporally stable for short periods, it may not be stable for the whole period.

TABLE 3. CONGRESSIONAL BEHAVIOR TENDS TO BECOME MORE SOPHISTICATED

First Period Decision Equations

	1	2	3
4	45	0	10
7	1	0	0
8	2	0	0

Second Period Decision Equations

	1	2	3
4	35	1	9
7	1	0	0
8	12	0	0

Table 3 presents a summary of the combinations of the agency-Bureau of the Budget and Congressional decision equations when each series is broken into two parts. These specifications are referred to as "first period" and "second period" for all agencies even though the years at which the time series were broken vary. While the most frequent combinations of behavior are the simple ones represented by equations (4) and (1) respectively, there is a marked tendency for Congressional behavior to become more sophisticated: the incidence of the gaming behavior represented by equation (8) increases over time.[18]

The budgetary process seems to become more linear over time in the sense that the importance of the "special circumstances" appears to diminish. Table 4 presents frequencies of the correlation coefficients for the first and second periods. Although there is a different number of correlation coefficients in each period (111 in the first period and 114 in the second)[19] Table 4 shows clearly that fits are better for the second period, which is sufficient evidence of increasing linear tendencies. To us it seems reasonable to expect an increasing use of simplifying rules of thumb as the budget grows in size and the pressure of time on key decision makers increases. Yet this is

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[16] G. C. Chow, "Tests of Equality between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions," *Econometrica*, 28 (1960), 591–605, and the appendix to Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, *op. cit.*

[17] In a few instances an inspection of the residuals indicated that a shift point occurred so early or so late in the series that it was not possible to compute a meaningful stationarity F-Statistic. In these few cases the deviant observations were dropped and the usual analysis performed on the shortened time series. Thus we "forced" a break in every case in order to perform subsequent operations.

[18] The apparent discrepancy between the latter part of Table 3 and Table 1 is caused by the fact that for two agencies, the Bureau of the Census and the Office of Education, although the Agency-Bureau of the Budget decision equations are temporally stable and best specified as (1), when a shift point is forced, the criteria indicate (3) for the latter period.

[19] Some of the shift points appeared to occur so early in the series that it was not possible to calculate a correlation coefficient.

TABLE 4. THE BUDGETARY PROCESS IS BECOMING MORE LINEAR

	Frequencies of Correlation Coefficients										
	1 - .995	.995 - .99	.99 - .98	.98 - .97	.97 - .96	.96 - .94	.94 - .92	.92 - .90	.90 - .80	.80 - .60	.60 - 0
First Period	9	5	8	5	3	6	8	4	18	24	21
Second Period	27	5	13	8	8	15	7	5	12	8	6

TABLE 5. LIKELY SHIFT POINTS ARE CONCENTRATED IN THE FIRST YEARS OF THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

	Frequencies of Shift Points															
Year	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	T
Congressional	0	2	3	1	0	1	17	16	1	1	3	0	0	1	0	46 (40)
Agency-Bureau	0	2	4	0	2	3	15	13	3	0	2	1	0	2	1	37 (36)

only one of a number of possible explanations. For example, the data are not deflated for changes in the price level during the early years. Since there were larger increases in the price level during the early years, this might help explain why the fits are better during the second period.

When only one shift point is presumed, most shifts are discovered during the first two budgets of the Eisenhower Administration (1954–1955). Table 5 presents, for both Congressional and Agency-Budget Bureau decision equations, frequencies of the shift points for (a) those equations whose coefficients are in the not temporally stable or temporally un-stable categories and (b) those agencies for which the decision rules of the participants appeared to change. While it is certainly possible that shift points do not occur as dramatically and as sharply as shown here, and that it may take several years for actual behavior to change noticeably, Table 5 nevertheless makes it clear that likely shifts are concentrated in the first period of the Eisenhower administration.

We said, in Section II, that we expected β_0, β_1, and β_3, to be greater than one, and β_2 to be negative. In 56 instances this expectation is satisfied, but eight exceptions were noted. In the two cases where the estimated $\beta_3 < 1$, explanations are immediately available. First, the fit for the Bureau of Employment Security is not good. Second, the Office of Territories evidences most un-Parkinsonian behavior: its activities decline with a decrease in the number of territories. In the six other exceptions, the estimated coefficient is $\beta_0 < 1$. For three of these, Congress tends to appropriate an amount greater than the request, and two of the three represent an interesting phenomenon. When those parts of requests and appropriations directly related to loans are omitted from the data for both the Rural Electrification Administration and the Federal Housing Administration, the estimated coefficients are of the magnitudes expected with $\beta_0 > 1$ and $a_0 < 1$. However, when the data relating to loans are included, then $\beta_0 < 1$ and $a_0 > 1$. Apparently, Congress favors the loan programs more than do the agencies or the Budget Bureau.

As a rule, the d-statistics resulting from fitting the best specifications were not significant. It would thus appear that all major underlying trended variables (with the possible exception of variables with the same trend) have been accounted for by these specifications. When an exception to this rule did exist, the authors made a careful examination of the residuals in an effort to determine the reason for such a situation. It appeared that in most of these instances the cause was either (a) that the coefficients shifted slowly over several years and not abruptly at one point in time, or (b) that restricting the search to only one shift point left undetected an additional shift either very early or very late in the series.

In an attempt to unmask the trended variable most likely (in our opinion) to have been ignored, and to cast some light upon the notion of "fair share," final appropriations y_t for each agency were regressed on total non-defense appropriations z_t. This time series was taken from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States*. The results were poor. Indeed, the sample correlations between y_t and z_t are usually worse than those between y_t and x_t.

Moreover, the d-statistics are usually highly significant and the residual patterns for the regression show the agency's proportion of the non-defense budget to be either increasing or decreasing over time. However, it should be noted that even those exceptional cases where the agency trend is close to that of the total non-defense appropriation do not invalidate the explicit decision structure fitted here. A similar study, with similar results, was conducted at the departmental level by regressing y_t for the eight National Institutes of Health on y_t for the Public Health Service, the agency of which they are a part. Finally, the y_t for selected pairs of agencies with "similar" interests were regressed on each other with uniformly poor results.

Although empirical evidence indicates that our models describe the budgetary process of the United States government, we are well aware of certain deficiencies in our work. One deficiency, omission of certain agencies from the study, is not serious because over one-half of all non-defense agencies were investigated. Nevertheless, the omission of certain agencies may have left undiscovered examples of additional decision rules. We will shortly study all agencies whose organizational structure can be traced. We will also include supplemental appropriations.

A more serious deficiency may lie in the fact that the sample sizes, of necessity, are small. The selection criterion of maximum sample correlation, therefore, lacks proper justification, and is only acceptable because of the lack of a better criterion. Further, full-information maximum likelihood estimators, and especially biased ones, even when they are known to be consistent, are not fully satisfactory in such a situation, although they may be the best available. However, the remedy for these deficiencies must await the results of future theoretical research on explosive or evolutionary processes.

IV. THE DEVIANT CASES AND PREDICTION: INTERPRETATION OF THE STOCHASTIC DISTURBANCES

The intent of this section is to clarify further the interpretation of the stochastic disturbances as special or unusual circumstances represented by random variables. While those influences present at a constant level during the period serve only to affect the magnitude of the coefficients, the special circumstances have an important, if subsidiary, place in these models. We have indicated that although outside observers can view the effects of special circumstances as a random variable, anyone familiar with all the facts available to the decision-makers at the time would be able to explain the special circumstances. It seems reasonable therefore to examine instances where, in estimating the coefficients, we find that the estimated values of the stochastic disturbances assume a large positive or negative value. Such instances appear as deviant cases in the sense that Congress or the agency-Budget Bureau actors affected by special circumstances (large positive or negative values of the random variable) do not appear to be closely following their usual decision rule at that time but base their decisions mostly on these circumstances. The use of case studies for the analyses of deviant phenomena, of course, presupposes our ability to explain most budgeting decisions by our original formulations. Deviant cases, then, are those instances in which particular decisions do not follow our equations. It is possible to determine these deviant instances simply by examining the residuals of the fitted equations: one observes a plot of the residuals, selects those which appear as extreme positive or negative values, determines the year to which these extreme residuals refer, and then examines evidence in the form of testimony at the Appropriations Committees, newspaper accounts and other sources. In this way it is possible to determine at least some of the circumstances of a budgetary decision and to investigate whether or not the use of the random variables is appropriate.[20]

Finally, it should be pointed out that in our model the occurrence of extreme disturbances represents deviant cases, or the temporary setting aside of their usual decision rules by the decision-makers in the process, while coefficient shifts represent a change (not necessarily in form) of these rules.

From the residuals of one-half of the estimated Congressional decision equations, a selection of 55 instances (approximately 14 percent of the 395 Congressional decisions under consideration) were identified as deviant.[21] Table 6 shows the yearly frequency of

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[20] The importance of analyzing deviant cases is suggested in: Milton M. Gordon, "Sociological Law and the Deviant Case," *Sociometry*, 10 (1947); Patricia Kendall and Katharine Wolf, "The Two Purposes of Deviant Case Analysis," in Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg (eds.), *The Language of Social Research*, (Glencoe, 1962), pp. 103–137; Paul Horst, *The Prediction of Personal Adjustment: A Survey of the Logical Problems and Research Techniques* (New York, 1941); and Seymour Lipset, Martin Trow, and James Coleman, *Union Democracy* (New York, 1960).

[21] We are indebted to Rose M. Kelly, a graduate student in the Department of Political Science,

TABLE 6. DEVIANT CASES CLUSTER IN YEARS OF POLITICAL CHANGE

Year	'48	'49	'50	'51	'52	'53	'54	'55	'56	'57	'58	'59	'60	'61	'62	'63
Number of Cases	8	2	1	1	1	4	6	4	1	1	2	3	4	2	8	7

the occurrence of deviant cases. It is apparent that deviancy grows in years of political change: in 1948 the Republican 80th Congress made a determined effort to reduce appropriations submitted by the Democratic President; the years 1953 through 1955 mark the beginning of Eisenhower's Presidency; the large number of deviant cases in 1962 and 1963 are related to the accession to office of Kennedy and Johnson. The latter category of deviant cases, we will explain later, may be mis-clasifications in the sense that the passage of time and the corresponding accumulation of additional evidence may reveal shift points, i.e., changes in the "average percentages" of the decision processes, rather than "exceptional circumstances." Nevertheless, this fact causes no particular problem in light of our purposes here, and the cases may be viewed as if they are appropriately classified.

Table 7 categorizes the cases according to estimates of why deviance occurred. It should be noted that the largest category, significant policy change, involves the lack of a budgetary base for the agency in question. In order to highlight the meaning we give to random phenomena, an illustration of each category follows. This analysis explains why, although the deviant cases are understandable to an experienced observer or participant, an outsider would have to regard them as essentially random disturbances to an otherwise deterministic system. Indeed, no two events in the categories of Table 7 are likely, *a priori,* either to be the same or to occur in any particular year.

TABLE 7. DEVIANT CASES MAY BE VIEWED AS RANDOM EVENTS

Categories of Deviance	Number of Cases
Significant policy change	20
Fiscal policy change	8
Felt need of Congressional supervision	6
Amended estimate due to a time factor	6
Single event	5
Large new legislative program	4
Reorganization of agency	1
Non-identifiable	5
TOTAL N=	55

Significant Policy Change

The Southwestern Power Administration is typical of agencies whose appropriations fluctuate unduly because basic policy is being negotiated. Deviance was evident in 1948, 1949, 1954, and 1955. The SPA continually requested funds for the building of transmission lines, and Congress repeatedly eliminated the request from their appropriations, insisting that private enterprise would supply the necessary facilities. In 1948 the Bureau of the Budget recommended $7,600,000 of which only $125,000 was appropriated, with stringent and explicit instructions that printing and mailing of materials calculated to increase clientele among rural and municipal electrical cooperatives cease.

The Korean War increased demands for electric power. Deviance occurred in 1955 not because of appropriations cuts but because of House floor amendments and Senate Appropriations Committee increases. Public policy then became stabilized as Congress established a budgetary base. The following years fit our equations.

Fiscal Policy Changes

The Foreign Agricultural Service's 1963 appropriation is deviant in appropriation figures, but, because $3,117,000 was provided by transferring funds from Sec. 32, the total budget for FAS is close to the Budget Bureau's initial request.

Felt Need of Congressional Supervision

The House Committee reports on Office of Territories for 1953 show a lack of confidence in the agency. The tenor can be judged by House Report 1622: "The Department was advised last year that the Committee did not intend to provide appropriations for an endless chain of capital investment in the Alaska Railroads. Army testimony was conflicting as to the need for a road and railways. There is need for a coordinated plan before the Committee can act intelligently with regard to the railroad."

University of California, Berkeley, who did the research on the deviant cases and provided the data for Tables 6 and 7.

Amended Estimate Due to Time Factor

Typical of this type of deviance is the Commodity Stabilization Service's appropriation for 1958. On the basis of figures from County Agricultural Agents, Secretary Ezra Taft Benson scaled down his request from $465 million to $298 million. A more accurate estimate was made possible because of added time.

Large New Legislative Program

This is especially apt to affect an agency if it is required to implement several new programs simultaneously. The Commissioner of Education said in reference to the student loan program, "We have no way of knowing because we never had such a program, and many of the institutions never had them." The NDEA Act alone had ten new entitlements.

Reorganization of an Agency

The only example is the Agricultural Marketing Service's appropriation for 1962. Funds were reduced because of a consolidation of diverse activities by the Secretary of Agriculture and not through reorganization as a result of Congressional demands.

Non-identifiable

This applies, for example, to the Public Health Service where a combination of lesser factors converge to make the agency extremely deviant for 1959, 1960, 1961, and 1962. Among the apparent causes of deviance are publicity factors, the roles of committee chairmen in both House and Senate, a high percentage of professionals in the agency, and the excellent press coverage of health research programs. No one factor appears primarily responsible for the deviance.

Our models are not predictive but explanatory. The alternate decision equations can be tried and the most appropriate one used when data on requests and appropriations are available. The appropriate equation explains the data in that, given a good fit, the process behaves "as if" the data were generated according to the equation. Thus, our explanatory models are backward looking: given a history of requests and appropriations, the data appears as if they were produced by the proposed and appropriately selected scheme.

The models are not predictive because the budget process is only temporally stable for short periods. We have found cases in which the coefficients of the equations change, i.e., cases in which there are alterations in the realized behavior of the processes. We have no *a priori* theory to predict the occurrence of these changes, but merely our *ad hoc* observation that most occurred during Eisenhower's first term. Predictions are necessarily based upon the estimated values of the coefficients and on the statistical properties of the stochastic disturbance (sometimes called the error term). Without a scientific method of predicting the shift points in our model, we cannot scientifically say that a request or an appropriation for some future year will fall within a prescribed range with a given level of confidence. We can predict only when the process remains stable in time. If the decision rules of the participants have changed, our predictions may be worthless: in our models, either the coefficients have shifted or, more seriously, the scheme has changed. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to determine whether or not the observation latest in time represents a shift point. A sudden change may be the result either of a change in the underlying process or a temporary setting aside of the usual decision rules in light of special circumstances. The data for several subsequent years are necessary to determine with any accuracy whether a change in decision rules indeed occurred.

It is possible, of course, to make conditional predictions by taking the estimated coefficients from the last shift point and assuming that no shift will occur. Limited predictions as to the next year's requests and appropriations could be made and might turn out to be reasonably accurate. However, scholarly efforts would be better directed toward knowledge of why, where and when changes in the process occur so that accurate predictions might be made.

The usual interpretation of stochastic (in lieu of deterministic) models may, of course, be made for the models of this paper, i.e., not all factors influencing the budgetary process have been included in the equations. Indeed, many factors often deemed most important such as pressure from interest groups, are ignored. Part of the reason for this lies in the nature of the models: they describe the decision process in skeleton form. Further, since the estimations are made, of necessity, on the basis of time series data, it is apparent that any influences that were present at a constant level during the period are not susceptible to discovery by these methods. However, these influences do affect the budgetary process by determining the size of the estimated coefficients. Thus, this paper, in making a comparative study of the estimated coefficients for the various agencies, suggests a new way of approaching constant influences.

No theory can take every possible unexpected circumstance into account, but our theory can be enlarged to include several classes of events. The concentration of shift points in the first years of the Eisenhower administration implies that an empirical theory should take account of changes in the political party controlling the White House and Congress.

We also intend to determine indices of clientele and confidence so that their effects, when stable over time, can be gauged.[22] Presidents sometimes attempt to gear their budgetary requests to fit their desired notion of the rate of expenditures appropriate for the economic level they wish the country to achieve. By checking the Budget Message, contemporary accounts, and memoirs, we hope to include a term (as a dummy variable) which would enable us to predict high and low appropriations rates depending on the President's intentions.

V. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FINDINGS

We wish to consider the significance of (a) the fact that it is possible to find equations which explain major facets of the federal budgetary process and (b) the particular equations fitted to the time series. We will take up each point in order.

A. It is possible to find equations for the budgetary process. There has been controversy for some time over whether it is possible to find laws, even of a probabilistic character, which explain important aspects of the political process. The greatest skepticism is reserved for laws which would explain how policy is made or account for the outcomes of the political process. Without engaging in further abstract speculation, it is apparent that the best kind of proof would be a demonstration of the existence of some such laws. This, we believe, we have done.

Everyone agrees that the federal budget is terribly complex. Yet, as we have shown, the budgetary process can be described by very simple decision rules. Work done by Simon, Newell, Reitman, Clarkson, Cyert and March, and others, on simulating the solution of complex problems, has demonstrated that in complicated situations human beings are likely to use heuristic rules or rules of thumb to enable them to find satisfactory solutions.[23] Braybrooke and Lindblom have provided convincing arguments on this score for the political process.[24] Wildavsky's interveiws with budget officers indicate that they, too, rely extensively on aids to calculation.[25] It is not surprising, therefore, as our work clearly shows, that a set of simple decision rules can explain or represent the behavior of participants in the federal budgetary process in their efforts to reach decisions in complex situations.

The most striking fact about the equations is their simplicity. This is perhaps partly because of the possibility that more complicated decision procedures are reserved for special circumstances represented by extreme values of the random variable. However, the fact that the decision rules generally fit the data very well is an indication that these simple equations have considerable explanatory power. Little of the variance is left unexplained.

What is the significance of the fact that the budgetary process follows rather simple laws for the general study of public policy? Perhaps the significance is limited; perhaps other policy processes are far more complex and cannot be reduced to simple laws. However, there is no reason to believe that this is the case. On the contrary, when one considers the central importance of budgeting in the political process—few activities can be carried on without funds—and the extraordinary problems of calculation which budgeting presents, a case might better be made for its comparative complexity than for its simplicity. At present it is undoubtedly easier to demonstrate that laws, whether simple or complex, do underlie the budgetary process than to account for other classes of policy outcomes, because budgeting provides units of analysis (appropriations requests and grants) that are readily amenable to formulating and testing propositions statistically. The dollar figures are uniform, precise, numerous, comparable with others, and, most important, represent an important class of policy outcomes. Outside of matters involving voting or attitudes, however, it is difficult to think of general statements about public policy that can be said to have been verified. The problem is not that political science lacks propositions which might be tested. Works of genuine distinction like Herring's *The Politics of Democracy*, Truman's *The Governmental Process*, Hyneman's *Bureaucracy in a Democracy*, Neustadt's *Presidential Power*, Buchanan and Tullock's *The Calculus of Consent*, contain implicit or explicit propositions which appear to be at least as interesting as (and potentially more interesting than) the ones tested in this paper. The real difficulty is that political scientists have been unable to develop a unit of analysis (there is little agreement on what constitutes a decision) that would permit them to test the many propositions they have at their command. By taking one step toward demonstrating what can be done when a useful unit of analysis has been developed, we hope to highlight the tremendous importance that the development of units of analysis would have for the study of public policy.

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[22] See Wildavsky, *op. cit,*. pp. 64–68, for a discussion of clientele and confidence. In his forthcoming book, *The Power of the Purse* (Boston, 1966), Richard Fenno provides further evidence of the usefulness of these categories.

[23] Geoffrey P. E. Clarkson, *Portfolio Selection: A Simulation of Trust Investment* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962); G. P. E. Clarkson and H. A. Simon, "Simulation of Individual and Group Behavior," *American Economic Review*, 50 (1960), 920–932; Richard Cyert and James March (eds.) *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963); Allen Newell, "The Chess Machine: An Example of Dealing with a Complex Task by Adaptation," *Proceedings of the Western Joint Computer Conference* (1955), pp. 101–108; Allen Newell, J. C. Shaw, and H. A. Simon, "Elements of a Theory of Human Problem Solving," *Psychological Review*, 65 (1958), 151–166; Allen Newell and H. A. Simon, "The Logic Theory Machine: A Complex Information Processing System," *Transactions on Information Theory* (1956), 61–79; W. R. Reitman, "Programming Intelligent Problem Solvers," *Transactions on Human Factors in Electronics*, HFE-2 (1961), pp. 26–33; H. A. Simon, "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 60 (1955), 99–118; and H. A. Simon, "Theories of Decision Making in Economics and Behavioral Science," *American Economic Review*, 49 (1959), 253–283.

[24] David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision* (New York, 1964).

[25] Wildavsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 8–63.

B. The significance of the particular equations. Let us examine the concepts that have been built into the particular equations. First, the importance of the previous year's appropriation is an indication that the notion of the base is a very significant explanatory concept for the behavior of the agencies and the Budget Bureau. Similarly, the agency-Budget Bureau requests are important variables in the decisions of Congress. Second, some of the equations, notably (7) and (8) for Congress, and (2) for the agency-Budget Bureau, incorporate strategic concepts. On some occasions, then, budgeting on the federal level does involve an element of gaming. Neither the Congress nor the agencies can be depended upon to "take it lying down." Both attempt to achieve their own aims and goals. Finally, the budgetary processs is only temporally stable. The occurrence of most changes of decision rules at a change in administration indicates that alterations in political party and personnel occupying high offices can exert some (but not total) influence upon the budgetary process.

Our decision rules may serve to cast some light on the problem of "power" in political analysis. The political scientist's dilemma is that it is hardly possible to think about politics without some concept of power, but that it is extremely difficult to create and then to use an operational definition in empirical work. Hence, James March makes the pessimistic conclusion that "The Power of Power" as a political variable may be rather low.[26] The problem is particularly acute when dealing with processes in which there is a high degree of mutual dependence among the participants. In budgeting, for example, the agency-Budget Bureau and Congressional relationships hardly permit a strict differentiation of the relative influence of the participants. Indeed, our equations are built on the observation of mutual dependence; and the empirical results show that how the agency-Budget Bureau participants behave depends on what Congress does (or has done) and that how Congress behaves depends on what the agency-Budget Bureau side is doing (or has done). Yet the concept of power does enter the analysis in calculations of the importance that each participant has for the other; it appears in the relative magnitude of the estimated coefficients. "Power" is saved because it is not required to carry too great a burden. It may be that theories which take power into account as part of the participants' calculations will prove of more use to social science research than attempts to measure the direct exercise of influence. At least we can say that theories of calculation, which animate the analysis of *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* and of this paper, do permit us to state and test propositions about the outcomes of a political process. Theories of power do not yet appear to have gone this far.

In the field of economics, work has long been done on organizational units called industrial firms. In political science, however, despite the flurry of excitement over organization theory, there has been no empirical demonstration of the value of dealing with various public organizations as comparable entities. By viewing governmental bodies not as distinctly different agencies but as having certain common properties (here, in budgetary calculations and strategies), we hope to have shown the utility to empirical theory of treating organizations *qua* organizations. Despite the differences among the organizations studied—some follow different decision rules and are affected by different random disturbances—it is analytically significant to explain their behavior by virtue of features they share as organizations.

It should be clear that we are dealing with general models of organizations and not with individual policies. One cannot say anything directly about water, land, health, or other transportation policies, from inspection of our models of a given agency. But this limit is not inherent in our approach. It is possible, for example, to calculate from our data present and future estimated rates of growth for virtually all domestic agencies since World War II. Agencies with similar growth rates may be segregated and examined for common features. The growth rates of agencies in similar areas of policy, such as public health and natural resources, may be compared, and the fortunes of policies in those areas deduced. Individual agencies may be broken down into sub-units or the courses of certain policy programs charted to explain the differential treatment they receive. While pursuing this type of analysis, we hope to have one advantage. We shall be working from a general model of the budgetary process. It will, therefore, be possible for us to locate our efforts within this larger scheme. To know whether one is dealing with a normal or deviant case, to know one's position in this larger universe, is to be able to give more general meaning to the individual and particular circumstances with which one must be involved in handling small parts of the total process.

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[26] James March, "The Power of Power," in David Easton, editor, *Varieties of Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1966), pp. 39–70.

The general mode of analysis we have developed here may be pursued in many different contexts. Similar studies could be undertaken in state and local governments as well as foreign countries.[27] Private firms and public agencies may be conceptualized in parallel terms through their budgetary mechanisms.[28] By comparing the processes underlying budgeting in a variety of political and economic systems, it may be possible to state more elegantly and precisely the conditions under which different forms of behavior would prevail.

APPENDIX

On the Definition of Terms

Certain of the technical terms required in the paper are here given informal definitions.

Coefficient: A coefficient of an equation is a parameter or number that is said to have some given but usually unknown value. The α's and β's used in the models are the coefficients of the equations in which they appear. Since the values of the coefficients are usually unknown, they must be estimated statistically from available data. In this paper, the coefficients (α's and β's) are average representations of the real percentages of requests made by agencies and appropriations granted by Congress.

Linear: An equation is linear if it has no square or higher order terms. Thus $y=\alpha x$ is linear whereas $y=\alpha x^2$ is not linear. (Remember that for two variables linear means "in a straight line.")

Stochastic: A variable is stochastic, a term meaning random, if the particular value that it assumes is a matter of chance and the set of values that it can assume is capable of being described by a probability distribution or density. The distribution gives the probability of the random variable assuming the various allowable values.

Variance: The variance is defined as $E(x-\mu)^2$ where x is a random variable, μ is its mean, and E stands for "the expected value of." One can think of variance as a measure of the dispersion or spread of the probability distribution governing the random variable.

Linear Regression Equation: A linear regression equation is a particular model of the relationship between two or more variables. The model has the form

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1i} + \beta_2 x_{2i} + \cdots + \beta_k x_{ki} + \epsilon_i$$

where β_0 is the unknown constant term, the other β's are unknown coefficients, and ϵ_i is a random variable. In this notation, y_i represents the value of the dependent variable on the ith observation and $x_{1i}, x_{2i}, \cdots, x_{ki}$ represents in a similar manner the values of the independent variables for the same observation. From a set of n observations, each of which consists of particular values for the dependent and independent variables, the regression operation estimates values for the unknown coefficients and the constant term; the regression operation also estimates n values of the random variable, which are called residuals. When the sets of observations on the dependent and independent variables refer to successive periods, the observations are called time series and we say that the values of y_i are generated by a stochastic process.

Stochastic Disturbance: This is a name for the random variable in a regression equation. It is also called the error term. Thus, in the equation $y_t=\alpha x_t+\epsilon_t$, the term ϵ_t represents a stochastic disturbance (or random variable), which is usually assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and finite but unknown variance.

Difference Equation: An equation which describes the value of a variable in one period in terms of the value of either that variable or another variable in some previous period is a difference equation. For example, $x_t = \beta y_{t-1}$ is a difference equation. If a random variable is present, the equation is called a stochastic difference equation. Thus, if ϵ is a random variable, $x_t = \beta y_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$ is a stochastic difference equation and the successive values of x may be thought of as a stochastic process.

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[27] See the forthcoming studies by John P. Crecine on budgeting in Pittsburgh, Detroit and Cleveland, and by Donald Gerwin on the Pittsburgh School District. Aaron Wildavsky will attempt to apply variations of the models in this paper to Oakland, California.

[28] Aaron Wildavsky, "Private Markets and Public Arenas," *The American Behavioral Scientist* vol. 9 no. 7, (Sept. 1965) pp. 33–39.

Unstable, Evolutionary or Explosive Process: A process is said to be unstable, evolutionary or explosive if the expected values of the successive values taken by the process are increasing. For example, the stochastic difference equation $y_t = \gamma y_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$, where $\gamma > 1$, generates an evolutionary process.

Serially Independent: If successive realizations of a random variable are serially independent, the value it assumes in one period is independent of the value it assumed in a previous period. This can be described mathematically as $E(x_t | x_{t-1}) = E(x_t)$, meaning that the expected value of random variable x at period t does not depend upon the value that the random variable x assumed at period $t-1$. It follows that the expected simple correlation between x_t and x_{t-1} will be zero, if the random variable x is serially independent. For example, in our models, the assumption of serial independence of the disturbances reflects the belief that special circumstances in one year either do not affect special circumstances in succeeding years or that their influence enters explicitly into our model (as in equation (8) and the equations of footnote 4).

The Meaning of a Markov Process

For our purposes, a Markov process generating some random variable x, is a process for which the value of x at time t depends upon the values assumed by that random variable at one or more earlier periods plus the value assumed by some stochastic disturbance at time t. A Markov process is "first order" if the variable x_t takes on a value that depends only upon the value of the variable x_{t-1} in the previous period plus the value of a stochastic disturbance at time t. Thus

$$x_t = \alpha x_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$$

is a first order Markov process where ϵ_t is a random variable with a given distribution and α is a non-zero constant. A second order Markov process can be described by

$$x_t = \alpha_1 x_{t-1} + \alpha_2 x_{t-2} + \epsilon_t$$

where both α_1 and α_2 are non-zero constants. The value of the variable x_t now depends upon its values in two previous periods.

On the Meaning of Goodness of Fit

An intuitive notion of good fit for a linear regression equation is that in a scatter diagram the observations should cluster about the fitted line. Probably the most popular measure of good fit is the square of the multiple correlation coefficient (R^2), which may often be interpreted as the percentage of the variance of the dependent variable that is explained by the postulated linear relationship (regression). For our models however, this interpretation is not valid, although the adjusted R gives a rough measure of the goodness of fit. The closer to 1 that the adjusted R is, the better the fit.

On Standard Deviations of Coefficient Estimates

Speaking roughly, these standard deviations measure the reliability of the estimates of the coefficients. The smaller the estimated standard deviation, the more accurate the estimated coefficient is likely to be. If we had another series of data generated from the same process, the smaller the standard deviation of the coefficient (estimated from the first data) in relation to the size of this coefficient, the more likely it is that a new estimate made on the basis of the hypothetical new series of data would be close to the estimate made from the original data. Generally, one hopes the estimated standard deviation of the coefficient is at least as small as one-half the size of the estimated coefficient.

On Biased and Unbiased Estimators

Think of the problem of trying to determine the average IQ of students at a large university. Suppose the administration would not allow access to records and one did not wish to give IQ tests to all students. One might select a certain number of students at random (a sample) and give them the tests. The test scores of these students are sample observations. One might compute the average of these test scores and claim that he has an estimate of the mean IQ of all students at the University. The estimator is the formula for the average of the sample observations. If he repeated the process, taking a new sample, it is possible that the estimator would produce a slightly different estimate of the mean. However, the estimator would still have a certain expected value. If the expected value of the estimator can be proven to equal the population parameter (the mean IQ of all the students example) then the estimator is said to be unbiased. Otherwise, it is said to be biased.

On Consistent Estimators

An estimator is consistent if it approaches nearer and nearer to the true value of a parameter (in our case, a coefficient) as the size of the sample is increased. A consistent estimator may be biased (it may approach closer to but never actually equal the parameter), but if the sample from which it is estimated is large enough this bias will be small.

On Least-Squares Estimators and the Meaning of Temporally Stable Processes

This discussion specifically refers to process (4) although it is equally applicable to all processes. Consider

$$y_t = \alpha_0 x_t + \eta_t$$

where α represents the coefficient of the equation or the "on the average" percentage of the request that is granted by Congress and η_t is a stochastic disturbance (random variable) that represents the variation in the request over time that may be assigned to special circumstances. We assume that η_t is normally distributed with mean zero and finite but unknown variance. The coefficient is unknown and must be estimated on the basis of available data. The data are the requests x_t and the corresponding appropriations y_t. We do not know the values assumed by the stochastic disburbance. Our estimates of the values assumed by the stochastic disturbance are the residuals of the fitted regression equation. If, for a given agency, we observe the requests and appropriations over a specified period of time, we could plot the data in a scatter diagram (Fig. 1). The line drawn in Fig. 1 would be our estimated line (the line resulting from our estimate of α).

The vertical positive and negative distances of the points from the fitted line are the values of the residuals, our estimates of the values assumed by the stochastic disturbance. The least-squares estimates of the coefficients are those values of the coefficients which make the sum of the squares of these distances a minimum. In Fig. 1, there is no discernible pattern of departure of the points from the line.

Thus, we can say that the process is temporally stable (i.e., fixed over time) and presume that the true value of the coefficient (we know only its estimated value) remained constant during the period under consideration. A temporally stable process is one in which the value of the true coefficient does not change during the period under consideration. This should not be confused with a stable or non-evolutionary process, i.e., one whose values do not tend to grow, but fluctuate about some level.



FIG. 1



FIG. 2

If we again plotted the requests and appropriations data for an agency and found the results to be as in Fig. 2, the longest line would represent our first fitted equation (or the equation resulting from our first estimate of the value of the coefficient). The points (alternately the residuals) form a pattern of departure from the fitted line. In the early years (a) they fall mostly above the line and in the later years (b) they fall mostly below the line. The process must have been temporally unstable for the period as a whole, i.e., the coefficient had one true value during the first years of the period and a different true value during the last years.

A temporally unstable process is one in which the true coefficient assumes two or more values during the period under consideration. Since we only know the estimated coefficient, we must examine the residuals to determine whether such a pattern is present. Then, we select what appears to be the probable year of change, and fit two lines such as those drawn in above. We then compute the F Statistic to make our statistical test to determine, at a given level of significance, whether or not the true value of the coefficient shifted. If it was found to shift, the process was temporally stable for some period of time but not necessarily for the entire series of time periods examined.

The Meaning of a Shift Point and a Break Point

The two second lines fitted to Figure 2 represent the true process. The year during which the coefficient changes (the year when the pattern shifts from clustering about line (a) to clustering about line (b) is referred to as a shift point. If what appears at first to be a shift in the true value of the coefficient is actually an alteration in behavior so that one equation fits the first sub-period and another equation must be used for the second sub-period, we still refer to the year of the change in realized behavior as a shift point. Break point is the term used to describe a suspected shift point but for which the F-test indicates that the true coefficient value did not shift.

LEARNING AND LEGITIMACY[1]

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This paper examines the theory of political legitimacy through the framework of psychological learning theory and the theory of cognitive dissonance. The concepts of primary and secondary reinforcement in cases of learning permit a general understanding of the growth of positive affect toward a political system.[2] Cognitive dissonance theory allows us to understand how this general positive affect built up by a regime's actions produces the sub-set of attitudes called political legitimacy. In order to build a theory of political legitimacy on these foundations, it is necessary to conceive of government policy-making as a case of producing successful learning throughout a population.

The diffuse, largely irrational nature of political legitimacy has made it difficult for political scientists to handle the concept systematically. That systems are or are not "legitimate" has been asserted numerous times, though often the precise definition of legitimacy employed has been at best vague and the indices of legitimacy unclearly stated. This paper attempts to meet the problem by setting forth a theory and a set of implicit indices of political legitimacy. After the general model has been explicated, I will specify several problems in the manipulation of political legitimacy. Finally, I will look at the relationship of governmental structure to these problems.

Before consideration of the model two preliminary tasks must be performed: a definition of legitimacy and justification for discussing it. We may define political legitimacy as the quality of "oughtness" that is perceived by the public to inhere in a political regime. That government is legitimate which is viewed as morally proper for a society.[3] Lipset suggests that "legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society."[4] We may amend this proposition slightly. Legitimacy is a quality attributed to a regime by a population. That quality is the *outcome* of the government's capacity to engender legitimacy; the capacity to produce legitimacy is not legitimacy itself. Further, we also suggest that "appropriate" in this context implies the moral as well the expediential "rightness" of the regime.

This consideration of legitimacy as a sense of moral rightness attributed to a regime does not require that positive attitudes of other kinds toward a regime be accompanied by legitimacy. However, the considerations set forth in this paper suggest that only in deviant circumstances will such positive attitudes exist without the development of legitimacy; the conditions under which such deviant cases appear need specification, but in most cases we suggest that, though legitimacy may lag behind the development of other attitudes, it may be expected to join them at some point. This prediction is based upon basic considerations of learning in both humans and lower animals. Further empirical examination using this model should allow for precise charting of the developmental process of legitimacy.

We must also answer the question, "Granted that one can examine the subject of legitimacy, *why* do it?" Easton suggests an answer: " . . . where acceptance of outputs as binding must depend upon force, the social costs are high; where they depend largely and continuously upon expediency, the unavoidable indeterminacy of the effectiveness of each output can be indefinitely tolerated only by systems in which the pace of life is slow, change is infrequent, and the functional interdependence weak."[5] In other words, illegitimate political regimes operate far less efficiently than legitimate regimes. This fact will become more understandable as we examine the model of legitimacy.

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[1] I wish to thank Murray Edelman, Robert E. Lane and Fred Greenstein for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

[2] For general works dealing with the learning theory that forms the basis of this article, see Fred S. Keller, *Learning: Reinforcement Theory* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1954); Henry Goldstein, David L. Krantz, and Jack D. Rains (eds.), *Controversial Issues in Learning* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965); Winfred F. Hill, *Learning: A Survey of Psychological Interpretations* (London: Methuen & Co., 1963); Sarnoff A. Mednick, *Learning* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964); O. H. Mowrer, *Learning Theory and the Symbolic Process* (New York: Wiley, 1960); The Kentucky Symposium, *Learning Theory, Personality Theory, and Clinical Research* (New York: Wiley, 1954); and Ernest Hilgard, *Theories of Learning* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956).

[3] See David Easton, *A. Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 278.

[4] Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1960), p. 64.

POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AS SECONDARY SOCIAL REINFORCEMENT

The major premise which underlies this discussion is that the policy-making process in a society may be viewed as a gigantic process of communication and learning. The premise is not new; models of the political system based upon notions of communication have been proposed before.[6] Yet, because they are drawn from the more precise natural sciences, little psychological theory has informed many of these models. The present model attempts to correct the lack. All we need note as the logic of the major premise is that, in order for a government to function at all, new policies must be put forth to meet new exigencies. These new policies must be communicated effectively to a population. The population then must comprehend the meaning of the policy at some minimal level and comply with its demands at an acceptable level of response. Clearly, some policies involve more of the public than others: e.g., income taxes in the United States require a greater distribution of response than corporate taxes. Yet the principle is unaffected by this qualification.

This process of learning, in which the government acts as the provider of a learning stimulus to a population and the population responds, is possible because the government attaches a series of sanctions or, in learning theory terms, reinforcements to each policy. These reinforcements constitute, as it were, the policy's payoffs. The learning sequences of governmental policy-making differ from other learning sequences primarily in the relative amounts of positive or negative reinforcements that are attached to each sequence. It is the great severity of negative sanctions and the great indulgences of positive sanctions that distinguish governmental policy-making from most other forms of learning sequences. The government, by analogy, acts as the experimenter in the laboratory, providing sanctions to its citizens in an attempt to get them to "run a maze" in optimum time. Policies are thus a special case of learning sequences distributed throughout a society. This consideration of policy-making allows us to specify what we mean by efficiency in policy-making. The model of legitimacy development will allow us to understand why legitimacy enhances efficiency.

Efficiency is, in this model, a ratio of the amount of information transmitted successfully to the amount lost in transmission or, in other words, the percentage of total successful learning per policy per population. As Deutsch puts it, "From the amount of information transmitted as against the information lost, we may derive a measure of the efficiency of a channel. . . . "[7] While this definition suffices to describe the efficiency of a single policy, we may also describe the long-term efficiency of a governmental system. Systems are efficient to the extent that they produce learning and implementation by their populations sufficient to meet and solve the problems of the society at the least cost. The cost involved may be considered, first, the waste of information and resources defined by the gap between total successful learning and total possible learning for all the policies considered in the time period. To this amount are added the additional costs imposed on the government by these gaps, but not defined by them. These are the costs of preparing new policies. It is the level of efficiency, as here defined, which is affected by the level of legitimacy maintained by a regime.

The learning process by which lower animals are trained to make responses to stimuli may be taken as a paradigm for the development of political legitimacy. When combined with basic concepts of cognitive dissonance theory,[8] a full explanation of the development of legitimacy among humans emerges. Briefly stated, legitimacy is the result of a learning sequence in which secondary reinforcement substitutes for primary reinforcement for populations and in which the entire learning effort is rationalized into a sense of legitimacy. Let us first sketch out the secondary reinforcement sequence in animals in order to understand its application to politics, after which we will apply it to politics, adding the cognitive dissonance dimension which does not apply to lower animal behavior, but is necessary for understanding the human case.

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[5] Easton, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

[6] See Easton, *ibid.;* Karl Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); Roy Grinker (ed.), *Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior* (New York: Basic Books, 1956); William C. Mitchell, *The American Polity* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).

[7] Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

[8] For an outline of cognitive dissonance theory, see Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Co., 1957); and Jack W. Brehm and Arthur R. Cohen, *Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance* (New York: Wiley, 1962).

Learning in lower animals takes place through four major processes. First, an "unconditioned" stimulus produces a response which is subsequently reinforced. Second, a "conditioned" stimulus is associated with the "unconditioned" stimulus and thereby produces the same response and reinforcement. Third, response to the conditioned stimulus may produce only intermittent reinforcement.[9] Finally, a stage of secondary reinforcement occurs in which yet a third stimulus is presented, the response to which produces as its reward not the original reinforcement but, in fact, the second stimulus, the conditioned stimulus, which has become associated with the original reinforcement.[10] We can illustrate the process by the following example:

1. A rat is presented with an unconditioned stimulus (food, water, shock). He makes a response that secures for him what the stimulus offers or drives him toward. For example, he learns to run a maze to secure the food or water. Or he learns to run through a door to escape the shock. The response then brings him his reward or reinforcement. In the case of food or water, the reward is the satisfaction of eating or drinking, clearly a positive reinforcement because the rat was attracted enough by the possibility of gaining a new satisfaction to learn to run the maze. In the case of shock, since the rat's behavior is based on his desire to avoid a state of pain rather than approach a goal that formerly did not exist for him, reinforcement is negative.
2. A rat is presented with a symbol of the unconditioned stimulus. For example, a blue light may flash on immediately before the appearance of the unconditioned stimulus. Because the two are associated, the rat learns to make the same response to the light that he makes to the unconditioned stimulus. When he sees the light flash he races for the maze or, in the case of shock, makes for the door. Again, the response having been made, reinforcement occurs. The rat eats, drinks or avoids the shock. Classical conditioning has occurred.[11]
3. The conditioned stimulus is presented (the blue light). Again the response is made, but this time no reinforcement occurs. This third stage of training involves intermittent reinforcement over a series of trials. Researchers, the most famous of whom was Clark Hull, discovered that reinforcement need not occur on every trial in order for the conditioned stimulus to maintain its hold.[12] However, unless some minimal level of reinforcement occurred, the learned response to the conditioned stimulus would disappear or be "extinguished."
4. Yet a third stimulus is introduced and paired with the *conditioned stimulus*. The animal learns to make a new response to gain the conditoned stimulus. The conditioned stimulus serves as his reward in the absence of the original reinforcement. Because the rat has learned to associate the blue light with the appearance of food, water, or the avoidance of shock he may, say, learn to run a treadmill in order to turn on the blue light. The symbol of the blue light produces for him a positive gain even if no other reinforcement follows it. In this way, a new response is learned, based upon the rat's desire to produce the symbol of his initial satisfaction or reinforcement. The means to reinforcement, the appearance of the blue light, has become a partial end in itself. The blue light is satisfying because it remains associated with the primary reinforcement. However, the light will cease to be a goal for the animal if primary reinforcement is never again forthcoming.

These four stages of animal learning can be labeled the stage of unconditioned reinforcement, the stage of classical conditioning, the stage of intermittent reinforcement, and the stage of secondary reinforcement. Together they provide the learning paradigm by which we can understand the development of political legitimacy. Some changes in the model are necessary to account for the differences between human beings and rats. Most important, a stage of cognitive dissonance must be considered for humans to explain the conversion of the positive affect set up through the learning process described above into that sub-set of positive attitudes which is legitimacy. Therefore, the process by which legitimacy comes to exist for a political regime may be visualized as a learning process similar to, but more complex than, the learning process described above. In this paradigm six stages exist:

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[9] Intermittent reinforcement is not an entirely necessary part of the paradigm to follow. However, it indicates the means by which a learning sequence may be maintained economically; as such, it is a relevant consideration for the rest of the paradigm.

[10] The secondary reinforcement phenomenon produces most learning in both humans and lower animals through the process of "chaining." On this point see Keller, *op cit.* pp. 22–27.

[11] Pavlov's famous experiments take us only through this second phase.

[12] For a good review of Hull's work, see Hill, *op. cit.*, chap. 5.

1. *The stage of unconditioned reinforcement:* The régime provides a stimulus for its population. This stimulus is a material inducement to learned behavior—food, shelter, security. The population responds by learning the proper route to the stimulus. Its reinforcement is, obviously, the consumption of food, the enjoyment of security, or the habitation of shelter.
2. *The stage of classical conditioning:* The regime associates itself with the stimuli that provoke the series of behaviors described in the stage of unconditioned reinforcement. The government elaborates a series of institutions whose processes precede or are paired with the appearance of the unconditioned stimulus. The population responds to the workings of the governmental process as a signal of the appearance of the unconditioned stimulus and the reinforcement it offers. Thus, the population begins its route to the unconditioned stimulus upon the perception of governmental processes which have become associated with the appearance of that stimulus. In short, the government makes itself visibly responsible for the control of the material resources that constitute the unconditioned stimuli.
3. *The stage of intermittent reinforcement:* Its association with unconditioned stimuli having become firmly embedded, the regime is then able to provide the resources that form the unconditioned stimulus only intermittently. This reduction in reinforcement obviously lowers its cost.
4. *The stage of secondary reinforcement:* At this point the regime realizes the payoffs that the previous three stages have prepared. It presents a third stimulus, in this case the demand that a new behavior sequence be undertaken by the populace. The response, a new set of learned behaviors or pattern of compliance, occurs because the regime assures that compliance will produce the institutional processes symbolizing unconditioned reinforcement. After such compliance occurs, the governmental processes which symbolize unconditioned reinforcement also occur and act as reinforcement in their own right, in the same way that the blue light in our first example was transformed from a conditioned stimulus into a secondary reinforcer. Now the symbol of unconditioned reinforcement, governmental behavior, has become a positive end for the population, not simply a signal of material rewards. Obviously, when the governmental processes which symbolize unconditioned reinforcement come to provide secondary reinforcement and are enough to provoke new learned behavior, the regime experiences virtually no cost in gaining compliance.
5. *The stage of cognitive dissonance:* Having now submitted to new demands for compliance in order to secure merely the symbols of material gain, the population converts this positive affect toward government into a grant of legitimacy. The population, having chosen compliance in order to gain both the symbolic rewards of governmental action and the actual rewards with which government originally associated itself, must rationalize this compliance.[13] The public reduces the cognitive dissonance between gaining primarily symbolic rewards on the one hand and having to learn new behavior sequences on the other by converting its positive affect toward government, evident at Stage 4, into a feeling that the regime is legitimate. Thus, according to Blau, cognitive dissonance reduction turns the positive affect toward government—indicated by satisfaction with symbolic rewards through secondary reinforcement—into the feeling that the regime is a morally appropriate agent of control within the society.[14]
6. *The stage of condensation symbols*[15]: Once the cognitive dissonance stage has been passed through and the government is considered to be legitimate, the regime can signify the governmental processes which provide secondary reinforcement by elaboration of a series of condensation symbols which stand for those processes. Hence, such terms as "our way of life" or "the Constitution" reinstate quickly in the minds of the public the symbolic reinforcement now considered legitimate. These symbols of legitimacy thereby become, according to Murray Edelman, substitute gratifications,[16] available for governmental ma-

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[13] On this point see Festinger, *op. cit.*, ch. 2.

[14] Peter Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York: Wiley, 1964), p. 208.

[15] The term, originally drawn from the psychoanalytic theory of dreams, is adapted to our uses by Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 6.

[16] *Ibid.*, ch. 1.

> nipulation to gain compliance. Once such a process of legitimizing has occurred within a population, it need not be repeated for each successive generation. Legitimacy is passed on from generation to generation; indeed, according to Easton[17] as well as Greenstein,[18] legitimacy, or its opposite, is one of the first political attitudes evident in children.

Why is it that rats cannot grant legitimacy to the blue light in quite the same way that the public grants legitimacy to the governmental process and its symbols? Apparently, among humans secondary reinforcement and the symbolic rewards it affords are far more potent than they are for lower animals. To put the answer another way, in the absence of tangible rewards lower animals unlearn their responses much more rapidly than do humans. Thus, proportionately, a political regime can offer its citizens many more symbolic rewards than an experimenter can offer his rats. On the other hand, although human satisfaction with the symbols and rituals of legitimacy may persist for some time after tangible reinforcement by a regime completely disappears,[19] we should not expect this anomalous situation to continue indefinitely.

We might put this point another way. Legitimacy is granted a regime after a considerable period of experience with it, training by it and symbolic rewards from it. The granting of legitimacy, as indicated by the paradigm, lags behind the stage of secondary reinforcement or diffused positive affect. On the other hand, it may persist for some time after a new regime begins to offer both material and secondary reinforcement. Legitimacy comes late and may be late in leaving. However, this model would predict that the coexistence of secondary reinforcement provided by a present regime and legitimacy granted to one no longer in existence would be relatively shortlived. Obviously, particular nations and societies will differ in this regard as national peculiarities are taken account of, but the general progression should be as described in the model.

It should also be obvious that this model is most applicable to the beginning of new regimes and to the end of old regimes. The model also suggests that those regimes which are rich are most likely to become legitimate. I take this to be similar to Lipset's conclusions,[20] at least about democracies, in most of which, he demonstrates, wealth and legitimacy are related. Finally, this model applies to the development of legitimacy in the contemporary world. In the past there have been cases of governments that were extremely poor at the outset, yet attained legitimacy. The example of Czarist Russia comes to mind most readily. However, in these cases the governments were sanctified by religious doctrine, some of them being virtual theocracies on the model of ancient Byzantium. This source of legitimacy—similar to the Weberian notion of "traditional" bases for the structure of authority in a state[21]—is unlikely to be as important either now or in the future as it once was.

However, rather than focusing solely on changes in whole political regimes for application or testing of the model, we may also examine sub-groups within particular populations. It is a mistake to believe that the levels of legitimacy which a government enjoys are equally distributed throughout a society. We would obviously expect that the response to symbols of legitimacy will be lower the more deprived the sub-group of the population to which they are directed. Among the poor, tangible rewards are far more likely to motivate compliance than symbols of legitimacy. Therefore, this alienated group provides a useful ground for examining the process of legitimacy acquisition.[22] The corollary of this point, of course, is that the marginal utility of material rewards in a society will be directly related to the length of time necessary for a political system to gain legitimacy, all other things being equal. If this prediction is not borne out, it is because factors other than those considered in this paper prevent the more advantaged from easily granting legitimacy to the regime.

We are now in a position to understand how legitimacy enhances the efficiency of a political system. The condensation symbols or symbols of legitimacy serve as secondary reinforcement which obviates the necessity of expending tangible resources. For example, a government which can produce military enlistments by invoking legitimacy symbols associated with enlistment, such as "protection of the national interest," rather than by providing the material stimuli and sanctions of the draft, can cut its costs. And, indeed, in such a situation one could measure the legitimacy of a government by the proportion of enlistees to draftees, all other things being equal.

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[17] Easton, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

[18] Greenstein's evidence is not conclusive on this point. He deals primarily with attitudes toward authorities rather than whole regimes. However, his data point toward this conclusion. See Fred I. Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), ch. 3.

[19] Easton, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

[20] Lipset, *op. cit.*, chs. 2 and 3.

[21] See Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, ed. by Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 341–58.

[22] The differences between the poor's support of economic, social welfare liberalism and rejection of symbolic, civil libertarian liberalism is a case in point. See V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1963), ch. 6.

We may now consider various problems in governmental manipulation of its legitimacy or condensation symbols. The manipulation of legitimacy symbols to encourage efficient compliance may be thought of as a series of efforts to maintain or enhance effective learning and implementation in the population.

THE MANIPULATION OF LEGITIMACY SYMBOLS: PRINCIPLES OF LEARNING

Discontinuity between symbol and policy must be minimized. Policy-makers attempt to associate the symbols of legitimacy with policies that they wish implemented. By imposing symbols of legitimacy on such policies, they associate them with the material and symbolic rewards that motivate public compliance. However, care must be taken to maintain the association between particular symbols and the policies they legitimize. For example, policy-makers can effectively associate the symbol, "rule of law," with the policy of integrating the schools, thereby instating perceptions of secondary and primary reinforcement to be gained from support of the policy. However, over time, as opposition rises or as circumstances change, "rule of law" may very well become separated in the public mind from the policy of school integration. The continuity between legitimacy symbol and its policy referent has broken down. Government must then absorb the costs of this separation.

When policy-makers are unable to maintain the association between policy and legitimacy symbol in one area, the symbol may become less effective in other areas as well. For example, because of the disjunction of "rule of law" from the school integration policy, gains offered by the policy may not arrive as the government plans. The symbolic power of "rule of law" is thereby discredited and the symbol is less likely to be efficient elsewhere. Indeed, it may be that the disjunction between "rule of law" and its intended policy area permits the symbol to be applied in other policy areas where it was not intended to apply. Its very lack of success in one area makes it available for application elsewhere. If so, then looking over the entire range of governmental affairs, the symbol will permit more responses from the public than was ever intended or, in other words, convey less specific information than it might have, largely because it precludes less. This last occurrence cheapens the symbol in the eyes of the public, because the marginal utility of legitimacy symbols is likely to vary inversely with the number of alternative behaviors permitted. Therefore, the government must strive to restrict the symbolic satisfaction derived from a legitimacy symbol to only those behaviors and policy positions it wishes to encourage. Indeed, most major political conflicts within any policy area may be seen as the attempt by partisans to attach the available legitimacy symbols to the policies they advocate and to sever the relationship between these symbols and the policies of their opponents.[23] Ultimately no political system can prevent the breakdown of continuity between symbol and policy, but the breakdown of continuity can be retarded.

"Connotative overflow" must be prevented. A problem which relates to that of the disjunction between symbol and policy is that of "connotative overflow." Though one symbol may itself signal only the appropriate response to policies for which policy makers intended it, it may be related in the public mind to other symbols which are associated with other, and from the standpoint of the policy-maker, inappropriate behaviors and policies out of favor. Though the first symbol may signal only one policy, it may also be closely related to other symbols which signal other policies. The symbol is specific enough, but it has many connections with other symbols. The areas of race relations and welfare programs provide an example. Policy-makers may succeed in getting the legitimacy symbol, "equal opportunity," associated with policies to assist Negroes in the job market. However, "equal opportunity" may be related to the legitimacy symbol of "fairness," which, to many, may stand for a policy of preferential hiring and, therefore, stimulate action in the latter area.[24] Policy-makers may prefer not to push ahead in the second area. However, because the two programs and their symbols are connected, the entire effort becomes costly.

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[23] A very good example of this kind of relatively severe conflict occurred in the recent battle over government programs to aid in providing medical care for the elderly.

[24] Indeed, it is this kind of connotative overflow in the area of race relations that leads to the complaint on the part of recalcitrant whites that "the Negro is going too fast."

Policy-makers are faced with an unfortunate choice of both policies or neither policy.

Opponents of policies advocated by those in power can follow two strategies, each making use of "connotative overflow" situations. On the one hand, they may argue that the symbols of the policies they oppose will stimulate action, through the connotative mechanism, in other areas which those in power would not desire. Or, on the other hand, when faced with almost certain approval of a policy they oppose, they may actually encourage enactment, hoping that connotative overflow follows and creates inappropriate responses in areas embarassing to the policy-makers. The general upshot of connotative overflow is clear. Ultimately, the symbols which are connected with those symbols that promote unpopular behavior will themselves become suspect. This problem of "overlearning" reduces the efficacy of legitimacy symbols.

Proper feedback must exist. When policy-makers choose to attach symbols of legitimacy to policies they wish learned, accepted and implemented, they make a major investment. If the policy fails, it is likely that the legitimacy symbol will also become less useful.[25] Therefore, those in power must make major efforts to assure that their investment pays off. One of the ways they insure success is through the provision of feedback to those in the public who must learn to comply with the policy. Public acceptance and implementation, like any problem of learning, requires the continual correction for error that is provided by feedback. Policy-makers must place high priority on the provision of information on the compliance with and implementation of a policy, so that those affected in the public may adjust their behavior accordingly. If such provision for correction is not made available, policy-makers run three major risks.

First, implementers and compliers activated by the legitimacy symbol may adjust their aspirations to the level of attainment practicable under conditions of incomplete information.[26] By thus assuring that the symbol is involved in a policy process that is only minimally successful, they inadvertently downgrade the power of the symbol employed. Second, they may become so frustrated that they simply block the learning process, screening out all stimuli—symbolic and tangible—which come from the policy area. In the latter instance, we have the potential for large amounts of alienation.[27] Third, implementers and compliers may have their expectations raised so drastically by the appearance of a symbol of legitimacy that they never really adjust their aspirations to their lack of continuing information. Under such conditions policy-makers have two choices. First, they can make it appear that the success of the policy has been commensurate with the expections raised so as not to alienate support from the symbols involved. This strategy involves subterfuge which, if discovered, could be disastrous, not only alienating support from the legitimacy symbol but also from the authorities. Or, alternatively, they may choose to withdraw the legitimacy symbol from the area so as not to endanger it further. However, this strategy will almost certainly insure the collapse of the policy and, probably, react indirectly on both the symbol of legitimacy and the authorities.

New legitimacy symbols must be generated. We have already looked at problems raised when a legitimacy symbol produces more responses than policy-makers intend, either through the disjunction of symbol from policy or thorugh the connotative overflow of symbols. The implication of both these problems is that no single symbol of legitimacy is likely to remain, over time, either tied closely enough to a particular area or restricted enough in reference to other symbols and the behavior they signify to maintain maximum utility. The political chronology of any complex, modern political system assures that legitimacy symbols become associated with more behaviors than policy-makers would like. To the extent that these symbols play the all-important role of cementing adherence to a regime, they remain of the highest importance. However, new, more specific legitimacy symbols must be generated to handle new policy sequences.

When written documents of historical and legal importance are widely known and accepted, the problem is reduced. Specific phrases can be used at some times and deemphasized at others. The Fourteenth Amendment can be substituted for the Tenth. In the American system, the Supreme Court plays a major role not only in defining the contexts in which particular legitimacy symbols may be used, but also in substituting or generating new symbols for old when new policy issues arise.[28] The peculiar "legalistic" position of the Court gives it a primary position in this area, largely because its "non-political" character makes it appear to have no institutional or personal political interests in the consequences of its actions. On the other hand, campaign rhetoric often performs the latent function of producing legitimacy symbols that can be fitted into a variety of learning contexts.[29] Obviously, such symbols as the "New Deal" are immediately relevant to this discussion, since they are meant to apply to entire policy sets. The major task for policy-makers is to fit these new symbols into the set of legitimacy symbols which already exist. Otherwise, the usefulness of the new symbols will be minimal. The problem is obviously a difficult one, because the fact that such legitimacy symbol candidates are obviously "political" assures stiff opposition to their inclusion within the set of existing legitimacy symbols. On the other hand, once such symbols are successfully included, they can provide stepping stones for still others: a "Fair Deal" can follow a "New Deal."[30]

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[25] This point is implied by the discussion in the previous two sections.

[26] March and Simon call this kind of behavior in organizations "satisficing." James March and Herbert Simon, *Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1959), pp. 140–141. For a discussion of the phenomenon in psychological terms, see Jerome Bruner, Jacqueline Goodnow, George Austin, *A Study of Thinking* (New York: Wiley, 1956), ch. 4.

[27] A fascinating example of this phenomenon occurred in the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. Cuban exiles were mobilized largely through potent legitimacy symbols, but were not provided enough information to orient them properly. Hence, many became alienated from the operation. See the account of the behavior of exile pilots in the invasion in David Wise and Thomas Ross, *The Invisible Government* (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 8–74.

New candidates for legitimacy symbols will be successful in direct relationship to their perceived harmonious relation to major value patterns of the society. For example, the "New Frontier" was a good candidate partially because it touched on the shared beliefs of many Americans in progress and adventure. Such symbols also have a better chance if it is apparent that much sacrifice in behalf of them has been endured by their supporters. Thus, the assassination of President Kennedy, while tragic as a personal and political event, probably aided the acceptance of the "New Frontier" as a legitimacy symbol with a particular aura of its own.

The proper symbolic sanction contexts must be chosen. There are three ways in which symbols of legitimacy can be applied to speed up the learning process, each with a characteristic set of rewards and costs for both policy-makers and implementers. These three modes of application are based on the sanctioning contexts into which policy-makers place legitimacy symbols. Symbols may be presented on a continuum of punitiveness. Three major positions can be discerned on this continuum—escape (the most punitive), avoidance, and pure reward.[31] We may fruitfully examine the ways in which a symbol may be employed to produce these three frameworks of perceived sanctions.

Let us examine the symbol, "the national interest." If we wish to employ the symbol most punitively, we may label as "against the national interest" a group of people who are not acting in accord with a certain policy. This context is one of escape; in order to gain the legitimacy symbols it desires and to avoid appearing illegitimate to others, the group in question must adopt the policy. If it does nothing, it cannot escape the definition of the situation used by policy-makers. Thus, the statement, "Those who are trying to prevent a Negro from entering the University of Mississippi are acting against the national interest," sets up severe sanctions for non-compliers since they are labeled as disreputable. They are motivated to escape from their illegitimate position. It will be recognized that this negative sanction corresponds exactly to the use of shock as a primary or unconditioned stimulus in the examples cited earlier.

The same symbol may be used somewhat less punitively to set up a situation of avoidance for potential learners of new policy sequences. Thus: "It is understandable that in some areas there is resentment over the enrollment of a Negro at Ole Miss. However, such enrollment is occurring. Those who wish to act in the national interest will support the enrollment policy." In this case, the context is one of avoidance; for the moment, recalcitrants are not labeled as illegitimate, but they can anticipate such labeling if they do not accept the policy. If recalcitrance continues, we may expect the avoidance context to turn into escape.

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[28] This formulation is similar to Dahl's. See Robert A. Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Role of the Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker," in Nelson Polsby, Robert Dentler, and Paul Smith (eds.), *Politics and Social Life* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1963), pp. 359–70.

[29] Thurman Arnold's work, though not dealing specifically with elections, postulates this kind of process in regard to other political and legal processes. See especially his *The Symbols of Government* (New York: Harbinger Books, 1962).

[30] Indeed, the structure of the American party system and the arithmetic of the electoral process combine to require successors to build on both the substance and the rhetoric of their predecessors, especially at the executive level.

[31] For a good, concise discussion of these contexts, see Roger Brown and Don E. Dulaney, "A Stimulus-Response Analysis of Language and Meaning," in Paul Henly (ed.), *Language, Thought and Culture* (Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1965), pp. 51–54.

Finally, let us look at a case of the pure reward context: "All those who support the entrance of a Negro at Ole Miss are acting in the national interest." Because the context does not specifically brand recalcitrants as being "against the national interest," it does not place severe sanctions on any groups opposing entrance. Similarly, it does not place any group in the context of avoidance of some future sanctions. For potential learners and compliers there is everything to gain and nothing to lose.

Normally, policy is made in contexts which stress avoidance and escape. Certain behaviors are labeled illegal, and symbols of legitimacy are coupled with the policy to stress the avoidance and escape contexts. However, there is some evidence, derived from experiments in learning in both lower animals and humans, that punitiveness is not necessarily uniformly efficient. Janis and Feshbach point out that, among humans, learning induced by severe negative sanctions leads to increased suspicion of the source of communication, in this case the policy-maker.[32] Moreover, this suspicion mounts as the tone of the communication becomes more threatening or, in other words, moves from avoidance to escape. Janis and Feshbach also note that ". . . as the amount of fear-arousing material is increased . . . conformity to the communicator's recommendations tends to decrease."[33] Furthermore, psychoanalytic theory suggests that behavior based on extreme punishment produces repression likely to prove harmful in future learning.[34]

Among lower animals, this kind of induced neurotic behavior has been experimentally produced by excessive punishment. Hilgard cites evidence suggesting that excessive shock produces among rats an inability to adjust to new situations and a propensity to become fixated in behavior sequences which may prove confining later.[35] At the human level, such inflexibility can prove costly for governments in the long run, and one would suspect that excessive punishment with the symbols of legitimacy could breed alienation in great quantities from the political system. Finally, as Lewis points out, reward requires less policing and therefore less cost, because it does not pose unpalatable alternatives which encourage escape from the situation.[36]

Symbol weights must be appropriate. As I have suggested, legitimacy symbols become associated over time with a variety of policies, responses, and contexts. Though a new symbol may be restricted to a few areas of application, soon its "connotative overflow" and disjunction from original policies become marked. As time goes on, the symbol acquires a more or less stable role and "weight." At any one point in time we may consider the weight of a symbol to be composed of the number of areas to which it can be applied, the intensity of emotional response it provokes such that it encourages learning and compliance, the number of potential implementers among whom it evokes the response, and the policy-implementing importance of the sub-groups among which it exercises power. We may make general calculations of symbol weight using each of those factors.[37] For example, it is doubtful whether a relatively specific legitimacy symbol such as "private enterprise" would apply to as many policy areas as "a government of laws, not of men," though the former might provoke a particularly intense response on economic policy matters, especially among the less numerous but more affluent and powerful in our society. In calculating symbol weight, we must take into account public opinion polls, the history of the symbol's development and previous application, and its relationship to projected uses. It may be taken as a general rule that, to limit governmental costs and danger to the symbols of legitimacy, symbols of progressively greater weight should be chosen for progressively more important policies.

Two problems exist if this rule is violated. First, a legitimacy symbol of great weight may be applied to a relatively minor policy. This application, putting the symbol in a context where it is not needed, may cheapen it. If cheapening occurs, the symbol will not be as useful in the future and the government may expect cost. On the other hand, a relatively light symbol may be used to help along an important program—one involving many resources. If this occurs, there will not be enough symbolic gratification to lessen government costs efficiently. Therefore, the government must substitute new, weightier symbols for its original symbols. Ideally, in such a situation, the government will introduce new symbols of greater weight up to the point where the marginal cost for introducing the last symbol equals the marginal gain associated with its symbolic power.

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[32] Carl Hovland, Irving Janis, and Harold Kelly, *Communication and Persuasion* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 74.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

[34] On this point see Franz Alexander, *Fundamentals of Psychoanalysis* (New York: Norton, 1948), pp. 96–100.

[35] See the discussion in Hilgard, *op. cit.*, p. 474. One wonders about the relationship of this theory to the high incidence of recidivism among residents of penal institutions.

[36] As cited in *ibid.*, 75.

[37] Such calculations will naturally be inexact, largely because the measures are not transitive. For a discussion of this problem in regard to measuring power, see Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, 2 (July, 1957), 201–215.

The regime must develop metasymbols. We have suggested that legitimacy symbols gain and lose potency over time, making it necessary for governments to develop new symbols of legitimacy. The possibility of such symbol generation hangs very largely on the availability of what may be called "metasymbols." Metasymbols are legitimacy symbols which indicate the proper circumstances under which new symbols of legitimacy may be introduced, the criteria of acceptability for such symbols, and, possibly, the method by which they may become legitimate. The notion of political "rules of the game," which are symbols of legitimate procedures, may cover much of what is here meant by "metasymbol."[38] However, the "rules of the game" describe far more than the conditions for legitimate symbol generation. They also cover means by which policies are made.

A good example of a metasymbol is the Communist directive, "two steps forward, one step backward." This "rules of the game" norm legitimizes the necessity of changing symbol-response relationships when such change is deemed necessary by the leadership. In the American system a corresponding metasymbol exists in the conception of "a government of laws, not of men"—a symbol which permits change in legitimacy symbols through legal or quasi-legal processes. The development of metasymbols probably occurs along with the development of other legitimacy symbols. It may safely be supposed that systems which do not develop such metasymbols have difficulty in maintaining legitimacy. It may also be supposed that major political crises are likely to erupt when governments attempt to substitute a new set of metasymbols for an old set.[39] Under such conditions, all of the symbols currently acting as secondary reinforcement will be undercut, and a breakdown in legitimacy and subsequent upheaval may be confidently expected.

GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE AS A VARIABLE

We have examined briefly seven problems encountered by regimes in manipulating legitimacy. Now we shall discuss the effects of governmental structure—centralization or decentralization—on these seven problems. We may define a centralized government as one having relatively few centers of autonomous decision-making, but those being well articulated with each other. A decentralized structure is composed of plural, autonomous power centers, poorly articulated with each other. There is no necessary correlation between centralization and autocratic decision-making, as the example of Great Britain clearly indicates. Similarly, there is no necessary relationship between decentralization and democratic norms of decision-making, as the case of feudal society demonstrates.[40]

The problem of maintaining continuity. Decentralization of political structure implies the autonomy of power groups. Purely on a statistical basis, therefore, the likelihood of conflict varies directly with the number of powerful groups within the decision-making structure.[41] And, on empirical grounds, it is clear that the origins of decentralization often lie in a plurality of mutually suspicious groups who desire a common government of limited powers, as was the case in the United States. Such diversity, while changeable over time, nonetheless lays the groundwork for continued and continual conflicts. Under such conditions many groups will be able to interfere with the process of maintaining continuity between symbols, and, indeed, more groups will have the motive to do so.

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[38] For a discussion of "rules of the game," see David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1955), *passim.*

[39] The charge that "creeping socialism" is taking over American politics represents, among other things, an attempt to suggest that metasymbols in the United States are being changed. So far, few Americans have been convinced that the metasymbols are in significant danger.

[40] But my criterion of centralization implies the existence of some hierarchy and the mechanisms associated with it, as discussed by Dahl and Lindblom. My decentralized criterion approximates their discussion of bargaining. See Robert A. Dahl and Charles Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare* (New York: Harper Torchback Books, 1953), chs. 8 and 12. Their emphasis on the interdependence of leaders in bargaining is not made explicit in my formulation.

[41] This formulation does not speak to the severity of conflict. However, membership in a group may not guarantee the reduced severity of conflict. See the theory of Georg Simmel on this point in his *Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations*, trans. by Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1955), pp. 43–45.

On the other hand, by allowing many groups a legitimate decision-making role, a decentralized structure assures that once policy is agreed upon, a greater percentage of the public will view it in similar ways. Compromises hammered out in bargaining will produce some agreement on the symbols to be used. Therefore, some continuity between policy and the symbols chosen to help implement it will still occur. However, because of the bargaining and lack of continuity between symbol and policy necessary *before* the policy adoption stage, the symbols finally chosen will be of extreme generality and, possibly, therefore, of less effect than those symbols applicable in a centralized structure. This last contention suggests that the period during which a legitimacy symbol proceeds from a specific to a more general meaning and applicability will be shorter in a decentralized structure, making the problem of symbol generation more pressing in the latter system.

The problem of connotative overflow. Superficially, it would appear that a centralized political system could more readily control the stimulus generalization that makes up connotative overflow. As we have seen, the more centralized the political structure the easier it is to construct a set of relatively specific legitimacy symbols. Such specificity should minimize the possibility of one symbol's affecting other symbols and their policies and therefore producing inappropriate responses. Also, because of the effectiveness of long-range planning the fewer the autonomous power centers, the more policies can be matched to specific symbols if the policy-makers decide. Thus, because of the greater specificity of its symbols and the likelihood that they can be tied effectively and exclusively to particular policies, we might expect a centralized structure to have a major advantage in controlling connotative overflow.

However, this view is incorrect. The flexibility of centralized structures in constructing a set of legitimacy symbols usually produces a logically tight national myth or ideology. And, indeed, centralized political systems are often the products of struggles in which a relatively consistent, tightly structured set of symbols gains ascendance. The flexibility of application which exists in a centralized structure permits this already consistent set of legitimacy symbols to become even more consistent in practice. Hence, each symbol and the specific policies to which it is attached are closely related in the public mind to the entire legitimacy set. This situation assures that what happens in one symbol-policy nexus will be intimately associated with an affected by other policy areas. In decentralized systems, where, as we have seen, more general but less consistent symbols are likely to be the rule, a good deal of connotative overflow will persist, but at no point is it likely that the symbols of legitimacy will stand or fall as a set rather than singly. The ideal situation, of course, would be one in which relatively specific symbols were attached to particular policies, yet the entire set of symbols did not possess the logical consistency that would produce connotative overflow. In this way, continuity between symbol and policy could be maintained without producing connotative overflow.

The problem of feedback. The more centralized the political structure, the greater its control over feedback to the public.[42] But a decentralized structure may be more representative of the diverse ethnic, geographical, and occupational groups that comprise the polity, though this is not necessarily the case. Representative decentralization, assured perhaps by a federal system, may, for example, allow New Englanders to grant feedback credibility to the information provided by local governments in New England.[43] However, in this situation no uniform control of feedback can be exerted and conflicting feedback may result. The dilemma would seem resolved most felicitously by pseudo-decentralization, a tactic in which actual decision-making about what feedback to provide would be made at a central point, but in which dissemination would come from decentralized, non-policy-making, but representative organs.[44] The Russian system, with its paper decision-makers such as the representative Supreme Soviet and its *oblast* and *raion* machinery at local levels, provides an example of such pseudo-decentralization. However, pseudo-decentralization produces two problems. First, the public may soon realize that the paper decision-makers are in fact merely mouthpieces of the centralized power structure and therefore discount feedback from these structures. Or, possibly, such paper decision-making structures can form a base from which challenges to the regime can be launched should it be felt that such challenges are necessary. Both dangers threaten the amount of system legitimacy.

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[42] For a look at the means by which this control may be maintained, see Z. A. B. Zeman, *Nazi Propaganda* (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

[43] Feedback credibility, in psychological terms, involves the belief in and acceptance of communication sources. On the subject of this source credibility, see Hovland, Janis, and Kelly, *op. cit.*, chap. 2.

[44] For a case study of this tactic see Victor Thompson, *The Regulatory Process in OPA Rationing* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1950).

The problem of symbol generation. The crucial question in deciding between the capacities of decision-making structures to generate a continuing flow of legitimacy symbols is, "Where are the symbols coming from?" It seems immediately obvious that the greater control over information enjoyed in a centralized political structure permits rapid infusion of new symbols meant to become legitimate. And, to the extent that the regime is centralized, it is unlikely that public arguments about either the meaning or applicability of such symbols will arise. Coordination at the decision-making level will lower the amount of conflict over new symbols of legitimacy which are introduced.

The capacity to generate symbols arises in a different way in a decentralized political structure. Autonomous bases of power permit and indeed force bargaining between sub-groups who wish to exercise control. In the process of enlisting support for policies and programs, decision-makers are constantly involved in pressing ideological appeals which they tie as closely as possible to already well-established symbols of legitimacy. These appeals spontaneously produce many symbols, some of which may eventually become legitimate. The normal progression of events is for symbols to be generated and attached to a particular set of policies advocated by a group in an autonomous power center. After bargaining sufficiently to produce agreement on a version of the group's demands, the policies, with their symbols still attached, are implemented. Then, gradually, as the policies become settled and gain widespread acceptance, their symbols gradually become detached from the initial set of policies and become available as legitimacy symbols for other situations. We have outlined the reasons for this diffusion in the considerations of continuity and overflow above. Obviously, the likelihood of acceptance of the new policies and their symbols depends greatly on the success with which already established legitimacy symbols can be associated with them.[45]

It therefore appears that both systems provide means for legitimacy symbol generation. Control over the emergence of such symbols is likely to be greater in the centralized system. However, this control may be a handicap in gaining acceptance for the new symbols in public perceptions. The very existence of obvious coordination and centralized control may alienate significant portions of the public. Many citizens may feel far less favorable toward the symbols offered than their public avowals would indicate. Obviously, if the centralized structure is democratic this problem may be more effectively met. But in such cases of centralized democracies, as well as autocracies, the strategy of pseudo-decentralization again suggests itself as feasible. In this situation, symbol generation can be centrally controlled, yet symbols may be diffused and legitimized by a variety of broadly representative structures. Again, however, the dangers in pseudo-centralization—already discussed in the area of feedback—apply in the case of symbol generation as well.

The problem of proper symbolic sanction contexts. It is difficult to determine exactly whether a decentralized political structure will differ significantly from a centralized structure in the use of the three modes of symbolic sanctions. In the decentralized situation, one might expect a lower proportion of punitive sanctions to pure reward sanctions. Bargaining, the hallmark of a decentralized system, assures that many groups must get something from the proposed behavior if policy-making is to proceed.[46] This requirement builds in a somewhat less punitive employment of legitimacy symbols.

On the other hand, a centralized political structure provides policy-makers greater flexibility in deciding exactly what kinds of sanction contexts should be employed. In a centralized political structure, if pure reward contexts *are* chosen, it is easier to present them effectively and consistently than it would be in a decentralized system. Hence, we can then say that a decentralized system is likely to employ a greater proportion of pure reward contexts, but a centralized structure can manipulate the contexts more efficiently and consistently. However, structure would not be crucial in this matter. More likely, the level of wealth of the polity—which conditions the relative scarcity of resources—would prove the determining factor.[47]

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[45] As partial custodian of legitimacy symbols, the Supreme Court in the American system is crucial in this area.

[46] Indeed, the concept of "side-payment" in game theory assumes that extra reward payoffs are possible in a bargaining situation. For a theory of bargaining behavior which assumes such a possibility as a rational strategy, see James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1965), ch. 11.

The problem of symbol weights. It is also difficult to decide which system is most likely to choose properly weighted legitimacy symbols. While it may be true that policy-makers in a centralized political structure can control more readily the assignment of symbols, they may not be as aware as their counterparts in a decentralized structure of the weights of symbols. In the process of decentralized bargaining, policy-makers are motivated to ascertain the weights of particular symbols in the public mind. If they are to improve their bargaining positions, they must know as precisely as possible the weight of their own and others' symbols. Public opinion polls and a variety of other techniques aim at the uncovering of symbol weights.[48] This built-in motivation does not exist as urgently for decision-makers in a centralized structure. Therefore, they must force themselves to do the intelligence work necessary to discover existing symbol weights. There is a temptation, however, for the policy-maker in a centralized structure to believe that the public's scale of symbol weights is similar to his own. When he realizes that his assignment of symbol weights differs from the public's, the system may experience momentary conflict.

We have already argued that a centralized political structure permits greater control over the emphasis and deemphasis of different symbols, the generation of new symbols, and the application of symbols in particular contexts and to particular policies. These factors lead to the conclusion that symbol weights may be changed rapidly in a centralized system, where there are few power centers to challenge new weight assignments. In a decentralized system of bargaining, weights also change, somewhat less rapidly to be sure, but with less control by any one set of decision-makers. The bargaining process itself continually changes the weight of symbols involved in the bargaining. Hence, when decision-makers come to use these symbols to aid in the implementation of the new policies, such symbols will have different weights than they had before bargaining on the policies began. Therefore, it is unlikely in a bargaining system that precise knowledge of the weight of legitimacy symbols will ever be wholly possible.

The problem of metasymbols. As I have suggested above, policy-makers in a centralized structure often come into control with a coherent ideology that forms the basis for a set of legitimacy symbols. Within such an ideology there usually exists some fairly explicit formulation of the means under which new symbols may be introduced and applied. And, indeed, in such a situation proposals for both policy changes and changes in the use and character of legitimacy symbols often find their way back quickly to arguments over the application of metasymbols. Therefore, such regimes face possible instability. On the other hand, the explicitness and authoritative character of such metasymbols reduce the likelihood that many conflicts will arise.

In a decentralized political structure the rules which cover bargaining procedures will probably be incorporated into metasymbols of legitimacy. Since such rules will be largely customary and not always stated in an operational fashion, the metasymbols of legitimacy are likely to be somewhat unclear. This zone of uncertainty, while making problematic modes of symbol generation, acceptance and application, at least assures that at no time is the entire set of legitimacy symbols likely to be attacked at once. To put it another way, there are likely to be plural metasymbols with unclear referents in a decentralized system. This fact assures that symbols and policies which are attacked as violating one metasymbol can be justified through another. Again the price of lowering the possibility of violent conflict and collapse of the system in a decentralized situation is the relative generality and diffuseness of symbols of legitimacy. This characteristic assures that, even when such systems enjoy great legitimacy in the public, the symbols of legitimacy cannot be manipulated as easily as they can be in a centralized system.

CONCLUSION

We have looked at the origins of legitimacy as a special case of reinforcement learning, whereby symbolic rewards come to replace material rewards for societies, whereby such rewards and the processes and exertions necessary to gain them are rationalized into a sense of legitimacy, and whereby, subsequently, condensation symbols of legitimacy come to stand for the entire process and may be manipulated to aid policy-making. These symbols of legitimacy are learning aids; they hasten the acceptance of and compliance with new policies put forth in the system.

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[47] This view is shared by David Potter: see his *People of Plenty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), chs. 4 and 5.

[48] For a discussion of the uses to which polls are put and the validity of such polls on the legislative level, see Leonard Marascuillo and Harriet Amster, "Survey of 1961–1962 Congressional Polls," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 28 (Fall, 1964), 497–507.

Seven problems affect manipulation of political legitimacy.[49] It would appear that centralized political systems have greater flexibility and control over many of these problems than decentralized systems. However, such control is not automatic and may carry with it consequences which are ultimately harmful to the regime. Decentralized structures do not permit such easy manipulation of the symbols of legitimacy, but neither do they incur the dangers that easy manipulation brings. Therefore, it is difficult to decide which mode of decision-making will effectively preserve the legitimacy of a regime and, with it, enhance the system's chances for survival.

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[49] I have deliberately chosen not to treat the effects of public attitudes and behavior on policy-makers. Although this subject has been excluded, it is obviously one of crucial importance in any full scale treatment of legitimacy. I have no intention of suggesting that, aside from the constraints treated in the discussion, policy-makers are wholly free to manipulate their populations at will.

INTER-NATION SIMULATION AND CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*

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The purpose of this article is to compare the Inter-Nation Simulation (INS)—developed by Harold Guetzkow and his colleagues at Northwestern University and now employed in a number of universities throughout the country—to verbal theories of international relations. It will not be a discussion of the methodological foundations of the simulation[1] but an analytical comparison, primarily on the level of middle-range theory, of the substantive assumptions contained in INS with contemporary international relations theory.

Although the primary purpose of this article is to compare the two bodies of theory, it will inevitably raise questions concerning the validity of the Inter-Nation Simulation model and the value of simulation as a general approach to theory. In terms of the former question, it is necessary to remember that the simulators themselves are theorists, albeit a special type. Consequently, the comparison is more a reliability check on simulation and verbal theorists than a validity check on either. The lack of congruence between the assumptions of the simulation and the assumptions of the verbal theorists does not necessarily indicate that the simulation model lacks validity, since the verbal theorist has no monopoly on valid hypotheses.

If the author's assumption that simulation is a way of theorizing about international relations is correct, the following comparison should yield some idea about the value of simulation in building a firm theoretical basis for a science of international relations. Forced to be abstract as well as explicit and parsimonious, those using simulation must approach the task of theorizing with a different operational code than the verbal theorists. A few variables must suffice for a large set of phenomena, and the variables must provide a set of rules and principles meaningful to the participants and essential to the structures and processes of the simulated conditions. Unlike the verbal theorist, who can enjoy the luxury of unlimited space and consequently unlimited equivocation, the simulator must combine high-level abstraction with explicit concreteness. The patterns which emerge out of the following comparison indicate both the strengths and weaknesses of simulation as an approach to international relations theory.

I. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE NATIONAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Although the national decision-making process is the most highly programmed segment, the Inter-Nation Simulation[2] is designed from a framework oriented towards the international system. The national decision-making process is constructed primarily in terms of what is presumed to be those requirements most salient to international activity. Capabilities and decision-making structures are similar in type, though not in degree, for all states in the INS. Differences in state behavior result from the interaction of the capabilities and internal demands of the society on the one hand, and the personalities and values of the decision-makers on the other. The primary focus of INS as a research tool is not the decision-making process *per se,* but rather the patterns of international interaction.

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[1] For discussions of the Inter-Nation Simulation focusing on methodology see Richard C. Snyder, "Some Perspectives on the Use of Experimental Techniques in the Study of International Relations," in Harold Guetzkow *et al.*, *Simulation in International Relations: Developments for Research and Teaching* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963); Sidney Verba, "Simulation, Reality and Theory in International Relations," *World Politics*, 16, (1964), 490–521; J. David Singer, "Date-Making in International Relations," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 10 (1965), 68–81; and Richard A. Brody, "Some Systematic Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Technology: A Study Through Simulation of a Multi-Nuclear Future," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 7 (1963), 663–753. pp. 668–687.

[2] For the most inclusive single-volume discussion of the Inter-Nation Simulation, see Harold Guetzkow, Chadwick F. Alger, Richard A. Brody, Robert C. Noel and Richard C. Synder, *Simulation in International Relations: Developments for Research and Teaching* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963). For the closest thing to a published survey of the assumptions of the Inter-Nation Simulation see the chapters by Guetzkow in this volume.

In this respect the focus of INS is more compatible with the approaches of Hans Morgenthau[3] or Morton Kaplan[4] than with those of Snyder-Bruck-Sapin,[5] Robert North *et al*[6] or the Crissicom Simulation developed by Ithiel Pool at M.I.T.[7]. The difference between the two approaches is the "level of analysis"[8] from which they theorize about international politics and is a difference of degree rather than kind, since the former do not deny the significance of different national decision-making processes and the latter do not maintain that there are no shared international norms or relevant patterns of international action. Nevertheless, INS is built on the assumption that it is more valuable in building a science of international politics to approach international relation from the framework of the international system.[9]

Values and Motivations in National Decision-Making. The central assumption of the Inter-Nation Simulation concerning national decision-making is that the desire to remain in office is a prime motivation of foreign policy-makers. The simulators have not made the assumption that the only motivation of decision-makers is the desire to remain in power since each participant in the simulation brings to his role a set of values and attitudes which leads him to interpret what his actions should be in his own way. Rather, they see the desire to remain in office as one of the primary drives.

To apply Max Weber's formulation of the motivation of politicians, the INS Decision-makers can see their role as both living "for" and living "off" politics.[10] Or, in Lasswellian terms, the Decision-makers in INS are provided the office which they are not always certain of possessing but through which they can displace their private motives onto public objects and rationalize their actions in terms of public interests.[11]

In the Inter-Nation Simulation, there is a sharp operational distinction between the pressures coming from the society—that is, anterior to but operating on the Decision-makers—and the motivations resulting from the Decision-makers' own internalized values. Just as political leaders in the referent world base their actions on the demands from the political environment as well as the political values internalized in their belief system, so the INS Decision-maker is subject to the same two sources of values.

Pressures coming from the society operate in the simulation through the Validators. Expressed to the Decision-makers on a mathematical scale ranging from zero to ten, Validators simulate those groups who must be pleased by the actions of the Decision-maker if his chances of staying in office are to be high. Overall Validator Satisfaction (VSm), which determines to a large degree the probability of the Decision-maker's staying in office, has two components: "Validator Satisfaction with regard to consumption" (VScs) and "Validator Satisfaction with respect to national security" (VSns). To keep the overall Validator Satisfaction high, the Decision-maker must allocate his own resources—Basic Capability units (BC's)—into a combination of Force Capability units (both conventional FCc and nuclear FCn) and Consumption Satisfaction units

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[3] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations,* 3rd ed. (New York, 1961).

[4] Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York; 1957).

[5] Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision-Making* (New York, 1962).

[6] Robert C. North, Ole R. Holsti and Richard A. Brody, "Perception and Action in the Study of International Relations: The 1914 Crisis," paper for the *International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research,* 1964.

[7] Ithiel de Sola Pool and Allan Kessler, "The Kaiser, the Tzar, and the Computer: Information Processing in a Crisis," *The American Behavioral Scientist,* (1965), 31–38.

[8] J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), *The International System* (Princeton, 1961), pp. 77–93.

[9] It is commonly but erroneously assumed that the Inter-Nation Simulation is focused primarily on the dynamics of decision-making since the most controlled and concretized part of the simulation is the national decision-making process. However, Guetzkow's discussion of the possibilities of the Inter-Nation Simulation for research and development of theories is focused on hypotheses regarding the interaction of states: e.g., see Guetzkow *et. al., op. cit.,* pp. 33–36; see also Richard C. Snyder and James A. Robinson, *National and International Decision-Making* (New York, 1961), p. 35.

[10] Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," *Essays in Sociology,* edited by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York, 1958), p. 84.

[11] Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (New York, 1960), pp. 261–263.

(CS's) as well as Research and Development (R & D) which work to insure not only the satisfaction of Validators in both the short and long run, but also the security of the state in terms of the international environment. In short, the Decision-maker is faced with two problems: having enough resources and distributing those resources properly. He must decide how he will acquire and maintain enough capability to satisfy current demands as well as how much he will invest in long-range research to increase the strength of his nation in the future.

The relationship between the Validators and the Decision-makers can be compared to a number of theoretical discussions in the international relations literature. Most theorists assume that a set of values held by the society influence or shape the actions of policy-makers.[12] For example, Snyder-Bruck-Sapin categorize one set of values as those which are the "material needs and values of the society or any segment thereof not internalized in the decision-making," unit.[13] However, few theorists maintain that the demands from the domestic society are limited only to consumption and national security defined as strictly as they are in the Inter-Nation Simulation.[14] Rather, most writers assume that policy-makers are subject to a whole series of pressures ranging from military security and economic well-being to questions of national prestige and the use of certain instruments of foreign policy.[15]

This is not to say that there is no place at all in INS for values other than economic well-being and national security. Although the non-economic/security values are not operative as societal pressures in the simulation, they do exist as the internalized values of Decision-makers. One purpose of using a simulation which gives a large role to human beings (as distinct from all-computer simulations) is to allow for the dynamic interaction of the pressures external to the Decision-maker and the values which the Decision-maker has acquired himself. Some attempt is made to control these values through the use of background histories given to the participants at the beginning of the simulation. These histories are different for each country and are designed not only to set the simulation in historical context but also to impart the historical and ideological goals of the simulate nation.

The simulators argue that values based on ideology, tradition, etc. are also introduced into the simulation from two other sources. First, there is the development of a game culture;[16] that is, a set of norms and patterns of behavior which evolve from the experiences of the simulation. Trust, prestige and even the "burden of the simulation past" develop into operating forces on the value structure of the individual Decision-maker during the course of each run. Secondly, the individual playing the role of a Decision-maker in INS brings certain values, attitudes and personality traits into the simulation himself. Through psychological tests, the simulators are able to control to some degree the type of individuals who participate in the simulation.[17]

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[12] For a discussion of the theoretical position on the nature of the influence flow between Validators and Decision-makers see *infra*, p. 565.

[13] Synder, Bruck, and Sapin, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

[14] For a discussion of the Inter-Nation Simulation conception of national security as expressed by the VSns see *infra*, p. 573 and Guetzkow *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 44–45.

[15] Most writers classify goals in categories of national security, economic interests and the values based on national character, tradition and ideology. The following list is arranged in an ordering based on the ratio of national security and economic interest values on the one hand, to values based on national character, tradition and ideology on the other, The authors appearing first have placed greater emphasis on national security and economic interest in relation to the other values. All writers, however, do assign some role to the three categories of values. Robert Strausz-Hupé and Stefan T. Possony, *International Relations* (New York, 1962), p. 563; Kurt London, *How Foreign Policy is Made* (New York, 1950), p. 13; Joseph Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy* (London, 1963), p. 131; Ernst B. Haas and Allan S. Whiting, *Dynamics of International Relations* (New York, 1956), p. 59; and Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, *op. cit.*, pp. 156–159.

[16] See Robert C. Noel, "Evolution of the Inter-Nation Simulation," in Guetzkow *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 100–101 for a discussion of game culture; and Harold Guetzkow, "Structured Programs and Their Relation to Free Activity Within the Inter-Nation Simulation," in *ibid.*, pp. 133–134, for a discussion of the development of "esteem" in the simulation.

[17] See Noel, *op. cit.*, pp. 88, 100 and 105 for a discussion of attempts to control the types of individuals participating in the simulations and the results from such attempts. Also, see a recent study by Michael J. Driver, *A Structural Analysis of Aggression, Stress, and Personality in an Inter-Nation Simulation* (Lafayette: Paper No. 97, Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic and Management Sciences, Purdue University, 1965).

No theorist would argue with the contention implicit in the Inter-Nation Simulation that the national decision-making process is a "meld" of the pressures from domestic society and the values, attitudes and personalities of the decision-makers.[18] However, few writers would maintain that economic well-being and national security are the only values operating on the decision-makers from the societal sources.[19] Rather, most assume that the values anterior to the decision-making unit and the values internalized by the unit are highly interdependent and often complementary.[20]

Structure and Process in National Decision-Making. All states in the simulation have similar decision-making components, although the relationship between the components are varied. The components are the Decision-makers (participants simulating the leaders of the state) and the Validators (parameters simulating the public, private and institutional pressures of the society). The basic relationship between the two components is that the Decision-makers must satisfy the Validators if they are to increase or maintain their probability of staying in office. The simulation is so structured that in all states the Decision-makers must be responsive to the Validators although the degree of responsiveness varies. Except for a temporary action which is costly, Decision-makers can influence the Validators only by satisfying them.[21] For all practical purposes, the flow of influence in the Inter-Nation Simulation is one-way: from the Validator to the Decision-makers. The Validator has the ability to control the Decision-maker by affecting his probability of staying in office, while the Decision-makers can not influence the Validator in most cases except by satisfying its wishes or by direct coercion.

Generally, writers on foreign policy decision-making view the flow between the public and other societal pressures on the one hand and the leaders of the states on the other as a two-way affair. Save for the more bitter and extreme remarks by "realists" like Morgenthau who complain that democratic foreign policy is almost totally dominated by domestic forces,[22] most writers maintain that decision-makers can follow as well as lead domestic opinion. Roger Hilsman discusses American policy-making in terms of the "consensus-building process" versus "rational decision-making,"[23] and Bernard Cohen sees American foreign policy as the result of an inordinately complex "pattern of influence."[24] Haas and Whiting assume that elites in every type of society get support not merely by satisfying the preferences of the interest groups and the public but also by manipulating symbols based on national myths.[25] Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin see the relationship between the decision-makers and the society as more than a question of the former satisfying the latter.[26] London and Frankel also assume that the relationship between the leadership and the public is one of varying degrees of interdependent dynamism.[27]

The Inter-Nation Simulation attempts to differentiate between democratic and autocratic foreign policy-making structures can also be compared with verbal international relations theories. Variation in decision-making structures is introduced through the concept of Decision Latitude (DL). DL represents the degree of responsiveness between the Decision-makers and the Validators. The focal point for its operation is the question of office-holding. If the Decision Latitude is high, Validator dissatisfaction will have a less severe consequence on the Decision-maker's staying in office (although it might increase the chances of successful revolution over a period of time) than if it were low. Assuming that the degree of responsiveness between the Decision-maker and the Validators is a prime factor in differentiating policy-making structures, the simulators use low DL to simulate a democratic state and high DL an autocratic state.

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[18] E.g., Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, *op. cit.*, pp. 6, 7, 63, 88, 89, 100, 102.

[19] At this point, it might be useful to note that the sharp operational dichotomy between economic/security values and non-economic/security values which exists in the Inter-Nation Simulation might be a result of the technical difficulties inherent in creating non-economic/security values in the Validator/Decision-maker relationship. It would necessitate a significant increase in the complexity of operating the simulation since non-economic/security values would not be subject to the quantitative manipulations now employed in the Inter-Nation Simulation Validator process. However, explorations in this development are now being undertaken by Charles F. Hermann of Princeton University and by myself at Wayne State University.

[20] E.g., see Bernard C. Cohen, *The Political Process and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, 1957) for a discussion of the broad range of values brought to bear on American policy-makers in the negotiations and signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty.

[21] The Decision-makers may take certain measures to lessen the effect of the Validator, but it involves the expenditures of force capability and increases the chances of a successful revolution if that revolution ever breaks out. Although some of the Decision-makers have employed these measures for a period of time, it represents a tool of coercion which Decision-makers would rather not use except in emergencies. For a discussion of this see Guetzkow *et. al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

[22] Hans Morgenthau, *The Dilemmas of Politics* (*Chicago*, 1958), p. 304.

[23] Roger Hilsman, "Congressional-Executive Relations and the Foreign Policy Consensus," this REVIEW, 52 (1958), 725–745.

[24] Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

[25] Haas and Whiting, *op. cit.*, pp. 32–35.

[26] Snyder *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 156–160.

[27] Frankel, *op. cit.*, pp. 70–83; and London, *op. cit.*, pp. 39–52.

The INS assumption that all national decision-making processes can be analysed from the same model is compatible with the approaches of a number of verbal theorists.[28] However, there is disagreement among theorists over whether or not the degree of responsiveness between the decision-making elite and the societal interests is the primary variable in differentiating types of foreign policy processes. There is some support for the use of a concept like Decision Latitude among writers like Frankel and Haas and Whiting who see the relationship between the elite and the society as the prime criteria for differentiating autocratic from democratic regimes.[29] However, others like London and Strausz-Hupé emphasize the ideological dynamism and the unfettered authority of autocratic elites (totalitarian types) so much that there is little mention of the variable of responsiveness as crucial to the differentiation between autocratic and democratic policy-making structures.[30]

INS also allows for the development of "administrative static" in the national decision-making process. Generally, the decision-making units have three or more participants with one designated as the Central Decision-maker, whose authority is final. The conflicts of roles and personality normal to all organizational structures may develop in the national decision-making process, although not to the extent envisioned by some theorists.[31]

A final point of comparison is the role assigned to political opposition in INS. Save for a few runs, there has been no place in the simulation for the forces opposing the existing regime.[32] Some writers consider the existence of a protected and vocal opposition the prerequisite for democracy and would no doubt find the exclusion of such a figure in the simulation incongruous.[33] Other writers, however, who advocate the principle of bi-partisanship and the general freedom of the decision-making elite vis-a-vis the political structure might find the INS disregard for such a role acceptable.[34]

II. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POLICY

In the Inter-Nation Simulation, the Decision-makers have at their disposal most of the means policy-makers in the referent world can employ. They may wage war, negotiate in bilateral or multi-lateral situations, trade, give or receive aid, use the mass media (simulation newspaper) for communication and take part in the operation of an international organization. The Decision-makers are constrained in the use of these tools only by the administrative regulations of the simulation, the demands of their Validators and the restrictions placed on their actions by other members of the international system.

In some ways, the simulate Decision-maker is freer in his international activity than most theorists see actual policy-makers. Since the simulation has only a limited chance to build up traditional patterns of behavior, the burden of the past does not fall as heavily on the decision-makers as, for example, some of the "realists" feel it influences contemporary decision-makers.[35] Although there is a background history for each simulation, the constraints implicit in these histories do not operate in regard to specific objectives.[36]

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[28] E.g., Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, *op. cit.*, p. 93; and Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (New York, 1955), p. 170.

[29] Haas and Whiting, *op. cit.*, pp. 27–8; and Frankel, *op. cit.*, pp. 86–177.

[30] London, *op. cit.*, pp. 7–10; and Strausz-Hupé and Possony, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

[31] Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, *op. cit.*, p. 176, greatly emphasize the impact of organizational roles on decision-making.

[32] The simulators have experimented with an "aspiring decision-maker" (Noel, *op. cit.*, p. 43), but have not included that role in the basic structure of the simulation.

[33] E.g., V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York, 1961), pp. 455–457.

[34] E.g., "realists" like Morgenthau, *Dilemmas*, p. 333; and commentators like Walter Lippmann, *The Public Philosophy* (New York, 1956), pp. 945–947, have maintained that foreign policy should be under the control of a relatively autonomous elite. Of course, this normative position does not imply the actual conditions. However, one could argue that the practice of states in the contemporary era is such that questions of "national interest" are often beyond partisan politics.

[35] For the importance of history in the realist tradition see Kenneth W. Thompson, *Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics* (Princeton, 1960), pp. 58–60, 6–10.

Similarly, the Decision-makers in the simulation are also relatively free from geographical restraints. Maps are not usually provided, and there are few inhibiting factors from geography affecting trade, alliances or war. In the simulation, the dimensions which verbal theorists attribute to geographical forces and images cannot exist to the degree assumed by them.[37] In the following discussion of the instruments of foreign policy existing in the Inter-Nation Simulation, the absence of these constraints will be examined in terms of their theoretical significance.

The Threat or Use of Violence. Warfare in the Inter-Nation Simulation occurs if two or more states engage in a battle or series of battles the outcome of which is decided by stochastic calculations based on the amount of force used by both sides. Since the wars can consist of a series of battles "fought" in a sequential nature over a number of periods, the antagonists may negotiate during the war. However, there is no room for ambiguity concerning the source and scope of an attack with conventional forces and, therefore, no place for subversive or guerrilla war. The absence of para-military activities among states is matched also by the impossibility of a revolution's becoming a prolonged civil war. In its present development,[38] the INS conception of war is more or less classical since the antagonists acknowledge their positions, and the outcome is decided by a series of violent exchanges.

Except for the omission of subversive and civil wars,[39] however, the simulation's framework for warfare is compatible with contemporary theories on limited and full-scale nuclear or conventional war. In the simulation, the costs of defense and the degree of destruction resulting from war are such that the defense of the civilian-economic segments of the simulate nation cannot be successful against a full-scale nuclear attack. Although a few writers have maintained that the costs of certain types of nuclear war might not be prohibitive,[40] most assume that for the present the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons far exceeds the ability of states to defend themselves.[41] Moreover, the simulate decision-makers of the nuclear powers may employ most of the attack strategies which contemporary theorists and policy-makers have formulated. They may follow a counter-value or counter-city strategy by designating the basic capabilities of the enemy state as targets, or a counter-force strategy by directing the attack at the force capabilities (both conventional and nuclear) of the enemy state.[42] They may also follow a mixed strategy (both counter-city and counter-force).

In the Inter-Nation Simulation, the potential for limited war exists since states can launch limited attacks and respond in a limited fashion. However, there is some question whether the conditions exist for the development and use of limited war as many theorists assume it operates in the contemporary international system.[43] According to theorists like

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[36] E.g., in a simulation observed by the author in November, 1964, at Northwestern University, a state (Eastern European) which started out firmly in what would be analogous to the Soviet bloc suddenly switched to the analogue of the American bloc because in the context of the simulation it was more profitable, especially in terms of satisfying the Validators. The reaction of vested interest and habitual thinking which would hinder such a move in the referent world did not seem to be operating in the simulate world.

[37] Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *Foundations of International Politics* (New York; 1963), pp. 287–291, 303–315; Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 3: 120–151.

[38] The absence of conditions for a subversive or civil war situation in the simulation is in part a technical difficulty although this difficulty could be partially transcended through the use of a new unit of military capability.

[39] The following have emphasized the importance of this type of warfare: Robert Strausz-Hupé *et al.*, *Protracted Conflict* (New York, 1963), p. 42; Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (Garden City, 1958), p. 43; John F. Kennedy, "Nature of Conflict," in *To Turn the Tide*, Edited by John W. Gardner (New York, 1962), p. 68; and Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York, 1960), pp. 130–180.

[40] E.g., Herman Kahn, *Thinking About the Unthinkable* (New York, 1962), pp. 41–84.

[41] E.g., Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 376; J. David Singer, *Deterrence, Arms Control, and Disarmament* Columbus, Ohio, 1962), pp. 31–38; and Sprout and Sprout, *op. cit.*, pp. 51–68.

[42] For an explanation of terminology see Kahn, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

[43] Osgood, *op. cit.*, pp. 234–284; Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1957), pp. 114–145; Dean Acheson, *Power and Diplomacy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 46–56; and Raymond Aron, *On War* (Garden City, 1959).

Morton Halperin[44] and Thomas C. Schelling[45] and policy-makers like Secretary of Defense McNamara,[46] limited war and other uses of force which threaten but do not actually implement violence play an important role in contemporary international politics by symbolizing and communicating certain foreign policy positions. Moreover, the geographical and historical conditions which characterize the international environment are assumed to be essential in the limitation of overt violence as well as in the use of force for symbolic purposes. The geographical and historical context of INS might not be rich enough to provide the environment for the role of force as some theorists assume it to exist in the contemporary world.

Alliances. Also related to the use of force is the role of alliances as an instrument of foreign policy in INS. Whether or not to join a particular alliance system creates one of the clearest international policy choices for the Decision-maker. The only parametric restraint on the making and breaking of alliances is the calculation of VSns (National Security Validator Satisfaction). Since the national security of the state is calculated by the ratio of the strength of the state and its allies to the strength of those states not in the alliance, alliance-building and maintainance can become a tool in the Decision-maker's increasing his chances of staying in office.[47]

Added to this parametric construct is the development of the importance of alliances in terms of the expectation and attitudes of the simulate nations. In the Inter-Nation Simulation, alliances become more than simply a matter of increased military capability since the loss or gain of a particular ally would have little significance both in terms of the calculations of VSns and the strategic requirements of the system. Alliances become part of the process of communicating political resolve and presenting the image of a cohesive coalition.[48]

In INS, the type of pay-off resulting from alliances differs between the small and the large nations. The smaller nations can use membership in either of the blocs to increase their internal stability. Joining an alliance might raise the VSns high enough to bring some stability to a weak regime. In contrast to the relative high rate of specific return accruing to the smaller powers in a bloc, the super-powers gain little in terms of VSns or general military strategic advantage when a smaller state joins its alliance. The payoff generally received by a super-power from the entrance of a small power into a bloc is either the one already mentioned—the image of heading a strong, dynamic and cohesive coalition—or some political control over the small state. The latter payoff is a result of the fact that since the small power's membership in the alliance can be crucial in keeping its Validators satisfied, the super-power can threaten to oust the small state from the alliance, which in effect would pull the domestic support from its government. However, even this threat is limited since, given the bi-polar structure of the stimulation, the smaller power can always join the other bloc and regain Validator support.[49]

In the Inter-Nation Simulation, then, there is an inverse relationship between the size of the state and the military benefits resulting from the alliance. A number of verbal theorists also see a similar relationship between the strength of a country and the benefits to be derived from any given alliance. For example, analysts of NATO have maintained that it provides only a limited advantage to the United States in purely military terms.[50] It is generally, but not universally, assumed that the payoffs which do accrue to the United States are in the amorphous area of political control,[51] affirming political commitments,[52] and building a "World Community."[53] Contrary to the classical conditions, alliance policy both in the contemporary world and in the simulation is not primarily a tool of maximizing military strength for all parties concerned, particularly the superpowers.

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[44] Morton H. Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age* (New York, 1963), p. 4.

[45] Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York, 1963), pp. 53–80.

[46] Secretary McNamara has argued that the communist actions in South Vietnam represent a "test and a challenge of will and purpose" to the United States: *New York Times*, February 8, 1965. For a similar position see W. W. Rostow, *View from the Seventh Floor* (New York, 1964), p. 43.

[47] For a discussion of the way in which the calculation of VSns affects national security and international stability see *infra*, p. 574.

[48] From observation of the simulation and examination of related materials, the author feels that a great deal of action and strategy is focused on the question of membership in blocs—so much so that it cannot be explained merely in terms of keeping Validators satisfied.

[49] Observation of the simulation as well as examination of the simulation newspaper reveals that the threat of getting aid from the other bloc is present.

[50] E.g., Hans Morgenthau, "Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy," this REVIEW, 58 (1964), pp. 23–35; Ronald Steel, *The End of Alliance* (New York, 1964), p. 34. Those who make the "trip-wire" rationale of NATO, which is not a criticism but a defense, still imply that the alliance is not primarily valuable as a means of adding to American military strength. For an example of the latter rationale see Glen H. Snyder, "Deterrence by Denial and Punishment," in Davis B. Bobrow (ed.), *Components of Defense Policy* (Chicago, 1965), pp. 213–216.

Negotiation. Negotiation occupies an important place in the simulate Decision-maker's tools of foreign policy. Through negotiation, alliances are formed, foreign aid and trade agreements are concluded, and many of the internal demands of the society are satisfied. In the simulation, negotiation can occur through written messages, bi-lateral and multi-lateral conferences, and international organization meetings.[54] There are no restraints on the scope and nature of the negotiations except for the limitations developing from the milieu of the international system.

Given the programmed emphasis on consumption and national security, it is natural that simulation negotiations are often focused on economic and military issues. However, a perusal of the simulation newspaper will show that many conferences both within the international organization (the simulation's analogue to the United Nations) and outside it are concerned with issues only tangentially related to military-economic matters. Most theorists also see international negotiation as primarily concerned with military-economic interests, although they do not assume that there are no tangential issues involved.[55]

At the same time, however, many verbal theorists could not agree with the neglect of the impact of domestic restraints on the actual processes of negotiation. Since the Validators are concerned only with substantive issues,[56] there are no procedural restrictions on the negotiation process in the simulation. There is no room for the Decision-makers to "play to the populace" or for public opinion and special interest groups to inhibit certain types of negotiation. Writers like Fred Charles Ikle, Thomas C. Schelling, Bernard Cohen and Sir Harold Nicolson, who approach international negotiation from varied analytical viewpoints, agree that the "public" plays a very large part in the style, substance and outcome of diplomatic negotiations in the contemporary world.[57]

Finally, it can be argued[58] that the simulation does not provide the sets of specific issues which, according to some theorists, characterize the international environment.[59] In the referent world, disputes may arise over questions of procedure (e.g., who should visit whom) and precedent growing out of the historical and geographical setting, and may provide existential phenomena through which the essentials of bargaining can be achieved. Although the simulation structure does not preclude the development of a complex environment for the negotiating process, INS does not provide the necessary environment at this time.

Information Manipulation and Intelligence.

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[51] See George Liska, *Nations in Alliance* (Baltimore, 1962), pp. 117–141, for a discussion of the elements of political control as a complement to the military value of alliances; John H. Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York, 1962), pp. 134–143, 174–176 and Henry A. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership* (New York, 1965), p. 228–234.

[52] Snyder, *op. cit.*, p. 215; Liska, *op. cit.*, p. 30; Herz, *op. cit.*, p. 119; Robert F. Osgood, "NATO: The Entangling Alliance," in John G. Stoessinger and Alan F. Westin (eds.), *Power and Order* (New York, 1964), pp. 66–102, and Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership*, p. 11.

[53] E.g., Paul Nitze, "Coalition Policy and the Concept of World Order," in Arnold Wolfers (ed.), *Alliance Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore, 1959), pp. 15–30; J. W. Fulbright, *Old Myths and New Realities* (New York, 1964), pp. 79–108; and Robert Strausz-Hupé, William R. Kinter and Stefan T. Possony, *A Forward Strategy for America* (New York, 1961), p. 42.

[54] A full discussion of the role of the simulation's international organization appears *infra*, p. 576.

[55] Cf. Morgenthau, *Dilemmas*, p. 274, who considers diplomacy a technique of "accommodating conflicting interests." While the concept of interest is often used by Morgenthau and other realists to mean "power interests," they sometimes allow the term to stand for a large variety of interests not directly related to power politics. See also Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

[56] This has already been pointed out in the discussion of the role of Validator values in the national decision-making process. See *supra*, p. 563.

[57] Fred Charles Ikle, *How Nations Negotiate* (New York, 1964), p. 122; Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 6, 28; Schelling, *op. cit.*, pp. 29–30; and Sir Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (New York, 1964), pp. 41–54.

[58] I am not maintaining that there are no specific issues in the simulation but that the degree of specificity may not be great enough to provide a context for the international bargaining process.

[59] See Schelling, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–34; and Ikle, *op. cit.* pp. 7–22, 59–75, 26–42.

Information manipulation is another non-violent tool of foreign policy which the simulate Decision-maker may use. In the simulation, a newspaper is published which prints any news released by any state as long as it is "newsworthy."[60] Rumors and information designed to achieve objectives can also be transmitted through messages, conferences and the international organization. However, there is no real opportunity for states to use propaganda in the sense of appealing to the publics of other states. Because the Validators are sensitive only to economic and military values, Decision-makers can not appeal over the heads of the government to the people.

Although there is little agreement among the international relations theorists on how important propaganda is as a tool of foreign policy, most of them include it in their discussions of the instruments of statecraft.[61] As a tool of international influence, propaganda has become, in many ways, a substitute for coercive conflict in the contemporary era. In fact, a number of writers have characterized its use in military parlance. Concepts like propaganda warfare, psychological operations and propaganda offensive are used not only by journalists, but also by a number of academic writers on international politics.[62] However, these writers conceive of propaganda as a tool for pressuring the governments of states by influencing the constituencies of those governments.

Propaganda and other forms of information manipulation do play a role in the simulation on the level of communications concerning government intentions and actions. Given the power to issue news statements, the simulation Decision-makers can manipulate the news media concerning their own intentions. As far as the role of acquiring information concerning the conditions of economic and political stability within each state, all states have an equal capacity. This is because most of the information concerning the internal conditions and capabilities of all states is published in the statistical report appearing periodically in the simulation newspaper. Decision-makers have no trouble ascertaining the strength as well as the internal stability of all the states in the simulation. Although this feature can easily be altered by eliminating the statistical reports, the simulators have not done so generally, which implies that they feel intelligence capability throughout the state system is relatively homogeneous.

The assumption that intelligence capability does not vary greatly throughout the state system conflicts with a number of verbal theories. Although some, like Roger Hilsman, emphasize that it is not so much the intelligence as what is done with the intelligence which greatly influences foreign policy-making,[63] others maintain that it makes a great deal of difference in the operation of foreign policy.[64] Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley have argued that the techniques of intelligence have created one of the arenas of Soviet-American competition since World War II.[65]

Trade and Aid as Tools of Foreign Policy. The simulate decision-maker may use both trade and aid as tools of foreign policy. The initiation, reduction or elimination of trade and aid agreements represents an important set of policy alternatives in achieving internally defined objectives as well as wielding international influence. Two general assumptions regarding the role of trade and aid in international politics will be explored in this section: (1) the role of comparative advantage in foreign policy decisions, and (2) the effectiveness of aid and trade in exercising political control in the international system.

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[60] The operational code of the simulation newspaper is to publish releases by the national Decision-makers if they are newsworthy. Although the exact criteria of newsworthiness have not been explicitly stated, it is assumed that the Editor relies on his sense of relevance. Information on this subject was provided in a memorandum written by R. Roger Majak.

[61] E.g., compare the essays in John B. Whitton (ed.), *Propaganda and the Cold War* (Washington, 1963). While some of the writers (Whitton and Murray Dyer) emphasize the importance of propaganda as a tool of American foreign policy, others like George Allan and, to a lesser degree, Allan Dulles are more skeptical.

[62] E.g., Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *Foundations of International Politics* (New York, 1963), pp. 145, 151; Haas and Whiting, *op. cit.*, p. 200; Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p. 338; Strausz-Hupé, Kintner and Possony, *op. cit.*, pp. 253–285; and Alexander T. Jordan, "Political Communication: The Third Dimension of Strategy," *Orbis* (Fall, 1964), 670–685.

[63] E.g., see Roger Hilsman, "Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1961), pp. 209–220.

[64] George Modelski, *A Theory of Foreign Policy* (New York, 1962), p. 15; and Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (New York, 1963), pp. 237–255, where he argues that free societies are at a distinct disadvantage in protecting themselves from intelligence research.

[65] Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley, "Soviet-American Relations—A Multiple Symmetry Model," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 9 (1965), 37–54.

The Inter-Nation Simulation is constructed so that comparative advantage provides a basis for international trade, but the factor of comparative advantage is not so vital that it makes the requirement of economic interdependence a constraint on the foreign policy of most states. Conditions of comparative advantage can exist in the simulation because some states can convert BC's into FC's and CS's more cheaply than others.[66] However, the conditions of high economic interdependence are not programmed into the simulation so that Decision-makers are not generally "forced" to trade to satisfy Validators.

The question of whether international trade is merely a matter of comparative advantage and, therefore, not an inherent restriction on the political activities of states or a matter of international interdependence and, therefore, an inherent constraint on the international political actions seems to have been avoided by many writers on international politics.[67] Generally, the question of economic interdependence is raised only by writers of the Functional School, [68] those commenting on the Functional School,[69] or those discussing the economic and social functions of international organizations.[70] Therefore, the simulation construct, which treats international trade as a consequence of the law of comparative advantage but not as a result of the economic interdependence of contemporary international society, cannot be adequately evaluated in terms of the theoretical literature. Few, if any, contemporary verbal theorists on international politics treat economic interdependence as a constraint on political policy and, more significantly, few studies have been made of the political impact on the foreign policies of states by the growing economic interdependence of the international environment. In this case, the simulation poses a theoretical question which would be worth the serious study it has not received.[71]

The second assumption behind the simulation construction of economic tools of foreign policy is that aid and trade are potentially effective tools of great power control over small powers since the government receiving the benefits of the trade or aid can easily become dependent upon it. However, the effectiveness of this use of aid and trade by the strong power is dependent upon the ability of the small state to acquire the aid or trade somewhere else. Since a bi-polar structure is programmed into the simulation, the Decision-maker of a small state may "play-off" one of the super-powers against the other, which in turn neutralizes the political-control effect of the aid or trade agreement.

Analysts of foreign aid can be classified according to three general arguments concerning the use of trade and aid (with emphasis on the latter) as a tool of foreign policy. First, there is the position expressed by Organski that great use "can be made of economic wealth . . . in the realm of reward and punishment, for economic rewards are among the most important that one nation can offer to another."[72] The second position assumes that aid and trade have little affect as short-run tools of influence but can be used to influence the development of a favorable international environment.[73] Thirdly, a few writers maintain that aid cannot contribute to the achievement of either short-run or long-range objectives.[74]

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[66] Each state is given a generation rate for converting BC's into FC's and CS's as well as for regenerating BC's. Since the generation rates are varied for each state as well as each type of conversion, certain states have advantages in producing the various commodities. For a discussion of the operation of this factor see Guetzkow *et. al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

[67] E.g., Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, Sprout and Sprout, *op. cit.*, and A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York, 1960) found it unnecessary to treat the role of economic interdependence on the political behavior of states. Even an economically-oriented theorist like Organski treats economic interdependence only in terms of the social and economic functions of the United Nations (p. 394).

[68] E.g., Gunnar Myrdal, *Beyond the Welfare State* (New Haven, 1960), pp. 23–29.

[69] E.g., Inis Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares* (New York, 1964), pp. 344–367; Stephan S. Goodspeed, *The Nature and Function of International Organization* (New York, 1959), p. 505–506; and Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State* (Stanford, 1964), pp. 459–497.

[70] E.g., Organski, *op. cit.*, p. 394; and Werner Levi, *Fundamentals of World Organization* (Minneapolis, 1950), p. 89–149.

[71] I am not asserting that no work has been done on the technical question of the importance of international trade to the economies of states but that few theorists concerned with international politics have examined the question of whether or not the decision-makers of nations have an image of international economic interdependence which affects the type of political decisions they make. The discussions that have come closest to this issue (but do not directly confront it) are those dealing with the effect of economic sanctions on political behavior: e.g., Rita Falk Taubenfeld and Howard J. Taubenfeld, "The 'Economic Weapon': The League and the United Nations," in *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law* (Washington, 1964), pp. 183–205.

All three positions are compatible with the use of trade and aid in the Inter-Nation Simulation. The simulate instruments of aid and trade are potentially the useful tools envisioned by those making the first argument, although given the bi-polar structure of the simulate international system their usefulness is often as limited as those making the third argument assume it to be. Finally, aid and trade can be employed to build simulate international environment to the liking of the powerful nations. The super-powers can support the leaders who act in the manner which contributes to the international environment they consider favorable. Even the theory that economic stability will produce states which have moderate foreign policies and are immune to the overtures of the opposing bloc can be explored in the simulation.

III. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL ACTION

Like any social system, the simulate international system is a combination of formal and informal patterns of behavior. Since the simulate state system, like the actual, remains a decentralized social order as far as the distribution of international authority and power are concerned, informal patterns constitute its heart. The state is the prime unit of action and the sole entity capable of using force, at least at the initial stages of each simulation. Its patterns of activity form the basis of the system. Nevertheless, the simulate state system can be examined and analysed in terms common to the analysis of all social systems, particularly systems that are decentralized like the international system.[75] Questions concerning the nature and distribution of power, the requirements for the security of the members of the system, the prerequisites for general systemic stability as well as the processes and institutions for centralizing power and, hence, authority are as relevant to the simulate international system as they are to the study of the contemporary international system.

The Nature and Distribution of Power. In the simulation, there is room for the tangible as well as non-tangible sources of power which most theorists discuss.[76] The material sources of power are represented by the Basic Capability units and the state's ability to convert those units into Consumer Statisfaction units and Force Capability units. The intangible sources are represented in the background histories and the development of "game culture" creates aspects of prestige based on the context of the international system. As far as creating a specific model which explains the relationship between power and the ability of states to achieve their objectives in terms susceptible to empirical testing, INS is no more enlightening than the international relations literature.[77]

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[72] Organski, *op. cit.*, p. 154–155. Also see Hans J. Morgenthau, "Preface to a Political Theory of Foreign Aid," in Robert A. Goldwin (ed.), *Why Foreign Aid?* (Chicago, 1963), pp. 70–90.

[73] There are a number of different writers who hold this position with different slants to their rationalizations. However, they all dwell on the long-run pay-off. Cf. Max F. Milikan and W. W. Rostow, *A Proposal: Key to An Effective Foreign Policy* (New York, 1957), p. 10; George Liska, *The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy* (Chicago, 1960), pp. 221–229; Strausz-Hupé, Kintner and Possony, *op. cit.*, pp. 187–199; and Barbara Ward Jackson, "Foreign Aid: Strategy or Stopgap?" *Foreign Affairs*, 41 (1962), 90–104.

[74] E.g., Edward C. Banfield, "American Foreign Aid Doctrines," in Goldwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 10–32.

[75] It is useful to discuss the international system from the model of a domestic political system, especially if that model is highly generalized. For a helpful suggestion along this line see Chadwick F. Alger, "Comparison of International Politics," this REVIEW, 57 (1963), 406–420, where he suggests that the Coleman-Almond model of developing nations might be applied to the analysis of the international system; and Talcott Parsons, "Order and Community in the International System," in Rosenau, *op. cit.*, pp. 120–130. Also see Hans Kelsen, *Principles of International Law* (New York, 1952), pp. 13–18, for a discussion of international law in this framework.

[76] E.g., Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 110–166; Strausz-Hupé and Possony, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–146; Sprout and Sprout, *op. cit.*, pp. 136–139, 181–191; Organski, *op. cit.*, pp. 112–147; Bruce M. Russett, *Trends in World Politics* (New York, 1965), p. 2; and Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 139–145; Charles O. Lerche, Jr. and Addul A. Said, *Concepts of International Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963), pp. 64–68; and William G. Carleton, *The Revolution in American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1963), p. 12.

[77] Although there are abstract definitions of the

The simulation typology of states which, like any classification of states, rests on assumptions about the patterns of dynamism of state action, is based on both the distribution of military-economic capability and the nature of the governmental structure. There are generally two states whose BC's far exceed the others, and a number of middle and smaller powers whose BC's are distributed accordingly. The simulators use Decision Latitude and Background Histories to differentiate types of governments. Employing DL to express different ideological commitments and buttressing its use with the Background Histories, the simulators have created six basic types of nations: super-power/democratic, middle power/democratic, small power/democratic, super-power/autocratic, middle power/autocratic and small power/autocratic. Although these classifications of states are employed by many theorists,[78] the contemporary international relations literature contains many other classification systems which are more sophisticated and precise.[79]

Finally, the simulators use the same conception of blocs which most verbal theorists employ. In the more recent simulations, there have been three blocs: two of them headed by a super-power and one, consisting of a number of non-aligned nations.[80] Although there are no parametric constraints prohibiting the Decision-makers from disregarding the blocs, the background histories describe at the outset of each simulation what Richard N. Rosecrance calls the "tri-polar" world or Morton A. Kaplan calls the "lose bi-polar system."[81]

The Nature of National Security. The programmed aspect of national security is entirely based on a concept of relative military security. Validator satisfaction with regard to national security—one of the two societal demands which the Decision-makers must satisfy if they wish to keep their probability of staying in office high—is determined by the state's own general military capability plus the general military capability of its allies in relation to the non-allies in the system.[82] The survival of the

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concept of power such as Morgenthau's statement that power is "A psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised," (*Politics Among Nations*, p. 29), and there are sophisticated discussions on how to measure power (Russett, *op. cit.*, pp. 2–6, and Stephen B. Jones, "The Power Inventory and National Strategy," *World Politics*, 4 (1954), 421–452), there have been no adequate theoretical schemes to relate criteria or elements of power to the ability to achieve objectives or to exercise political control. The simulation structure does not provide the scheme, either. However, it leaves the relationship of criteria or elements of power and the operational significance of power open so that the patterns of action which eventually emerge may provide the theoretical groundwork for the more rigorous development of the concept.

[78] The general distinction between the great and small powers can be found in almost all of the international relations literature. However, the importance of government structure in patterning state behavior is a theoretical issue on which there is still controversy. There is the pure power theory (e.g., Organski, *op. cit.*, p. 300–305), which states that the distribution of power is the prime determinant of state behavior and the more ideologically-oriented writings of Strausz-Hupé, Kintner and Possony, *op. cit.*, pp. 27–44. The practice of newspapers and political leaders to divide the world between "Communist" and "Free" is also based on the assumption that ideology and government structure are a source of differentiating state types.

[79] Organski, *op. cit.*, pp. 326–337. Organski's terms "satisfied" and "dissatisfied" correspond very closely to the traditional ideas of *revisionist* and *status quo*. E.g., E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis* (London, 1954), pp. 103–105. J. David Singer, "The Political Science of Human Conflict," in Elton B. McNeil (ed.), *The Nature of Human Conflict* B. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1965), pp. 142–144. There have been some attempts in certain of the simulation runs to place certain personality types into specific roles. In this way, the simulators have tried to have greater control over the types of actors which indicated an attempt to develop a more specific set of categories for types of states. Also, see Driver, *op. cit.*, pp. 24–44.

[80] Many of the initial simulations were set up in a bi-polar structure. This includes the simulation used for the Brody study on the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Brody, *op. cit.*). However, the more recent simulations have employed the three-bloc system.

[81] Richard N. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston, 1963), pp. 210–211 and Kaplan, *op. cit.*, pp. 36–43.

[82] For discussion of the calculations of VSns see Guetzkow *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 126–127. The ratio effect between the two major blocs applies only for the calculation of VSns for the two mass blocs. The VSns of the neutral states is calculated on the basis of the ratio between the state's strength and the strength of the other neutrals. The basic assumption, according to Terry Nardin, a collaborator in the Inter-Nation Simulation, is that perceived national security is a function of the nation's strength relative to the strength of nations in the same range of power.

state is also dependent upon its ability to defend itself and to deter attack from others.

However, the simulate Decision-makers may add their own interpretation of the necessities of survival. Since the costs of war are so high for both the winner and loser and the question of deterrence plays a significant role in the preservation of security, the simulate Decision-maker may equate security not only with the capability to deter but also with the ability to make the deterrence threat credible. Once the credibility issue is raised, the whole spectrum of non-military factors can enter into the calculation of security.[83]

Hence, the heavy emphasis on relative military strength in the programmed aspect of security does not preclude the generalizing of the security concept to account for other factors. Although some verbal theorists continue to discuss national security in terms of the military protection of physical survival,[84] most have generalized this concept to mean not only the physical protection through military strength of the homeland but also maintenance of political commitments and even "a way of life."[85] Such a generalizing of the concept does violence to its original meaning but, nevertheless, has become one of the conditions of contemporary international relations in theory as well as practice. Although INS has programmed aspects which represent a military-oriented concept of security, the generalized concept which is expressed by many verbal theorists is not precluded by the simulation structure.

Moreover, there exists in the simulation the basis for what John Herz calls the "security dilemma" or what Reinhold Niebuhr and E. H. Carr call the interdependence of the "will-to-live" and the "will-to-power."[86] With Validator satisfaction with regard to national security based on the ratio of military capability between alliance systems, states are forced into a zero-sum situation where the increase in the military strength of one side automatically results in the decrease of security for the other. Out of this calculation basis stems both the arms race[87] and the competitions for allies[88] which verbal theorists find in the contemporary world.

Stability in the International System. Aside from the international stability resulting from nuclear deterrence which is so pervasive and generic that it is as difficult to analyse in the simulation as it is in the contemporary world,[89] there are a number of assumptions about international stability which can be compared to verbal theories.

First, stability in the simulation is conceived to be a function of a relatively equal distribution of power among the two major blocs. Since a ratio is employed in calculating the national security of each state, the more evenly distributed the power between the two blocs the more satisfied the Validators with their Decision-makers throughout the system. Any significant alteration in the distribution of military strength between the two blocs will result in an appreciable loss of Validation satisfaction for one bloc and an equal gain for the other bloc. If the power is evenly distributed, the Decision-makers in both blocs will have no trouble with their VSns rating, and they may concentrate on economic development.

A corollary to this emphasis on an equal distribution of power for international stability is the simulate condition that the internal cohesion and stability of the two blocs also contributes to international stability. If a state shifts its allegiance from one bloc to the other, there must be a change in the ratio of military strength between the two blocs which in turn could reduce the VSns so that its Decision-maker would be threatened. The cohesion of blocs, therefore, becomes essential for evenly distributed power. As mentioned earlier, the attention of the Decision-makers in the simulations seems to be focused on the question of membership in alliance blocs, and there has been some correlation between shifts or threatened shifts and the outbreak of war.

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[83] The question of the credibility of deterrence in the simulation is directly related to certain premises about the attitudes of the participants and the requirements for deterrence. Since there is no fear of devastation or death in the simulation, does the question of the credibility of threats arise? If so, does it structure the broad range of activities which shape the referent world?

[84] Strausz-Hupé and Possony, *op. cit.*, p. 532; Carr, *op. cit.*, p. 112; and Organski, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–57.

[85] For a presentation of the policy-maker's conception of the generalized concept of security see Fulbright, *op. cit.*, pp. 47–78. On the concept of security in American Foreign Policy see Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. *American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age* (New York, 1965), pp. 1–3. For a theoretical approach using the generalized concept of security see Haas and Whiting, *op. cit.*, pp. 61–64.

[86] Carr, *op. cit.*, p. 112; Herz, *op. cit.*, pp. 231–243; see also Anatol Rapaport, *Strategy and Conscience* (New York, 1964), pp. 105–109 for a discussion of the implications of this type of attitude.

[87] Kenneth E. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense* (New York, 1962), pp. 34–35; Anatol Rappoport, *Fights, Games and Debates* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1960), pp. 31–46.

[88] Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore, 1962), p. 218.

[89] For a discussion of the role of credibility and deterrence see *infra*, p. 575. Also, for a research experiment dealing with problems of stability and nuclear weapons using simulation see Brody, *op. cit.*

The general consensus in the theoretical literature runs counter to the assumption of the Inter-Nation Simulation on this point. Thinking in terms of the classical international system where flexibility in alliances and at least four major powers were considered essential to the preservation of international stability, many writers today maintain that a bi-polar system is less stable than a multi-power system.[90] However, there are a few writers whose position supports the assumptions of the Inter-Nation Simulation. For example, Robert E. Osgood writes that "on the basis of an historical analysis of the development of alliance systems and their relationship to changes in the nature military power during the past two centuries, . . . since the end of the nineteenth century international order and stability has come to depend not on multipolarity but upon fairly rigid military alliances and prudent management of peacetime military power, including the arms race."[91] Likewise, Talcott Parsons maintains that the bi-polar structure of contemporary international politics will contribute to the development of a more integrated international society in the long run although it may increase short-run instability.[92] Finally, a number of theorists maintain that regardless of the stability of the bi-polar structure, it will remain a constant in the international system for a long time.[93]

Implicit in the simulation structure and related to the question of international stability is the framework for super-power relations. The two simulate super-powers are caught in a "security dilemma," since the increase in military strength of one will result automatically in the loss of military strength for the other. However, given the overall value of a relatively equal distribution of power among the two blocs in terms of the stability of the VSns and the mutual loss that would occur from a nuclear war, the simulate-super-powers are certainly not implacable enemies. Although mutual distrust which grows out of the "security dilemma" and hostility resulting from the ideological slants of the historical background inhibit super-power collaboration, the structural attributes of the system do not preclude it.

The framework for super-power relations in INS is compatible with many theorists' conception of the basis for Russian-American relations in the contemporary world. Writers using game theory concepts, like Schelling, Rapoport and Kaplan, have developed the mixed-motive and non-zero sum game in their analysis of the super-power relationship.[94] A number of writers[95] as well as policy-makers[96] have also noted the existence of conditions for super-power cooperation in the contemporary world.

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[90] The writers who see the bi-polar structure contributing to international instability can be divided into two groups: (1) those who think that the bi-polar structure itself cannot last and (2) those who feel that even if it does last, it is inherently unstable. The former group includes Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 360–361; Wolfers, *op. cit.*, p. 127; and Rosecrance, *op. cit.* pp. 212–215. The latter includes Kaplan, "Bi-Polarity in a Revolutional World," in Morton Kaplan (ed.), *The Revolution in World Politics* (New York, 1962), pp. 262–266; Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," *World Politics*, 16 (1964), 390–407; Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 143; Herz, *op. cit*, pp. 109–166. Generally, the position that a United Europe or a strong neutral bloc will contribute to international stability is advocated by persons speaking as a political representative of a nation following a policy based on their force idea (France, India, UAR, etc.). For a group of writings by these figures, see Walter C. Clemens, Jr. (ed.), *World Perspectives on International Politics* (Boston, 1965), pp. 178–200 and 238–250. For an examination of the various effects of the non-Western areas on international stability see the essays in Laurence W. Martin (ed.), *Neutralism and Non-Alignment* (New York, 1962); and J. W. Burton, *International Relations: A General Theory* (Cambridge, Eng., 1965). For a discussion of the role of Europe as a third force see George Liska, *Europe Ascendent: The International Politics of Unification* (Baltimore, 1964), pp. 106–107 and 150–162.

[91] In a private letter to the author dated June 25, 1965.

[92] Talcott Parsons, "Polarization of the World and the International Order," in Quincy Wright, William M. Evan and Morton Deutsch (eds.), *Preventing World War III* (New York, 1962), pp. 310–332.

[93] Clemens, *op. cit.*, pp. 13–20. Also see Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bi-Polar World," *Daedalus* (Summer, 1964), 881–910.

[94] Schelling, *op. cit.*, p. 89; Rapoport, *op. cit.*, pp. 75, 110–124; and Kaplan, *System and Process in International Relations*, pp. 181–187.

Formal Patterns of International Interaction. With the exception of the I.O. Charter, there are no international norms comparable to international law in the simulation. This is not to say that the simulators assume there are no international norms. Although the simulate international norms are not expressed as an authoritative law,[97] they nonetheless operate on two levels. First, they are apparent in the relative homogeneity of the national decision-making structures and function as part of the simulation calculations. Secondly, international norms develop in the simulation as a result of the "game culture." In this respect, the simulation I.O. fulfills a useful function by providing a common international institution where mutual international values and attitudes can be developed, crystallized and expressed.

The omission of a formal set of norms comparable to international law is not as incompatible with the theoretical literature as might appear. Assuming that the Inter-Nation Simulation is concerned with international *politics* rather than international *relations*, the neglect of international law could be sanctioned by a number of theorists. Several writers on international politics,[98] and a few on international law,[99] maintain that a political community must precede the operation of an effective international law of politics which leads them to conclude that at this time international law is not really central to the political activities of states. Although some writers do not deny a political role to international law—especially in the resolution of conflict[100]—the neglect of international law by the simulators is certainly not incompatible with the position of a number of verbal theorists. However, I feel that the inclusion of international law in the simulation would provide a source of specific issues generally lacking. Ritualistic actions and implicit bargaining patterns receive increased impetus from international law, even in the contemporary environment.[101]

The international organization, which is the simulation analogue to the United Nations, functions in ways conceptualized by most theorists. First, although principles affirming collective security are expressed in the I.O. Charter, the voting structure gives representation and effect to the bi-polar distribution of power. The two super-powers are given the right to veto all action unless that veto is over-ridden by three-fourths of the I.O. Considering the bloc structure that usually exists in the simulation runs, this formulation gives the super-powers *de facto* control over the I.O. Most commentators would agree that the super-powers have a large measure of actual control over the United Nations.[102]

The I.O. Charter contains the inherent ambiguity between the concept of sovereignty and the concept of international cooperation that most theorists find in the United Nations Charter.[103] The deviations from the principle of collective security in Articles 51 and 52 and the tension between sovereign rights and international responsibilities in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter appear in the Preamble and Articles 10 and 11 of the I.O. Charter.

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[95] Halperin, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–30; Ole R. Holsti, Richard A. Brody and Robert C. North, "The Management of International Crisis: Affection and Action in American-Soviet Relations, October 1962," in *Studies in International Conflict and Integration* (Stanford, mimeo.).

[96] E.g., Fulbright, *op. cit.*, pp. 55, 61; and President Kennedy's "American University Speech," June, 1964.

[97] For a discussion of this conception of international law see William D. Coplin, "International Law and Assumptions of the International System," *World Politics*, 17 (1965), 615–35.

[98] Most of those writers on international politics who de-emphasize the role of international law in politics are "realists." Usually reacting from what they term "legalism" in American foreign policy, the realists maintain that "rigid legal norms" could never enable the United States to achieve its objectives. For a discussion of this point see Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 60–61; George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900–1950* (Chicago, 1951), p. 95; and Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 275 (in spite of the fact that he cautions against too much skepticism toward international law).

[99] Writers on international law who have most closely approached this position are Charles De Visscher, *Theory and Reality in Public International Law* (Princeton, 1957), pp. 71–95; and Gerhart Niemeyer, *Law Without Force* (Princeton, 1941), pp. 134–207.

[100] E.g., Richard A. Falk, "World Law and Human Conflict," in McNeil, *op. cit.*, pp. 227–248; Michael Barkun, "Conflict Resolution Through Implicit Mediation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 8 (1964), 121–31; and Roger Fischer, "Fractionating Conflict," in Roger Fischer (ed.), *International Conflict and Behavioral Science*, (New York, 1964), pp. 91–110.

[101] The lack of specifity was discussed *supra*, p. 569. For a treatment of the aspect of international law mentioned above see William D. Coplin, *The Functions of International Law* (In press).

[102] Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 480; Goodspeed, *op. cit.*, p. 605; and Levi, *op. cit.*, pp. 3–44.

[103] Hans Kelsen, *The Law of the United Nations* (New York, 1950); Claude, *op. cit.*, p. 23; and Goodspeed, *op. cit.*, pp. 10–13.

The functions of the I.O. in the simulate international system closely parallel those attributed to the United Nations by verbal theorists. First, the I.O. can serve as an international institution where contacts among governments can be easily maintained to facilitate diplomatic intercourse.[104] Secondly, the I.O. can serve as an institution for preserving international stability by isolating and resolving conflict.[105]

Finally, the I.O. provides a medium for the interaction of states through which a game culture can be developed. This is important for two reasons. First, the politics of the international organization become part of the politics of the international system. Disputes over agenda and conflicting attempts to influence the decisions of the I.O. become stakes in the international arena.[106] Secondly, the I.O. provides a system through which attitudes concerning success can be communicated to all of the participants in the system. In short, the I.O. constitutes a process of socialization in the simulate international system just as the United Nations does, according to some writers, for the contemporary international system.[107]

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

If there is one obvious conclusion from the preceding discussion, it is that the Inter-Nation Simulation is a theory-building exercise conducted not by a number of unsophisticated psychologists who have run out of experiments, but rather by a group of scholars who are well acquainted with the verbal theories of international relations. Moreover, the creators of the simulation have been eclectic in their approach. Their model has as much in common with "traditional" as with "non-traditional" theoretical positions.

INS as a theory-building exercise is valuable not because it produces new hypotheses but because its eclecticism provides the medium through which the existing verbal theories can be made more explicit and coherent. Both explicit and abstract because of the nature of the nature of the simulation technique, INS represents a model operationalizing many of the existing theoretical positions in concrete and testable terms. Forced to represent an entire universe of international politics, the simulators have interrelated numerous middle range theories so that a coherent international system is simulated. This does not mean that the simulators are not interested in developing "new" middle range theory but that the strength of the Inter-Nation Simulation as a theory-building exercise lies in its eclecticism.

The by-product of this eclecticism is to force a greater degree of rigor on the formulations of verbal theorists. While verbal theorists writing in the "traditionalist style" are able to becloud their theoretical positions with all the techniques employed by skillful polemicists since man began to write, and those writing in the "non-traditionalist medium" can introduce their equivocations by loosely defining the relationship between variables or by attaching so many conditions to their hypotheses that insight is sacrificed for validity, the simulators have been forced to allow a few hypotheses to suffice in describing a very large and complex set of phenomena. This greater explicitness in formulating and applying assumptions is valuable to all theorists because it identifies more clearly theoretical questions, aids in classifying the positions of other theorists on those questions and, in some cases, poses theoretical questions that have not been explicitly raised by the verbal theorists (e.g., perception of comparative advantage in decision-making).

This is not to say that every assumption in the Inter-Nation Simulation is expressed at a satisfactory level of explicitness. The role of ideological, cultural and historical values in the national decision-making process is left to a process which the simulators themselves can explain only in terms of the "black box." The idea of the "game culture," which is crucial to the behavior of the simulate actors particularly in relation to bloc politics and the use of force, is neither adequately controlled nor rationalized in the simulation structure. This lack of explicit development of the game culture concept is particularly significant, since many of the simulate strategies depend upon assumptions about the behavior patterns of other participants. Moreover, it could be argued that simulations which rely on human decision-makers will never be completely explicit.[108]

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[104] Chadwick F. Alger, "Decision-Making Theory and Human Conflict," in McNeil, *op. cit.*, pp. 250–271 and Lincoln P. Bloomfield, *The United Nations and U. S. Foreign Policy* (Boston, 1960), p. 120.

[105] John G. Stoessinger, *The Might of Nations* (New York, 1965); Bloomfield, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–63; and Claude, *op. cit.*, pp. 285–302.

[106] For a treatment of the United Nations as an arena for great power competition see Bloomfield, *op. cit.*, pp. 105–134 and Amitai Etzioni, "International Prestige and Peaceful Competition," in Wright, Evan and Deutsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 226–246.

[107] For a discussion of the socialization function of the United Nations see Chadwick F. Alger, "United Nations Participation as a Learning Experience," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27 (1963), 411–426. Alger also has worked on the Inter-Nation Simulation at Northwestern University. See also the suggestion of Quincy Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

At the same time, there are certain substantive weaknesses in the INS model itself. The neglect of such non-military/economic factors as pressures upon the Decision-makers, the de-emphasis on history and geography and the lack of an opportunity for subversive war could permanently limit the usefulness of the model if not corrected. However, these limitations and others are not inherent in the simulation technique and can be corrected in future simulations, In fact, steps are already underway to make some of the corrections.

Notwithstanding these limitations in the present model, INS represents an essential supplement to the verbal theorist. It is a process of theory-building operated by a group of scholars and open to investigation from many quarters. Therefore, it is a dynamic undertaking inviting the kind of criticism necessary for its development and at the same time complementing the task of the verbal theorist. While it can never be a substitute for the study of the referent world, INS can serve the theorist by providing a vehicle for making explicit his vaguely articulated assumptions and for creating a general model where the implications of his hypotheses for the entire state system can be evaluated. At the very least, by requiring the verbal theorist to be explicit or by subjecting his imprecise hypotheses to explicit formulation, the Inter-Nation Simulation can force some discipline on what has hitherto been a discouragingly inexplicit field of study.

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[108] For this reason, the Inter-Nation Simulation and man-computer simulations in general may be considered way-stations on the path to all-computer simulations. The latter development depends on the evolution of computer techniques in simulating the various aspects of human behavior (cognitive, affective, etc.). If this argument be accepted, the role of man-computer simulations of international relations like the Inter-Nation Simulation can be viewed as contributing to the development of the all-computer international relations simulation by aiding in the creation of explicit variables and hypotheses.

THE MUSLIM LEAGUE IN SOUTH INDIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN MINORITY GROUP POLITICAL STRATEGIES

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How can a religious minority organize most effectively to protect its interests without weakening the distinction between religion and politics by which advocates of a secular state justify equal treatment for the minority? As in Europe earlier in the century, this problem is again acute in some of the so-called "New Nations" of Asia and Africa where national integration is far from complete and religion is still the primary mode of self-identification among many of its communicants. If a minority faith is geographically concentrated so as to constitute a majority in certain extensive areas, it is likely to seek independence, merger with an adjacent state of the same religion, or at least provincial autonomy if its members believe that their religious identity is threatened by assimilation.[1]

Of the great world religions, Islam provides the most difficult case of adjustment to minority status by separation of religion from the state.[2] The leaders of the Muslim minority of British India finally set the objective of separate national independence in 1940 after they had concluded that they could not rely upon constitutional guarantees to safeguard their rights against the Hindu majority.[3] But the creation of Pakistan in 1947 left a substantial though scattered Muslim population of some forty million in the Indian Republic, ten percent of the latter's people. Suspected by many Hindus of further divisive intentions, how was this group to act within the framework of parliamentary and at least ostensibly secular democracy?

The familiar alternatives in Western political systems have been: (a) to form a distinct political party which might extract concessions by holding the balance of power in the bargaining for the formation of a governing coalition within a multi-party situation (for instance the Catholics in Bismarckian and Weimar Germany); (b) to join various secular parties and work from within them (like Protestants in Catholic Europe and Latin America); or (c) to operate through non-partisan pressure group organizations (like the Jews in the United States).

Most observers of Indian politics since independence have agreed that Muslims took the second of these paths.[4] Much of the educated and politically experienced elite, it is asserted, had opted to go to Pakistan.[5] The Indian National Congress, which had retained the allegiance of some of the most secular Muslims as well as some of the most orthodox *ulema* (doctors of religious law) throughout the agitation for Pakistan,[6] made conscientious efforts to absorb the remaining notables of the Muslim League as well as their mass following.[7] For instance, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the leading nationalist (i.e., Congress) Muslim, worked tirelessly through the *Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind* to encourage the lost sheep to return to the Congress fold.

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[1] R. A. Schermerhorn in "Minorities: European and American," *Phylon* 20 (June 1959), 178–185, cites Louis Wirth "Problems of Minority Groups" from Ralph Linton (ed.), *The Science of Man in the World Crisis* (New York, 1954) on four types of minority orientation: pluralistic, assimilative, secessionist and militant. The research for the present paper was done while the author was a Fulbright Research Professor in India in 1963–64 on leave from Bates College. The paper was delivered at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in New York, April, 1966.

[2] Donald E. Smith, *India as a Secular State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 40; see also P. Hardy, "Traditional Muslim Views of the Nature of Politics" in C. H. Philips (ed.), *Politics and Society in India* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1963), pp. 24–38.

[3] Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims, a Political History 1858–1947* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1959), pp. 266–269.

[4] E.g., Norman D. Palmer, *The Indian Political System* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), p. 212.

[5] Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (New York: New American Library, 1959), p. 276.

[6] See Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963).

[7] Sisir K. Gupta, "Moslems in Indian Politics, 1947–1960," *India Quarterly*, Vol. XVIII (Oct.–Dec., 1962), p. 366; *Link, Indian Newsmagazine*, May 28, 1961, quoted Sadiq Ali, General Secretary of the A.I.C.C., as saying, "We are against the League and not the Leaguers."

Like so much analysis of Indian politics, these generalizations are based, one suspects, largely on North Indian experience. In South India the Muslim League has survived because of a radically different religious context:

(a) Islam came to the South peacefully compared to the North.[8] Arab traders propagated their faith by persuasion and example rather than by conquest and force. They intermarried with Hindu women and produced the Moplahs of Malabar, the Navayats of Kanara and the Lebbais, Marrakayars and Rowthers of Madras. Thus,

(b) most South Indian Muslims speak dialects of the Malayalam, Tamil and Gujerati languages of their Hindu neighbors. Linguistic barriers to communication do not exist.[9]

(c) Only during the brief rule of Hyder Ali and Tippu Sultan in Mysore, the Sultans of Madurai in the fourteenth century and the Nawabs of Arcot in the eighteenth have Muslims dominated parts of the South politically.[10] Therefore they have remained self-reliant merchants, fishermen and peasants who do not look to the government for jobs and privileges as much as their coreligionists in the North.[11]

(d) The Muslim community's leadership was not drained off to Pakistan in 1947 in marked contrast to the North. When partition came, only one Muslim legislator from Madras province, Haji Abdus Sattar Sait, a member of the Central Legislative Assembly, emigrated. As another former legislator commented to me, "We southerners would find the culture and even the language of Pakistan strange."[12] Consequently, there has been less erosion of Hindus' confidence in the Indian loyalties of Muslims.

By contrast, Choudhry Khaliquzzaman of Uttar Pradesh, who was Jinnah's first choice to succeed him as leader of the Muslim League in India, defected to Pakistan in October, 1947.[13]

(e) As a result of all the foregoing conditions, practically no communal rioting accompanied partition in the South. The relative amicability of Hindu-Muslim relations in Madras is also promoted by the fact that the major source of tension in that province in the twentieth century has been the Brahmin vs. non-Brahmin rivalry, which has diverted attention from the Muslim minority.[14]

(f) Finally, there are local pockets in Malabar on the southwest coast with Muslim majorities.[15] Since the Moplahs who live there have a tradition of devotion to Islam, they are susceptible to the appeals of an avowedly Islamic political party like the Muslim League whose candidates have consistently won state assembly seats in Malappuram and Tirur. Unlike Kashmir and Murshidabad District in West Bengal with their Muslim majorities contiguous to Pakistan, Malabar is too far away to excite either the fears of the Hindus or the hopes of the Muslims for secession.

Thus South India affords a better test case of how Muslims relate politically to a non-Muslim majority in a professedly secular state than the North with its exacerbating historical experiences and propinquity to Pakistan. This fact may give a study of the South greater potential predictive value for some future period when these disturbing factors may dwindle in the North too. The present paper will be concerned with the debate within the South Indian Muslim leadership over the best minority political strategy in the circumstances.

A study of this experience over the nearly twenty years since Indian independence reveals five basic strategies which have been pursued: first was the attempt to retain separate representation through various electoral devices; second, the policy of alliance with the Congress party on the basis of recognition of the Muslim League as exclusive representative of Muslim interests; third, coalition with opposition parties against Congress; fourth, joining the dominant party individually to work from within it; fifth, reliance on "non-political" organizations either alone or in conjunction with other minorities.

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[8] Murray T. Titus, *Islam in India and Pakistan* (Calcutta: Y.M.C.A. Publishing House, 1959), Chapter III.

[9] True, in the North, Urdu developed as a *lingua franca* between the Persian-speaking Muslim conquerors and their Hindu subjects, but this tongue has now come to be identified largely with Muslims and is rejected, along with the Persian alphabet, by many North Indian Hindus in favor of Sanskritized Hindi, written in Devanagari script, so Urdu has become a bone of contention instead of a bridge between communities.

[10] I am excluding the Deccan where Muslim rule lasted six hundred years so the situation is more comparable to North India's.

[11] See my "Muslim Legislators in India, Profile of a Minority Elite," *Journal of Asian Studies* 23 (February 1964), p. 262.

[12] Personal interview, M.S. Abdul Majeed, May 19, 1964. The Provincial League President, Syed Mohammed Pasha, however, also emigrated.

[13] See "Betrayal of Muslims" in *Tarjuman*, 1 (May 15, 1963), pp. 3–7 and his own account in *Pathway to Pakistan*, (Lahore: Longman's Green, 1961).

[14] See Robert L. Hardgrave Jr., "The D.M.K. and the Politics of Tamil Nationalism," *Pacific Affairs*, 37 (Winter 1964–65), 396–411, and Eugene F. Irschick's forthcoming *Politics and Social Conflict in India; the non-Brahmin Movement and Tamil Separatism 1916–29.*

[15] Malabar District in the old Madras State had 34% Muslims, *Census of India 1951*, Vol. III, Part IIB Tables, p. 145; Kozhikode District (Calicut) of Kerala State has 42% Muslims, *Census of India, Paper No. 1 of 1963, 1961 Census —Religion*, p. 15.

I. SEPARATE REPRESENTATION

At least since the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909, the Muslim League had benefitted from and therefore defended the reservation of legislative seats and separate electorates for the Muslim population of British India. These devices naturally tended to favor "communal," that is to say, religious party, candidates.

The All India Muslim League had been founded at Dacca in 1906[16] on the basis of the "two-nation" separatist theory and remained throughout its pre-partition history a primarily North Indian organization but centered on the Muslim minority areas, especially the United Provinces. Although some individual Muslims in the Madras legislature were members at least as far back as the 1920's, the party was not organized to contest elections with official candidates in the South until 1936.[17] The princely states in that region such as Hyderabad, Mysore, Travancore and Cochin tended, if anything, to favor the Muslim minority in government appointments, the chief aim of communal organizations, so the "States' Muslim League" (as it was called in princely India) was weak or nonexistent within them.

In the Malabar district of Madras Presidency, however, the Moplahs became politically conscious in 1921 through the quixotic *Khilafat* Movement. Despite the espousal of this Islamic cause by Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress, the Non-Cooperation method soon degenerated in that area into a hopeless rebellion by the Moplahs against both the British rulers and Hindu landlords which was bloodily suppressed. During the mid-1930's when Mohammed Ali Jinnah revived the moribund League and ceased to cooperate with Congress, the same split developed in the Malabar Muslim leadership as in the North: Mohammed Abdur Rahman and Moidu Moulvi, two surviving leaders of the 1921 revolt, stayed with Congress while others, including Seethi Saheb, B. Pocker, K. Uppi Saheb and M. Mohammed Ismail of Madras, chose the League.[18]

Once the League was well set up, it had no difficulty in sweeping the separate polls since there were no effective landlord parties to compete with the League for the Muslim seats as, for instance, the Unionist Party did in the Punjab. Of 36 reserved seats in the Madras legislature (29 in the lower house, 7 in the upper), it captured all but ten in 1936 and the whole lot in 1946 despite the patent irrelevance of the Pakistan proposal to South India.[19]

After partition, Muslims were still well represented in both the state legislative assemblies and the Constituent Assembly of India (indirectly elected from among the members of the former) despite the sudden reduction of the minority's proportion of the population from 25% to 10% by the creation of Pakistan in the Muslim majority areas. This incongruous strength was by virtue of the "weightage" given minorities under the British India Act of 1935. Almost all of these legislators had been elected on the League ticket in 1946 although only those from Madras still formally adhered to the party.

The matter of most vital concern to this residue in the drafting of the Constitution was the question of representation. Within a couple of weeks of independence, the Constituent Assembly voted, as a compromise between the perennial majority and minority positions, to retain reserved seats for Muslims as well as the Scheduled Castes (Untouchables) during a period of ten years, but to abolish separate electorates.[20] Two active South Indian

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[16] Ram Gopal, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

[17] K. M. Seethi Sahib, "The Progress of the Muslim League in Kerala," in *Kerala State Muslim League Souvenir*, (Calicut, 1959), pp. 7–30 (Translated by U. A. Beeran) says there were no branches outside Madras City before 1935; Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League, its History, Activities and Achievements*, (Agra: Agra Book Store, 1954), pp. 27, 246, attributes the founding of the League in Madras to Seth Yakub Hasan, who was expelled in 1937 for accepting a place in the Congress ministry.

[18] *Kerala Muslim Directory*, (Cochin: Kerala Publications, 1960), pp. 378–395 (Translated by K. Vijaya Raghavan).

[19] Times of India, *Indian Year Book and Who's Who, 1937–38, 1947;* there was some talk of carving out a "Moplahstan" in Malabar. *Tarjuman*, Vol. I, No. 3 (June 1, 1963), p. 5.

[20] The following account is taken from Raza Khan's *Tarjuman*, Vol. I, Nos. 14–15 (Dec. 1, 1963), pp. 3–6 and from The Tamilnad Muslim League Conference (September 17–18, 1960) *Report Presented by Mr. K. T. M. Ahmed Ibrahim, General Secretary.*

Leaguers, B. Pocker from Malabar and K.T.M. Ahmed Ibrahim (brother of the new League President, M. Mohammed Ismail of Madras), thereupon moved an amendment to retain the separate communal vote as well. It received little support even among the other Muslims, and Sardar Vallabbhai Patel, the Congress Home Minister who was in charge of minority problems, pointed out the divisive effects of this method. When his motion was defeated, Ahmed Ibrahim made a final effort with an amendment to require that candidates elected by a joint roll to reserved seats must secure at least thirty percent of the votes of their own community. This too was voted down, but it provoked Patel and the Congress to begin reconsidering their temporary concession of reserved seats to Muslims. Two years later in 1949 when the report of the Advisory Committee on Minorities was debated, the League President himself was an Assembly member and again moved the retention of both safeguards. Z.H. Lari of Uttar Pradesh intensified Congress resentment by adding a provision for cumulative voting in multimember constituencies. Patel angrily rejected both motions and this time was aided by two North Indian Muslims, Begum Aizaz Rasul of U.P. and Tajamul Hussain of Bihar, who argued that it was better to trust the good will of the majority community than to depend upon guarantees which would only isolate the Muslims in a perpetual political minority. The question of who really represented Muslim public opinion was much debated, but the outcome was that the original concession of reserved seats was lost too, which can only point to the conclusion that the League leaders had overreached themselves.[21]

Subsequently the League, charging gerrymandering against Muslims, shifted its position to a demand for proportional representation with single transferable vote or Lari's proposal of cumulative voting.[22] The latter existed until recently in elections to the Bombay Municipal Corporation and made it possible for the League to elect four out of its five candidates to that body in April, 1961.[23]

Procedural reforms like these, of which the older Muslim leaders are still enamoured, are no real solution to the problem of adequate representation. After all, this was the very conclusion reached by the pre-partition League which led it to demand Pakistan. With these devices, a few more members of the religious minority would get into office, but probably at the cost of solidifying Hindu self-consciousness and polarizing the two faiths again as in the 1940's. J.A. Laponce, who has exhaustively studied electoral methods for protecting minorities, has warned that the closer a separate religious minority party comes to obtaining a majority of legislative seats, the more dangerous it is likely to appear to the dominant majority, with a consequent increase in the latter's cohesion and hostility to the former.[24]

II. ALLIANCE WITH THE DOMINANT PARTY

At the level of state politics, the League, where it has survived in the South, has oscillated between two strategies: one of seeking recognition from the ruling Congress Party as the sole representative of Muslims, and the other of attempting to forge a coalition of minor parties to oust Congress and convert the "one party dominant" system into a genuinely competitive multiparty system.[25]

Once the League had achieved its primary objective, the creation of Pakistan, the remnants of the party in India confronted the dilemmas of whether, and if so how and for what purposes to continue a separate political organization of the minority. In the tense months following independence, one after another of the provincial and district branches of the League disbanded.[26] When the final meeting of the All India Muslim League was held at Karachi December 14–15, 1947, to sever the Indian and Pakistani segments of the party, it was decided that the members from each country should meet by themselves to ponder their respective futures.[27] The choice of a Convenor for the Indian section was difficult because few of the remaining leaders wanted to shoulder the responsibility and take the risk of calling a meeting of Muslims in his city under the existing conditions of communal riot and massacre. Since Madras, as mentioned above, had been almost entirely free of disturbances, the recently chosen President of its provincial League, M. Mohammed Ismail, was now designated Convenor.[28]

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[21] *Tarjuman*, Vol. II, No. 1 (May 1, 1964), pp. 3–7; and Donald E. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 409.

[22] *Election Manifesto of Indian Union Muslim League*, issued in connection with the General Election, 1962, published by M. Mohammed Ismail Saheb, Chromepet, Madras, January 1962, p. 36.

[23] Personal interview with Haji Noor Mohammed Ahmed Sait, Jan. 13, 1964. Six Congress Muslims, two Communist and one P.S.P. were also elected. *Municipal Councillors' List*, Bombay, September 1961.

[24] J. A. LaPonce, "Protection of Minorities by the Electoral System," *Western Political Quarterly*, 10 (1957), pp. 324, 338.

[25] The terms are taken from Fred R. von der Mehden, *Politics in the Developing Nations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964).

[26] Times of India, *Indian and Pakistan Yearbook and Who's Who, 1949*, p. 509.

[27] "All India Muslim League Meeting in Karachi," *Tarjuman*, Vol. I, No. 16 (Dec. 15, 1963), pp. 10–12.

Ismail summoned the Indian delegates to meet at Madras on March 10, 1948, but only 30 of 147 came, and those mostly from the South (19 from Madras, 5 from Bombay and 3 from Mysore). Uttar Pradesh, the historic home of the party, was practically unrepresented and so it was that the center of the League's activity shifted halfway across the subcontinent. Even within the rump session there was disagreement with the idea of continuing as a political party. P.P. Hasan Koya, a legislator from Malabar, backed by M.S.A. Majid of Madras, moved to dissolve the party's political activity, but after a hot debate they were defeated. A compromise resolution moved by P.K. Moideenkutty, another Moplah, was then passed, 23–7, that "the Muslim League shall now devote its attention *principally* to the promotion of the religious, cultural, educational and economic interests of the Muslims of the Union."[29] The League's legislature parties were to be retained and a subcommittee was appointed to frame a new constitution for what was now to be named the "Indian Union Muslim League." Significantly, the committee was directed to provide for "joining with *any* other political party that can deliver the goods for the people." A policy of electoral coalitions was clearly anticipated. The constitution ultimately passed in 1951[30] contains no mention of the above compromise clause but does empower the League's Council "to ally itself or cooperate with any other organization in the country whose aims and objects and program of work are identical with or approximately identical with those of the Muslim League."

The question of whether to turn to Congress or its foes for alliance was much debated within the Muslim League of Madras as the first general election approached in 1951. Mohammed Ismail negotiated first with the state Congress leadership, but set conditions which if acceptable locally were not approved by the Congress High Command in New Delhi: that Congress accept unaltered a list of League nominees from Ismail and not run any Muslim candidates itself.[31] When rejected, the League Council resolved to oppose Congress, Communists and Socialists alike in the election, although Ismail allowed the Bombay branch, now called the "Fourth Party", to take the opposite course of backing Congress.[32] Post-election maneuvering in Madras, as we shall see in the next section, actually achieved the coveted Congress recognition as an official party and also, surprisingly, an invitation to its members to attend the important Congress Legislature Party meetings!

Later the same year, Dr. P. Subbaroyan, the Tamil Nad (i.e., Madras) Congress President, reached an agreement with the League for the municipal elections by which the latter would be allotted seats in each town according to the Muslim proportion of the population in return for supporting Congress candidates for the rest. The pact was repudiated by Congress, again probably under orders from New Delhi, but the two parties together did achieve a majority in Tiruchirappalli which made possible the election of a Congress chairman.[33]

Two years later (1954) the Rajagopalachari cabinet fell in Madras. The shrewd state Congress President, Kamaraj Nadar, himself took over the reins as Chief Minister and restored stability to Madras by undercutting the anti-Brahmin demands of his foes. First, however, he had to obtain a seat in the Assembly, which required a by-election. The constituency he chose, Gudiyattam near Vellore, apparently had an appreciable Muslim minority, for he approached the League for help and received it unconditionally.[34] This informal alliance continued during the Malabar District Board elections where the first big League conference since partition had taken place in 1953.[35]

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[28] *Tarjuman*, Vol. I, No. 2 (May 15, 1963), pp. 3–7.

[29] *Resolutions Passed at the Meeting of the Council of the Indian Union Muslim League Held on 10-3-48 at Madras*, Madras, 1948, and personal interview with P. P. Hasan Koya, April 13, 1964. Emphasis added.

[30] *Constitution of the Indian Union Muslim League* (Passed at the meeting of the Council held on 1st September 1951). Emphasis added.

[31] Abdul Latif Farookhi in *Madras Legislative Council Debates*, 1952, Vol. VII, March 20, 1952, p. 188.

[32] K. T. Sheriff to M. Mohammed Ismail, 14-8-1961, in *Correspondence Between Members of the Council of the Indian Union Muslim League and its President Mr. M. Mohammed Ismail Sahib*, Madras, 1961, p. 16.

[33] Report of K. T. M. Ahmed Ibrahim, *op. cit.*, pp. 12–13.

[34] Seethi Sahib, *op. cit.;* Kamaraj's role is explained in R. Bhaskaran, "Aspects of Political Leadership in Madras," unpublished paper delivered at the Round Table of the International political Science Association, Bombay, Jan., 1964.

Meanwhile, the process of reorganizing Indian state boundaries along linguistic lines got under way with the detachment of Andhra from Madras in 1953, followed by the creation of a new Kerala state, with a Muslim population of 18%,[36] out of Malabar and the former princely states of Travancore and Cochin in 1956. This drastic truncation of Madras completely changed the context within which the Muslim League had to operate. The removal of the areas in which the Communist Party had its strongholds reduced Congress dependence upon the marginal votes of the League. The loss of Malabar to Kerala three years later meant another shift of the League's own power base to a state even more remote than Madras from the northern center of Indian politics. The transformation of Madras from a multilingual state to an overwhelmingly Tamil-speaking one resulted in the replacement of English by Tamil as the official language of government, including the legislature, to the disadvantage of those Muslims whose mother tongue was Urdu and to the advantage of the Tamil-speaking Lebbais.[37]

In these unpropitious circumstances, Ismail nevertheless rejected Kamaraj's offer to adopt as Congress candidates for the forthcoming 1957 general election any ten Muslims for the legislature and three or four for Parliament whom the League leader would designate in return for his endorsement of the whole Congress slate. If elected, these ten would safeguard Muslim rights. If they were dissatisfied with the treatment of Muslims, they could resign from Congress and publicly declare their reasons for doing so. Ismail's counter price was too high. He demanded: (1) that the League be recognized as the sole representative of Muslims; (2) that the League leaders select *all* Muslim candidates; (3) that these nominees run on a Muslim League ticket which Congress would then support.[38]

The negotiations broke down again. Ismail regarded Kamaraj's proposal as tantamount to the dissolution of his party. He also looked upon it as a purely personal arrangement which would not outlive him. Instead, he set up no official candidates at all this time, but backed a handful of Muslim Independents and took special care to work for the election of the Hindu opponents of the Congress Muslims, K.S.G. Haja Sheriff, A.A. Rasheed and S. Khader Sheriff, except for his own former employer, M.J. Jamal Mohideen. In contrast to 1952, the Congress machine worked smoothly; all four Congress Muslim legislative candidates and two for Parliament won handily. The League had reached its low ebb. Out of the debacle, it saved only its usual safe Malabar seats (now in Kerala) which grew to eight plus one member of Parliament. In Kerala the party had to present its eighteen candidates as Independents because it was not recognized by the Election Commission.

Ismail's apparently suicidal policy in the first two general elections provoked a long-brewing crisis in the League Council in October, 1956. That infrequently-summoned body had declined by deaths, retirement, defection and emigration to a mere eight members. Three of them, Mohammed Raza Khan, M.S.A. Majeed, K. T. Sheriff, protested against the fruitlessness of fighting Congress in elections and then joining forces with it unconditionally afterwards. They urged instead that the League back Congress in toto from the beginning without demanding anything in return in order to win the good will of the party in power. President Mohammed Ismail used the votes of a number of "special invitees" to the Council from Malabar and Tiruchirappalli to smother the proposal. The three dissidents then withdrew, told the press their position and stayed aloof from active participation in the party and the 1957 election.[39] The rebels were in a poor position to press their case because of the rather authoritarian character of the party's 1951 constitution. It gives the President the right to nominate Council members (Article 6,a,iii) and the Working Committee (Article 8), to convene meetings of both at his pleasure (Articles 10a and 11) and in general, to "exercise all powers inherent in his office" (Article 21). The powers of the General Secretary are also in the President's hands because his brother, K.T.M. Ahmed Ibrahim, holds that office.[40]

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[35] *Debates* 1954, Vol. VII, pp. 347, March 9, 1954; for the Malabar meeting, see *The Hindu*, Oct. 25, 1953.

[36] Census of India, Paper No. 1 of 1963, *1961 Census—Religion*, p. 15.

[37] A Question in the Legislative Council (*Debates*, *1955*, Vol. X, March 17, 1955, p. 562) elicited the information that in 1954, 332 speeches in the Council were still in English and only 34 in Tamil; the number was more nearly even in the Assembly: 596 and 515 respectively. S. K. Ahmed Meeran estimates that about 90% of Madras State Muslims have Tamil as mother tongue and only 10% Urdu. Personal interview, May 13, 1964.

[38] Correspondence, *op. cit.*, Raza Khan, M. S. A. Majid and K. T. Sheriff to M. Mohammed Ismail, August 5, 1961, pp. 4–5.

[39] R. V. Krisna Ayyar, ed., *All India Election Guide* (Madras: Oriental Publishers, 1956), p. 72.

Out of a professed desire not to hurt the community by "washing its dirty linen in public" and perhaps impressed by the greater success of Ismail's tactics in Kerala, the three splitters kept quiet until 1961 when Raza Khan completed his second term as a member of the Madras Legislative Council. Then in August, September and October, after petitioning the President for a meeting of the Executive Committee, again to no avail, they appeared at a series of League Primary Unit meetings to explain their position and try to win away the membership from him.[41] They protested about the lack of party elections, financial accounting and Council meetings and charged Ismail with misleading Muslims into dangerous antagonism with the majority party and community. Consequently they demanded a return to the non-political aims and activities specified in the March, 1948 resolution. Despairing of budging the leader, they organized a new party, the "All-India Muslim League" (in contrast to his "Indian Union Muslim League") on October 29, 1961 and released their correspondence with him for publication.[42]

The new party proceeded to support the Congress in the approaching third general election. Besides the usual requests for better representation in the civil, police and military services and in the legislatures, it asked that all Muslims, not just the Lebbais, be declared a "backward community" in Madras to gain the educational concessions accompanying that status, and urged relief measures for Indian nationals forced out of Burma and Ceylon. It took a strong stand against the Constitution-burning demonstrations of the D.M.K. party with which Ismail was now allied. In the opportune timing of this split in the Muslim League, one can't help but suspect the hand of that master politician, Shri Kamaraj Nadar. At the least, he must have subsidized Raza Khan's new periodical, *Tarjuman*, in which the editor's version of League history was retold.[43]

Ismail was not slow to retaliate, hurling invective at the seceders in his Urdu monthly, *Nusrat*,[44] and defending his political tactics in the English-language organ of the League in Delhi, *Siraat*: "Without politics no organization can speak of or secure rights, particularly in a democratic setup where politics enters everywhere."[45] He accused them of being mere office-seekers and of exploiting the popularity of the party's name among Muslims for their own purposes. Their activities, he concluded, "have placed them outside the pale of the Muslim League." Letters to the editor in *Link* and *Siraat* showed that non-Muslims found the two as like as Tweedledum and Tweedledee while Muslims found the similarity of names confusing.[46]

Ismail's disparagement of his pro-Congress rivals as a mere "handful of people" turned out to be correct. Raza Khan had lost touch with the Muslim community during his nine years in the Legislative Council and the Muslim masses stayed with Ismail, as demonstrated in the municipal elections described below. Raza quarreled with Majeed, who wanted to give all-out support to Congress whereas Raza really preferred a more independent policy of dickering between parties and swinging the vote to whichever would deliver the goods to Muslims. A few unofficial candidates of the new party in the 1964 municipal election made a poor showing so Kamaraj lost interest in its leaders. Raza was unable to get back into the Legislative Council via the Graduates' Constituency in 1964 and by 1965 seemed to be drifting back to his original affiliation.[47]

The other case of League alliance with Congress came in the quite different circumstances of Kerala in 1959–61 where Congress, far from enjoying its usual easy preeminence, had actually been driven from power for two years by the Communists.

The princely states of Travancore and Cochin had had Muslim cultural and educational organizations at least since the 1920's[48] and individual Muslims sat in the state legislatures in seats reserved for the minority just as in British India. For instance, K.M. Seethi Sahib, the late League Speaker of the Kerala Assembly, started his political career as a Congress member of the Cochin Council in 1928. But here as in the other princely states, the Muslims were somewhat isolated from the All India Muslim League of Jinnah and the Pakistan Movement as well as being fewer in numbers than in Malabar. The Travancore League went through various metamorphoses depending on whether the nationalist or the "communalist" wing was dominant, alternatively asserting and abjuring its interest in partisan politics. When Kerala was formed in 1956 out of Travancore, Cochin and Malabar, the Malabar League had to organize the southern part of the new state all over again. In November of that year a conference at Ernakulam chaired by Ismail formed the Kerala State Muslim League to combine the two sections.

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[40] Constitution of the Indian Union Muslim League, *op. cit.*

[41] *Hindu*, Aug. 21, Sept. 4, 14, Oct. 4, 1961. The whole episode seems to contradict Myron Weiner's finding that "the greatest enthusiasm for splits [in minor parties] has come from the rank and file . . . ," *Party Politics in India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 229, 240.

[42] *Resolutions of the First Madras District Conference, All India Muslim League,* held on November 3, 1963, p. 2.

[43] M. S. A. Majid denies this (personal interview, May 19, 1964) but Raza Khan admits that the support given their organization by the Madras Congress hurt them with their own community (interview, May 24, 1964).

[44] *Link*, Nov. 12, 1961, p. 14.

[45] *Siraat*, Nov. 1, 1961, p. 1.

[46] *Link*, Dec. 3, 1961; *Siraat*, Feb. 16, 1962.

[47] *Siraat*, Jan. 1, 1965, p. 8, mentions his presence at a meeting of the Indian Union Muslim League at Cannanore along with Ismail, Bafakhy Thangal and Abdus Samad.

In preparation for the 1957 general election, the Congress High Command appointed S.K. Patil of Bombay to guide the Kerala Congress. He and the Praja Socialist (P.S.P.) leader, Pattom Thanu Pillai, met Seethi Sahib, Secretary of the League, on December 19th to discuss a triple alliance against the rising Communist Party. Enemies of the League, such as K. P. Keshava Menon, the influential editor of *Mathrubhumi* of Calicut, appealed to Prime Minister Nehru over the heads of the Congress emissaries and the proposed front was vetoed as in Madras.[49] With three- and four-cornered races, a Communist cabinet came to power, the first in history to obtain a majority in a free election. Actually it can be argued that this Communist victory frightened the Congress leadership sufficiently to make it condone the formation two years later of exactly the kind of tripartite coalition envisaged by Patil in 1957 and so long advocated by Ismail in Madras.

The instability which has characterized Kerala politics ever since independence and which made possible the Communist victory of 1957 has been explained in terms of: (1) a briefer and less intensive struggle for independence than elsewhere in India, which produced an untried and undisciplined Congress Party; (2) communal rivalries between fairly evenly matched Brahmins (6% but prestigious), Nairs (17%), Ezhavas (25%), Christians (24%) and Muslims (18%), which continued after their common foes—British and princely—disappeared; (3) factional bickering in Congress and allegations of corruption and nepotism against its leaders undermined popular confidence in the ruling party.[50] Since 1948 the state has had seven elections (1948, 1951, 1954, 1957, 1960, 1962, 1965), nine ministries and three periods of presidential rule, averages approximating those of the notoriously unstable French Third and Fourth Republics. From the point of view of a minority however, such evenly balanced forces and frequent shifts of power might afford better opportunities for political bargaining than where Congress is always in control.[51]

As the Congress, and particularly the Christian minority within it, became ever more desperate to remove the Communists from power because of that party's infiltration of the police and civil service, the League found itself in the happy position of being courted by both sides, "ins" and "outs". Ismail and Syed Abdur Rahiman Bafakhy Thangal, the State League President, cannily resisted the blandishments of the opposition and announced that each issue would be considered on its merits.

Eventually fear of isolation, the desire for recognition by the Congress and distaste for the "godlessness, violence and immorality" of the Communists[52] determined the League to cast its lot with the Congress and P.S.P. In June 1959, a "Three Party Joint Standing Committee" launched a "Liberation Movement" or Gandhian direct action campaign to drive the Communist ministry from office by creating such disorder that the Central government would have to step in and proclaim Presidential Rule, which it did on July 31, 1959. Even then the Muslims balked to the last minute at closing down their own few private schools for fear of educational paralysis in an already disadvantaged community. However, once the agitation got under way, Leaguers, despite their lack of experience in *satyagraha*, joined with enthusiasm in demonstrations and underwent the usual police charges and arrests. Congress and League, Hindu, Christian and Muslim displayed a unity against a common foe which they had not enjoyed since the 1930's. The party flags were flown together and leading Congressmen spoke from League platforms.

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[48] "The Age of Renaissance" in *Kerala Muslim Directory*, *op. cit.*, pp. 303–316 (Translated by K. Vijaya Raghavan).

[49] K. P. Keshava Menon and U. A. Beeran, personal interviews, April 15, April 12, 1964.

[50] Jitendra Singh, "Communism in Kerala," *Political Quarterly*, 31 (April 1960), p. 189.

[51] In my chapter in Donald E. Smith's forthcoming *Religion and Politics in South Asia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), I argue that Congress factional politics have not been as beneficial to the Muslim Community as genuine multiparty competition. This conclusion also seems implicit in Paul R. Brass, *Factional Politics in an Indian State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), pp. 146, 184.

[52] *Hindu*, Aug. 9, 1959, p. 10.

Once the Communists were ousted, the partners still had to reach an electoral arrangement for the February 1960 special election or the outcome of 1957 would be repeated and all would have been for nought. But with the immediate threat of Communist rule removed and the League committed to the Congress side, the long range implications of too open an alliance with a "communal" party began to be brought to the attention of the High Command by the Congress Left wing and nationalist Muslims.[53] How could Congress resist Hindu communalist pressures like those from the Jan Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha in the North, they argued, if it succumbed to Muslims in the South? The P.S.P., on the other hand, was small and desperate and had no such responsibilities or compunctions. Nehru and his lieutenants had rationalized at first that it was the Communists who had started the flirtation with the League, and that anyway the Kerala branch of the organization was democratic and not separatist as the old League had been. Negotiations for a division of seats to be contested by the three partners proceeded to a satisfactory conclusion. Thus Ismail gained what he had sought for in vain in Madras in 1952 and 1957: Congress support for League candidates on a League ticket, though he couldn't prevent his allies from putting up some of their own Muslims too. The League's enemies managed to forestall a common election manifesto and to hedge the implied promise of a League seat in the post-election coalition cabinet.

As it turned out, the electoral coalition was too effective for League purposes. Although the party increased its Assembly delegation from eight to eleven by winning with all but one of its allotted candidacies, Congress captured an absolute majority of seats and therefore no longer depended on both of its small allies. This left the League in a not very satisfactory tactical position in 1960. It had contributed to a resounding coalition victory over the Communists and thereby reduced its own usefulness to the Congress. What would the party get for its efforts? Immediately a crisis arose over the formation of the new ministry. League leaders insist that there was no preelection commitment, either written or oral, for League representation in the cabinet.[54] They stoutly maintain that their only purpose in joining the Liberation Movement of 1959 and the election alliance was to "wipe out the Communist menace." Preelection discussion of the division of offices would only have played into the latter's hands. At the same time they add, "none of the Congress leaders told us there would be any difficulty including the Muslim League in the Ministry . . . Nobody said either that the League did *not* want or would not get a ministership." In fact they charge it was the Congress newspapers and campaigners, such as S. K. Patil and P. T. Chacko, the Christian leader, who declared that there would be a joint ministry of all three parties.

Complicated negotiations followed in Kerala and New Delhi. The P.S.P. and some of the Kerala Congressmen felt honor-bound to insist on League participation in the government while others, especially those from Malabar and nationalist Muslims like A. A. Rahim, T. O. Bava and Moidu Moulvi, joined with the North Indian Congress leadership as in 1957 to block it. Prime Minister Nehru, repeating his tragic historic error of 1937 in U. P.,[55] now found the League's election manifesto objectionable because it was too much like that of the pre-partition body of the same name. Presumably what nettled the Congress chief most was the League's persistent claim to be the sole representative of Muslims and its demand for proportional representation.[56] Otherwise, its program was practically indistinguishable from the Congress's in its endorsement of planning, the "socialistic pattern of society," industrialization, Harijan uplift, land ceilings, education, prohibition and an end to corruption.

As substitutes for a state cabinet seat, Nehru offered the Speakership of the Kerala Assembly (because it did not entail responsibility for government policy) and a place in the Rajya Sabha (the upper house of Parliament) as symbols of continued cooperation. Stung by the High Command's ingratitude, the League now insisted that it not be discriminated against; either it must be included or the Congress must form a one-party ministry. The P.S.P. loyally resolved not to join without the consent of the third member of the alliance. Congress refused the gambit, knowing all too well that factional strife within its own ranks would render its slim majority unstable. It wished to nail down its partners' support by giving them office but without cabinet rank. Various Congress negotiators countered with two more proposals: a joint Assembly party (even more objectionable to the High Command) or a P.S.P.—League minority government. Experience of the first such ministry in 1954 in Travancore-Cochin showed how briefly that would endure. The deadlock broke when Congress dangled the Chief Ministership before P.S.P. leader Pattom Thanu Pillai and lured him into persuading the League to settle for the Speakership. The next month Seethi Saheb, the senior League legislator, was elected to that office and Ebrahim Sulaiman Sait to the Rajya Sabha. Nationalist Muslims were placated by the elevation of P. P. Ummer Koya to the Ministry and Nafeesath Beevi to the Deputy Speakership, thus reasserting the Congress position that it too represents Muslims.

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[53] E.g., the Congress Socialist Forum (*Hindu*, Sept. 23, 1959), Maulana Hifzur Rahman (*Hindu*, Aug. 4, 1959), P. K. Moideenkutty, (*Hindu*, Nov. 30, 1959).

[54] C. H. Mohammed Koya, *Kerala Ministry Formation and the Muslim League*, (Calicut: Green House, 1960) (Translated by U. A. Beeran); Personal interview with Syed Abdur Rahiman Bafakhy Thangal, April 15, 1964.

[55] In 1937 Nehru prevented a Congress—League coalition in the United Provinces which might conceivably have forestalled partition. See Ram Gopal, *op. cit.*, pp. 247–249.

[56] *Manifesto of the Indian Union Muslim League with Particular Reference to Kerala State*, (Chromepet, Madras, 1959).

Despite this crisis, the coalition might have limped along for the full five-year term of the Assembly had it not been for two untoward events: the communal riots in Jabalpur (Madhya Pradesh) in February, 1961, and the death of Seethi Saheb on April 17th of that year. The former event produced a distinct stiffening in the Congress attitude towards "communalism," as formulated in its Durgapur Resolution, and even led to discussion of a ban on communal parties, clearly aimed at the League. The other event reopened the whole question of the League's position in the government. All parties agreed that the new Speaker must be a Muslim, but the same men who had stood against League cabinet entry in 1960 now hypocritically invoked a sort of *rebus sic stantibus* doctrine to renege on the earlier agreement with the League and demand the election of Nafeesath Beevi, the Congress lady Deputy Speaker.[57] Ismail strongly rejected all non-League Muslims for the post and threatened to break up the alliance unless his party got its due. The Communists tried to widen the breach between their foes by offering to vote for a Congress candidate, and, failing that, offered one of their own Muslims, Aysha Bai. Eventually saner counsel prevailed within the Congress and a compromise was effected whereby C. H. Mohammed Koya, the League's candidate, would be elected provided he resigned his legislative party affiliation beforehand. Thus Congressmen would technically not be voting for a Leaguer. Koya reveals in his description of the imbroglio that his party's leaders had a hard time convincing the younger members to swallow this humiliation for the sake of unity against the Communists.[58]

Not only did Seethi Saheb's Speakership have to be filled but also his Assembly seat. Pressure was applied by the All India Congress Committee to the Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee not to endorse the League's candidate for the latter, Mohsin Bin Ahmed. When further word came from New Delhi not even to leave the seat uncontested, the distraught Kerala Congressmen refused on the sensible ground that no Congressman could win against the League in this Muslim constituency. The alliance in this by-election was far more tenuous than in 1960 because, on paper, Congressmen were simply told to vote as they liked; only verbally did orders come down to work for Mohsin.[59] A young Congressman, K. Kunhi Mohammed, not without encouragement from higher up, rebelled at this blatant evasion and stood as an Independent with the all-too-willing aid of the Communists. He was suspended by the K.P.C.C. for his audacity and lost the election by a wide margin.

The straw that broke the League camel's back was laid on that Fall when Congress President Sanjiva Reddi announced that his party would "have no truck" with its erstwhile ally in the third general election.[60] K. Hassan Gani, League Assembly leader, warned that his party could function just as comfortably in opposition, and the party's Council voted to treat Congress thereafter with reciprocity.

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[57] *Hindu*, May 30, p. 5; June 7, p. 1; Aug. 13, 1961, p. 7.

[58] C. H. Mohammed Koya, *Muslim League and the Kerala Assembly Speaker Problem* (Calicut: Green House, 1961) (Translated by U. A. Beeran). Unlike the Madras case (Footnote 41), this seems to fit Myron Weiner's proposition.

[59] Personal interview with P. P. Hasan Koya, April 13, 1964.

[60] *Hindu*, Oct. 9, p. 6; Oct. 12, 1961, p. 11; C. K. Govindan Nair, K.P.C.C. President and always hostile to the League, is said to have been instrumental in this decision, winning out over Chacko and Shanker, who replaced the P.S.P. Chief Minister in Sept. 1962.

But the ruling party didn't really need the third partner's assembly votes as long as the P.S.P. stayed with it, so when in November, 1961, the League broke from the alliance and Koya resigned his speakership, it can accurately be said that Congress had driven it out.[61]

The League has burnt its fingers each time it has allied itself with the Congress because of the irreconcilable contradiction between Ismail's demand to be accepted as the sole channel of Muslim political expression and the North Indian Congress leaders' equally doctrinaire dislike of any party based on religion. As long as Congress thinks of itself as representing all legitimate interests in the nation and the opposition as in some sense "un-Indian," it will not be a comfortable alliance partner for any party, let alone a religious one.[62] Now that Nehru is gone and the more practical Madrasi, Kamaraj Nadar, as President of Congress is one of his chief successors, the way may be open for an eventual resumption of the relationship unless the war with Pakistan in 1965 has spread religious animosities to the South. Ismail on his side has shown greater flexibility in dealing with his new allies, the D.M.K. and Swatantra Parties. If his party and Muslims in general are to reap more benefits from political bargaining, they can't afford to be taken for granted by the opposition any more than by Congress.

III. ALLIANCES WITH OPPOSITION PARTIES

It will be recalled that the resolution of the League meeting at Madras in March, 1948 as well as its constitution of 1951 opened the door to alliance with *any* other political party. While President Mohammed Ismail for years harbored an understandable preference for working arrangements with Congress as the government in power in succession to the British, he was also prepared to dicker with the opposition when negotiations with the ruling party foundered.

In the first general election of 1951–52 when Congress spurned him, he threw his support to some forty or fifty Independent candidates in Madras apparently hoping that no party would achieve a majority and the League would hold the balance of power. Of Muslim candidates, Ismail designated fourteen (13 for M.L.A. and one for M.P.) to run in the League's name and six (3 each for Assembly and Parliament) also as Independents. The latter ruse may have been employed so that credit could be claimed if any unlikely candidate won but he could be disavowed if he lost; or it may have represented an effort to attract non-League and even non-Muslim votes in particular constituencies. It is noteworthy that only eight of the twenty were incumbents from 1946. The rest of the sitting legislators apparently shied away from certain defeat or were businessmen who feared antagonizing the ruling party. Two other former sitting Leaguers (P. K. Mohideenkutty and S. K. Ahmed Meeran) contested unsuccessfully as Congressmen, and one (Abdul Latif Farookhi) as an Independent.[63] Congress put up a total of fifteen Muslims in Madras (12 for Assembly and 3 for Parliament). Ismail purposely worked against these men, whom he regarded as traitors, even if it meant directing his followers to vote for Hindus, in order to validate his claim that the League alone could represent Muslims.

The results, as elsewhere in India, were disastrous for Muslim participation in the law-making bodies: the League seated only five M.L.A.'s (including one Scheduled Caste member)[64] and one M.P., all from Malabar, while the Congress captured only two places for the minority community. How low had the proud League of 1946 fallen only six years later! One other resource remained to Ismail: the victorious Independent Hindu candidates whom he had endorsed. From among them, his lieutenants, M. S. A. Majid and Mohammed Raza

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[61] *New York Times*, Nov. 11, 1961.

[62] W. H. Morris-Jones, *The Government and Politics of India*, (London: Hutchinson, 1964), p. 33.

[63] Farookhi commented bitterly afterwards (*Debates, op. cit.*), "If we had put forward reasonable demands the Congress or Praja Party or the Communist would have given us enough opportunities [*i.e.*, nominations] and the number of Muslims in the new legislature would have been much more than what it is. I have not gone . . . with a begging bowl . . . to any party and asked for their ticket. I stood as an Independent and got defeated. It was the duty of some party or other to ask me to stand on their ticket, but they did not do so. I have played my part well . . . did not flatter government or cringe." Another former Muslim legislator told me he advised Kamaraj to put up one Muslim candidate in each district to win the minority's confidence but was told they must command at least 20% of their own community's votes and be able to raise thirty thousand rupees for the campaign.

[64] S. V. Kogekar and R. L. Park, *Reports on the Indian General Elections, 1951–52*, (Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1956), p. 89, say there was an alliance between the League and the Scheduled Caste Federation for this seat and one at Kalyandrug in Anantapur.

Khan, canvassed for votes in the indirect, preferential ballot for members of the upper house of Parliament (Rajya Sabha). They barely scraped together the minimum necessary thirteen in the Madras Assembly (5 League, 5 Independents and 3 second and third preferences) with which to send the party President to New Delhi. The next year Raza Khan was himself elevated to the state Legislative Council in similar manner.[65]

Congress itself emerged from the first general election in a very shaky position in Madras because of the Kamma-Reddi caste rivalry in coastal Andhra, anti-Brahminism of many Tamils and neglect of Malabar.[66] In this crisis the tiny delegation of Leaguers appeared to be in a good bargaining position. The Communist, Praja and Socialist parties tried jointly to organize a united front with the many Independents to prevent formation of a new Congress ministry by C. Rajagopalachari, the former Governor-General of India, and approached the League to cooperate in this plan. The party refused, professedly on religious grounds, to join a coalition of atheists.[67] It also cited the need for stability in the state which such a diverse coalition could not supply. Rajagopalachari then solicited Uppi Saheb, the League's Assembly leader, for the party's votes against a motion of no confidence and obtained them *without conditions!*[68] It is surprising that Uppi Saheb didn't negotiate for a League seat in the cabinet as the Tamil Nad Toilers Party and the Commonwealth Party did,[69] but the confidence vote turned out 200–151 in favor of Congress so it would appear that the Muslims were outmaneuvered and lost their "swing-vote" advantage. What they did gain from "Rajaji," besides the exclusion of Congress Muslims from the cabinet, was his coveted recognition as an official party. This demonstrates that Ismail's real purpose was alliance with Congress and also illustrates the narrow limits within which he could bargain with the opposition when he found their atheism even more distasteful than Congress secularism.

The second general election (1957) found the League's opportunities for maneuver even more circumscribed in Madras but simultaneously broader in Kerala because of states' reorganization as described above. C. N. Annadurai, Chief of the Tamil separatist party, D.M.K. (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam), approached Ismail for an electoral alliance but proved at that time to be unwilling to accept the latter's conditions: a cessation of attacks on religion and the disavowal of secessionist aims.[70]

The League did reach an agreement in Kerala with the Praja Socialist Party,[71] but it made little difference because the two parties' areas of strength lay in opposite ends of the state: the League in the North, the P.S.P. in the South. Without an arrangement with the Congress, they were not strong enough to stem the Communist tide. Actually the League benefitted to the extent that it garnered enough votes to be recognized by the Central Election Commission as a state party which could have its own ballot symbol in the next election.

The party used its increased strength in the Kerala Assembly after 1957 to press a number of both religious and economic demands: in the former category, restoration of religious instruction in schools, the removal from textbooks of passages offensive to Muslims, and an end to old Madras State restrictions on the building of new mosques and madrassahs (seminaries) in Malabar; in the latter category, more reservations (10% instead of 7.5%) for Muslims as a "backward community" in colleges and civil service and their promotion to higher posts in the latter, the appointment of a Muslim to the Public Service Commission and the Kerala High Court, and more government investment in Malabar.[72]

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[65] *Correspondence, op. cit.*, M. S. A. Majid to M. Mohammed Ismail Saheb, 14-8-61, pp. 14–15. Raza Khan sat first as an Independent and then joined the United Party, a purely legislative group. *Debates, 1953*, Vol. V, July 25, 1953, p. 357.

[66] On the background of Congress weakness in Madras, see Lloyd Rudolph, "Urban Life and Populist Radicalism; Dravidian Politics in Madras," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 20 (May 1961), 283–297. Selig Harrison has sought to explain Communist strength in Andhra at that time in terms of a Kamma-Reddi caste rivalry in *India, the Dangerous Decades.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). This view has been modified by Carolyn Elliott in her unpublished paper, "Caste and Politics in Andhra Pradesh," delivered at the Association for Asian Studies meeting, April 5, 1966.

[67] Speeches by K. M. Seethi Sahib and K. Uppi Sahib, *Madras Legislative Assembly Debates*, 1952, Vol. II, July 2 and 3, 1952, pp. 315, 373.

[68] Seethi Sahib, *op. cit.*

[69] Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 55. See also Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, "The Political Role of India's Caste Associations," *Pacific Affairs*, 33 (March 1960), 16–19.

[70] Personal interview with M. Mohammed Ismail, May 21, 1964; and *Siraat*, Dec. 1, 1961, p. 2.

[71] P. K. Kunju, personal interview, April 9, 1964.

The Communist cabinet of Nambudiripad conceded some high-level Muslim appointments and promotions, mosque-building permits, expunged undesirable textbook passages and backed down on its proposal to eliminate communal reservations.[73] In fact the Communists challenged the League to prove that their regime was not safeguarding Muslim interests. Rank and file Muslims did not share the intense indignation of Christians over the government's Education Bill to take over management of private schools or of the Nairs over the Agrarian Relations Bill.[74] In the end, however, as we have seen, the same considerations which drove the League back to Congress in Madras in 1952 prevailed in Kerala in June 1959.

An important repercussion of the Congress-League-P.S.P. "Liberation Movement" in Kerala as well as a cause of its later collapse was to encourage Muslims further north to revive long dormant branches of the party.[75] As early as July, 1959, it was reported that C. H. Mohammed Koya, the League's Assembly party leader in Kerala, while on his way back from *Haj* to Mecca, urged Bombay Muslims to reorganize.[76] Since the chief officers of the Fourth Party (A. K. M. Hafizka and Hasanali P. Ebrahim) had deserted to Congress in 1955, it devolved upon Haji Noor Mohammed Ahmed Sait (M.L.A. 1946–52 and ex-Secretary and Vice-President of the Provincial League), who had avoided the Fourth Party in favor of the Socialists in 1952, to undertake the task. This he did on August 9, 1959. The party has maintained a precarious existence in the Muslim majority wards of Bombay city since that date, aided, as we have noted, by the multi-member district system with cumulative voting.[77] The Jabalpur communal riots of February, 1961 probably also increased the League vote in Bombay. Congress, with less than a majority on the Corporation Council was tempted to make a deal with the League.

This limited advance encouraged the party to play for higher stakes in the 1962 general election. It designated three candidates for the Maharashtra state Assembly and supported Acharya J. B. Kripalani against Nehru's favorite, V. K. Krishna Menon, in the prestige contest for the North Bombay parliamentary seat.[78] In return Kripalani's backers, the P.S.P., Swatantra and Republican Parties, were supposed to vote for the League candidates. All four lost, however, including the League's young Secretary, a former school teacher named Ghulam M. Banatwalla, who lost by the narrow margin of 449 votes out of 37,363 to Mustafa G. N. Faki, the Muslim General Secretary of the Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee.[79] Afterwards, the League state president had to deny rumors that he had entered negotiations with S. K. Patil to disband his organization; instead he launched into municipal elections elsewhere in Maharashtra state. A proposal to replace Bombay's municipal voting system with single member wards may sound the death knell for the League in that city.[80] As an example of the issues agitated by the party in Bombay, recent resolutions of its Working Committee: (1) expressed sympathy with victims of language riots; (2) asked that the question of Urdu language be reviewed; (3) requested the government to restore Muslim festivals to the list of public holidays; (4) expressed concern over a proposed bill to ban cow slaughter; (5) regret over Bombay's sanction for closing Municipal slaughter houses on Hindu holidays when they coincide with Muslim *Id;* (6) expressed concern over the mixing of *Halal* and *Jhatka* meat in slaughter houses, and (7) requested a ban on an issue of *Life* magazine which pictured the Prophet Mohammed.[81] Two of the thirteen members of the Bombay Port Haj Committee which regulates traffic on the annual pilgrimage to Mecca are elected by the Muslims on the Municipal Corporation. In January, 1964, by drawing lots with the two Congress Muslims, the four Leaguers were able to get one of their number on this prestigious committee while a Congress Muslim got the other place.

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[72] C. H. Mohammed Koya, "Muslim League in the Kerala Assembly," in *Kerala State Muslim League Souvenir*, 1959, pp. 1–6 (translated by U. A. Beeran).

[73] *Hindu*, June 24, 1958, Dec. 7, 1958; Feb. 28, June 24, July 17, 1959; personal interview with B. V. Abdulla Koya, April 15, 1964.

[74] *Link*, June 21, 1959; *Hindu*, July 18, 1959.

[75] Logically, one would expect that Hyderabad City with its near-majority of Muslims and long tradition of Muslim rule would have been fertile ground for League recruitment. However, the exclusive local or "mulki" sentiment there gave the advantage to another party, the *Majlis Ittihadul-Muslimin*. Its founder, Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung, was simultaneously President of the States Muslim League (personal interview with Haji Abdul Lateef Khan, President, Organizing Committee, Muslim League of Telangana, June 28, 1964). Between Independence and the Hyderabad "Police Action" of September, 1948, this party and its paramilitary wing, the *Razakars*, under Kasim Rizvi dominated the Nizam's state. On the release of Rizvi from prison in 1957, the party was revived by its present leader, Abdul Wahid Owaisi. (See my "Revival of the Majlis Ittihad-ul-Muslimin of Hyderabad," *Muslim World*, v. 53 (July 1963), 234–243.) Ismail has tried in vain to get Owaisi to merge his party with the Muslim League. The local League has been signally unsuccessful in its electoral ventures, possibly because of a largely non-mulki leadership.

[76] *Link*, July 19, 1959, p. 11; and June 4, 1961, p. 14.

[77] B. A. V. Sharma and R. Jangam, *The Bombay Municipal Corporation, an Election Study* (Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1962).

[78] *Siraat*, Feb. 1, 1962, p. 7; *Deccan Chronicle*, Feb. 17, 1962; *Link*, Feb. 25, 1962, p. 14; Norman D. Palmer, "The 1962 Election in North Bombay," *Pacific Affairs*, 36 (Summer 1963), p. 123.

[79] *Report on the Third General Elections in India, 1962*, Vol. II, p. 264.

[80] *Siraat*, Jan. 1, 1965, p. 4.

If the League enjoyed scant success in Bombay, Ismail's efforts in Northern India met with total failure. Reports appeared in the press about organizational meetings of the League in Ahmedabad (Gujerat), Bhopal (Madhya Pradesh), Purnea (Bihar), Kotah (Rajasthan) and Calcutta.[82] But close on their heels came further news that the party convenors in Lucknow, Aligarh, Bhopal and Calcutta were arrested, the Calcutta office was "under lock and key"[83] and Maulana Abdul Waheed Siddiqui, editor of *Nai Dunya* of Delhi, was detained for merely advocating the reestablishment of the party.[84] In North India clearly the state and central government and probably most Muslims themselves would not risk this development in the communally sensitive regions near to Pakistan where many Sikh and Hindu refugees from that country have settled. Ismail held an "All-India" convention of his party in Madras and talked bravely of setting up candidates in Uttar Pradesh in 1962, but in the end there were none north of Nagpur. Instead some potential League candidates joined with the Republican Party (the former Scheduled Castes Federation) and won a few legislative and Parliamentary seats on its ticket. Even without the hated League label, some of these men have suffered preventive detention for "provocative" speeches.[85]

In Madras the League has been resuscitated from its nadir in 1957 by alliance with the D.M.K. and Swatantra parties. Consequently, it endured an internal split so characteristic of Indian political organizations. From 1919 until 1959, the Madras Municipal Corporation Council included seven special seats reserved for corporate functional bodies like the Muslim Chamber of Commerce and the Hides and Leather Merchants Association.[86] In the 1955 municipal election, these accounted for two of the four places won by Muslims: three Congressmen and an Independent. Four years later, the year of the triple alliance in Kerala, the Muslim League elected a Councilman in Madras for the first time since independence: A.K.A. Abdus Samad from Harbour Division, the only constituency with a Muslim majority.[87] The D.M.K. seated a Muslim too, M. S. Abdul Khader. The latter became Mayor in 1959 under a scheme of communal rotation of the position dating back to about 1923 when the D.M.K.'s progenitor, the Justice Party, was in power. It rotated first, third, fifth and seventh years in the cycle to a non-Brahmin caste Hindu, second to a Muslim, fourth to a Christian, sixth to a Scheduled Caste member and eighth to a Brahmin.[88] Since the D.M.K. had a plurality only (45 out of 100 members), Abdus Samad's vote was clearly one of the crucial ones.[89]

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[81] *Siraat,* Mar. 1, 1965, p. 5, and Oct. 1, 1963, p. 4.

[82] *Link,* Oct. 25, 1959, p. 11, Feb. 7, Mar. 13, Aug. 7, Dec. 4, 1960; *Hindu,* May 15, 1961; *Siraat,* Oct. 1, 1964.

[83] *Link,* July 16, 1961, p. 19; an authoritative source within the League admits that two factions within the Calcutta office denounced each other as Pakistani agents to the government

[84] *Siraat.* Jan. 1, 1962, p. 1.

[85] E.g., Muzafar Hussain Kachochvi, M. P., *Times of India,* March 6, 1964; Dr. Abbas Malik, *Statesman,* Sept. 25, 1963; Hafiz Ali Bahadur Khan, *Siraat,* Oct. 1, 1964. Unfortunately there is an economic conflict of interests between the Chamars, who provide the backbone of the Republican Party in U.P. and are traditionally leather workers, and the Muslims some of whom have been proprietors and middlemen in the leather industry. Since 1964, Ismail has staged something of a comeback in North India through membership in the *Muslim Majlis-i-Mushawarat* (consultative council) in conjunction with the *Jamaat-i-Islami,* the historically nationalist *Jamiat-ul-ulema-i-Hind* and some dissident Congress Muslims.

[86] Personal interview with A. A. Rasheed, May 11, 1964.

[87] Personal interview with A. K. A. Abdus Samad, May 16, 1964.

[88] Personal interview with A. K. Refaye, editor *Urimaikural,* May 7, 1964; and *Hindu,* Nov. 19, 1960, Nov. 3, 1962.

[89] Abdus Samad's vote for the D.M.K. Muslim for Mayor would seem contrary to Ismail's demand that only the League represent Muslims,

This minor victory, like that in Bombay, emboldened Ismail to venture seven candidates for the Assembly and Abdus Samad for Parliament in the 1962 general election. He now acted in close harmony with the D.M.K. and the new free enterprise party, Swatantra, which was led by the former Congress Chief Minister, Rajagopalachari. In keeping with the alliance with the latter, the League's 1962 manifesto[90] places a new emphasis on the need for retaining a permanent place for regulated private enterprise in the economy in order not to destroy the spirit of incentive "which is a basic human instinct and a law of nature." Therefore "the nationalization process ought not to be carried too far." Of the eight candidates only Abdus Samad came close to success. However, the party's voters contributed to the election of fifty D.M.K. legislators who thereupon repaid the debt, as some of the League-backed Independents had in 1952, by sending Abdus Samad to the Rajya Sabha in 1964 and another of the younger Leaguers, K. S. Abdul Wahab, to the Madras Legislative Council in 1962.[91] This time Ismail himself took no chances by running in his home state, but got himself sent to the more powerful lower house of Parliament from a safe Moplah constituency in Kerala. An indirect consequence of the burgeoning Dravidian—Muslim alliance may have been to induce Congress Chief Minister Kamaraj to select one of his own party's Muslims, S. M. Abdul Majid, for the state cabinet, the first since 1939.[92]

The League's most ambitious endeavor so far in Madras came in February, 1964 when it entered 84 candidates in municipal contests throughout the state and seated 54, including five in Madras city, which wiped out Congress Muslim representation there. The joint posters of League, D.M.K. and Swatantra were still in evidence when I visited the city in May of that year. Since the D.M.K. now held a narrow 49–40 lead over the Congress in the state capital,[93] the League votes again potentially held the balance of power between them. It is therefore not surprising that Dr. Habibullah Baig, the party's leader in the Corporation Council, was raised to Deputy Mayor in 1964.[94] Now that the D.M.K. has foresworn irreligion and secession, the League's leaders confidently look forward to gaining a place in the state cabinet if their allies should win a majority in the next general election. Beyond Madras, however, the alliance is of no use because of the purely provincial appeal of the Dravidian movement.

After Congress drove the League into opposition in Kerala in November, 1961, the latter nevertheless continued to flourish in that state in a modest way. It demonstrated again its strength among the Moplahs by electing two out of three of its candidates for Parliament, Ismail and C. H. Mohammed Koya, in February, 1962 against both Congress and Communists opponents, despite the League President coming from outside of the state and not speaking Malayalam.[95] Next Spring the performance was repeated when another Leaguer won Koya's Assembly seat handily.

Thereafter, naturally, relations between the former partners were seriously strained as the League prepared to settle the score with Congress for its treachery.[96] The dilemma of the traditionalist leaders like Bafakhy Thangal was how to do this without bringing the atheistic Communists back to power. For the younger men this was less of a problem since they found the economic program of the Marxists attractive. Panchayat and municipal elections were

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but he replies that the D.M.K. doesn't claim to represent them the way Congress does. Interview with M. Mohammed Ismail, May 21, 1964.

[90] *Election Manifesto of the Indian Union Muslim League,* Issued in connection with the General Election, 1962, (Chromepet, Madras, Jan. 1962), pp. 3, 13, 22.

[91] Personal Interview with A.K.A. Abdus Samad, May 16, 1964.

[92] *Link,* Mar. 25, 1962, p. 18. Another possible result was the election by Congress of N. Mohammed Anwar, a former League M.L.A. (1946–52), to the Rajya Sabha in 1962 apparently with the consent of Ismail, which looks like a fruition of Kamaraj's offers of 1952 and 1957. In a sensational speech in 1964, Anwar castigated his fellow Congress Muslims as "show boys." When needled about his own affiliation by Ebrahim Sulaiman Sait, he retorted, "There is no political party of the Muslim community in this country excepting the Muslim League": *Hindu,* April 26, May 2, 1964.

[93] *Deccan Chronicle,* Feb. 24, 1964.

[94] *Siraat,* Dec. 16, 1964, p. 9.

[95] Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publications Division, *India 1962, a Reference Annual,* p. 567; Ali Ashraf, "Muslim Groups" in "Election Analysis" a symposium of *Seminar,* No. 34 (June 1962), pp. 38–40.

[96] However, the League Assemblymen continued to support Chief Minister Pattom Thanu Pillai and his successor, Shanker, by abstaining on crucial votes rather than voting with the Communists against the cabinet. In the case of Shanker, it may have been because as an Ezhava he would favor the continuation of reservations for Backward Classes which benefitted Muslims: *Hindu,* Oct. 12, 1962, p. 1, and personal interview with Dr. V. K. Sukumuran Nair, April 6, 1964.

long impending in Kerala and they offered the League its first local opportunity to show its independence. The Trivandrum city corporation poll in October, 1960 had taken place while the triple alliance was still in effect, so the League garnered two seats. But two years later it was ready to essay a local pact with the Communists in Kozhikode (Calicut). It had been arranged among the three leading parties in that Malabar city (Communist, Congress and League) to elect a joint non-partisan civic board. Because of its unhappy experience in 1960, the League insisted upon a prior agreement for rotation of the mayoralty over the five year term: Congress, Communist, League, Congress, Communists. This was upset by the League's *bête noir*, C. K. Govindan Nair, Kerala Pradesh Congress President, who compelled the local Congressmen to withdraw lest they be responsible for electing a "communal" mayor for even one year.[97] The other two parties stuck together as the "Civic Front" and captured between them 32 of 45 seats, so the League's M. Bavutty Haji became Deputy Mayor and then Mayor in a more advantageous two-out-of-five rotation plan.

That same Fall of 1962 an escape from the League's quandary and its danger of isolation "in the wilderness" began to present itself when the Chinese attack on India split the Communist Party of India into two wings, pro-Russian and pro-Chinese. The Communist Mayor of Calicut and Bafakhy Thangal could agree on condemning Chinese aggression. Paradoxically, the entente between Communist China and Pakistan may have facilitated an eventual understanding between the Left (pro-Chinese) Communists and the League, or so their enemies charged by likening them to the "Peking—(Rawal)pindi Axis."[98]

On the Congress side, the severe factionalism which had for so long denied stability to Kerala also broke out into the open during 1964 over the ouster of the Christian Congress leader, P. T. Chacko, from the cabinet. Although Chacko and Govindan Nair both died during the year, the former's followers, rendered desperate by their exclusion from the Congress election committee, finally bolted their party and precipitated the downfall of the Congress ministry with the decisive help of the hitherto neutral eleven League assembly votes. Presidential Rule was instituted for the third time in Kerala. Now the League's prospects for negotiating local "adjustments" with both rebel factions, Communist and Congress, dramatically improved its previously dismal electoral chances. If either won and threatened to leave its Muslim allies in the lurch as in 1960, the League could turn to its other ally. Ultimately, the party chose an open alliance with the "Kerala Congress" rebels[99] in exchange for a firm promise of a coalition ministry should they win. At the same time there was a tacit arrangement with the Left Communists whereby both would vote for certain Leaguers who would run as Independents in order to salve the consciences of the Marxists.

In the March 4, 1965 assembly election, League tactics appeared to pay off. Although only six of the sixteen avowed party candidates survived and three sitting M.L.A.'s, including the party assembly leader, Gani, were defeated, five of the Communist-backed Independents won seats and promptly rejoined the League, thus raising its delegation by one to twelve, the highest yet.[100] Unfortunately for the League's strategy, no stable cabinet majority could be found within the splintered new assembly even with 29 of the Left Communists in preventive detention, and New Delhi was able to justify the continuation of Presidential Rule indefinitely.

The experience of three general elections and special elections shows that the number of legislators the League can seat is too few to influence law-making or administration significantly except where its marginal votes hold the balance of power between major parties as in Madras City and Kerala recently. Otherwise, the League simply isolates the minority from the majority community.

IV. JOINING THE DOMINANT PARTY

I have already observed that most of the nationally prominent and rewarded (if not necessarily most "representative") Muslim leaders in India since partition have been those like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, Hafiz Mohammed Ibrahim and Humayun Kabir who had stuck with the Congress, or at least avoided the Muslim League, throughout the pre-independence agitation for Pakistan.

The new Indian Constitution, the formulation of the electoral provisions of which we have discussed above, was not promulgated until 1950, and in the meantime how were the residual Muslim League state legislators to vote? In most states the League's "parliamentary party" organizations dissolved or lost all coherence as the rush for the Congress bandwagon began. In Madras, however, a few League legislators grouped themselves into a "United People's Party"[101] and the larger number stayed together and acted as "loyal opposition" to the Congress ministry, in which capacity they prided themselves on their constructive role. During this pre-constitutional period (1947–50), the League also contested by-elections in five reserved Muslim constituencies and won them all, thereby demonstrating that the party still held the allegiance of the ordinary Muslim voter.[102]

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[97] Personal interview with U. A. Beeran, Sub-Editor, *Chandrika*, April 12, 1964.

[98] *Link*, Sept. 27, 1964, p. 16; Mar. 14, 1965, p. 10.

[99] *Siraat*, Nov. 1, 1964, p. 6. The P.S.P. had left the government Oct. 8, 1962.

[100] *Hindu*, Mar. 6, 1965, p. 8ff; *Link*, Mar. 21, 1965, p. 17.

It should be clear by now that the watershed date for Muslim legislative representation in India, and therefore for political strategy, was not the partition of 1947 but the first general election under the new Constitution in 1951–52. Those League politicians remaining in India who had been put into office by communal electorates in 1946 at the height of the Pakistan movement had now either to face a predominantly Hindu body of voters or retire from politics. Of the 225 M.L.A.'s swept in on the League ticket six years before, about 19, mostly in Bihar, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh, joined the Congress Party. All but one of them (and he in Malabar) rode to victory on its coattails or were rewarded with nominations to the state legislative councils. An equal number ran as Independents, but only two of them won. Three tried their luck with the Socialists or K.M.P.P. and another three, as we have noted, retained seats in Malabar under the League's own banner. The transition was patently painful and the lesson obvious: join the dominant party to win office. It is ironic, however, that the nationalist Muslims who had essayed the impossible task of upholding the Congress by offering themselves as candidates in 1946 to Muslim electorates did not fare much better in 1951 with the Congress in power and joint electorates in effect. About 38 of them got on the Congress ticket, but a considerable number defected to the K.M.P.P. or Socialists, possibly disgruntled by the reception of their bitter enemies, the former Muslim Leaguers, into the Congress fold.[103]

In Bombay, some of the local Leaguers took a different tack from Ismail's in Madras or the North Indian Muslims, indicative of the city's intermediate position between North and South in the degree of anti-Muslim communalism present. They transformed themselves into the already alluded-to "Fourth Party" to avoid the onus of the League's name and opened membership to all who would subscribe to the party's Madras program of 1948, a move calculated to attract the more timorous Muslims and perhaps some non-Muslims.[104] In 1952 they endorsed the Congress ticket in Bombay while Ismail was opposing it in Madras, but they pledged their members not to run as Congressmen. Nevertheless the fact that the two sitting M.L.A.'s who ran as Independents, Jukaku Shamsuddin and Raziuddin Goodwala, were defeated while two others who disobeyed instructions and accepted Congress nomination, Fazleabbas Zamindar and Wajihuddin Parkar, were elected underscored the attractiveness of the latter course.

The result was as Ismail predicted when he rejected the Congress offer in Madras: temporary dissolution of the party. Having failed by its change of name to recruit non-Muslims,[105] the Working Committee of the Fourth Party joined the Congress *en bloc* in 1955 in return for the ruling party's not opposing the candidacy of some of its members for the Bombay Municipal Corporation.[106] The deal was arranged by S. K. Patil and Morarji Desai to bolster their faction of the Bombay Congress and to counteract the threat of the Maharashtra Samiti movement to which many Congressmen were then deserting. Hafizka, the Fourth Party's Secretary, got the Congress ticket for M.L.A. in 1957 and kept possession of the League's headquarters in Bombay City, much to the chagrin, as we have related before, of Haji Noor Mohammed Ahmed Sait when he later revived the party. Another former Bombay League M.L.A., Jukaku Shamsuddin, also crossed over to Congress and rapidly rose to a Deputy Ministership in the newly enlarged Mysore state on the coattails of Lingayat sect politicians with some of whom he had been a classmate at Karnatak University. Since both Hafizka and he were Navayat Muslims from Kanara, one might speculate about the superior adaptability of that group.[107]

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[101] For this ten of them were expelled from the League in August, 1950: Jalal Zakariah, *Meet Mr. Mohammed Ismail* (Madras: Mani Vilakku Book House, 1960), p. 24. S. Mohammed Ismail says it was called the Progressive Socialists and included himself, Hamid Khan, M. S. Salam and Abdul Latif Farookhi: personal interview, June 25, 1964.

[102] These were in Ramnad, Tinneveli, Bellary, Chirakkal and Mallapuram constituencies.

[103] See S. A. Kamali, "Muslims in India Since Partition," *Muslim World*, 45 (Jan. 1955), p. 49, and Times of India, *Indian and Pakistan Year Book and Who's Who, 1951*, p. 550; *Return Showing the Results of Elections to the Central Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures in 1945–46*, New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1948.

[104] *Times of India, Indian and Pakistan Yearbook and Who's Who, 1949*, p. 509.

[105] Personal interview with Salebhoy Abdul Kadar, Jan. 14, 1964.

[106] Personal interview with Jukaku Shamsuddin, March 10, 1964, and Mohammed Yasin Nuri, Jan. 11, 1964. Congress honored the agreement in Bombay City but not in Poona, Surat and Ahmedabad because of the protests of nationalist Muslims. Norman Brown in *The United States and India and Pakistan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2nd ed. 1963), p. 248, mistakenly identifies this as a party of Muslim women.

A similar absorption took place in Travancore-Cochin just before the first general election in 1951 when Congress Chief Minister T. K. Narayan Pillai induced T. A. Abdulla to amalgamate his branch of the League with the Congress in return for a place in a short-lived ministry.[108] The next year P. Kasim Kunju, another former President of the state League, deserted to the P.S.P. for a seat in its cabinet. In 1953 what was left of the organization converted itself into the Kerala Muslim Jama'at Federation, which has remained a loyal adjunct of the Congress ever since.[109] These experiences too seem to lend substance to Ismail's warning that to take nominations or cabinet posts under the Congress label would be fatal to the Muslim organization and its particular mission.[110]

Nationalist Muslims did not accept unchallenged the continuing claims of Ismail's residue of the League to speak on behalf of all Muslims, but decided to build a countermovement to wean away Muslim voters in his own city. Therefore on December 23–24, 1956 a conference was held in Madras at which the South India Muslim Convention was founded.[111] Invited was an imposing list of notables including stalwart Congressmen like Dr. Syed Mahmud of Bihar, A. M. Allapichai (Madras M.L.C.), Mir Akbar Ali Khan and S. Osman Ali Khan, M.P.'s, as well as former League legislators like Abdul Latif Farookhi, M. A. Salam, Samalkot Mohammed Ismail and Abdul Hameed Khan. The moving spirits were Allapichai and C. A. Mohammed Ibrahim, a Madras advocate. The meeting endorsed the Congress unreservedly and called upon the "so-called Muslim League" to dissolve itself. Lest it appear too docile a creature of the ruling party, it voiced the perennial complaint of the minority about inadequate representation in the civil service and legislature, even making so bold as to urge reservation of seats for Muslims if a number proportional to their share of the population could not otherwise get elected.

Congress recognizes the Convention as an auxiliary at all levels: village, taluk, district and state just like the Youth Congress, Mahila (Women's) Sangham and Harijan organizations. C. A. Mohammed Ibrahim is its voting member on the Tamilnad Congress Committee and Abdul Latif Farookhi (President also of the *Jamiat-ul-Ulema* of Madras) on the District Congress Committee.[112] Its leadership interlocks with that of the influential Muslim Educational Association of South India of which Ibrahim is Secretary. Through Ibrahim's monthly publication, *Comrade* and Farookhi's *Musalman*, it seeks to reach the English and Urdu reading publics respectively.

Since the South India Muslim Convention was created by Congress Muslims to bring the rest of their people into their own party it is more akin to the "mass organizations" of totalitarian single party systems than to the independent and non-partisan pressure groups with which Americans are familiar. Comparable perhaps was the effort of the Communists of Kerala during the 1959–60 election campaign to split the League by setting up a "Progressive Muslim League." It played upon the economic grievances of the poor Moplah peasants and the youth against the traditional religious leadership of the *thangals* like Syed Abdur Rahiman Bafakhy Thangal, state League President.[113]

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[107] See Victor S. D'Souza, *The Navayats of Kanara* (Dharwar: Kanada Research Institute, 1955).

[108] Seethi Sahib, *op. cit.*

[109] At least it has repeatedly proclaimed itself to be non-political: *The Hindu*, May 28, Dec. 2, 1957; March 17, 1958. However, its *Policy and Programme* (Ernakulam, 1961), couples the Muslim League with the Congress and P.S.P. as "democratic in character."

[110] Lloyd Rudolph in "The Modernity of Tradition: The Democratic Incarnation of Caste in India," this REVIEW, 59 (Dec. 1965), p. 983, notes that as soon as the Vanniyar Caste party, the Tamilnad Toilers, joined Congress in 1954, caste political solidarity cracked.

[111] *Manifesto of the Muslim Convention Conference*, Madras, 1962, reprinted in *Comrade*, Vol. IV, No. 13 (January 15, 1964), pp. 11–15.

[112] Personal interview with C. A. Mohammed Ibrahim, June 6, 1964.

[113] Jitendra Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 193. The *thangals*

I have discussed elsewhere[114] the disadvantages under which Muslims labor within the Congress Party in trying to represent their community, at least with respect to what are considered to be "communal" issues. Whatever the motives of individual Muslims may be in joining the dominant party, it appears to be difficult if not impossible for the modern, educated Muslim to wean away the uneducated, religious rank and file from more traditional leadership into secular parties. The tragedy of this gap between élite and mass is that while the printed program of the League looks rational enough, inflammatory slogans employed verbally and in the Indian language press in the heat of election campaigns may arouse suspicions of Muslim disloyalty to India. This could bring to communally peaceful South India the very kinds of militant Hindu counter-activity whose absence heretofore has been the precondition for the League's continued existence. For instance, a reckless attack on a police station near Tiruchirappalli on February 15, 1962 by six Muslim youths calling themselves the Liberation Force may have been the unintended byproduct of such ill-advised campaign oratory.[115] Repeated rumors that League followers have raised cries of "Pakistan Zindabad" (long live Pakistan)[116] are hardly likely to reassure those secular-minded Indian nationalists who would otherwise discount the Jan Sangh's malicious charges that every Indian Muslim is a Pakistani fifth columnist. Evidence of the penetration of Madras by the tensions of the North is afforded by the Pulianthope mosque episode of April 26, 1964, the first serious clash between Hindu and Muslim since 1948.[117] Yet no appeal other than "Islam in danger" seems capable of mobilizing the ordinary Muslim. What is needed is a Muslim leader who, like Gandhi or Bhave for the Hindus, can bridge the gap by symbolic gestures and appropriate language between the traditional religious impulses of the community and its modern economic needs.

V. NON-PARTISAN ORGANIZATIONS

The strategy of eschewing electoral politics altogether has been present ever since independence, as witness the resolutions offered at the March, 1948 League convention to dissolve the party *qua* party and convert it into a welfare organization devoted to "the promotion of the religious, cultural, educational and economic interests of Muslims." Raza Khan's "All-India Muslim League," the South Indian Muslim Convention, the Muslim Educational Association of Southern India, the Kerala Muslim Jama'at Federation and Syed Khalilullah Husseini's *Majlis Tamir-i-Millat* in Hyderabad[118] have all been groping in that direction. Unfortunately, Indians, probably because of both their British and their Gandhian heritages, accord no legitimacy to the idea of pressure groups—political organizations which work for their goals through lobbying with all parties, but which do not themselves nominate candidates. For instance, the chairman of the South India Muslim Convention flatly denies that his organization is a "lobby" or "pressure group," terms which seemed to evoke in him as negative a reaction as they did in the United States fifty years ago before political scientists

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are the descendants of the Arabic missionaries who came to Malabar and are equivalent in prestige to the Syeds in North India: personal interview with Syed Alavi Jifri Thangal, April 16, 1964.

[114] In "The Effectiveness of Muslim Representation in India" which will appear in Donald E. Smith (ed.), *Religion and Politics in South Asia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

[115] *Deccan Chronicle*, Feb. 21, 1962, p. 5; *Hindu*, Feb. 21, 1962, p. 1. *Link* claims that at the September, 1960 League rally the slogan "Muslims, remember your destiny; Qaid-i-Azam (*i.e.*, Jinnah) is watching you from heaven" appeared. (Sept. 25, 1960, pp. 13–15) and that Ismail orated in the 1962 campaign, "Jinnah fought for a Muslim homeland and got it. Now Annah (C. N. Annadurai of the D.M.K.) fights for a sovereign homeland for the Southerners. By the grace of Allah he too shall succeed": *Link*, Feb. 25, 1962, p. 19. That such quotations may be distorted in the translation is shown by an exchange in the Madras legislature following the 1964 municipal election. It was charged that the League had promised its followers that the portrait (sic!) of the late Pakistani leader, Liaquat Ali Khan, would be installed in the Mayor's chambers along with Annadurai's if the League-D.M.K. coalition won. The accuser, it turned out, had misunderstood that "Qaid-i-Millat" referred to Ismail, not to the earlier League leader: *Hindu*, March 10, 1964, p. 1.

[116] *Hindu*, Jan. 20, 1961, p. 5; March 10, 1964, p. 1.

[117] *Deccan Chronicle*, April 29, 1964, and letters to the editor by Raza Khan (*Hindu*, May 3), M. S. A. Majid (May 5) and V. Rajagopalachari, President Madras State Bharatiya Jan Sangh, (May 5). This was a case of music before a mosque during prayers.

[118] Robert T. Anderson, "Voluntary Associations in Hyderabad," *Anthropological Quarterly*, 37 (Oct. 1964), 175–190.

bestowed respectability upon such group activities. That the Convention may act more like a lobby than its chairman admits is shown by an article in his own paper, *Comrade* (Mar. 15, 1964, p. 5) entitled "Deputation to the Chief Minister" reporting that Ibrahim, Allapichai, A. A. Rasheed and Abdul Latif Farookhi requested Madras Chief Minister Bhaktavatsalam to give more legislative representation to Muslims.

Ismail keeps reiterating that you cannot separate religion from politics in Islam.[119] The fact that it has been done in many Middle Eastern countries where Muslims are in a majority[120] would seem to indicate that he is right only with respect to certain religious issues which invade politics when a secular state threatens the beliefs and practices of a Muslim minority. There, as in India, only a Muslim organization is likely to take the initiative in defending these interests. But there are other demands of an economic and cultural nature, such as civil service jobs, and media of instruction which are not distinctively Islamic and could be worked for more effectively if couched in terms of general principles that would appeal to a larger segment of the Indian population, including, for instance, other minorities.[121] In place of rival "parties," Muslims need a variety of organizations with a functional division of labor.

CONCLUSIONS

What conclusions can be drawn from the little-known struggles of this minor Indian party? First, let us admit what Indian nationalists often do not: that religious minorities in any country have some particular interests upon which the state may impinge. In a pluralistic democracy it must be legitimate for the members of a faith to organize for the protection of those interests against encroachment and to obtain equal treatment, so long as that activity does not subvert the state. Whether the most effective organization for these purposes is a political party is another matter and depends very much on the local political configuration.

Unlike ideological and nationalist parties, one based on a minority religion is almost inherently incapable of aggregating a majority. The C.D.U. of Germany, an apparent exception, has gained from the separation of heavily Protestant East Germany. Therefore, the religious minority party's only hopes of sharing power are by alliance with other small parties or by redefining its boundaries and opening membership to other minorities. The former method, which the Muslim League is currently trying in South India, points, unfortunately, to greater governmental instability, not necessarily a benefit to a minority.[122] The latter method is apparently unacceptable to either the League's leaders or followers. They say they fear being swamped if the gates were opened to other communities.[123]

Evidently no serious consideration has been given to changing the party's name so as to attract members from other minority groups except by the abortive "Fourth Party" of Bombay. Indeed the constitution restricts membership to Muslims, although one of the objects of the party is stated "to protect the legitimate rights and interests of Muslims *and other minorities* in the state." An exemption clause from this requirement seems to have been little used. Yet the party's name is one of its most controversial features, both asset and liability. The fact that its splinter-group rivals feel compelled to adopt similar appellations (All India Muslim League, Progressive Muslim League) shows the appeal of the title to the ordinary Muslim. At the same time, it repels non-Muslims. Here the experience of the Jewish community of New York City might be instructive. Although they constitute at least a quarter of the population, there is no Jewish party as such in New York. Instead, Jews have helped found and many have joined and led the Liberal Party[124] which has played balancer between the Democrats and Republicans. This reform party's name and program are broad enough to attract some distinguished gentiles and yet it is heavily enough Jewish in both membership and leadership to be an effective vehicle of minority group interests. In any case, Muslim self-expression through a distinct political party whatever its name will probably continue to be feasible only in South India so long as Indian relations with Pakistan are hostile.

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[119] E.g., "Presidential Address Delivered by Quaid-e-Millat Mohammed Ismail Saheb at the Tamilnad Muslim League Conference held at S.I.A.A. Grounds, Madras on September 17th and 18th, 1960," p. 7; and Zakariah, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

[120] See Leonard Binder, *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East* (New York: Wiley, 1964), for the shift from religion to nationalism.

[121] Eleanor Zelliott reaches the same conclusion for the scheduled castes' Republican Party in her unpublished paper on "Babasaheb Ambedkar" for the Association for Asian Studies meeting, April 4, 1966.

[122] Myron Weiner in "Political Integration and Political Development," *The Annals*, 358 (March, 1965), p. 63, observes that "The multiplication of ineffectual political organizations tends to result either in a highly fragmented political process in which government is unable to make or implement public policy, or in a political system in which the authoritative structures make all decisions completely independently of the political process outside of government."

[123] A Muslim businessman of Madras cited to me the example of the South Indian Chamber of Commerce, originally a largely Muslim organization but so flooded with chettiars even by 1937 that Jamal Mohammed was defeated for the presidency by T. T. Krishnamachari.

Does the Muslim League really want to share the responsibility of rule? Apparently not, beyond an occasional cabinet post for symbolic purposes. This leaves us with the question, what other functions does the party perform? The most important may be Myron Weiner's "boundary-maintenance."[125] Most Muslims have a genuine fear of the absorptive tendencies of Hinduism. By raising thorny issues like religious education and cow slaughter, the League reminds Muslims of their religious allegiance even when the protests have no effective channel to the centers of power. Clearly this militates against assimilation or any too-close association with other political groups. Another function, social mobility, would hardly seem likely to be performed by a much-maligned minor party, but it is possible that some of the members of the traditionally lower-status groups within the Muslim community gain some esteem from their co-religionists by occupying the political roles once performed by the nobility. Politicians of a party perennially out of power are not able to fulfill as well as Congressmen several other functions suggested by Weiner: expeditor, mediator, recruiter,[126] although the business of "housekeeping" (party organization) undoubtedly keeps some young men occupied and trains them in politics. "Constructive work," in the Gandhian sense, has always been conspicuously absent from the party's activities.

For most issues as distinguished from functions, American experience shows that the pressure group or lobby is more useful for minorities than running candidates hopelessly in elections. To an American observer, the whole debate between the South Indian Muslim Convention and the Indian Union Muslim League seems like an excessive dichotimization between the supposed purity of national integration with its implied threat of assimilation, and the equally rigid insistence on forming a political party to be the sole representative of Muslims. Indians suffer from too narrow a definition of politics. What Muslims need is less electioneering and more solid research to prove, e.g., job discrimination and other abuses, such as can satisfy courts, commissions, newspapers and educated public opinion. Admittedly, the British-style parliamentary system with its weak legislative committees and its relatively strong party discipline, as well as the "steel frame" civil service, make Washington-type lobbying difficult in India. But a lot of the problem still lies in accepting the legitimacy of lobbying and pressure groups. Without the kind of factual presentations which such organizations can produce, barriers are harder to break down because grievances will be discounted as the usual minority group "chip on the shoulder."

All this costs money. South Indian Muslims, more than their brethren in the North, have a tradition of mercantile acumen which needs to be fostered and modernized and put to the use of the community. Whether by donations to major parties or charities or schools, a religious minority can compel recognition of its rights if it has economic power. While the Muslim League pays lip service to planning and economic development, there is little evidence except the Muslim Educational Association of South India in Madras[127] and the Majlis Tamir-i-Millat in Hyderabad of an adequate awareness of the need for the kind of communal effort for self-improvement at which some of the minorities in America have been so successful. If this kind of work is not done, the existing Muslim organizations may well lose more and more of their youth to Marxist and other radical parties which promise quick results.

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[124] Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963), pp. 138, 166, 170.

[125] Weiner, *Politics of Scarcity*, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

[126] Weiner, "Traditional Role Performance and the Development of Modern Political Parties: The Indian Case," *Journal of Politics*, 26 (1964), 830–849.

[127] This organization founded as far back as 1901, founded New College in Madras in 1951 to replace the old Muhammadan College which was swamped with Hindu students by government action after independence. Muslims have founded eight colleges in Madras and Kerala since then. Although Muslim leaders think of their communities as educationally backward, Joseph Elder shows in a recent study, "India: Fatalism—a Comparison between Hindus and Muslims," *Anthropological Quarterly* (Summer 1966), that Muslims have higher educational aspirations than Hindus.

SUPPORT FOR THE PARTY SYSTEM BY THE MASS PUBLIC*

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Compared with most political institutions, the American party system has endured for a long time. The parties as organizations and symbols have become so much a part of our thinking about politics that we generally overlook the possibility of their eventual decline. One of the parties indeed has existed nearly as long as the republic itself; it thus antedates all but a few of the modern nations of the Western world.[1] The basic form of the party system—two major, decentralized, ideologically diffuse parties—has remained generally intact throughout its lifespan. The system of parties as a principle of political organization has been extended in some form to every level and branch of government. When the persistence of the party system has been most in jeopardy—as in the period of the Civil War—it has managed always to reestablish itself. On the criteria of duration, constancy of form, degree of penetration of other political institutions and response to stress, the record of the party system has been one of marked success.

This is not to say that there has been no variability in this performance. Constraints were present from the very beginning of party life in this country and have continued—with changing levels of severity—over the years. The failure of the parties to become part of the formal constitutional structure reflects a lack of full legitimation which has proved difficult to overcome. Whatever legal recognition through regulation has occurred has served to limit their activities more than to acknowledge whatever positive functions they perform. Recurrent suspicion of the parties has taken a variety of tangible forms: the practice of separating the powers and elections of political executives and legislators; the institution, most notably at the local level, of nonpartisan elections; the establishment of direct primaries; and other means which have been used to weaken the role of the parties in government.[2] In spite of these discouragements, the party system has nevertheless managed to survive.

To view the matter this way is to raise the important general theoretical issue of the explanation of such variability. How do we best explain the changes and persistence of an institution such as the party system? What are the factors which contribute most to its survival over an extended span of years or which affect the extent to which it is limited in its operations in certain times and places? Undoubtedly a host of potentially interesting explanations could be proposed. For present purposes, however, a quite straightforward but hitherto dimly illuminated way of accounting for this variability is proposed: the changing levels of public support for the party system. The present inquiry attempts to lay down one piece of the foundation necessary for answering the question of institutional change and persistence by specifying a satisfactory indicator of public support and by beginning what it is hoped will be a series of measurements. Only when these measurements have been taken can the wider theoretical question be answered satisfactorily.

Measuring Public Support for the Party System. As a general matter, one can approach the question of public support for an institution at two somewhat different levels. One is the level of specific organizational inputs of time, money and energy which involve, for the supporter, some exchange of his own resources for benefits derived from the institution. These benefits in the context of party could involve the economic security of patronage, the pleasures of association with like-minded people, or perhaps the symbolic pursuit of preferred policy programs and leadership. So long as the supporter perceives himself to be benefitting from this exchange, he is likely to continue it. But when the *quid pro quo* is no longer

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[1] E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942), pp. 1–2.

[2] See, for example, V. O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics: An Introduction* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956).

available, then his support is likely to be withdrawn. Thus his support is *specific* to the returns he obtains from it.

By contrast, a second type of support is what Easton has termed "diffuse support." The essential character of diffuse support "is that since it is an attachment to a political object for its own sake, it constitutes a store of political good will. As such it taps deep political sentiments and is not easily depleted through disappointments with outputs."[3] To distinguish "diffuse" from "specific" support, Easton says:

> . . . specific support flows from the favorable attitudes and predispositions stimulated by outputs that are perceived by members to meet their demands as they arise or in anticipation. The specific rewards help to compensate for any dissatisfactions at failing to have all demands met. But simultaneously, members are capable of directing *diffuse* support toward the objects of a system. This forms a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants.
>
> Except in the long run, diffuse support is independent of the effects of daily outputs. It consists of a reserve of support that enables a system to weather the many storms when outputs cannot be balanced off against inputs of demands. It is a kind of support that a system does not have to buy with more or less direct benefits for the obligations and responsibilities the member incurs.[4]

No doubt the specific supports which are exchanged for immediate rewards are important to the maintenance of the institution of party. Basically, however, this form of support is short-term and applies mainly to a restricted, activist sector of the general population. While it is of some obvious importance, it will be bypassed here in order to deal directly with diffuse support.

The Objects of Diffuse Support. To analyze the diffuse support for the party system by the mass public requires that the most significant features of that system—meaningful both from a public and a theoretic standpoint—can be specified. What are they? At the broadest level they include endorsement of the party system as a whole and of the general norm that partisan spirit and activity is allowable in political life. The latter is especially important in that it involves the idea that people can and ought to take opposing sides on political matters, and that there should be regular means for doing so. It necessarily entails the acceptance of a degree of cleavage and controversy if the parties are to pose genuine alternatives of public policy and leadership. The acceptance of the regime norm of partisanship and its embodiment in the existing system are central elements of this diffuse support.

It should be noted that this orientation goes beyond simple party identification and the public image of each of the parties. Both of these dispositions may indirectly reflect diffuse support; yet they are orientations towards subsystems of the party system rather than to the system as a whole. What in other contexts are quite valuable investigations of the distribution and intensity of party identification and of the images people have of each of the two major parties—as in the Michigan Survey Research Center studies[5]—are only of potential or indirect relevance for the present problem. That is, the connection of these orientations to diffuse support for the party system is still to be demonstrated.

Approval of the present party system as a whole and of partisan spirit will undoubtedly depend upon a variety of specific judgements and perceptions about the way the present system works. Do the party leaders behave responsibly and prudently? Do the parties stir up conflicts where none are called for, while failing to provide clear alternatives on the most pressing matters? These and many other evaluations are called into play in the acceptance or disapproval of the existing party system.

While orientation to the party system as an undifferentiated object and to the norm of partisanship constitute the most central elements of diffuse support, a third aspect can also be considered. This is a judgment of the adequacy of the present system relative to some program of possible reform. Although this may not be a part of the same attitudinal dimension—and some empirical results presented below will shed light on this question—it is something which has an obvious connection to diffuse support. It is conceivable that the norm of partisanship could be endorsed, for example, either in connection with approval of the present system or only in relation to some favored alternative form. Or it could be that people who endorse the present system are also the people who most desire its improvement. These are obviously matters for empirical determination.

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[3] David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 274.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 273.

[5] See, for example, Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1954); and Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960).

With regard to the question of possible improvements in the American party system, a prominent version of futuristic orientation is what has come to be called "the doctrine of responsible party government."[6] It is the idea that the present system of loosely structured major parties should be replaced by a party system in which political cleavage is represented less diffusely and more responsibly. This involves a reordering of the present parties to make them more centralized in leadership and control, internally homogeneous in program and ideology, and disciplined in the official behavior of their representatives in government. When we raise the question of how much the American mass public supports the present system therefore, a related question involves how widely it approves or disapproves of a reform like responsible party government. In addition, we can ask how closely related are these various sentiments. Are they all part of the same complex of dispositions or do they fall into separate attitudinal categories?

In sum, diffuse support is a concept which directs our attention to a reserve of favorable attitudes towards political objects. When applied to support for the party system, it could conceivably operate at the level of acceptance of the general regime norm of partisanship, approval or disapproval of the present system of parties as a whole or in terms of some reformed organization of the parties. These elements do not exhaust the universe of relevant possibilities, but they would appear to provide significant foci for valid operationalization. The data presented below are the products of an inquiry designed to illuminate them.

THE DATA

Sixteen interview items were devised which were judged to tap the analytically distinguished elements of diffuse support for the party system discussed above. These items were presented in November and December, 1964, to an area cluster probability sample of the adult population of Wisconsin by interviewers of the University of Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory.[7] Respondents were given the following instruction:

> Here is a second series of agree-disagree questions. This time they are about your general opinions of the political parties. As before, for each statement, please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, both agree and disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree. You can just give me the number on the card that applies.

CARD 2

1. Strongly agree	3. Agree-Disagree
2. Agree	4. Disagree
	5. Strongly Disagree

The items are shown in Table 1 below.

Items 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 11, and 12 were included primarily to tap feelings pertaining to the general norm of partisanship. Items 3, 6, 9, 10, 13, and 14 were designed to evoke perceptions of the adequacy of the present parties. Items 7, 15, and 16 were intended to elicit attitudes towards key elements of the responsible-parties idea—in particular, intraparty cohesion and discipline.

Rather than trust entirely to the intentions of the investigator to interpret these items it was thought desirable first to examine the extent to which the respondents exhibited the hypothesized clusters of attitudes or some different overall patterns of response to the sixteen items. A psychometric technique designed to perform this kind of test is factor analysis. In essence, factor analysis allows investigation of whatever underlying dimensions are contained in the association among variables such as these sixteen items. It illuminates in this case the respondents,' principal kinds of basic attitudinal reactions to the items. Table 1 presents the varimax rotated factors of a principal component solution to the problem of what are the underlying dimensions in the patterns of response.[8]

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[6] See Austin Ranney, *The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government* (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1962).

[7] Project 175.

[8] The principal component analysis utilized the Pearson r correlation matrix of the item responses 1–5. The varimax orthogonal rotation employed, as a minimum criterion for rotation, an eigenvalue ≥ 1.0. "Don't know" responses were recoded as "agree-disagree" for use in the component analysis reported. A separate component analysis was carried out using a correlation for which the "don't knows" were treated as missing data. The results of the two separate component analyses were essentially the same. For descrip-

TABLE 1. COMPONENTS OF SUPPORT FOR THE PARTY SYSTEM[a]

ITEM	Rotated Factor Matrix				
	I	II	III	IV	h²
1. "It would be better if, in all elections, we put no party labels on the ballot."	$\boxed{.52}$	−.01	.16	$\boxed{-.33}$	.40
2. Even if people are not able to help their political party in other ways, they ought to contribute money to the party of their choice."	−.07	.01	$\boxed{.58}$	$\boxed{.30}$	.43
3. "The political parties more often than not create conflicts where none really exists."	$\boxed{.54}$	−.22	.10	−.04	.35
4. "The best rule in voting is to pick the man regardless of his party label."	$\boxed{.33}$	$\boxed{-.37}$	$\boxed{.47}$	−.27	.53
5. "People who work for parties during political campaigns do our nation a great service."	$\boxed{-.35}$	.16	$\boxed{.59}$	−.04	.50
6. "Our system of government would work a lot more efficiently if we could get rid of conflicts between the parties all together."	$\boxed{.57}$	$\boxed{.37}$	.03	$\boxed{-.35}$	.58
7. "Our senators and representatives ought to follow their party leaders more than they do."	.15	$\boxed{.63}$	.23	−.15	.50
8. "Democracy works best where competition between parties is strong."	−.13	−.08	.19	$\boxed{.77}$	.65
9. "The parties do more to confuse the issues than to provide a clear choice on them."	$\boxed{.72}$	.05	−.15	.10	.56
10. "The party leaders make no real effort to keep their promises once they get into office."	$\boxed{.63}$	.16	−.12	.09	.45
11. "Tax deductions should be allowed for people who contribute money to the political party of their choice."	.09	$\boxed{.33}$	$\boxed{.50}$	.09	.38
12. "It is good to stick with your party through thick and thin."	−.04	$\boxed{.67}$	.01	.24	.51
13. "Things would be better if the parties took opposite stands on issues more than they now do."	$\boxed{.31}$	$\boxed{.42}$	.08	$\boxed{.46}$	.48
14. "The conflicts and controversies between the parties hurt our country more than they help it."	$\boxed{.64}$	$\boxed{.33}$	−.10	−.12	.54
15. "We would be better off if all the Democrats in government stood together and all the Republicans did the same."	.12	$\boxed{.73}$	.04	−.11	.56
16. "A senator or representative should follow his party leaders even if he doesn't want to."	.02	$\boxed{.76}$	.05	.00	.58
Percent of total variance	16.3	17.1	8.4	8.3	50.1
Percent of common variance	32.5	34.2	16.8	16.5	100.0

[a] The cell entries are factor weights or "loadings" which express the extent to which each item is correlated with one of the principal components. Signs refer to how the item is scored relative to the dimension in question. For example, item 1 is weighted +.52 on Component I—which means in this case that a high item score (which expresses strong disagreement with the statement) is related to positive diffuse support. The communality (h²) of each item expresses the proportion of the variance of the item that is associated with all four of the components. Loadings which are enclosed are those ≥.30. They best define the dimensions empirically.

Table 1 shows four principal attitudinal dimensions—two major and two minor. The first appears to combine, in terms of the items which are weighted most heavily on it, favorable or unfavorable perceptions of the present party system and orientations towards the general norm of partisanship. For example, the two highest loading items are numbers 9 and 10. Both involve present perceptions and are interpretable as items relating to diffuse support. In addition, fairly high loadings are obtained for more purely norm-related items such as number 1. We thus experience no difficulty in labelling the first factor "diffuse support," in that it involves both present perceptions of the parties and feelings relevant to the general norm. It combines two of the elements postulated above as having primary meaning for diffuse support for the party system.

A second and separate dimension is defined by the items concerned with responsible party government. The highest loading item is number 16. This is followed closely by the other two intended responsible party government items, numbers 15 and 7, as well as by a somewhat unexpected but quite reasonable item-number 12. I shall call this component "support for responsible parties."

The third and fourth principal components are more specific in meaning. The third apparently defines an attitude which is that of the contributor. It suggests, as in the two items concerned with financial contributions to the parties, a specific support orientation. I shall call this "contributor support."

The fourth dimension I shall call "support for the cleavage function" of the party system. It invokes an attitude towards partisan competition and its role in the political system. This and the other three principal attitudinal dimensions will be discussed in detail below.

The Distribution of Party Supportive Sentiment. Once the principal types of reactions the sample had to the items have been empirically determined, it is useful to observe the item distributions—grouped according to the dimensions for which each item has some meaning. These distributions are shown in Table 2. Included with each item is its factor weight in order to show its relative importance for each dimension under consideration.

With the items regrouped according to the dimension each taps and in order of relative weight on this dimension, we can begin to assess the relative levels of support of each kind that have been elicited.

Diffuse Support

Consider first the Factor I items. Giving due weight to the fact that the pattern of response of any item is likely to change with how extremely it puts the matter in question, we see that the level of support shown is far from overwhelming on any of these items. The highest proportion strongly supportive of the party system in this sense on any item is 13%—on item 1. It is on this item, moreover, that a majority (67%) rejects the somewhat extreme proposal to make *all* elections nonpartisan. In addition, support is relatively high (68%) for the proposition that "people who work for parties during political campaigns do our nation a great service." The response to these two items suggests a high level of diffuse support for the parties.

On the other hand, we must also take into account that a number of other relatively unfavorable perceptions are also frequent. Only 21% disagree with the statement that "the parties do more to confuse the issues than to provide a clear choice on them." A similar response is given to the proposition that "our system of government would work a lot more efficiently if we could get rid of conflicts between the parties altogether" and for "The political parties more often than not create conflicts where none really exists." And 47% agree while only 35% disagree that "the conflicts and controversies between the parties hurt our country more than they help it." The most extreme instance of this negative feeling is shown in the response to the statement of a venerable nonpartisan norm, "The best rule in voting is to pick the man regardless of his party label." The fact that only 10% disagree suggests a consensual level of endorsement of a patently antiparty norm. Of course, in practice this may mean for many members of the electorate that they always vote for the better candidates who happen to be from their own party. But at the level of diffuse support it constitutes a counternorm which acts as a check on unabated enthusiasm for the institution of party.

Taken as a group, the distribution of opinion on these items suggests a somewhat ambivalent and irresolute state of diffuse support for the party system. Predominantly favorable perceptions and norms are mixed with unfavorable ones. The weightier portion of the mass public favors retaining at least partial party organization of elections. And it approves citizen participation in campaign related party activity.

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tion of the procedures used see: "Program Image," University of Wisconsin Computing Center, August 13, 1964; and Chester W. Harris, "Some Rao-Guttman Relationships," *Psychometrika*, 27 (September, 1962), 247–263.

TABLE 2. THE DISTRIBUTION OF SENTIMENT ON ITEMS PERTAINING TO SUPPORT FOR THE PARTY SYSTEM.[a]

Items	Rotated Factor Weight	Percent							
Factor I. "Diffuse Support"		1 Strongly Agree	2 Agree	3 Agree-Disagree	4 Disagree	5 Strongly Disagree	6 Don't Know	7 Not Ascertained	Total Percent
9. "The parties do more to confuse the issues than to provide a clear choice on them."	.72	4%	50	19	20	1	5	1	100%
14. "The conflicts and controversies between the parties hurt our country more than they help it."	.64	3	44	14	33	2	3	1	100%
10. "The party leaders make no real effort to keep their promises once they get into office."	.63	6	30	28	31	2	3	1	101%
⑥ "Our system of government would work a lot more efficiently if we could get rid of conflicts between the parties all together."	.57	9	44	8	28	6	4	1	100%
3. "The political parties more often than not create conflicts where none really exists."	.54	5	59	13	15	*	7	1	100%
1. "It would be better if, in all elections, we put no party labels on the ballot."	.52	3	19	7	54	13	3	1	100%
⑤ "People who work for parties during political campaigns do our nation a great service."	−.35	7	61	19	10	*	4	*	101%
④ "The best rule in voting is to pick the man regardless of his party label."	.33	23	59	6	9	1	2	*	100%
⑬ "Things would be better if the parties took opposite stands on issues more than they do now."	.31	1	30	17	42	1	9	1	101%

Factor II. "Support for Responsible Party Government"	Rotated Factor Weight	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Total Percent
16. "A senator or representative should follow his party leaders even if he doesn't want to."	.76	1%	22	9	56	7	4	1	100%
15. "We would be better off if all the Democrats in government stood together and all the Republicans did the same."	.73	2	28	12	49	5	4	1	101%
12. "It is good to stick with your party through thick and thin."	.67	3	33	14	41	6	3	1	101%
7. "Our senators and representatives ought to follow their party leaders more than they do."	.63	4	37	20	31	2	6	1	101%
⑬ (See above—Factor I)	.42			(See above)					
⑥ (See above—Factor I)	.37			(See above)					
④ (See above—Factor I)	−.37			(See above)					
14. (See above—Factor I)	.33			(See above)					
⑪ (See below—Factor III)	.33			(See below)					

* Less than 1%.

[a] Only items with factor weights above ±.30 are included; circled items load on more than one factor. Some rows do not add to 100% due to rounding error; N = 702.

TABLE 2. (*continued*)

Factor III. "Contributor Support"	Rotated Factor Weight	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Total Percent
⑤ "People who work for parties during political campaigns do our nation a great service."	.59	7%	61	19	10	*	4	*	101%
2. "Even if people are not able to help their political party in other ways, they ought to contribute money to the party of their choice."	.58	1	27	18	46	4	2	1	99%
11. "Tax deductions should be allowed for people who contribute money to the political party of their choice."	.50	1	18	7	59	9	5	1	100%
④ "The best rule in voting is to pick the man regardless of his party label."	.47	23	59	6	9	1	2	*	100%

Factor IV. "Cleavage Function Support"	Rotated Factor Weight	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Total Percent
8. "Democracy works best where competition between parties is strong."	.77	7%	61	12	11	1	7	1	100%
⑬ "Things would be better if the parties took opposite stands on issues more than they now do."	.46	1	30	17	42	1	9	1	101%
⑥ "Our system of government would work a lot more efficiently if we could get rid of conflicts between the parties all together."	−.35	9	44	8	28	6	4	1	100%
① (See above—Factor I)	−.33			(See above)					
② (See above—Factor III)	.30			(See above)					

From the standpoint of current practice in Wisconsin—where party labels are applied in non-judicial elections above the municipal level and where the parties exhibit a great deal of election-time volunteer activity—mass opinion is preservative.[9] On the other hand the general public apparently does not greatly approve party competition and controversy; nor does it regard the party leaders as particularly reliable keepers of campaign promises. In these senses opinion is unfavorable. It is hard to conclude from these data therefore that the general population is thoroughly supportive of the party system. Rather, the general image which emerges is that public feeling is lukewarm and somewhat mixed.

Responsible Parties?

Given the fact that diffuse support thus roughly gauged is mixed and moderate, we might then ask whether there is strong public sentiment for reform. Would the majority of members perfer the more cohesive, disciplined form of party organization of "responsible party government" for example? Or do they prefer, on this alternative, the status quo? Considering the items which define Factor II (in Table 2) we see that on none is there a majority in favor of some tenets of the "responsible party government" doctrine. Only 23% agree that "a senator or representative should follow his party leaders even if he doesn't want to." This agreement rises to 30% for "We would be better off if all the Democrats in government stood together and all the Republicans did the same." For what is perhaps a weaker statement, "Our senators and representatives ought to follow their party leaders more than they do," agreement becomes 41%. On none of these items is there a majority on the side of responsible parties. Thus we would have to conclude that this kind of reform, so desirable in the eyes of many professional observers, is not very attractive to general opinion.

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[9] For a discussion of the main features of the Wisconsin party scene, see Leon D. Epstein, *Politics in Wisconsin* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958).

Contributor Support

One of the often-noted dispositions of Americans is the "booster" orientation. It is part of our outlook and culture to adopt quite naturally the role of the contributor—the joiner who pushes for organizational success. One of the reactions evoked by several of these questions appears to pertain to such an attitude complex. In Factor III appears the suggestion of a contributor orientation.

Among the first three items defining this dimension, we observe that the greater part of mass opinion favors party work over financial contributions as a means for satisfying these supportive urges. On one of these items (11), which concerns the recent proposal to allow tax rebates for party contributions, only 19% are in favor. In this context—one which denotes a type of specific support disposition—the mass public is unwilling to depart from the present limitations on party financing.[10]

Consensus/Cleavage Orientation

The fourth factor appears to involve a disposition towards party conflict and competition—or to what at a more abstract level we could call the cleavage-representing function of the party system. One of the most basic functions of parties in a democratic system is to organize and express political cleavage. This involves the recognition, articulation, organization and aggregation of political demands which reflect basic divisions over public policy. In general, this partisan function entails social conflict over the allocation of scarce resources. It could well be argued that it is one of the most important manifest functions of parties and is implied in their very definition. Parties act as a basic mechanism for the representation of differing, conflicting or "partisan" points of view. It is something that is a normal characteristic of parties in democratic systems.

The cleavage function and the social conflict it entails might be contrasted with an opposite function, the creation of consensus—a function widely remarked in the American party system.[11] Parties serve not only as an organized set of combatants over the allocation of valued things; they also act as forces of political integration. They moderate the very conflicts they promote by providing a regulated arena of political competition. They serve to mitigate social conflict by allowing dissident elements of society a means of expression and participation in a wider coalition of groups and individuals. Because they promote social unity and consensus, they may be widely embraced as a force for good.

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[10] Somewhat similar data exist for the national public from the University of Michigan Survey Research Center's 1964 election survey. The question asked nationally was: "Would you be against or in favor of allowing people when they figure their income tax, to deduct the money they give to parties and candidates in the same way that money given to charities can be deducted?" Taking into account the disparities in question and option format, we might compare the national results with the Wisconsin data. In the United States as a whole 26% were in favor of this proposal in comparison with 19% in Wisconsin. 55% were against the proposal nationally whereas 68% were opposed in Wisconsin. Those who had mixed feelings, did not know or whose opinion was not ascertained constituted about 20% nationally and 13% in Wisconsin. Thus, if this one item is an indication, Wisconsin may be lower than the nation as a whole in party system support of this kind. See the Codebook of the 1964 Election Study, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, Study 473, September–November, 1964, Post Election Study, Deck 11, Question 34, page 27. For more general discussion of this kind of proposal which could strengthen the position of the parties, see various publications of Herbert E. Alexander, Citizens' Research Foundation, Princeton, N.J. In particular, see *Tax Incentives for Political Contributions?*, Study Number 3, March, 1961. Also see *Financing Presidential Campaigns*, Report of the President's Commission on Campaign Costs (Washington D.C., April, 1962).

[11] See Easton, *op. cit.*, pp. 256–259. See also, for discussion of related concepts: Austin Ranney and Wilmoore Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1956) pp. 152–153; Talcott Parsons, "'Voting' and the Equilibrium of the American Political System" in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck (eds.), *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 80–120; Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), Chapter III; Gabriel Almond, introduction to Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, (eds.), *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Theodore Lowi, "Toward Functionalism in Political Science: The Case of Innovation in Party Systems," this REVIEW, 57 (September, 1963), 570–583; and Giovanni Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 84.

Reconsidering Factor I from this point of view suggests that the approval of conflict or cleavage as party system outputs is very much tied up with the more general kind of diffuse support which Factor I defines (see items 3, 6, and 14). The extent to which the mass public feels that the parties create unnecessary social conflict is connected to such attitudes as that concerning the retention of party labels on the ballot or whether party leaders keep their promises. But the appearance of Factor IV suggests that a more specific attitude on the worth of interparty competition is also present.

The best defining item on Factor IV is number 8: "Democracy works best where competition between parties is strong." Sixty-eight per cent agree. As a general principle, the public favors the partisan function of cleavage. When applied more specifically to possible change of the existing party system, however, support is much lower. Only 31% agree that "Things would be better if the parties took opposite stands on issues more than they now do," and 53% endorse the idea that government efficiency would be improved by ridding the system of conflicts between the parties. Thus it would appear that party competitiveness is desired only at an abstract level. Relative to the existing parties, an increase in conflict is not seen widely as desirable.

Summary and Interpretation

On several different kinds of general orientation towards the party system, we find that popular support is less than firm. On the most general orientation of the four evoked by these statements—what has been construed here as diffuse support for the present system—opinion is very mixed. Some features of the present operation of the parties are supported, yet others are disapproved. This is particularly evident in support for statements that the party leaders are not trustworthy, that the the parties stir up trouble and create conflict, and that they interfere with government efficiency. The fourth dimension, seen in this context, brings home this ambivalence as well. A majority endorses the idea of partisan competition as eufunctional for democracy; and a majority opposes any furtherance of this competition among the present, amorphous coalition parties. The items which concern the responsible parties idea reinforce the latter tendency. There is general rejection of the idea of increased intraparty cohesion and discipline. On the third dimension, we find a majority in favor of the idea that party work is citizenly service; yet we also find relatively few respondents who think that improving the financial conditions for the parties is necessary. As Sorauf says, "American political parties have long been the victims of a peculiarly ambivalent attitude—an attitude which on the one hand views them as perverters of the democratic spirit while on the other hand it gives them a vital role in the political process."[12] This hypothesis is for the most part supported by these data. The one exception is the responsible-parties issue. Here an hypothesis more akin to that of Ranney and Kendall is needed. They observe, " . . . that the formal-governmental system and the party system *as they now are* are substantially as most Americans wish them to be."[13] The major part of the mass public rejects the responsible parties idea.

To account for the generally mixed state of public support for the party system, a first possibility might be that this is but another instance of public ambivalence about politics and politicians grounded in the general American belief in limited government. Where government is seen as artificial and must be limited, then politics is not likely to be admired. Americans, it has been found, are quite capable of bestowing both positive and negative evaluations on the personnel and processes of politics. On the one hand, the top political posts are accorded high prestige. On the other hand, a vast majority of respondents would not encourage their progeny to pursue a political career.[14] The carry over of esteem mixed with distrust of politics may thus color public response to the parties. It may be that a general ambivalence to politics accounts for these findings.

A second line of interpretation might be that ambivalence has grown out of mixed experiences with the parties *per se*. On the one hand the expectation is that they will operate to promote democracy, but on the other their success could be regarded as limited. Thus a gap appears between expectation and perception. A long earlier period often characterized by boss rule, corruption, inefficiency and ineffectiveness may thus still have its impact through a "cultural lag" and through the processes of political socialization which reproduce in succeeding generations these earlier attitudes towards the parties.

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[12] Frank J. Sorauf, "Extra-Legal Political Parties in Wisconsin," this REVIEW, 58 (September, 1954), 692–704.

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 502, emphasis in the original.

[14] William C. Mitchell, "The Ambivalent Social Status of the American Politician," *The Western Political Quarterly*, 12 (September, 1959), 683–698. Of course, part of the reason why parents would not wish their progeny to pursue a political career is that they may have picked out some other career for them.

In Wisconsin the public reaction to the failures of existing party organizations has taken various forms but particularly the form of support for LaFollette Progressivism. As Sorauf has observed, "The traditional LaFollette opposition to strong parties and strong party leadership ('bossism') has not lost its power in Wisconsin."[15] From these data it might appear that some of the feelings the movement generated have outlived the movement itself.[16] The legal limitations upon the parties left over from the Progressive era are paralleled by a present-day, partly negative set of feelings among the members of the public. That the echoes of Progressivism are still being heard in succeeding generations is a possible interpretation.

A third interpretation, and one which arises naturally out of the analysis already given, is that part of this ambivalence arises from inconsistent functions the parties must perform in a consensual society. The democratic representation of social cleavage—which becomes emphasized in a vision of the parties as responsible, disciplined and cohesive—is partly undercut in the American system by the contrasting function of building consensus. The parties are expected to manage and mitigate conflict at the same time that they are expected to organize and promote it. The public shies away from too strong a partisan division, preferring overlapping programs and ideologies, or no ideologies at all. Yet the parties are also interpreted as forces of legitimate opposition. This duality, as it affects the public consciousness, becomes manifested in contradictory feelings.[17]

In a society such as ours the functions of an institution are likely to be of supreme consequence for its survival. A pragmatic culture places greater emphasis upon what a thing does than what it is. When an institution fails to do that which is defined as socially useful, social resources normally will be withdrawn. But if the functions of the institution are ambiguous or competing, then a limited withdrawal of support is the more likely outcome. The parties have always occupied in this respect a somewhat curious position in the United States. The nation has had continually to put great priority on the maintenance of unity. Parties as organizers of difference constitute a force in direct opposition to the consensual principle.

In the modern era the party has come to be perceived as a mechanism of consensus-building as well. The parties have offset in part the divisions they organize by not organizing them in a cohesive way, by allowing much internal difference, bargaining, balancing of tickets and the like. They thus mend the rent in the fabric of consensus which they create. But they present thereby a duality of functions. An institution such as party which is fundamentally involved in two essential but in some sense antithetical processes of the political system—allocation, depending on difference, and integration, depending on harmony—unavoidably evokes mixed feelings. Where the relative emphasis of the society is more upon concord and the relative emphasis of the institution is upon discord—as party is in terms of its most apparent, manifest function—then feelings will be not only conflicted but also negatively tinged.

Undoubtedly these broad cultural phenomena and the varied experiences they represent go far in providing strategic matters for research in more comprehensive future studies of the causes of public support for the party system. We might wish to consider as well, however, more specific kinds of explanations—some of which are available for analysis in the present survey. In particular, we can analyze several political and demographic variables to see if they suggest any further fruitful lines of explanation.

CORRELATES OF SUPPORT FOR THE PARTY SYSTEM

In order to investigate variations in support among various strata of the population the sixteen items were aggregated into four composite measures based on the four principal components discussed above.[18] Each respon-

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[15] *Op. cit.*, p. 698.

[16] In another part of the survey reported here, the respondents were asked, "While you were growing up, did your father consider himself a Republican, a Democrat, a Progressive, or what?" Only two percent chose Progressive.

[17] Were these feelings more intense, they might provide the occasion for considerable cognitive dissonance. As can be readily seen from the marginals, however, a calculation of the Key intensity ratio would result in a rather low value for all of these items. This is not an area of great public feeling. See V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1961), pp. 208–218.

[18] Component scores were computed using a program written by Keith Billingsley, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin. The formula used is $X = B'R^{-1}S^{-1}(P-\bar{P})$ where X is the component scores matrix, B′ is the transpose of the rotated factor matrix, R^{-1} is the inverse of the correlation matrix and $S^{-1}(P-\bar{P})$ is

TABLE 3. CORRELATES OF SUPPORT FOR THE PARTY SYSTEM: A SUMMARY[a]

FACTOR SCORE I

Diffuse Support

Independent Variable	r	R² (Cumulative)	
Education	.31	.10[b]	.10[b]
Party Identification (Intensity)	.18	—	.13
Age	−.31	.13	.18
Partisan Activism	.14	.15	.18
Ideological Ident. (Direction)	.08	.15	—
Organizational Memberships	.16	.16	.19
Ideological Ident. (Intensity)	.03	—	.19
Party Ident. (Direction)	.00	.16	—
Size of Place	.06	.16	.19
Income	.17	.16	.19
Sex	−.01	.16	.19

FACTOR II

Responsible Parties Support

Independent Variable	r	R² (Cumulative)	
Education	−.41	.17	.17
Party Identification (Intensity)	.27	—	.23
Sex	.17	.20	.26
Age	.26	.21	.28
Organizational Memberships	−.27	.22	.27[c]
Ideological Ident. (Intensity)	−.04	—	.28
Party Ident. (Direction)	.11	.22	—
Size of Place	−.04	.22	.28
Income	−.25	.22	.28
Partisan Activism	−.06	.22	.28
Ideological Ident. (Direction)	.02	.22	—

FACTOR SCORE III

Contributor Support

Independent Variable	r	R² (Cumulative)	
Size of Place	.13	.02	.02
Partisan Activism	.09	.02	.02
Party Ident. (Direction)	−.04	.03	—
Sex	.06	.03	.03
Organizational Memberships	.05	.03	.03
Age	−.04	.03	.03
Ideological Ident. (Intensity)	.05	—	.03
Ideological Ident. (Direction)	.02	.03	—
Income	.06	.03	.03
Party Ident. (Intensity)	.02	—	.03
Education	.07	.03	.03

FACTOR SCORE IV

Cleavage Function Support

Independent Variable	r	R² (Cumulative)	
Sex	−.23	.05	.05
Age	.17	.08	.08
Party Identification (Intensity)	.13	—	.10
Organizational Memberships	.12	.09	.11
Ideological Ident. (Intensity)	.13	—	.11
Partisan Activism	.10	.09	.11
Size of Place	.02	.09	.11
Party Ident. (Direction)	−.06	.10	—
Ideological Ident. (Direction)	.02	.10	—
Income	.06	.10	.11
Education	−.02	.10	.11

[a] Sex is scored as males =1, females =2, Party identification is scored as strong Republican =1 . . . strong Democrat =7; Ideological identification is scored as strong conservative =1 . . . strong liberal =7; Intensity of party and ideological identification is scored low =1 . . . high =4.

[b] The first column under the multiple R² denotes the first correlation solution in which party identification and ideological identification were scored for direction; the second column refers to the second solution in which these two variables were rescored for intensity.

[c] This variable appears in a different order in the second correlation solution than it did in the first.

dent was given four component scores based on linear combinations of the factor weights of the items. When the respondents have each been provided with these four overall scores, it becomes convenient to test for differences among various types of respondents—those active or inactive in partisan politics, those who are identified with one or the other of the two major parties, those higher or lower in socio-economic status, etc. A host of potential correlates can be used to describe respondents who are disproportionately high or low in their level of support for the party system in each of the four senses described by the factor scores. Nine independent variables available in the survey were thought to be of potential theoretical significance for party system support: extent of partisan activism; party identification; ideological self-identification; educational attainment; age; sex; income; size of place; and number of organizational memberships. In order to treat these potential correlates as a group and in a summary way, a correlation and regression analysis was performed to determine the relative contribution of each to the four, party system-related orientations.[19] Table 3 presents

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the matrix of standardized observed scores with mean = 0 and variance = 1. See Henry F. Kaiser, "Formulas for Component Scores," *Psychometrika*, 27 (March, 1962), pp. 83–87.

[19] The procedure used is described in "BMDO2R, Stepwise Regression" in W. J. Dixon (ed.), *BMD Biomedical Computer Programs*, Health Sciences Computing Facility, Department of Preventive Medicine and School of Health, School of Medicine, U.C.L.A., Revised Edition, September 1, 1965, pp. 233–257. It should be noted that several of these measures are ordinal in nature, in particular party identification, partisan activism, ideological self-identifica-

TABLE 4. THE RELATION OF EDUCATION TO SUPPORT FOR THE PARTY SYSTEM[a]

Percent

Diffuse Support (Factor Score I)	*Education*			
	Grade School	High School[b]	College	Graduate and Professional School
Low[c]	46%	31	19	8
Medium	32	37	23	24
High	23	31	58	68
	101%	99%	100%	100%
N =	206	372	88	25

Support for Responsible Parties (Factor Score II)	Grade School	High School[b]	College	Graduate and Professional School
Low	15	36	58	60
Medium	26	37	31	40
High	60	26	11	—
	101%	99%	100%	100%
N =	206	372	88	25

[a] Some columns fail to add to 100% due to rounding error; N not ascertained = 11

[b] Includes vocational school

[c] Factor scores were collapsed so that 1/3 of the respondents fell into each category, high, medium, and low.

a summary of these data in terms of the cumulative multiple R^2 among the independent variables and each of the factor score variables. It also presents the individual Pearsonian coefficients.

The overall finding is that this set of independent variables still leaves a considerable proportion of the variance of each factor score unaccounted for. Yet some of these independent variables explain considerably more than others. Let us view two of them more closely: education and party identification.

Education. Education has a significant impact for Factor Scores I and II. Table 4 shows the nature of these relationships in detail. It presents in tabular form the relation of categories of successively higher educational attainment to Factor Scores I and II, with each factor score collapsed into high, medium, and low.

We observe that those higher in education more frequently score high on the diffuse support dimension than do those lower in education, and vice versa. On the other hand, this situation is reversed for approval of the idea of responsible party government. It is those lower in education who more often favor responsible parties.

That educational attainment should be thus related to support for the present party system and rejection of a relevant reformation suggests several things. First, it could mean that the forces of political socialization which are manifest in the educational system act to preserve the present system. It could suggest as well a general effect of socio-economic status, of which education is one measure. That is, people higher on the social ladder are more apt to be active participants in politics, have more political awareness and feel a greater stake in present democratic political institutions such as the parties.[20] This interpretation is borne out in

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tion, sex, and size of place. The use of interval statistics was thought desirable for reasons of comparability and power even though the assumptions of these statistics are not fully met by several of the variables used.

[20] See, for example, the references in Lester Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965). See also Gabriel Almond and

TABLE 5. THE RELATION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION TO SUPPORT FOR THE PARTY SYSTEM[a]

Percent

Diffuse Support (Factor Score I)	Party Identification						
	Strong Republican	Republican	Independent Republican	Independent	Independent Democrat	Democrat	Strong Democrat
Low	25%	40	30	51	39	32	20
Medium	29	29	37	29	26	36	43
High	46	32	33	20	35	32	36
	100%	101%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%
N=	79	114	43	75	84	173	118

Support for Responsible Parties (Factor Score II)	Party Identification						
	Strong Republican	Republican	Independent Republican	Independent	Independent Democrat	Democrat	Strong Democrat
Low	28%	34	54	43	48	29	20
Medium	34	35	33	33	33	37	25
High	38	31	14	24	19	34	55
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N=	79	114	43	75	84	173	118

[a] Some columns fail to add to 100% due to rounding error; N not ascertained = 16.

part by the greater diffuse support exhibited by those who are partisan actives (see Table 3). It is also suggested by the relationship to diffuse support of increasing number of memberships in various organizations and higher income—both of which are part of the participation/social status syndrome well known to social science. Age is another variable which overlaps heavily with education in its effects here. It is not only the well-educated but also the young who are more diffusely supportive. This complex of forces acts to inhibit approval of the revisionist ideas of the responsible parties' doctrine.

Party Identification. A variable with a rather different impact—again small, but significant—is *intensity* of party identification. Table 5 shows the relationship of party identification to Factor Scores I and II.

Intensity of party identification works in the same direction as education for diffuse support but in an opposite way for approval of responsible parties. The person of more intense party identification is likely to be more supportive of the present parties. He is also more likely to endorse the concepts of greater intra-party cohesion and discipline.

It is interesting that education and intensity of party identification have an opposite effect on support for responsible parties. This suggests that partisan-related experience and socialization of the person who is highly attached to a party offset the negative cues he may receive about responsible party reform through educational and related influences. Perhaps the person who cares more about his party attachment is more eager to see it reformed in a way which maximizes the value of consistent party meaning—whether it be program, ideology, or something else. Strong loyalty at the individual level is more readily generalized to the collective level.

These things are true both for Democrats and Republicans. Strangely, however, there are

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Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), and Samuel H. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1955).

proportionately more independent identifiers than independents who disapprove of responsible parties. Evidently the person who identifies with a party loosely is more likely to generalize this flexibility of attachment to expectations about how elected or other officials should behave. The pure independent on the other hand may more readily allow intraparty cohesion so long as he himself remains detached.

For diffuse support the matter is straightforward. Both greater educational attainment and increasing levels of strong party identification contribute to a favorable image. Thus the contention of the voting studies that rising levels of party identification contribute to stability in the party and political systems is given some confirmation.[21] The contribution however is not high. We must look therefore to a variety of additional influences to account for the present or future support for the parties at the institutional level. Party identification itself makes only a small contribution to diffuse support and thus to possible stability in these terms.

Thus, the independent variables available in this survey of some potential theoretical consequence show only modest capacity to account for variability in levels of support for the party system. Education and the variables which overlap it such as age or socio-economic status show the strongest relationships. They operate to increase diffuse support for the present parties but to undermine approval of the idea of cohesive parties. Strength of party identification also adds a modest increment to diffuse support. It works in an opposite direction from education on the responsible parties issue. The strongly identified supporter is not only more likely to favor the present system but he is also more apt to desire greater intraparty unity than is the weakly identified partisan or the respondent who is independent of party.

CONCLUSION

Blau and Scott, in describing the state of knowledge about public orientations to governmental organizations, point out: "One serious shortcoming of most organizational research, including our own, is that there is no investigation of the publics related to the organization. Studies of organizations have not included within the scope of their analysis the publics directly in contact with the organization, let alone the larger public which is potentially in contact."[22]

This description, when applied to the political parties, is partially offset by the voting behavior literature. These studies have given us much valuable information about the image of the parties as reference groups. They have not provided direct information about the public reaction to the parties at the level of system and institution, however. It has been the intention of the present investigation to make an initial excursion into this uncharted area.[23]

The major emphases have been upon defining the problem and operationalizing the central variables. A first approximation of such measures has been made, and they have been used to determine the approximate values that the variables take in a relevant population and among several population strata. The overall finding is that the public has mixed and not highly supportive feelings about the institution of party.

There are, of course, limitations inherent in a study such as this. It is only able to contribute in a small way to the goals of explanation and prediction of party-system stability and change. It applies to a relatively small segment of the total American general public. Other geographical areas may exhibit substantial differences from these findings. In addition, this is a snapshot taken at a particular moment in time. Nevertheless, our presumption, in the absence of replication, is that these data are indicative of more general phenomena.

The implications of these findings could be of several kinds. One possible meaning is that this study registers what has been continuously true, if little recognized, about our politics. It may be that Americans have ordinarily withheld full acceptance from the party system. The lukewarm public approval found here could represent a lasting indifference or a permanent state of partial disfavor which originally grew out of a fear of disunity. In a nation which created and maintained its unity precariously, the introduction of a political device apparently designed to encourage faction and division was met with initial suspicion. As time passed and the party organizations grew, the original reservations became reinforced in the corruption and autocracy of the machines. The orientation already present in the political culture was refurbished in the reaction of an anti-party Progressivism. In Wisconsin as elsewhere, this movement gave special impetus to these feelings which became institutionalized in legal limitations on the operation of the parties. These orientations in our day continue to be fostered as general norms of nonpartisanship.

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[21] See, for example, *The American Voter*.

[22] *Formal Organizations* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962), page 74.

[23] For explorations of related interest, but involving the public view of other political institutions, see: Herbert Hamilton, The *U.N. and the Public: A Multidimensional Analysis of the Meanings of a Social Institution*, (Mimeograph) Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Institute of Communications Research, (no date); Morris Janowitz, Deil Wright and William Delany, *Public Administration and the Public's Perspectives Toward Government in a Metropolitan Community* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Institute of Public Administration, 1958), and Donald E. Stokes, "Popular Evaluations of Government: An Empirical Assessment" in Harlan Cleveland and Harold D. Lasswell (eds.) *Ethics and Bigness* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), pp. 61–72. For a discussion of the image of a political institution held by an emergent public, see: David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government," in Roberta Sigel (ed.), *Political Socialization: Its Role in the Political Process*, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 361 (Sept., 1965), pp. 40–57.

Another way we could view the implications of this research is in terms of possible contemporary trends away from party. A variety of observers have detected tendencies in American society which can be interpreted as anti-party in nature. The great growth of modern, technical, merit-based bureaucracy constitutes an incremental removal of party from many areas of government decision-making. The expansion of "mass society" modes of political behavior also represents a weakening of the party's role in political life.[24] In addition, such relatively recent phenomena as the upsurge of split-ticket voting and the new rash of non-party political groups—civil rights, far right, far left and others—are perhaps symptomatic of a more general malaise in the party system.

If this is the present general drift, it does not mean that the party system is doomed. In ordinary times, without great environmental stress, the parties may carry on indefinitely in much same manner as at present. They can serve as convenient means of electioneering or as builders of consensus as long as their short-term specific sources of support are adequate. The danger for them might come, however, in the rare moments of great political crisis. Because they lack strong pillars of reserve support, they could buckle under the pressure of a flash mass movement or a man on horseback if their specific supports were effectively neutralized. It may appear strange even to pose such possibilities in what has proved to be, at the regime level, the most stable existing national system. Yet such dramatic consequences are not entirely remote, especially if secular forces which undermine the party institution are already in motion.

That mass endorsement is infirm and narrow means also that forceful embodiments of party spirit such as "responsible party government" are unlikely to become widely established. The general public is cool to the idea of sharp competition and clarity of opposing views—even in the wake of an election where there was a choice rather than an echo; and the concepts of party cohesion and discipline have little mass appeal. The future development of this more "advanced" organization of partisanship is therefore likely to be inhibited.

If there is evidence of a counter-tendency among these data, it is found first of all at the intersection of youth, status, social involvement and increased education. The younger, more active, better educated segment of the populace offsets the feebly supporting force of other mass opinion. This would suggest that there may be at work a shift in the pattern of political socialization which alters the character of regime-level partisan commitment. The other possibility, so far as age is concerned, is that the older one gets, the more he becomes disillusioned by the operation of the parties. In any case, with rising proportions of youth and of those with greater educational attainment, the prospects are somewhat brighter for the future of party system support.

In addition, the maintenance of a high level of party identification increases the store of good will being generated towards the party system. Continued reproduction of intense individual preference among the parties is reflected at the institutional level in an increase in the level of diffuse support, as well as in a greater desire for more responsible parties. There is some spillover, therefore, between levels of partisan commitment. Yet, because there is a fairly weak relationship with diffuse support, the party system must seek support from forces beyond the simple, intergenerational transmission of party affiliation.

For the moment, counternorms which encourage nonpartisan politics appear to have salience in the populace. The popular base for reconstituting the party system as a more central part of our politics is inadequate on these findings. Thus those who call for a reinvigoration of the parties are likely to be disappointed if present public support is a condition. Key once argued:

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[24] See, for example, William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959).

> . . . if there is to be a reconstruction of party in the government of the American states, it will need to be accompanied by a reorientation in popular thought about party politicians. That popular theory of belittlement and condemnation which reached its full flowering in the Progressive era aided in the disintegration of political organization and forced the retreat of most of the remnants of organized politics into the backroom. True, only an abject people holds its politicians in awe, and even if a people merely respects its politicians, the republic may be ailing. Yet the functions of party politicians have to be performed. It may be just as well to create institutional conditions that both permit them to do their work and allow the people to watch them like a hawk.[25]

It appears that Key was right in his assessment of the orientation of popular thought. In our system, as no doubt in many others—where leaders from Mobutu to De Gaulle have been calling for an end to partisan politics—anti-party norms and images are present as a living part of the political culture. They offset significantly the measure of support for the status quo party system which exists in the orientations of the mass public.

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[25] *American State Politics*, page 130.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA

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It is noteworthy that the recent spate of writings in the field of "political development" has shown a pronounced tendency to omit consideration of Latin America. Thus the "communications" and "bureaucracy" volumes in the SSRC political development series[1] are totally innocent of Latin American data, as is an excellent recent treatment of—of all things!—the political behavior of the military in developing areas.[2]

The Latin Americanists, for their part, have largely stressed those key features of the area's politics which have long remained constant—executive predominance, military intervention, and the influence of the peculiarities of Hispanic culture. At the same time, it is clear that the social changes usually collectively termed "modernization"—urbanization, technological borrowing, and the development of mass communications grids—together with their political correlate, the expansion of the political community to include hitherto excluded social elements, are proceeding in Latin America too.[3] Accordingly, it becomes desirable to reexamine the "statics" of Latin American politics in the light of the "dynamics" of the processes of political development and social mobilization.[4]

The present article attempts this reexamination with respect to the most characteristic feature of Latin American politics, the coup d'état and the establishment of a de facto military government.[5]

A priori, mutually contradictory theses about the relations of the military coup to social development can be constructed—and indeed the literature on the subject abounds in such contradictory theses, evidence to support each of which is always available.[6] These hypotheses focus on whether military intervention in politics, represented most typically by the extra-constitutional seizure of power, is (a) increasing or decreasing, and (b) occurring primarily with the object of promoting socio-economic change or of resisting it. Their starting points are the changes assumed to be going forward in the armed forces—the growth of professionalism, recruitment from a wider range of the population, greater influence from the United States, etc.

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[1] Lucian W. Pye (ed.), *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); and Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[2] Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).

[3] Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," this REVIEW, 55 (September, 1961), 493–514; Bruce M. Russett *et al. World Handbook of Social and Political Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), esp. pp. 294–298.

[4] Two exceptions to the general lack of attempts to relate static and dynamic factors in a systematic way are the very fine article by Gino Germani and Kalman H. Silvert entitled "Politics, Social Structure, and Military Intervention in Latin America," *European Journal of Sociology*, 2 (1961), 62–81; and Karl M. Schmitt and David Burks, *Evolution or Chaos: Dynamics of Latin American Government and Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1963).

[5] This article forms part of a larger work currently in progress. I wish to thank the Horace H. Rackham Graduate School of the University of Michigan for the Faculty Summer Research Fellowship which enabled me to begin work on this subject, and the Harvard Center for International Affairs for the appointment as Research Associate which is enabling me to bring it to completion. I also wish to express my gratitude to Walter C. Soderlund, a doctoral candidate at the University of Michigan, whose research is reflected in the statistical data reported here.

[6] A series of such pairs of mutually contradictory hypotheses drawn from the literature is neatly formulated by Lyle N. McAlister in his contribution to John J. Johnson (ed.), *Continuity and Change in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 158–159. Some authors point out the evidence that various mutually opposed tendencies exist without attempting to subsume them in some general formulation. This is Johnson's own approach: see his *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), Introduction and Chapter IX; and also that of Irving Horowitz, "United States Policy and the Latin American Military Establishment," *The Correspondent*, Autumn 1964. Lieuwen reconciles opposing tendencies by means of positing cycles in which a set of trends in one direction is succeeded by a countervailing set; see his *Arms and Politics in Latin America*, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1961), esp. Chapter V.

Now if evidence can be cited on either side of a proposition about developmental tendencies, it is clearly necessary to quantify these items of evidence along a time dimension; what is needed, accordingly, are empirical data giving the change in the frequencies of the occurrence of each of the contrasting possibilities over time.

The empirical questions we want answered, therefore, are:

(1) Since the breakdown of early twentieth-century stability began the current period of change in Latin America, have coups d'état become more or less frequent?

(2) What changes have been occurring in the function of the coup in relation to changes taking place in the larger society?

(3) What are the effects of changes in the Latin American military on the form, structure, and timing of the coup d'état, and what political significance do these effects have?

INCIDENCE OF COUPS D'ÉTAT

One must first eschew the hopeless task of trying to account for coups d'état that were not successful. The categories of coups that were aborted, suppressed, or abandoned melt into each other and into a host of other non-coup phenomena so as to defy accounting. At the same time, of course, since coups are after all illegal, they are matured under conditions of secrecy which make it inevitable that the unsuccessful projects for coups which become known about represent a highly biased sample. At the same time, an unsuccessful coup attempt may be the work of one or two atypical people; its occurrence does not necessarily say anything about the state of the polity as a whole, as does a successful coup.

During the thirty-year period 1935–1964, there were 56 successful changes of government by extra-constitutional means in the twenty independent countries of Latin America. The frequency of their occurrence was as shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1. FREQUENCY OF SUCCESSFUL COUPS D'ETAT IN LATIN AMERICA, BY YEAR, 1935–1964

1935	1	1945	2	1955	2
1936	3	1946	2	1956	2
1937	3	1947	1	1957	1
1938	0	1948	4	1958	1
1939	0	1949	4	1959	1
1940	0	1950	1	1960	1
1941	1	1951	2	1961	2
1942	0	1952	2	1962	2
1943	2	1953	1	1963	4
1944	6	1954	3	1964	2

That is, the number of successful coups normally fluctuates between one and three per year. The clearly exceptional period was that from 1938 to 1942, during which only a single coup took place.

The first explanation which suggests itself is that these were years of recuperation from depression in which economic conditions were improving and the performance of government was likely to be regarded as satisfactory.[7] One would then hypothesize that a successful coup or revolt is less likely when economic conditions are improving.

A very rough test of this hypothesis can be made on the basis of figures for annual changes in real per capita product given in the UN Statistical Yearbooks for the 1947–1963 period.

It should be borne in mind, here and at subsequent points, that statistical data from Latin America leave much to be desired. It should also be noted that the data are not complete. However, data are available, for most of the years during that period, for ten countries in which coups d'etat occurred.

During 1947–63, it is possible to assert, real per capita income figures for these countries showed a rise over the previous year's figure 87 times, a drop 39 times, and remained the same ten times. (These figures cannot be assumed to be typical of Latin America as a whole, it should be noted, since it is precisely the countries whose economies are likely not to be improving which do not report reliable economic statistics.) If coups d'etat occurred without relation to the state of the economy, one would then expect at least twice as many coups to have occurred in years which showed improvement as in those which showed deterioration, since there were more than twice as many "improvement years" as "deterioration years." However, that is not the case. Of the fifteen coups occurring during years for which the economic data are available, seven took place during years which showed an improvement, seven during years of deterioration, and one when no change was reported. The incomplete nature of the evidence should be stressed; in future years more complete calculations will doubtless be possible; other factors, not now identifiable, may be partly responsible; but the available data are consistent with the hypothesis postulated, that the overthrow of a government is more likely when economic conditions worsen.[8]

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[7] Edwin Lieuwen discusses the relation between the depression and military intervention in "Militarism and Politics in Latin America," in John J. Johnson (ed.), *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962).

It seems reasonable, accordingly, to regard the years of low coup activity from 1938 to 1942 as due to the economic recovery of that period. Since 1949, a very slight secular trend in the reduction of the frequency of coups may be discernible. Since economic conditions are generally improving, although irregularly, this too might be expected on the basis of the same premise. Yet it should be remembered that variation in economic conditions can be held responsible for only a part of the variation in the frequency of coups as, the data discussed above also show.

COUPS D'ETAT AND SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE

We turn now to the question of changes in the function of the coup in relation to social and political change. This question is extremely awkward to get at, since the origins of coups are often obscure, and the intentions of those staging them mixed. The author nevertheless believes it sound to explain the coup functionally rather than genetically, or in terms of factors external to the military rather than of internal characteristics of the military establishment, because of several considerations.

First, a military coup is not made by the military alone. Almost invariably, the conspirators are in touch with civilian politicians and respond to their advice, counting on their assistance in justifying the coup to public opinion and helping to run the country afterwards. This relationship not infrequently takes the form of a coup only reluctantly staged by the military at the insistence of civilian politicians, who appeal to the officers' patriotism, the historic role of the army in saving the country at its hour of need—of which national history doubtless affords many examples—and so on.[9] The chairman of one military junta which had outstayed its welcome spoke bitterly of some of its latter-day detractors "who used to cry at the doors of the barracks asking that the constitutional government be removed and even used to complain about the apathy of the military who did not want to act."[10]

Second, among the various conspirators, with their varying orientations and objectives, the position of those who can most count on outside support, whose own objectives are most in harmony with the aims of major outside forces, will be strengthened.

Third, the autonomy of the military decision to intervene may further be reduced by the fact that the political situation to which the military respond has been "engineered" by outside groups desiring intervention so as to trigger military predispositions in that direction. It is not unknown, for example, for Right-wing activists to fake "Communist" terrorist attempts in order to help create an atmosphere conducive to military intervention.[11]

If the military coup is thus frequently called into play by the workings of the political system, what is its function in relation to social and economic change? Clearly, its purpose must increasingly be to thwart such change. This is so because the point of the coup is to prevent from happening what, it is assumed, would happen in its absence.[12]

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[8] It should not be thought that economic conditions always worsen as a result of a coup. At least as commonly, in the writer's experience, conditions improve as business confidence shows an upsurge after a coup, which normally occurs without appreciable economic dislocation and typically removes a government regarded as incompetent.

[9] McAlister argues in favor of this "revisionist" approach, which regards military intervention as chiefly a response to functional imperatives rather than as an expression of willful selfishness, in "Changing Concepts of the Role of the Military in Latin America," *The Annals* (July 1965), pp. 90–92.

[10] Admiral Ramón Castro Jijón, quoted in the *Diario Las Américas* (Miami), May 28, 1964. For a detailed account of the creation of an interventionist frame of mind on the part of the military, see Chapter V of my *Anatomy of a Coup d'Etat: Ecuador, 1963.* Johnson gives an example from Brazil of public incitement of the military to revolt by civilians on p. 124 of his *The Role of the Military in Developing Societies.* Finer discusses the interventionist mood in Chapter 5 of *The Man on Horseback.*

[11] For one such case of which the author has personal knowledge, see *Anatomy of a Coup d'Etat: Ecuador, 1963*, p. 19.

[12] This is also Lieuwen's view: "On the balance, the armed forces have been a force for the preservation of the *status quo;* their political intervention has generally signified, as it does today, a conservative action. . . . " Edwin Lieuwen, "The Military: A Force for Continuity or Change," in John TePaske and Sydney N. Fisher (eds.), *Ex-*

Since social mobilization is proceeding, that is, constitutional presidents are likely to be responsive to social classes of progressively lower status, as these enter the political arena by moving to the city or otherwise become mobilized. The policies of each successive constitutional president are thus likely, on balance, to constitute a greater threat to the status quo than those of his predecessor. This may be interpreted to the military by those trying to secure their intervention as a threat to the personal interests of military officers in the economy at large, as a challenge to the military in its role of preserver of domestic order, or, most likely, as a long-term threat to the special status and privileges, and even the continued existence, of the military institution.[13]

It thus seems probable that as social and economic development take place:

(1) military intervention increasingly takes the form of an attempt by the possessing classes to maintain the status quo;

(2) military intervention is increasingly directed against legally elected presidents heading constitutional regimes;

(3) interventions increasingly occur to forestall the election and inauguration of reforming presidents; and

(4) popular resistance to military intervention increases, resulting in greater likelihood that a military coup will lead to open fighting.

An analysis of the 56 successful insurrections[14] which occurred in the 20 countries of Latin America during the thirty-year period 1935–1964 appears to confirm each of these hypotheses, and thus to substantiate the argument made above. Table 2 gives the numbers and percentages of insurrections during each of the three decades of the period in which:

(1) The reformation of the social and economic status quo was clearly a goal of the conspiratorial group; this shows a decrease.

(2) A low level of violence (essentially a bloodless coup without streetfighting or other popular involvement) was maintained; this also decreases.

(3) Constitutional, rather than de facto governments were overthrown; this shows an increase.

(4) The insurrection occurred during the 12 months prior to a scheduled presidential election, or in the four months immediately following; this likewise increased.

DYNAMICS OF COUPS D'ÉTAT

Even if it be granted that the major determinants of the occurrence of a successful coup lie in the functioning of the total political system rather than in the internal dynamics of the military institution, those dynamics are of significance in such questions as the timing of the coup, and become especially important in determining the directions followed after the coup is successful and its leaders installed in government positions.

An examination of this problem must start from an appreciation of the fact that officers of the armed forces are not dominated by a single political viewpoint, but hold a variety of political orientations. The correlates of these political orientations in personal characteristics have not as yet been systematically evaluated and weighed for the Latin American military, along the lines of Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier*.[15] However, available evidence suggests that on top of a primary set of conditioning factors such as those which the American voting studies indicate are significant in

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plosive Forces in Latin America (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964), p. 77.

[13] It is the conclusion of Lieuwen's insightful *Generals Vs. Presidents* (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 101–107, that the last factor mentioned has been the crucial one in the recent coups.

[14] Successful insurrections took place during the period in Argentina: June 1943, February 1944, September 1955, and March 1962;
Bolivia: May 1936, July 1937, December 1943, July 1946, May 1951, April 1952, and November 1964;
Brazil: October 1945, August 1954, November 1955, and April 1964;
Colombia: June 1953 and May 1957;
Costa Rica: March 1948;
Cuba: March 1952 and January 1959;
Dominican Republic: September 1963;
Ecuador: August 1935, October 1937, May 1944, August 1947, November 1961, and July 1963;
El Salvador: May 1944, October 1944, December 1948, October 1960, and January 1961;
Guatemala: July 1944, October 1944, June 1954, and March 1963;
Haiti: January 1946, May 1950, and December 1956;
Honduras: October 1956 and October 1963;
Nicaragua: June 1936;
Panama: October 1941, November 1949, and May 1951;
Paraguay: February 1936, August 1937, June 1948, January 1949, September 1949, May 1954;
Peru: October 1949 and July 1962;
Venezuela: October 1945, November 1948, and January 1958.

[15] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: Free Press, 1964).

TABLE 2. STATISTICS OF SUCCESSFUL INSURRECTIONS, BY DECADES, 1935–1964

	1935–1944		1945–1954		1955–1964	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Total	16	100	22	100	18	100
(1) Reformist	8	50	5	23	3	17
(2) Low in Violence	13	81	15	68	6	33
(3) Overthrew Constitutional Governments	2	12	7	32	9	50
(4) Around Election Time	2	12	7	32	10	56

party preference—that is, family tradition, social and economic level, and ethnic or other particularistic identification—is imposed a second set of factors peculiar to the military profession: rank, branch of service, occupational specialty, and career pattern. In a situation in which a coup d'état becomes a possibility, ranking military officers are called on to develop policy positions on the question of the continuance in office of the president. The position each officer assumes will have two components, one based on attitudes towards the president's personal abilities, his programs, and the arrangements he is making for the succession; the other, partially independent of the first, reflecting the officer's views on the question of military intervention in politics in general.

The changes which have been taking place in Latin American armed forces in recent years suggest that the variety of political views represented within the military services has been on the increase, as the social origins from which officers are drawn have become less upper-class,[16] as the range of military technical specialties has been extended, and as the sheer size of military establishments has increased.[17] At the same time the increasing complexity of the governmental apparatus and the steady expansion of the proportion of the population which participates in politics, together with the technical improvement in the means of communication, have meant that a military coup needs itself to be more complex, to be more carefully planned, and to involve more people if it is to be successful. Because of heightened popular involvement in politics, a coup is also more likely to lead to open fighting, rather than being accepted passively by an indifferent population. Given the range of political orientations within the military services, then, the task of the organizer of a successful coup d'état is thus to build up a coalition of officers of a size and character adequate to execute the successful coup. The prime mover or movers in organizing the coup must therefore be engaged over a period of time in the process of building a coalition which will eventually exceed, in size and "weight,"[18] the minimum necessary to insure success.

The originators of the conspiracy and the first to join it are those most opposed to the president and his policies, while other officers of different political orientations and a greater commitment to constitutional procedures have higher thresholds to interventionism. However, as time goes on, these thresholds will be reached for many officers as the tendency of the president's policies becomes clearer, as the country's situation, seen from their point of view, worsens, or as the succession problem becomes more acute with the approach of the end of the president's term.

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[16] Medina Echevarría states flatly that the officers seizing power today "come, practically without exception, from hard-working middle-class families"; José Medina Echevarría and Benjamin Higgins, *Social Aspects of Economic Development in Latin America* (UNESCO: Paris, 1963), vol. II, p. 88.

[17] The evidence for these developments is summarized by Edwin Lieuwen in Chapter 5 of *Arms and Politics in Latin America*, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 122–153. If one thought solely in terms of these factors, as some authors do, regarding military political activity exclusively as being "pushed" by pressures internal to the military, rather than being also "pulled" by the demands of the total political situation, then it would be logical to expect these changes to result in greater professionalism and technicism, reducing military involvement in politics, and in greater sympathy with the lower classes, rendering such involvement more progressive in orientation. Although several authors have assumed viewpoints of this type, they do not appear substantiated by the evidence cited above.

[18] The concept of "weight" is discussed below.

It is of course possible that as time goes on the changes which take place in the situation are such as to reduce the degree of hostility to the president on the part of the organizers of the conspiracy, which may then disintegrate. It seems clear, however, that a successful coup would show a curve of support within the ranks of the military, rising over time and beginning with the original instigator of the plot, who represents the most extreme opposition to the president. The development of the curve of military support for the coup is likely to be exponential as the end of the president's term approaches. Under normal conditions the president prepares to hand over power to a successor of his own party or orientation, sometimes using not only his personal influence but also extra-legal techniques to guarantee the succession. This raises the prospect of another four or six years of the same policies; yet the trepidation of those who oppose them necessarily increases. The heir-apparent is in part an unknown quantity, which is disquieting; his previous public service will normally have taken place as a member of the president's cabinet, in which his own views necessarily had to be subordinated to those of his chief.

If there is a chance that the heir-apparent would be defeated in the elections, the conspirators may await their outcome before striking. If he is indeed defeated, the need for conspiracy disappears; if he is elected, it then becomes necessary to strike before his inauguration, since his actual occupancy of the presidency would enable him to consolidate his power. Yet it is risky to wait until after the elections, which will mobilize his supporters and which may give him a strong mandate and thus strengthen his position with domestic and foreign opinion.

Thus, for these reasons also, the likelihood of a coup d'état could be expected to increase as a president's term wears on, reaching its high point prior to a scheduled election but remaining high until the inauguration of a new president, this tendency becoming more marked over time, in response not only to the accelerating social mobilization of the masses but also to the increases in the size, technical differentiation, and range of social origins of the officer corps.

Within the group of conspirators, then, a series of thresholds to interventionism is present, the lowest being that of the instigator (or group of instigators) of the plot, the highest being that of the last man (or group) to join in the coup before it is launched. The position of this hypothetical last adherent to the conspiracy is interesting to consider. If one recalls that the success of the coup is predicated on the formation of a decisive coalition to support it, then it is clear that the last adherent or set of adherents to the movement provided the critical margin of support, not just in its size, but especially in its "weight."

The importance of this hypothetical "swing man" in the situation, that is, may be due to any one of a series of factors—his personal influence within the armed forces; his prestige among the public; and/or his critical position in the command structure of the armed forces. It then becomes probable that because of his higher rank, greater prestige, and crucial importance for the coup, the "swing man" is placed at the head of the provisional government that emerges after the revolt is successful—as provisional president, as chairman of the ruling military junta, or as minister of the armed forces behind the façade of a civilian provisional government.[19]

An interesting and paradoxical situation is thus created. The "swing man" becomes the leading figure in the new government; yet he is the person who was least committed to the objectives of the coup, whose threshold to intervention was the highest of all the conspirators, and who was a last-minute addition to the conspiracy perhaps out of sympathy with, or not even aware of, the more fundamental aims of the group that hatched the original plan. Indeed, a situation can actually be created in which the head of the new government actually sympathized with the aims of the conspiracy not at all, but joined it at the last minute only to avoid pitting brother officers against each other, possibly precipitating a civil war.

These characteristics of the "swing man" can perhaps be made clearer by an illustration. A classical occupant of the role of "swing man" has been Marshal Castelo Branco of Brazil. A *New York Times* reporter described his position in the 1964 coup as follows:

> "General Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco has been called a 'general's general.' He rose to his present post of Army Chief of Staff after a long professional career in which he gained the high respect of his fellow officers but remained virtually unknown to the general public . . .
>
> "In the present crisis, the soft-spoken general first played the role of the reluctant dragon in

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[19] This set of dynamics is of course not peculiar to Latin America. Classic occupants of the role of "swing man," with local variations, have been Naguib in Egypt, Gürsel in Turkey, Aguiyi-Ironsi in Nigeria—or even de Gaulle in France.

> refusing to join the developing movement against President João Goulart. His scruples were the same as those of many other Brazilian officers: The Brazilian Army has a tradition of protecting legality and the Constitution, and General Castelo Branco was not eager to become involved in a coup against a constitutional President.
>
> "But the general became convinced that the continuation of the Goulart regime would lead Brazil to chaos and possibly a sharp shift toward the extreme left. He then drafted a position paper, the 'Castelo Branco analysis' that became the justification for the army's support of last week's rebellion.
>
> "Such is the respect enjoyed by the short, stocky, bull-necked general, that his analysis served as the turning point in the hesitations of many commanders in the crisis over Mr. Goulart."[20]

Clearly, in this kind of situation ample material exists for a conflict to emerge within the new provisional government. The conflict develops along the following lines. The erstwhile "swing man," now, let us say, president of the provisional junta, regards the objectives of the coup as realized with the overthrow of the former President and begins to make preparations to return the country to constitutional normality and to hold elections. The original instigator of the coup and the group around him, on the other hand, resist this tendency and instead urge the necessity for the military to keep power for a longer period, to purge all sympathizers with the deposed president completely from public life, to outlaw his party indefinitely, and to restructure political life to make it impossible for the tendency which he represents again to come to power.

During the recent period the basic situation described above has been reproduced in reality most faithfully in Argentina, Brazil, and Peru, and with local variations in Guatemala, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras.

In Argentina this basic set of dynamics has played itself out again and again since the overthrow of Perón in 1955, the irreconciliable anti-Perón forces being known as the *colorados*, or "reds," whose most characteristic figure is Admiral Isaac Rojas.[21]

Due to the more amorphous character of politics in Brazil, the same basic situation crystallized more slowly. The opposition between the military irreconcilables and the heirs of Getúlio Vargas has nevertheless been waged intermittently for 10 years. The coup staged to prevent the inauguration of Kubitschek and Goulart in 1955 was unsuccessful; the coup designed to prevent the inauguration of Goulart as President in 1962 succeeded merely in having the powers of the presidency temporarily curtailed; only with the overthrow of Goulart in 1964 was the military anti-Getulista movement fully successful. After the successful revolt of 1964, the pattern described above became operative in its purest form, with conflict developing between the prestigious "swing man," Marshal Castelo Branco, metamorphosed into Provisional President, and the *linha dura*, the "hard line" of the irreconcilable military opposition to the heirs of Vargas.[22]

A similar process took place in Peru following the coup d'état of 1962. For 30 years the commanding officers of the armed forces had resisted the assumption of power by the revolutionary APRA movement, despite the fact that it commanded a majority, or at least a plurality, of the votes during the entire period. The party had begun in the 'twenties and 'thirties as a revolutionary Marxoid group, strongly anti-Yankee and prepared to use violence. During the 30-odd years of its sojourn in the wilderness, however, the party leadership, and especially the party's founder, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, had "evolved" to a more moderate position of which anti-communism was the central principle. At the same time, in the search for a respectability which would allay the misgivings of the military about the party, APRA's major tactician, Ramiro Prialé, led the party into alliance with increasingly more conservative forces, culminating shortly after the 1962 presidential election in an entente with the forces of General Manuel Odría. This was clearly the ultimate stage of the party's evolution, since Odría was a former military dictator who had outlawed and persecuted the party during his period of office, and who had run his election campaign in 1962 on a militantly anti-APRA platform. Haya had gathered more votes than any of the other candidates in the presidential elections of 1962, although only a handful more than Fernando Belaúnde and fewer than the one-third of the vote necessary to prevent the election's being decided by Congress. However, the new Congress, due to the vagaries of the electoral system, heavily over-represented the APRA. Immediately following the election, the coup was staged, the leaders of the armed forces implausibly charging that the electoral results were vitiated by widespread fraud. In an unsuccessful last-minute attempt to avert the coup, the APRA leadership announced that its congressional votes would go to General Odría in a self-sacrificing attempt to break the impasse and avert the breakdown of constitutional procedures.

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[20] "Man in the News," *New York Times*, April 6, 1964. Typographic errors in the original have been corrected.

[21] See Arthur Whitaker, *Argentine Upheaval* (New York: Praeger, 1956); Lieuwen, *Generals vs. Presidents*, pp. 10–25; James W. Rowe, *The Argentine Elections of 1963: An Analysis*, (Washington: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, n.d.), pp. 11–18; Peter G. Snow, "Parties and Politics in Argentina: The Elections of 1962 and 1963," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 9 (February, 1965), 1–36.

[22] See *Generals vs. Presidents*, pp. 69–85; and Phyllis Peterson, "Brazil: Institutionalized Confusion," in Martin C. Needler (ed.), *Political Systems of Latin America* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964), pp. 473–477.

This situation made possible the emergence of a more muted version of the split which occurred in the Argentine and Brazilian cases. The ranking officer of the military junta, General Ricardo Pérez Godoy, was willing to return the country to constitutionality on the basis of the APRA offer to have its congressmen vote for Odría. The two key younger members of the junta, Generals Lindley López and Vargas Prada, who had personal and family ties to Belaúnde, opposed this solution, which would enable the APRA to exact concessions, for example in the shape of posts in an Odría administration. Pérez Godoy was accordingly forced to resign and the reconstituted junta presided, during 1963, over elections in which, because of the withdrawal of two minor candidates, Belaúnde was successful.[23]

It appears overwhelmingly likely that as time goes on and popular participation in the processes of politics becomes greater, the Peruvian type of situation, in which over as long a period as necessary the popular choice is kept out of the presidency by repeated military intervention, will become increasingly common. As was suggested above, the pattern has extended itself to Argentina and Brazil already. Honduran politics seem to be moving in the same direction as the army has become increasingly committed against the Liberal party; the Guatemalan military staged their coup in 1964 to prevent the return to power of Juan José Arévalo; and the Dominican armed forces have clearly attempted to assume a similar position relative to Juan Bosch and the Dominican Revolutionary Party.

The logic of this type of situation suggests that the conflict between the most popular individual or party on the one hand, and the military irreconcilables on the other, tends to go on for some time, rather than being resolved by a single coup. This occurs for two reasons. In the military junta which forms after a coup, first of all, the irreconcilables normally are in a superior strategic position. The more moderate "swing man," whose prestige has entitled him to the chairmanship of the junta, may wish to restore constitutional processes as soon as possible. If this is likely to lead to the coming to power of the individual or tendency originally vetoed by the coup, however, the position of the junta president becomes untenable. Although he occupies the position with most authority and he may have placed close associates in the cabinet, theirs are not the key posts under showdown conditions: the key posts belong to those in direct command of troops, that is, the minister of the armed forces, the three service commanders, and even the commanders in the field. Because of this lack of congruence between the positions of authority when affairs are moving smoothly and the positions of power when a split develops, it is normally easier in such a situation to stage a coup d'état than to prevent one.[24] The odds are therefore that the irreconcilables will be able to prevent the return to constitutionality for an extended period if this should seem likely to favor the arch-enemy.

Once military elements have vetoed the popular leader and his party, moreover, the hostility between the two becomes self-perpetuating and self-reinforcing, since those who participated in the original coup have reason to believe they will forfeit at least their careers, and perhaps more, if the outlawed party should ever gain power. As one Dominican colonel put it after the coup of 1963 when he was asked his attitude towards a return of Juan Bosch: "If Bosch ever comes back, he will throw me into jail so deep I will never find my way out." Because of this set of circumstances the restoration of constitutional procedures becomes extremely difficult: unless the distribution of voter sentiment changes drastically it is only too likely that the person or party which secured a majority in the last election would do as well in the next one. A temporary return to constitutionality may be possible on the basis of rigged or restricted elections, as has been the case in Argentina. Nevertheless, the Argentine political problem is not permanently solved. Given the persistence of the military irreconcilables and their point of view, the only permanent resolution of the problem lies in: (1) the definitive removal from the political scene of the vetoed leader by death or his renunciation of politics; (2) a shift in the distribution of popular opinion to the disadvantage of the vetoed party; or (3) the party's gaining respectability by drastic modification of its program or tactics. In Latin America, the third alternative seems a formal possibility only, since the irreconcilables may simply refuse to believe that the shift towards respectability is genuine. Thus the military veto against the APRA was still applied in 1962, despite the party's evolution to a moderate Center or even Right-of-Center position. If the political problem has in fact been resolved in Peru—and this is not yet clear—it has been by way of the second alternative, in that the APRA may have been driven permanently below a third of the vote by a combination of disaffection from the Left as the party's leadership has grown more conservative, and the permanent establishment in popular favor of Belaúnde's *Acción Popular*. Elsewhere a similar result may be achieved, at least temporarily, by the expansion or contraction of the electorate to shift the balance of forces against the vetoed political movement—by giving the vote to resident aliens, for example, or by taking it away from illiterates.

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[23] See *General vs. Presidents*, pp. 26–36; and M. C. Needler, "Peru Since the *Coup d'Etat*," *The World Today*, February, 1963.

[24] In one variant of this situation, the provisional president may save his own personal position by switching sides at the last minute and adopting the program of the "hard liners," if the forces they can marshal seem decisive. This tactic was adopted by Castelo Branco in early 1966.

CONCLUSIONS

This examination of the internal logic of the Latin American coup d'état in the circumstances of the current phase of history has so far led to three conclusions. First: the overthrow of a government is more likely when economic conditions are deteriorating. Second: as the military services have become larger and more various in the social origins of their officers, as military occupational specializations have become more differentiated and more highly professionalized, and as elections have become representative of the sentiments of a wider range of the population, coups d'état have tended increasingly to occur in the period immediately prior to a presidential election and the subsequent inauguration, to be conservative in policy orientation, to be directed against constitutional governments, and to be accompanied by violence. Third: the tendency has emerged for conflict to develop, following a coup d'état, between a more fundamentalist "hard line," and a "soft line" that shows greater readiness to restore constitutional procedures and is normally represented by officers of higher rank, occupying positions of greater prestige in the provisional government.

It is possible to draw a further conclusion, with policy implications for the United States, from this analysis. There has long existed a difference of opinion among students of U.S. foreign policy as to both the desirability and the feasibility of attempting to discourage military seizures of power in Latin America. The desirability argument is outside our present province,[25] but it is possible for us now to add something on the feasibility question—that is, how successful United States attempts to discourage military coups can be.

The failure of the United States to recognize a provisional government issuing from an extra-constitutional seizure of power, plus the imposition of other mild sanctions such as the suspension of military and economic aid, is of different effect to countries differently situated. The smaller countries whose economies are more dependent on actions of the United States—Bolivia, plus the countries of Central America and the Caribbean—are more susceptible to United States pressures than the larger South American countries. Nevertheless, examples can be cited of military coups which have taken place despite clear United States opposition, even in countries in the Caribbean area. These have been regarded as indicating that American opposition to such coups is ineffectual. The coup which took place in Peru in 1962, and the 1963 coups in Honduras and the Dominican Republic, for example, took place in the face of strong and explicit American opposition.

It still seems premature to conclude that American opposition to the military seizure of power is bound to be ineffectual, however. One problem here is methodological, since it is not possible to enumerate the coups d'état that did *not* take place (although in two countries where American influence is heavy and which have known a history of military seizures of power, Venezuela and Panama, the constitutional succession has in recent years been unbroken while other countries of the area were experiencing violent changes of government). If the analysis made above is correct, however, the success of a coup d'état depends, especially where the military services are large and highly differenti-

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[25] I have discussed it in "United States Recognition Policy and the Peruvian Case," *Inter-American Economic Affairs* (Spring, 1963).



FIG. 1. Number of dictatorial governments in power in Latin America, by year, 1935–1964.

ated, on the adherence to the coup in its later stages of officers least committed to its goals, less inclined to military intervention, and with more prestige and a higher position at stake. Since the success of the coup thus may well depend on its being joined by relatively few officers with a relatively weak commitment to its goals, it seems overwhelmingly likely that *any* deterrent to intervention—such as the suspension of military aid, or a credible threat not to recognize the new government—while not sufficient to deter the hard-core organizers of the coup, may nevertheless be sufficient to tip the scales against intervention for the crucial "swing man," or for the small group occupying the same tactical position, and thus may cause the coup to be abandoned, or to be launched without adequate support and thus to prove abortive.

In the coup situation, accordingly, even the mildest deterrent threat, such as a firmly stated non-recognition policy on the part of the United States, may still be effective, because of the pre-coup balance of forces.

Light can also be thrown on the general problem raised in the opening section of the article, that of the relation between the constant features of Latin American politics and developmental trends, by an examination of the varying incidence over time of the characteristic military dictatorship in the area.

Here observers have tended to divide into the optimists, who perceive the evolutionary forces at work in the area as tending in a democratic direction, and the cynics, who take an attitude of "plus ça change . . . ." The incidence of military dictatorships in the area seems to support the views first of one group, then of the other. A few years after Tad Szulc published his *Twilight of the Tyrants*,[26] which celebrates the replacement of dictators by democratic regimes, Edwin Lieuwen can write a *Generals Vs. Presidents*, which analyzes the reverse phenomenon.

The relation of cyclical and evolutionary patterns on this point can best be demonstrated by a graph. Figure 1 plots the number of unequivocally dictatorial regimes[27] in power during at least six months of each year over the period of the last 30 years during which evolutionary changes have clearly been occurring.[28]

Conclusions of great interest can be drawn. Clearly, the factors which produce military dictatorships seem in part cyclical. At the same time, the cyclical pattern reproduces itself around a clearly descending trend line, so that each successive peak in the number of dictatorships existing contemporaneously is lower than the last: in 1936–37, there were fifteen dictatorships; in 1942–43, there were twelve; in 1955–56, there were ten. Similarly, successively lower levels of dictatorship are reached at each low point of the cycle: in 1939, nine dictatorships; in 1948, six; in 1961, three.

The conclusion seems inescapable that, in this respect as in the others examined, while Latin American politics has certain abiding characteristics which produce its distinctive features, these are being progressively modified under the influence of forces of an evolutionary character.

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[26] (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1959).

[27] To be considered "dictatorial," a government:

(1) Had to be not an avowedly provisional regime holding office for 36 months or less;

(2) Had to come to power, or remain in power after the conclusion of the constitutionally prescribed term of office, by means other than a free and competitive election; or rule in clear disregard of constitutionally guranteed liberties.

[28] The idea of approaching the problem in this fashion was suggested to the author by Ronald Schneider's article "The U. S. in Latin America" in *Current History* for January, 1965.

CONGRESSIONAL RECRUITMENT AND REPRESENTATION*

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This is a study of the relationship between local political organization, candidate recruitment, and representation in the United States House of Representatives. It seeks to ascertain the effects which different systems of recruitment have upon the kinds of men who enter public life and the public policies they espouse. A case study of metropolitan Chicago is used to demonstrate the utility of this kind of analysis. The objective is to distinguish distinct systems of recruitment in the Chicago area, describe the factors associated with each, and note the consequences of each for representation in Congress.

RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION

Political recruitment is the process by which public officials attain office. The study of recruitment and the study of representation are complementary. Knowledge of representative institutions gives direction to analyses of rerecruitment; in turn, knowledge of factors affecting recruitment may explain much about the behavior of legislative bodies.

The Necessity of Organization. Congressional recruitment is essentially a problem of organization. Congressional districts, with populations generally in excess of 400,000, are typified by social diversity and the dispersion of politically relevant power. The concentration of sufficient power for the nomination and election of candidates for Congress is a difficult problem. Congressional districts are rarely "natural" political units, neatly corresponding to local governmental lines or to concentrations of particular population groups and interests. Local politicians generally do try to establish relatively homogeneous districts in which there are favorable concentrations of politically relevant power. But demographic homogeneity and concentration of power are not optimally achieved even in the most favorable circumstances, such as those found in the relatively compact districts of central Chicago. While the population of a central city district may be relatively homogeneous in terms of some relevant variables (e.g., income and home ownership), its population may show signs of diversity and conflict with regard to others (e.g., race and ethnicity); it may contain potentially conflicting units of state and local governmental power (e.g., wards and state assembly districts); and it will very likely have numerous politically interested and potentially conflicting organizations (e.g., party factions, unions, ethnic and service clubs).[1]

Systems of Recruitment. The organization of effective power for recruitment is not unstructured or haphazard. To the extent that distinct processes of concentrating power can be isolated, patterns of recruitment and their consequences for representation can be classified and analyzed. A *system* of recruitment is a complex of variables affecting the organization of constituency power in a way which produces identifiable types of legislators. A system of recruitment is essentially a system of organization.

I have utilized five major variables in analyzing the organization of power for recruitment in the Chicago area:

(*1*) *Social Bases of Organization.* Social structures set the parameters for political systems. This is certainly manifest in the well documented correlations between key socioeconomic variables and both party identification and electoral support.[2] However, insofar

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[1] Even Adolph Sabath (d. 1952), dean of the House and Chairman of its Rules Committee, was not immune to political attack by various party factions. On several occasions high-ranking national leaders, acting through Mayors Kelly and Kennelley, had to intervene to save his seat from ward committeemen anxious to displace him in the name of their own ethnic communities. Even within the well disciplined Democratic party, only strong leadership could maintain unity.

[2] For a summary of the relevant literature see, Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, *Presidential Elections* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), chs. i and iii.

as the systematic organization of power for recruitment is concerned, it is the primary electorates which are crucial. They provide the most active party workers, the most dependable electoral support, and the major sources of intraparty factionalism and competition. This distinction is important because primary electorates do not simply mirror the social structure of general electorates. On the contrary, primary turnouts tend to distort and exaggerate the social bases of partisan support which are manifest in general elections.[3]

(*2*) *Organizational Resources.* If primary electorates provide the social bases for organization support, the availability and suitability of particular resources affect the actual exploitation of those bases. Distinct systems of recruitment tend to be associated with the extent to which types of material or non-material incentives (patronage or issues, respectively) are applied to particular kinds of primary electorates.[4]

(*3*) *Organizational Structure.* The utilization of particular kinds and quantities of resources largely determines the character of organizational authority and the capacity of organizations to resist external influence. The use of material incentives tends to be associated with party organizations which are relatively hierarchic (evincing centralized leadership, discipline and unity) and impermeable (resisting external influences upon their decision-making processes), while reliance on non-material incentives tends toward dispersed authority and permeable decision-making structures.

(*4*) *Organizational Ethos.* The dominant resources and prevailing structures tend to promote characteristic organizational values. Materially-oriented party organizations with elaborate structures of authority tend to promote certain skills (such as bargaining and compromise) among their personnel, while issue-oriented party organizations are more inclined to emphasize ideological commitment.[5]

(*5*) *Organizational Control.* If congressional recruitment is essentially a process of organizing power, it is imperative to ascertain the extent to which particular organizations can control their electoral environments in both primary and general elections. In the Chicago area, the regular party organizations control recruitment with varying degrees of success, depending on their internal structure, the extent of electoral competition, and the character of organized non-party counter-elites in the primary electorates. Party organizations which are faction-ridden and/or confronted with well-organized and readily available non-party opposition in primaries, tend to lose control over recruitment at the nominating stage. In districts where general elections tend to be highly competitive (irrespective of the primary situation), the regular party organizations may not actually lose control over recruitment, but deliberately tend to recruit from sources outside the party organizations. Insofar as the regular party organizations tend toward internal recruitment, organizational ethos has a decisive impact on the character of the men who run for Congress. Where external recruitment prevails, party organizational ethos is less important and the character of non-party elites takes on greater significance.

METROPOLITAN CHICAGO: THREE TYPES OF DISTRICTS

The fundamental character of post-war representation in Congress from the Chicago area was established by the Apportionment Act of 1947, the first congressional redistricting in Illinois since 1901. The new apportionment delineated three systems of political recruitment among the districts allotted to Cook County. These have been five safely Democratic *inner city* "machine" districts, five (four after the apportionment of 1961) *outer city* swing districts, and three Republican-oriented *suburban* districts. The three areas are relatively distinct in regard to their socio-economic characteristics and divisions of partisan sentiment. These differences are summarized in Tables 1 and 2, below.

I. The Inner City Districts

The apportionment of 1947 created five congressional districts in the center of Chicago (the

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[3] A general discussion of the effects of the primary on the party system is found in V. O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics: An Introduction* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), chs. iv–vi. The social bases of party organization in Los Angeles are analyzed in Dwaine Marvick and Charles R. Nixon, "Recruitment Contrasts in Rival Campaign Groups," in Dwaine Marvick (ed.), *Political Decision-Makers* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961), ch. v.

[4] The effects of material and non-material resources upon organizations are treated in Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 6 (September, 1961), 129–166.

[5] *Ibid.*; James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); James Q. Wilson, "The Economy of Pa-

TABLE 1. INDICES OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS, BY TYPE OF DISTRICT, 1960[a]

	Percentages		
	Inner City	Outer City	Suburban
Family Income Under $5,000	37	26	16
Family Income Over $10,000	14	26	33
Minority Groups (Negroes plus foreign stock)	65	55	36
High School Graduates	25	42	50
Home Ownership, single family	14	26	62
Home Ownership, total	29	36	72
White Collar	32	49	53

[a] Compiled from, U.S., Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population and Housing: 1960 Census Tracts*, Final Report PHC (1)-26. (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962.) The districts are for the apportionment of 1947. The reapportionment of 1961 did not alter these figures significantly.

1st, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th). They cut a wide swath through the city, from Lake Michigan in the east, out along the slum wards adjoining the Chicago River and Sanitary Canal, and westward into mixed residential and industrial areas. This area is the least affluent in Cook County and has always been heavily populated by ethnic and racial minorities.

Inner City Democratic Organization. The inner city districts are the domain of the Democratic party organization. The basic character of the organization throughout Cook County has been molded here, where its most extensive electoral support lies. This organization is a classic political "machine," a kind of party organization which relies primarily upon material incentives for its ward and precinct workers and supplies local services for its voter constituents. Non-material rewards, for workers or voters, generally are not needed or used.[6] With large stocks of patronage available from city, county, and state offices, and with relatively centralized control over the distribution of those stocks, the organization is both massive and disciplined. This is especially true in the inner city wards of Chicago, where the low socio-economic status of the people is conducive to a materially-oriented organization.

Six attributes of the Democratic organization have decisively affected inner city congressional recruitment:

(1) Although party structure is formally based upon ward level organization, party leaders have been able to centralize the distribution of patronage and maintain a relatively hierarchic structure of authority throughout the city and county.

(2) The centralization of patronage has enabled party leaders to ensure unity among ward and township organizations. Committeemen cannot oppose the organization slate of candidates with impunity in either primary or general elections.

(3) Unity and hierarchy have made organization decision-making relatively impervious to the influences of rival non-party groups, associations, and elites in the primary electorate. Although the preferences of external groups e.g., unions and ethnic associations) are considered, the slating of candidates for Congress is controlled entirely by the party leaders.

(4) The predominance of material incentives and the need to maintain the unity of a rather complex organization have contributed to an ethos which tends to inhibit the use of issues for obtaining either personnel or public support. The organization is able to maintain unity through intricate bargaining over the allocation of patronage. Issues, on the other hand, are deemed irrelevant at best and dangerously divisive at worst. Under such conditions, skills at bargaining, negotiation, and compromise are fostered and rewarded.

(5) The availability of important local offices as the major sources of patronage and of prestigious career objectives has produced a strong local orientation in the organization and among its personnel. The office of congressman is not highly regarded because it has no patronage worth mentioning and no apparent influence upon local politics. High city, county, or state-wide offices, with relatively broader jurisdictions, considerable administrative responsibilities, and greater visibility, are more eagerly sought than seats in Congress.

(6) Since the inner city organization is in large part an alliance of numerous ward-based

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tronage," *The Journal of Political Economy*, 69 (August, 1961), 360–380.

[6] The early formation and contemporary operation of the Democratic organization in Chicago have been described and analyzed so often elsewhere, that the analysis here need not go beyond a few summary remarks. For detailed treatments see: Edward C. Banfield, *Political Influence* (Glencoe: The Free Press, (1961); Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), ch ix; Harold F. Gosnell, *Machine Politics, Chicago Model* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1937); Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield, *Politics, Planning and the Public Interest* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955), chs. iii and xi; James Q. Wilson, *Negro Politics* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), ch. iii.

TABLE 2. METROPOLITAN CHICAGO CONGRESSIONAL VOTING TRENDS: AVERAGES BY TYPE OF DISTRICT[a]

District Type	Per Cent Democratic								
	1948	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964
Inner City	71	65	66	74	63	76	74	71	77
Outer City	51	46	47	56	51	62	58	55	62
Suburban	42	35	36	40	35	42	40	35	41

[a] Sources: *The Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (Washington, D.C., 1957), XIII, 180–181; *ibid.*, 1961, XVII, 1039–1040; *The Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, April 5, 1963, Part 1, p. 482, and March 26, 1965, Part 1, p. 477.

ethnic, racial, and religious groups, such affiliations have become important criteria for determining the distribution of patronage and elective office—in effect, the allocation of power within the organization.

Inner City Recruitment. The recruitment of congressmen from the inner city districts has been an internal affair of the Democratic party organization during the last thirty years. Massive, hierarchic, unified, impervious to external pressure, and without serious Republican opposition, the Democratic organization has been able to exercise absolute control over the nomination and election of inner city congressmen. Long-standing membership in the organization has been the single most important criterion of selection. The congressmen have been chosen by party regulars from among party regulars.[7] They have risen through the party apparatus following career lines shaped by the distribution of power and the existence of established traditions. The party tends to funnel certain racial, ethnic, and religious groups to specific organizational and public positions. A given office may be reserved for Irishmen, or particular ward organizations may by tradition be awarded specified offices or patronage jobs. And offices are traded as patronage in bargains among different factions within the party. In this manner, prospective careers are determined and paths to Congress established.

Internal recruitment has had certain pronounced effects upon the character of inner city representation in Congress:

(1) Reflecting the material ethos of the organization, inner city congressmen have been well schooled in and appreciate the value of quiet bargaining, negotiation, and compromise —virtues amply rewarded in the House. But few are skilled orators or advocates. Such abilities are not often needed in the House, but when they are, the inner city congressmen are handicapped.

(2) The local, non-ideological orientation of the organization generally has not been conducive to the recruitment of men who know much about questions of national policy. The nature of organization business has given few the time or incentive to prepare themselves for an office of national stature.

(3) Democrats who have risen through the disciplined and unified local party organization are well aware of the virtues of party unity. Local experience has taught them that in unity there is power. Chicago Democratic congressmen, particularly those from the inner city, value party cohesion as a positive good in need of little or no justification.

(4) Inner city Democrats abjure personality politics. Since recruitment is entirely controlled by the organization, there is little incentive for individuals to cultivate personal publicity or personal followings among the electorate. Inner city congressmen tend to resent individuals who consciously attempt to attract personal publicity. There is even some inclination to regard those who frequently make policy pronouncements as somewhat opportunistic and sensationalistic. Politics tends to be viewed as a cooperative, organizational enterprise.

(5) Inner city Democrats tend to be relatively old when they go to Congress. The elaborate structure of the organization usually entails a lengthy tenure and ascent through the hierarchy of organization-controlled offices. Since 1932, all but two of the fifteen inner city

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[7] The fifteen men who have represented the inner city between 1932 and 1964 have owed much to the local organization. Seven of the congressmen had been slated by the organization and elected to legislative positions (in the State Assembly or the City Council) before going to Congress and two others had been elected to local executive offices. Four of the others had held high patronage positions in Chicago. Six of the fifteen were ward committeemen.

congressmen have been at least forty-five years old when first elected. Ten were over fifty, and one was seventy-eight. Although its utility to the organization is low, the office is not without its glamor and has tended to become a reward for long and loyal service.[8]

II. The Suburban Districts

The three suburban districts (the 4th, 10th, and 13th) have been the most safely Republican in metropolitan Chicago.[9] Three features of suburban society have decisively affected suburban organization for recruitment. First, as Table 1 indicates, these are the most affluent districts in the area. There are, however, numerous suburbs with large working class populations, concentrations of heavy industry, and pockets of poverty—a fact of decisive importance for Democratic township organization. Secondly, with thirty townships and over 100 municipalities, the dispersion of power and population is especially great.[10] Thirdly, there is a widely shared political ethic which is antagonistic to, if not incompatible with, organization politics. This ethic is manifest in the non-partisan local governments of most suburban municipalities, which deny to the parties potentially large stocks of patronage.[11]

Suburban Republican Organization. Just as the Democratic organization in metropolitan Chicago takes its characteristic form in central Chicago, the archetype of the Republican organization is found in the suburbs, where its voting support is most secure. Republican party organization and recruitment here have been shaped by the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of patronage in the suburban political milieu. Because the districts are so large, with dispersed populations living in individual homes, effective precinct work requires very large corps of party workers. The patronage needed is much greater than the supplies available from suburban sources. Moreover, the relatively high socio-economic status of the people and the ethic antagonistic to the use of patronage severely limit the utility of that which is available. The Republican township organizations encounter these conditions and beliefs more than the suburban Democratic party organizations and in exaggerated form. The Republicans must appeal to those more affluent country towns and townships where the suburban ethic is strongest and the middle and upper classes largest. This is true for the general and especially for the primary electorate.

Republican township leaders have had to make extensive use of issue-oriented volunteer workers as the fundamental basis of party organization in the suburbs. The result in each of the three districts has been an organization which is non-materially oriented, undermanned, undisciplined if not disunited, decentralized, and easily penetrated by external elites from the primary electorate. The fact that the Republican committeemen have little useable patronage is of decisive importance. Without it they lack the resources to attract sufficient campaign workers and have no effective sanctions with which to discipline their organizations. In primary elections, township committeemen cannot rely on their volunteer precinct captains to work for the entire organization slate. Congressional district caucuses cannot even rely upon individual committeemen to adhere to caucus-endorsed candidates for Congress. Even when the organization is united, it cannot assure a safe primary vote, because non-patronage volunteers do not work their precincts all year and cannot build personal ties with their constituents.

The character of the major Republican counter-elites in the primary electorate has also affected the structure of the party organization.

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[8] For comparative data, see Tables 3 and 4, below. Even the youngest man ever elected to Congress from an inner city district, Dan Rostenkowski, had considerable experience within the organization. His father was a Democratic committeeman. Mr. Rostenkowski grew up in the organization, served two terms in the State General Assembly, was elected Treasurer of the Cook County Young Democrats, and was elected to Congress in 1958 at the age of thirty. He became a party committeeman when his father was appointed to a federal job in 1961.

[9] Only four Democratic candidates received as much as 45 per cent of the vote in individual suburban districts between 1948 and 1964. No Republican candidate for Congress has received a comparable percentage of the inner city vote during this period.

[10] District densities vary from 1,556 (4th C.D.) to 5,164 (10th C.D.) persons per square mile. In the city of Chicago, densities range from 9,880 (2nd C.D.) to 30,600 (9th C.D.). Source: U. S., Bureau of the Census, *Congressional District Data Book (Districts of the 88th Congress)*—A Statistical Abstract Supplement (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 128 and 135.

[11] For an extensive treatment of the use of patronage in suburban Cook County, see David McCoy, "Patronage in Suburbia" (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 1963).

Generally speaking, although the party depends upon the good will and support of the business community in general elections, businessmen have had a rather disruptive influence on the party structure in primary elections. The party simply does not know when a prosperous businessman will decide to embark upon a political career or support a non-organization Republican for some office. If the Republican primaries were controlled by strong party organizations this would not be possible. On the other hand, the presence of prosperous businessmen who finance their own or help to finance someone else's campaign is an independent factor which damages already precarious organization control of the Republican primaries. Public spirited businessmen have upset regular Republican organization expectations on all levels of government in Illinois—from the ward or township to the governorship. In primary elections for public offices, it is not uncommon for a segment of the regular party to ally itself with some businessman and oppose other elements in the regular party who have endorsed some other candidates.

Suburban Republican Recruitment. In sharp contrast to the inner city Democratic pattern, suburban Republican recruitment generally has not been from within the party organization.[12] The non-hierarchic, highly permeable structure of Republican organization has compelled Republican candidates for Congress to rely upon personal initiative and personal resources. The system tends to foster extreme sensitivity to the character of the primary electorate, which candidates must scrupulously cultivate.

External recruitment has had the following concrete effects upon the character of suburban congressmen and representation:

(1) These Republican congressmen have tended to be issue-oriented conservatives. They have had to cultivate primary electorates which are generally among the most prosperous and traditionally conservative in the entire county. From these primary electorates they have had to enlist large numbers of volunteer workers[13] (to supplement or combat the weak regular party organizations, as the case may be), solicit financial contributions, and obtain whatever support they can from prestigious businessmen. The primary constituency has set certain broad limits to the process of recruitment, while the influence of the business community and issue-oriented volunteers, drawn from among the more activist Republican elements in the primary electorate, have further influenced the process.

(2) Insofar as the Republicans elected to Congress have been issue-oriented and ideologically inclined, they have tended to put less emphasis on skills of bargaining or negotiation and more on oratory and public advocacy. The contrast with the inner city Democrats is particularly great.[14]

(3) In the absence of adequate organizational control, suburban Republican congressmen must engage in personality politics. They have either begun their congressional careers with relatively well-known names (two of the seven were school district superintendents) or have made every honorable effort to publicize their names and cultivate personal followings.

(4) Suburban Republican congressmen seem to place considerably less value on party cohesion for its own sake than do inner city Democrats. The Republican recruitment process is hardly conducive to traditions of unity and even less to any capacity to enforce it.[15]

(5) Suburban candidates of both parties tend to be the youngest in Cook County. The seven Suburban Republican congressmen who have served since 1949, the products of the most open, unstructured and uncertain system of recruitment in metropolitan Chicago, have averaged about forty-seven years of age when first elected to Congress.[16]

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[12] Since the creation of the three suburban districts in 1947, only one of the seven Republicans elected had previously held a party organization position of any consequence. Given the uncertainty of the primaries, few committeemen have sought the nomination.

[13] In some cases personal organizations have been exceptionally large. This has been particularly true of the 13th C. D., where the last two representatives could rely on well over 1,000 volunteers in primary or general elections.

[14] Speeches and insertions in the *Congressional Record* are a helpful (albeit inadequate) index to the differences between the two groups in this regard. On the whole, suburban Republicans have shown a greater propensity for oratory and on a wider range of issues than have the inner city Democrats.

[15] During the post-war period under study, Illinois Republican congressmen have not caucused with anything approaching the regularity of the Democratic delegation, which has consciously sought to maintain high cohesion on roll call votes. Unity among Illinois Republicans is much less deliberately cultivated.

[16] The nine outer city Republicans who have served in Congress during this same period have averaged fifty-three years of age when first elected. No Republicans have been elected from inner city districts since 1934. Although Republican candidates are nominated in all five inner city

Suburban Democratic Organization. Democratic recruitment is very different from its Republican counterpart in the suburbs. Because the Democratic organization in Cook County is relatively centralized, it has access to stocks of patronage in a variety of offices outside of the suburbs and can distribute them in townships where they are scarce. Many township committeemen themselves have patronage jobs controlled by the central committee. In each of the three suburban districts, Democratic party organization is characterized by the patronage-service concept with hierarchic, unified leadership not easily permeated by external elites. The Democratic party has been able to build township organizations of this type because its primary electorate is largely composed of lower status groups who are amenable to the non-issue service appeals associated with patronage-oriented organizations. While it is true that the size of this electorate is sharply restricted in relation to the general electorate in most townships, it has been adequate to give the organization firm control over primary elections.

This control is facilitated by the structure of the potential counter-elites in that electorate—the labor unions. Labor cannot wheel into Democratic primary politics the way businessmen can enter Republican primaries. While businessmen can act as individual entrepeneurs, unions must act as collective entities—they are bureaucracies whose political decisions must be bureaucratic, not individual. The labor movement and the Democratic party in Cook County are both relatively centralized. Union leaders must think of the long-term effects and ramifications of opposition to a centralized and powerful Democratic political organization. They must also consider how best to allocate the limited political resources of their organizations. These officials are not individualistic entrepeneurs free to spend their own fortunes. Consequently, the suburban Democratic primaries are highly structured—the party organizations are strong and disciplined and the only source of countervailing power is weaker and disinclined to risk adventuresome political fliers.

Suburban Democratic Recruitment. In each of the three suburban townships the Democratic organization is strong enough to control its own internal affairs, including the recruitment of candidates for public office. This strength, however, is bult upon a severely restricted primary electorate. In general elections, where the public at large must be solicited, patronage-based Democratic organizations are much less effective. Not only are they too small for the task; they are the wrong kind of organization for the suburban milieu. The very factors which give the Democratic organization control over primary elections hurt their effectiveness in general elections. Then, when Democratic candidates must broaden their appeal to the wider general electorate, the ideals of the suburban ethic or "political culture" come into conflict with the image projected by the Democratic township organizations. The use of patronage, closed primaries, and central committee influence in the township political organizations are not viewed with favor in the middle class suburbia which decides the outcome of the general elections.

Although Democratic recruitment is internally controlled, Republican predominance in the general electorate has decisively affected the recruitment of Democratic candidates. Because there is no presumption of victory in the general elections (the Democrats have won only one suburban election since 1948), old line organization stalwarts have not valued the nomination. On the contrary, it has been sought by ambitious young men, mostly lawyers, seeking to establish themselves politically or professionally. The committeemen, in turn, tend to use the power of endorsement as a kind of incentive to induce aspirants to join their township organizations and serve for some time prior to receiving the nomination. Twenty-six organization-backed candidates were nominated in the three suburban districts between 1948 and 1964; seventeen, or about two-thirds were attorneys, compared to one-third of the inner city congressmen during the same period. These divergent patterns are an indication of the relative professionalization of career expectations in the inner city organization, where the probability of recruiting candidates from an independent profession is less likely than in the suburbs.

The disadvantageous competitive situation in general elections has affected internal recruitment in other important aspects. The average age of the suburban nominees has been forty-four years, some six years younger than the average for the inner city congressmen when first elected. (Of the seventeen suburban lawyers, eight were under forty when nominated.) The fact that suburban nominees have not had to rise through the Democratic party

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districts, the action is perfunctory because the election is viewed almost invariably as an impossible cause by party officials and nominees alike. Moreover, since the Republicans are patronage-poor, the nomination cannot even be used as a qualification for obtaining some other office. The analysis of recruitment is not an especially fruitful enterprise under these circumstances.

hierarchy largely accounts for their relative youth. Moreover, the candidates tend to be issue-oriented and are, like their Republican opponents, compelled to indulge in personality politics.[17]

III. The Outer City Districts

Nowhere in metropolitan Chicago is the influence of organization upon recruitment more evident than in the outer city districts (the 2nd, 3rd, 9th, 11th, and former 12th). The heterogeneous and intermediate socio-economic status of the people in these districts has provided ample social bases for the organizations of the two parties in their characteristic forms. The extremes of poverty and affluence are more evenly divided in this area than in either of the other two sets of districts. (See Table 1.) Neither party is compelled to build its outer city organization on severely attenuated primary electorates. Nor has either party had to face almost certain defeat in general elections throughout the entire period under study, as has been the case in the suburbs and inner city. At the same time, there have been gradual changes in the demographic and political environments within which the organizations must function. While the organizational structures have remained relatively stable in form, the districts have evolved from marginally Republican to marginally (and in some cases safely) Democratic.[18] (See Table 2.) Analysis of these districts over time reveals the variable influences of party organization and constituency upon candidate recruitment.

Outer City Republican Organization and Recruitment. Like Republican organizations throughout Cook County, those in the outer city are poorly disciplined, understaffed, and readily permeated by external elites because they have little patronage and must rely heavily on volunteer workers. Again the most important consequence of party organizational weakness is the enhanced influence of the primary electorate in the recruitment process. As in the suburbs, the system has tended to produce conservative candidates who have been issue-oriented, inclined (if not actually compelled) to cultivate personal followings and personal volunteer organizations, and disinclined to treat party unity as a cardinal virtue.

The influence of the Republican primary electorate has been more evident in the outer city districts than in the suburbs, where the dispersion of the electorate has tended to diffuse the influence of particular townships, municipalities, and population groups. On the other hand, a Republican legislature created the outer city districts with specific traditionally Republican areas of support at the heart of each. These communities are pockets of prosperity which serve as sources of money, volunteer personnel, and candidates in congressional elections. The founding of the districts in 1947 actually helped to structure power and recruitment in the primary constituency. As long as these communities have remained intact, they have dominated a recruitment process which has culminated in the nomination of outspokenly conservative candidates for Congress. This has been especially evident in the 3rd and 11th Districts. In each case, the candidates have come from a single ward dominated by long-established communities. In the case of the 3rd C.D., that community is formally organized into an association which has exercised considerable influence over the weak, disunited Republican party organization in the key Republican ward. In the 2nd C.D. two wards generally dominated, while in the 9th C.D. it was the Lake Shore Gold Coast area in general.

But changes in outer city social structure and party competition during the last decade have promoted deviations in the old patterns of recruitment in a number of districts:

(1) When population changes have altered the balance of party competition and the composition of Republican primary electorates, significant changes in candidate recruitment have occurred. This has been most evident in the Lake Shore districts, which have had a large immigration of Jews. By the late 1950's these districts (especially the 2nd and old 12th) were beginning to slate avowedly liberal candidates for Congress. Where the effective primary electorate changed, so too did the available and influential elites, the personnel of the

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[17] Since, with a single exception, these candidates were not elected, it was not possible to ascertain their orientation toward party unity and the utilization of particular skills in concrete legislative situations. Issue-orientation and personality politics were evident in their campaigns and in interviews. Not infrequently, these propensities among suburban Democratic candidates created strains between them and the non-issue-oriented organizations which nominated them.

[18] Population trends since the apportionment of 1947 have contributed greatly to the increasing outer city Democratic pluralities shown in Table 2. The principal sources of the trend have been the expansion of the Negro ghetto, especially into a few wards in the 2nd and 3rd congressional districts, and the outmigration of Jews from the west side into some wards in the 2nd, 9th, and old 12th congressional districts.

ward organizations, and eventually the kind of candidates recruited.[19]

(2) Where population changes have altered party competition but have not affected the structure of the Republican primary electorate, recruitment patterns have tended to remain relatively stable. Republican party leaders have known for some time that population trends were fundamentally altering the balance of partisan support in the outer city. But in districts with stable primary electorates, the party has not nominated candidates who could appeal to the new general electorates. This has been true particularly in the 3rd and 11th districts, where the balance of partisan sentiment has been least unfavorable to the Republicans and the primary electorates have been the most stable.

(3) As the outer city districts have become increasingly Democratic, Republican candidates have tended to become younger. The average age of outer city Republican nominees from 1950 through 1956 was fifty-two years; since 1958 the average has dropped to about forty-six years.

Outer City Democratic Organization and Recruitment. The Democratic organizations in the outer city wards are patronage and service-oriented, disciplined, hierarchic, and relatively impervious to external influences upon recruitment. Although the socio-economic conditions of the outer city are not ideal for this form of organization, considerable patronage has been invested there and organizations thoroughly capable of controlling primary elections and of appreciably influencing general elections have been created. Two factors have contributed to the success of outer city Democratic organizations. First, population changes have made some outlying wards very much like wards found in central Chicago. Secondly, the large electoral base which the Democrats have in the poor areas of "mixed" wards gives them power to exert considerable influence in the more affluent areas of those wards—by distributing the prestigious patronage and emoluments to which a ruling party has access and by recruiting volunteers with practical interests in joining the ruling party of the wards and city. Republican committeemen complain that some of their best captains are enticed into the enemy camp.

Although the Democratic organizations are strong enough to control the outer city primary electorate, the marginality of the general electorate has compelled candidates to seek organized support beyond that which the party can supply. Notwithstanding this dependence on outside groups, particularly labor, recruitment has not been affected. Labor's hierarchic organizational ties to the Democratic party in the city as a whole are such that bolting the ticket (in primaries or general elections) in these districts could not be done without risking too much elsewhere in the city.

Nevertheless, electoral marginality has had a decisive impact on outer city Democratic recruitment. Although the process is internal, marginality has tended to divert the recruitment process away from old-line politicians of the type sent to Congress from the inner city districts. Most Democratic candidates and congressmen from the outer city have not held important party positions. In these districts, the kind of candidate slated for Congress has depended upon the party committeemen's assessments of the electoral situation at a given time. When the prospects for victory have seemed remote, the candidates chosen have been outsiders with tenuous links to the organization, or loyal men being rewarded with the candidacy or being groomed for more important (i.e. local) offices.[20]

Information is available on nineteen of the twenty-one Democrats who have been nominated in the outer city area since 1932 (the 2nd, 3rd, and 9th Districts) and 1947 (when the 11th and 12th Districts were created). The average age of the nineteen candidates when first slated is 47 years. Table 3 compares the averages of the three district categories in this regard. The fact that the outer city average falls between the other averages is a useful indicator of the overall differences between the three district categories. Where the party organization is highly structured and entrenched and where electoral security is most certain, candidates tend to be recruited internally from among organization men who have served the party for many years. Where the opposite conditions

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[19] The permeability of the Republican party organization has admitted a number of liberal Republican committeemen, many of them Jewish. This is particularly true in the northern Lake Shore wards, where the largest numbers of Jewish people have moved in the last decade. With only one exception, the highly structured Democratic organizations in these same wards have remained in the hands of Irish Catholics.

[20] In the 3rd C. D., for example, the seat was marginal during the 1940's and early 1950's, moving with national trends. But a large influx of Negroes gradually changed the partisan balance and, in 1958, an organization committeeman, William Murphy, decided the time was ripe to send himself to Congress and did so.

TABLE 3. AGE OF DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES WHEN FIRST NOMINATED, 1932–1964

District Type	Average Age	Per Cent Under 40	Total Cases[a]
Inner City	50	13	15
Outer City	47	37	19
Suburban	44	44	26

[a] Two outer city districts (11th and 12th) and two Suburban districts (4th and 10th) were created in 1947, so information dates from 1948.

prevail, younger men with tenuous ties to the organization are recruited. The political significance of these age differentials must be emphasized. It is the men who come from the marginal and unsafe districts who tend to be young enough to acquire seniority and with it power and leadership potential in Congress. But it is precisely these men who have the least chance of electoral survival.

The age differential is by no means the most important consequence of the different recruitment patterns in the inner and outer city districts. Like the suburban candidates, outer city Democrats have not been systematically socialized into norms which have become second nature for typical inner city congressmen. The differences are obvious and important for understanding the operation of the Chicago Democratic delegation in Congress. It is the outer city congressmen who have been the most inclined to seek personal publicity, least committed to the intrinsic value of party unity, most articulate, and most issue-oriented.

CHICAGO DEMOCRATS IN CONGRESS

For the past decade, Democrats have dominated the Chicago delegation in the House. Although Democratic candidates have failed to carry a suburban district since the election of 1948, they have won every congressional election in the inner city since 1934 and in the outer city since 1958. The impact which different systems of recruitment have upon representation can be evaluated by examining the means utilized by the Democratic delegation in exploiting the principal sources of influence in the House: the seniority and committee systems, bloc voting, and the skills and knowledge of individual members.

The Seniority and Committee Systems. When they were first elected to Congress, the average age of the twenty-one Democrats who have represented Chicago since 1949 has been fifty years (median fifty-three). The eleven from the inner city averaged fifty-two, while those from the outlying districts averaged forty-eight. Only five (twenty-four per cent) were under forty when first elected—four of them having come from unsafe outer city districts which were marginally Republican when they were first elected.[21] During this same period, House Democrats who have served as committee chairmen have averaged forty-one years of age (median forty) when first elected to Congress. The Chicago delegation has been under a considerable handicap in achieving senior committee rank.[22]

Bloc Voting. Leadership of the delegation has perforce accrued to the safe inner city Members with close ties to the local party organization. Without adequate important committee or subcommittee chairmanships during most of the post-war period, delegation leaders have had to be concerned with the cultivation of personal friendships among congressional leaders, a willingness to go along with the requests of others, and the promotion of delegation cohesion as a bargaining instrument. Long experienced in the practical political arts, the inner city Members have been well trained for such tasks. Under their leadership, the delegation has maintained extraordinary unity on roll call votes. Since 1949, delegation leaders could rely on nine or ten sure votes, which, taken with those of a few downstate Democrats, have composed a sizeable bloc on close roll calls. These votes were readily expandable when other congressmen or delegations became indebted to the Chicago group.

The principal source of delegation unity has been the common organization background of most of the Members, especially those from the inner city. They have been well aware of the utility of unity. To the organization stalwarts this is a self-evident truth which needs little explanation and no justification.

The principal source of disunity and deviant roll call voting during the period studied almost invariably came from those outer city congressmen who had the most tenuous ties to the organization when they were first elected. Some of these Members were also prone to seek personal publicity to a degree that disturbed delegation leaders.[23] Insofar as the leaders sought to maintain group solidarity, they tried to minimize these sources of tension emanating from outer city recruitment.

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[21] Two of the four (James Murray [3rd C. D.] and Chester Chesney [11th C. D.]) were defeated after one term. A third, Sidney R. Yates (9th C. D.), retired temporarily in 1962 and ran unsuccessfully for the United States Senate.

[22] The problem has been especially noticeable since the death of Mr. Sabath in 1952. Generally speaking, by the time Chicago Democrats have begun to accumulate seniority and committee rank, they have been too old to enjoy the fruits of power for any length of time, if at all.

Skills and Knowledge. The recruitment process in Chicago generally has not supplied the Democratic delegation with men who have been knowledgeable about and capable of significantly contributing to the formulation of important national policies. The most articulate, interested, and best informed have almost invariably come from the outer city. But insofar as the delegation has acted in concert, the values of the inner city representatives have prevailed. Their practical, instrumental outlook and their preoccupations with tangible, highly specific goals have helped them to acquire much of value for the city. When necessary, credits could be collected on roll call votes in the House and even in the Senate. Pursuing limited, specific, tangible goals, they have been able to exercise considerable influence over the disposition of federal public works. In view of the recruitment patterns of the congressmen, it is not surprising that the federal projects and financing which the delegation has sought for Chicago typify the service ethos characteristic of the local political organization. Rivers and harbors, highways, and housing have been their forte. Lobbyists have complained that no one on the delegation adequately understands the complexities of new fields, particularly those relating to electronics. Moreover, inner city congressmen rarely have initiated legislation of signal importance to the city. They generally have looked to local government and private business for requests—the highly specific kind best handled under the circumstances in the House. The justifications for these ideas and particularly the arguments for them on the floor of the House (when that was necessary) were generally left to the outer city congressmen.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The general effects of recruitment upon the functioning of the House must await systematic, extensive study of that body. The development of appropriate categories relative to the functioning of the House is clearly a prerequisite to the most useful application of recruitment analysis. Even without this knowledge, however, the variety of organizational forms in the cities throughout the nation provides an unusually large source of data for the study of political recruitment. A cursory examination of the major cities, using a very simple classification of organizational forms, is indicative of the research possibilities. Differences in the structures of the political systems within metropolitan Chicago suggest great differences between (and within some) other big cities and metropolitan areas.[24] Do these constituency differences have any systematic effects upon urban recruitment and representation in the House?

Chicago is the model of a strong, centrally-directed, patronage-oriented political organization. Labor, although relatively well organized for political action, is relegated to a decidedly secondary position in the recruitment process. The situation in Los Angeles is very different. There, as in California generally, local parties lack effective precinct level organization, cannot control the nominating process, and have no patronage.[25] In the absence of effective local party organization, the recruitment of Democrats in Los Angeles is decisively affected by the endorsements of important groups—particularly the press, labor, and the California Democratic Council, a liberal, issue-oriented, volunteer organ of the Democratic club movement.[26] In marked contrast to Chicago, local party leaders in California are primarily concerned not with local affairs, but with issues of state and national interest.[27] The general effect has been the recruitment of ideological liberals to serve in Congress. Detroit presents a third kind of political structure in which a labor union under ideologically liberal leadership has effectively dominated a weak and disunited regular Democratic party. As in Los Angeles, a local non-partisan tradition and scarcity of patronage have crippled the Democratic party organization. But in Detroit, unlike Los Angeles, a strong, politically conscious union exists. The UAW, via its control of the local COPE organization, frequently in alliance with activist liberal or ethnic groups, has stepped into the organizational void.[28] But nowhere in Detroit has COPE been able to exercise the degree of control over recruitment which the Democratic party organization has everywhere in Chicago. The incompleteness of organizational control by either party or labor is manifest in the importance of personality in determining the outcomes of primary elections in most Wayne County congressional districts.[29]

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[23] These habits are at least in part necessitated by the close electoral situation in these districts and the consequent need to rely on personal followings, the press, and non-party organizations for supplementary electoral help. But the marginality of the districts is also part of the original recruitment process which tends to funnel non-organization types to Congress in the first place.

[24] For more detailed comparisons of big cities, see the following: Charles E. Gilbert, "National Political Alignments and the Politics of Big Cities," *Political Science Quarterly*, 79 (March, 1964), 25–51; J. David Greenstone, "Labor Politics in Three Cities: Political Action in Detroit, Chicago, and Los Angeles," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 1963); James Q. Wilson, "Politics and Reform in American Cities," in Ivan Hinderaker (ed.), *American Government Annual* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1962); Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat;* Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963); "City Bosses and Political Machines," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (May, 1964), entire issue. The most detailed studies are found in the series edited by Edward C. Banfield, "City Politics Reports" (Cambridge: Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, 1959–63).

[25] Wilson, *Amateur Democrat,* p. 101.

Other major cities more or less approximate these three types. Those with a strong, centralized, patronage-oriented Democratic party organization which can control political recruitment, as in Chicago, include Gary, Pittsburgh and Philadelphia.[30] Other machines are weak and highly factionalized, such as those in Cleveland, Jersey City, Kansas City, and St. Louis.[31] In Boston, the Democratic organization is weak and local patronage is scarce, but state legislators do have considerable patronage and can influence the local factions.[32] There are also machines which are not city-wide. Such organizations have been strong in Baltimore and in Kings (Brooklyn) and Bronx Counties in New York City. In other areas of the city patronage resources have been inadequate to sustain professional party organizations strong enough to dominate the political system.[33] Finally, there are cities which resemble Los Angeles or Detroit in being genuinely nonpartisan locally, with little or no patronage, and no party machines in the classic sense of the term. The major cities of this type include Milwaukee, Minneapolis, St. Paul, and San Francisco. Labor is especially well organized and militant in San Francisco. In Minneapolis and St. Paul, labor has joined a coalition of Democratic party leaders and liberal intellectuals in the Democratic-Farmer-Labor party, which emerged as a dominant political force in 1948.[34] As we noted previously in regard to Los Angeles, the political systems in all of these cities, in marked contrast to the machine organization cities (whether centralized, factional, or partial), tend to encourage the recruitment of Democratic congressmen who are issue-oriented ideological liberals.

The simple classification of machine and non-machine recruitment can be shown to have general, systematic effects in the House. We see the distinction between the ideological, issue-oriented liberal Democrats, who founded the Democratic Study Group, and the non-ideological, machine liberals, who took much less interest and provided almost no leadership for the DSG during its formative years.[35] We see

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[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 110–111, 118–120, 248.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 125, 149, 162.

[28] Greenstone, *op. cit.*, ch. ii; *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (May, 1964), pp. 47–48; Banfield and Wilson, *City Politics*, pp. 286ff.

[29] See Greenstone's discussion of the nominations of Charles Diggs, Jr. (Thirteenth), Harold Ryan (Fourteenth), John Dingell, Jr. (Fifteenth), John Lesinski, Jr. (Sixteenth), and Martha Griffiths (Seventeenth).

[30] For a detailed account of the Democratic organization in Philadelphia, see Robert L. Freedman, *A Report on Politics in Philadelphia* (Cambridge: Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, 1963). See also James Reichley, *The Art of Government: Reform and Organization Politics in Philadelphia* (New York: The Fund for the Republic, 1959).

[31] Wilson, *American Government Annual* (1962), p. 38.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 40; Banfield and Wilson, *City Politics*, pp. 116, 136, 152, 161, and 230.

[33] This is particularly true of Queens and, lately, of Manhatten, where Tammany Hall has steadily lost control. The Bronx organization has also deteriorated.

[34] Banfield and Wilson, *City Politics*, pp. 285–289.

[35] Mark Ferber lists 27 M.C.'s whom he calls the "inner core" of leaders in the DSG when it was organized formally during the 86th Congress. Only three were from big cities having political machines in the traditional sense of the term, while seven were from non-machine urban districts, which had a total of only 27 Democratic representatives at that time. There were nearly twice that number of machine congressmen. For the list of DSG leaders and members during the 86th Congress, see Mark F. Feber, "The Democratic Study Group: A Study of Intra-Party Organization in the House of Representatives"

TABLE 4. NORTHERN METROPOLITAN DEMOCRATS: AGE AT FIRST ELECTION 1953–1961, BY TYPE OF DISTRICT

Age	District Types[a]					
	Safe		Unsafe		All	
	Machine (39)	Non-Machine (12)	Machine (28)	Non-Machine (28)	Machine (67)	Non-Machine (40)
Average	45.2	40.9	45.7	40.5	45.4	40.7
Median	44.0	40.0	44.0	40.0	44.0	40.0
Under 40	23%	50%	32%	46%	27%	48%

[a] Cox index of inter-party competition. Edward F. Cox, "Congressional District Party Strength and the 1960 Election," *Journal of Politics,* 24 (May, 1962), 277–302. "Unsafe" includes three of Cox's categories: "generally" Democratic, "marginal" and "generally" Republican. Metropolitan districts are defined in *Congressional Quarterly Almanac,* 12 (1956), 788–791.

Machine and non-machine categories are based on the characteristics of political organization analyzed in the discussion above. The major machine-dominated areas include: Baltimore, Boston, The Bronx, Brooklyn, Buffalo, Cleveland, Gary, Jersey City, Kansas City, Manhattan, Newark, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis. A number of anti-machine congressmen have been elected in machine cities. Such men have the support of independent political organizations and are classified as non-machine in the Table. They include: Bolling (Mo.), Donovan (N. Y.), Powell (N. Y.), Roosevelt (N. Y.), and Ryan (N. Y.).

the distinction, too, in the different recruitment ages of northern metropolitan Democrats (Table 4). Irrespective of district marginality, non-machine Democrats tend to enter Congress with a career-potential advantage of two to three terms. The nonmachine congressmen, however, have tended to represent districts whose electoral marginality gives the least promise of long careers in the House.

It has been pointed out that the increasing number of safe Democratic seats in the urban North and the decrease of such seats in the South portends significant changes in the distribution of power in the Democratic party in the House.[36] What kind of men will represent these urban districts? What interests and skills will they bring to the House? The decline in strength of a number of party machines and recent increases in the number of safe Democratic seats in non-machine areas may ultimately have a significant impact upon the character of the Democratic representation and leadership from the urban North.

Future analyses of recruitment need not be confined to the simple categories used for illustrative purposes here. Even the machine-non-machine distinction can be re-classified into numerous types according to the extent of centralization, sources of resourses, local goal-orientations and organizational age.

(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, 1964). A DSG official has estimated that in the 88th Congress only one-third of the machine Democrats in the House actually belonged to the DSG and that many who did were there at the request of the leadership.

[36] Raymond E. Wolfinger and Joan Heifetz, "Safe Seats, Seniority, and Power in Congress," this REVIEW, 59 (June, 1965), 337–349. See also, Charles O. Jones, "Inter-Party Competition for Congressional Seats," *Western Political Quarterly,* 17 (September, 1964), 461–476.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND THE LOCAL COMMUNITY*

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Politicians and political scientists alike have long recognized the impact of the local political environment on the attitudes and behavior of community residents. V.O. Key demonstrated in a variety of contexts the striking persistence of distinctive community political traditions.[1] The extensive discussion of the "suburban conversion" hypothesis has turned in part on the question of the influence of the local community on partisan attitudes.[2] A number of studies of voting behavior have shown that majority views in a community have a disproportionate advantage in gaining and holding adherents.[3] There is, in short, good reason to suspect that the local community has a significant influence on social attitudes and political behavior. Why is this so? How does the Republican "atmosphere" in Elmira affect the votes of individual Elmirans? How are community political traditions maintained through decades of changing community composition? Why does the minority party in a community fail to mobilize many of the voters who are predisposed toward it? What explanation of these sorts of community influence seems most adequate?—this is the question to be examined in this paper.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

There are at least three important theoretical alternatives. The first and simplest proposal rests on two empirical assumptions. Let us assume that the intensity of each party's campaign activities in any community is a function of that party's electoral strength in that community. Let us assume, that is, that the majority party is apt to campaign more actively. Let us also assume that these campaign activities have a significant influence on individual voting decisions. On these assumptions, we would expect the majority party in a given area to gain disproportionately from uncommitted voters, as a result of that party's greater organizational activity. In other words, the influence of the community majority on residents' attitudes would operate through the activity of the majority party organization. I shall term this the "party activity" theory of community influence.

Angus Campbell has proposed a second explanation of community influence, in terms of motivated conformity to perceived community norms.[4] Using the model for group influence developed in *The American Voter*, Campbell indicates two crucial factors in the community influence process: "community identification" and (perceived) community standards. Just as trade union influence depends on the closeness of the member's attachment to the union (his "identification" with the union) and on the clarity and acceptability of union norms on political issues, so, Campbell argues, community influence depends on identification with the local community and on the clarity and acceptability of community political standards.[5] This is an attractively simple explanatory model, drawing substantially on reference-group theory. Motivated conformity to perceived community norms is, then, a second possible explanation of community influence.

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[1] V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York: Crowell, 1958) 4th ed., pp. 267–268; "Partisanship and County Office: The Case of Ohio," this REVIEW, 47 (1953), 525–532; V. O. Key, Jr., and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decisions . . . ," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck (eds.), *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), pp. 281–299.

[2] See, *inter alia*, Louis Harris, *Is There a Republican Majority?* (New York: Harper, 1954), pp. 118–138; Robert C. Wood, *Suburbia*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), pp. 134–153; Fred I. Greenstein and Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The Suburbs and Shifting Party Loyalties," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 22 (1958), 473–482.

[3] Bernard R. Berelson *et al.*, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 98 *ff. et passim;* Warren E. Miller, "One-Party Politics and the Voter," this REVIEW, 50 (1956), 707–725; Phillips Cutright and Peter Rossi, "Grass Root Politicians and the Vote," *American Sociological Review*, 23 (1958), 171–179; Daniel Katz and Samuel J. Eldersfeld, "The Impact of Local Party Activity Upon the Electorate," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (1961), 1–24; Philip H. Ennis, "The Contextual Dimension in Voting," in William N. McPhee and William A. Glaser (eds.), *Public Opinion and Congressional Elections* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1962), pp. 180–211; Angus Campbell *et al.*, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960), pp. 286–289; Leon Epstein, *Politics in Wisconsin* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958), pp. 61–70. For a summary of further studies on the related topics of "clustering," "enclave," and similar effects, see Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), pp. 261–272. For a discussion of phenomena analogous to community influence in the context of trade union elections, see Seymour Martin Lipset *et al.*, *Union Democracy* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956), pp. 338 *ff.*

A final explanation, which I shall call the "social interaction" theory, suggests that community influence is mediated primarily through the numerous personal contacts among members of a community. Such social interaction within the community would, on the whole, tend to support political attitudes commonly held by community members, and to undermine "deviant" views. The extensive literature on personal influence spells out in greater detail the social and psychological processes assumed by this theory.[6] Whereas Campbell's theory emphasizes a resident's psychological attachment to his community, the social interaction theory emphasizes the resident's social involvement in the community. Obviously, we would expect these two factors—psychological attachment and social involvement—to be related, but they are distinct, both logically and (it will turn out) empirically.[7] Campbell's theory asserts that the "community" itself is a significant reference group for many voters, whereas the social interaction theory implies that voters can be influenced by their community environment even if they are not motivated to conform to community norms, indeed, even if they are unaware that such norms exist. All that is necessary according to this latter theory is that the voters be involved in social interaction within the community, and that they be subject to personal influence in these daily, face-to-face contacts.

Each of these three theories has considerable plausibility. The present study will tentatively assess the adequacy of each as an explanation of the relationship between the community political environment and the attitudes and behavior of members of the community.

RESEARCH DESIGN

As a crude indicator of one complex set of political attitudes presumably subject to community influence, I shall here use the reported presidential vote of the non-Southern respondents in the Survey Research Center's 1952 national survey.[8] Obviously, "community environment" could be defined at any number of levels, ranging from the state down to the precinct. It seems reasonable to expect more noticeable effects of community influence, the more localized the operational definition of "community environment." In this study exigencies of the data available force us to use the county as our operational "community" unit. This definition is consistent with previous work on this problem, such as that by Key, by Miller, and by Campbell and his associates.[9] In defining the county as the environmental unit, I am not assuming that it is itself a "community" in the sociological sense. Like these other investigators, I assume that for a national sample of voters the partisan complexion of their counties will be a relatively good indicator of the partisan complexion of their more immediate community environment.

The political complexion of a given county is indicated by the Democratic percentage of the

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[4] "The Political Implications of Community Identification," in Roland Young (ed.), *Approaches to the Study of Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1958), pp. 318–328.

[5] See *The American Voter*, pp. 295–332.

[6] For an introduction to the voluminous literature on personal influence, see Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1955), Part One, and the items cited there. See also Berelson *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 126–27.

[7] See footnote 22 below.

[8] Non-voters have been excluded from the entire analysis, as their inclusion would have complicated it immensely. Southern respondents have been excluded, since preliminary analysis of data from Southern respondents gave some reason to doubt that the nature of the community influence process is quite the same in that region as in the rest of the country. The entire study has, wherever possible, been replicated using the 1960 SRC survey data. All findings reported here were confirmed in that replication, except those involving primary and secondary group membership. It was impossible to replicate these latter findings, since the 1960 survey did not include the relevant questions.

[9] Key, *op. cit.*; Miller, *op. cit.; The American Voter*, pp. 286–289.

TABLE 1. COMMUNITY INFLUENCE AND "SOCIAL INTEGRATION"

	County Environment, in Terms of Democratic % of Two-Party Vote for President, 1952				Kendall's *tau c*
	18%–29%	30%–39%	40%–49%	50%–62%	
Table 1a: Total Sample	28%* (134)	32% (300)	44% (280)	49% (252)	.18 (N = 966)
Table 1b: R's "High" on "Social Integration" Index	18% (33)	28% (78)	41% (63)	50% (64)	.25 (N = 238)
R's "Low" on "Social Integration" Index	46% (13)	52% (25)	48% (27)	58% (26)	.07 (N = 91)

* Entries are percentage Democratic votes among respondents in the indicated category. Below each percentage is given the base on which it has been calculated, i.e., the total number of respondents in the indicated category.

two-party vote for President in 1952.[10] The 62 counties represented are then classified into four levels of partisan dominance, from most Republican (18%–29% Democratic) to most Democratic (50%–62% Democratic). Note that this is an ordinal continuum of relative partisan dominance, so that in 1952 the "moderately Democratic" counties were in fact only 40%–49% Democratic. The rationale for using this relative ordinal continuum is given by Miller.[11]

Before going into a detailed discussion of the findings, I want to illustrate the mode of analysis to be used. Table 1a displays for the entire sample the simple relationship between community political environment and reported vote of respondent. Obviously, this table reveals merely a fairly close relationship between the partisan proportions characteristic of certain counties and the partisan proportions characteristic of samples drawn from those counties. Within the limits of sampling error, we must (logically "must") expect the positive association shown here. Beside the table is shown Kendall's *tau c* characterizing the correlation between the two variables.[12] Roughly speaking, this statistic can be interpreted as a measure of the gradient in the percentage of Democratic votes among *respondents* as we move from strongly Republican to strongly Democratic *counties*, here the gradient 28%—32%—44%—49%.

Table 1b shows this same environment-vote relationship separately for two sub-groups of the total sample, the first sub-table for respondents who rank high on an index of social integration, the second, for respondents who rank low on this index. (This index of "social integration" is based on responses to questions dealing with home-ownership, intent to remain in the local community, and membership in various secondary associations. The index is used merely for illustrative purposes here; each of its components will be examined individually later in the paper.) Consider the *relative* sizes of the *taus* for the two sub-tables. Clearly, the relationship between individual vote and county environment is much stronger for well-integrated respondents than for their poorly-integrated counterparts, for the *tau* for respondents "high" on this index is .25, while the *tau* for respondents "low" on the index is .07. Stated somewhat differently, the partisan distribution of the votes of poorly-integrated respondents is

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[10] Data from Richard M. Scammon (ed.), *America Votes* (New York: Macmillan, 1956), Vol. I.

[11] *Op. cit.*, p. 709, footnote 6.

[12] Kendall's *tau c* is a widely-used measure of the correlation between two ordinal-scale variables. It ranges between 0 (which indicates no correlation at all) and ±1.0 (which indicates perfect correlation), and thus is very roughly (*not* mathematically) equivalent to the more familiar Pearsonian *r*, which is used in connection with ratio-scale variables. See Hubert M. Blalock, *Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 317–324; and Maurice G. Kendall, *Rank Correlation Methods* (London: C. Griffin, 1955), chs. 1 and 3.

TABLE 2. INCIDENCE OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL CONTACT AS RELATED TO COUNTY ENVIRONMENT

	County Environment, in Terms of Democratic % of Two-Party Vote for President, 1952			
	18%–29%	30%–39%	40%–49%	50%–62%
Number of R's Contacted by Democrats:	5	17	24	35
Number of R's Contacted by Republicans:	2	23	33	33
Total Contacts:	7	40	57	68
	Kendall's *tau c* for this relationship = .04			

much less sensitive to differences in the community political environment than is the comparable distribution for well-integrated respondents. It is also true that respondents with low social integration are in general more likely to vote Democratic than are respondents with high social integration, but this fact does not vitiate the crucial observation that respondents with high social integration are apparently more susceptible to community influence than are respondents with low social integration.[13]

The present analysis will focus primarily on comparisons of the strengths of the environment-vote relationship (as measured by *tau c*) in various categories of respondents. There is no straight-forward test for the statistical significance of differences between *taus*. Fortunately, however, most of the differences which will concern us are quite clear-cut and the patterns of findings are consistent. In Table 1b, for example, it seems fairly clear that there is an important difference with respect to sensitivity to the community political environment between respondents of low social integration and those of high integration.

THE "PARTY ACTIVITY" THEORY

The simplest explanation of the tendency for the majority party in a community to pick up more than its "fair share" of the uncommitted votes refers to the differential strengths of the party organizations. All our respondents were asked whether or not they had been contacted by party workers during the campaign. In our analysis we shall use the extent of this party contact as our indicator of party organizational strength. (The overall level of such personal contact by the parties is rather low. Only about 14% of all respondents reported being contacted by a representative of either party.) The first and crucial assumption of the "party activity" explanation of community influence is that campaign activity is disproportionately undertaken by the majority party in each area. Table 2 shows that there is at the county level virtually no such disproportionate concentration of party activity. The correlation between party electoral strength and the extent of personal contact by the party organizations is virtually nil. Thus, this first, crucial assumption of the "party activity" theory is disconfirmed.

There is further evidence which casts doubt on this theory. If community influence depends on party activity, then those respondents who have been personally contacted by some party representative will show greater sensitivity to the community political environment than those who have not. Table 3 shows, however, that, if anything, the opposite relationship obtains. While we cannot explain this anomalous finding without further information about the types of people reached by party organizations, it is clear that the "party activity" theory of community influence is inadequate.

THE "COMMUNITY IDENTIFICATION" THEORY

According to Campbell's theory of community influence, one crucial variable in the influence process is "community identification" —the sense of attachment and commitment to

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[13] Note that a high positive *tau* for a given table does not mean that respondents represented in that table are concentrated in extreme one-party areas; it means that the direction of their vote is highly dependent on their political environment. Hence, it is illegitimate to argue that this evidence of community influence is artifactual on the grounds that integrated respondents tend to be Republican and that most counties were Republican in 1952.

TABLE 3. COMMUNITY INFLUENCE AND PARTY CONTACT

	County Environment, in Terms of Democratic % of Two-Party Vote for President, 1952				Kendall's *tau c*
	18%–29%	30%–39%	40%–49%	50%–62%	
R's Contacted by One or Both Parties	43%* (7)	38% (39)	30% (46)	49% (53)	.10 (N = 145)
R's Contracted by Neither Party	28% (127)	31% (260)	47% (234)	49% (197)	.19 (N = 818)

* Entries are percentage Democratic votes among respondents in the indicated category. Below each percentage is given the base on which it has been calculated, i.e., the total number of respondents in the indicated category.

the local community. Since we have no direct and unambiguous measures of this variable in the data available, we must use a variety of indirect indicators to test the theory. Gresham Sykes in an investigation of the "differential distribution of community knowledge" found that several social attributes were closely associated with knowledge about local politics and government. Homeowners, parents with children in local schools, and long-time local residents were all, according to Sykes, especially apt to be oriented toward the local community, and hence to be more knowledgeable about community affairs.[14] It is reasonable to suppose that such individuals would have greater "community identification" in Campbell's sense, and thus, if his theory is correct, that they would be more susceptible to community influence.

Sykes found a positive relationship between home-ownership and "localism." One might expect homeowners to tend to be more strongly identified with the local community than non-owners, and, according to Campbell's theory, to be relatively more sensitive to the community political environment. Surprisingly, however, our data in Table 4a suggest a contrary finding: homeowners are, if anything, less sensitive to the political community than non-owners, though the difference between *taus* of .13 and .21 is probably not significant. Parents of school-children are also, according to Sykes, more apt to be "locals." If so, however, this "localism" does not result in a greater susceptibility to community influence, as is shown in Table 4b. Finally, if community identification is to some extent a function of length of residence, and if community influence depends significantly on community identification, then we would expect respondents who have lived in their present community for some time to be much more sensitive to this political environment than relative newcomers would be. The slight difference between *taus* of .12 for newcomers and .18 for long-time residents, shown in Table 4c, though in the predicted direction, indicates a very weak relationship at best.[15]

Another item which seems very closely related to "community identification" tapped the respondent's feelings of having "settled down to stay" in his community. Individuals who feel they have "settled down to stay" should also feel greater community identification than those who are not so sure they intend to remain in the community. Table 4d shows the relationship of this item to sensitivity to the community political environment. Once again, we find our expectations, based on Campbell's theory, disconfirmed. There is, if anything, a closer relationship between vote and environment among potential migrants than among those settled down to stay, though again this difference between *taus* of .15 and .23 is probably not significant.

It might be thought that emotional involvement in the outcome of local elections would indicate some degree of "community identification." Table 4e shows that there is a slight re-

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[14] Gresham Sykes, "The Differential Distribution of Community Knowledge," in Paul K. Hatt and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., *Cities and Society* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1957), pp. 711–721. Sykes also found location of work in the local community to be an indicator of "localism," but we have no information on this for our respondents.

[15] Even clear positive results would be ambiguous since length of residence is also related to membership in community organizations, and, as we shall find later, such membership is clearly linked to community influence.

TABLE 4. COMMUNITY INFLUENCE AND "COMMUNITY IDENTIFICATION"

	County Environment, in Terms of Democratic % of Two-Party Vote for President, 1952				Kendall's *tau c*
	18%–29%	30%–39%	40%–49%	50%–62%	
Table 4a:					
Homeowners	28%* (90)	29% (208)	46% (181)	38% (113)	.13 (N = 592)
Non-homeowners	30% (44)	40% (92)	41% (98)	58% (138)	.21 (N = 372)
Table 4b:					
Parents of School-Children	27% (52)	40% (126)	55% (95)	48% (86)	.16 (N = 359)
Not Parents of School-Children	29% (82)	26% (171)	39% (184)	50% (165)	.20 (N = 602)
Table 4c:					
Resident of County Five Years or More	30% (118)	30% (263)	46% (248)	49% (223)	.18 (N = 852)
Resident of County Less than Five Years	12% (16)	50% (34)	29% (31)	48% (27)	.12 (N = 108)
Table 4d:					
R "Sure" He Intends to Stay in Community	28% (87)	34% (232)	44% (216)	47% (189)	.15 (N = 724)
R *not* "Sure" He Intends to Stay in Community	32% (38)	28% (58)	47% (57)	55% (53)	.23 (N = 206)
Table 4e:					
R "Cares" About Local Elections	28% (79)	28% (200)	45% (178)	48% (152)	.19 (N = 609)
R Doesn't "Care" About Local Elections	30% (50)	44% (87)	44% (89)	48% (85)	.11 (N = 311)
Table 4f:					
R "Cares" About National Elections	27%* (86)	27% (227)	40% (193)	50% (188)	.21 (N = 694)
R Doesn't "Care" About National Elections	30% (46)	51% (65)	54% (81)	44% (59)	.08 (N = 251)
Table 4g:					
R Followed Politics Closely in Press	21% (48)	27% (146)	36% (138)	42% (116)	.16 (N = 448)
R Didn't Follow Politics Closely in Press	33% (86)	38% (152)	53% (142)	55% (135)	.20 (N = 515)

* Entries are percentage Democratic votes among respondents in the indicated category. Below each percentage is given the base on which it has been calculated, i.e., the total number of respondents in the indicated category.

lationship in the expected direction between concern about local elections and sensitivity to the political environment. There are, however, two problems in the interpretation of this finding. In the first place, it might be argued that the finding is spurious, because those voting with the majority in a community would naturally express more interest in local politics. A more basic problem in interpretation is raised by Table 4f, which shows that concern about national elections is more strongly related to community influence than is concern about local elections. This suggests that what is relevant to community influence is not concern about local elections, but rather concern about elections in general.[16]

At best, then, the relationship between community influence and various indicators of community identification is uncertain. Though each of these indicators can be plausibly linked to community identification, none segregates a group of respondents who are clearly and unambiguously more sensitive to the community political environment than are other respondents.

The second independent variable of Campbell's theory of community influence is perception of local political standards. If the community influence process involves awareness of community norms, then one might expect community influence to be related to exposure to local news media, since on the whole those individuals more highly exposed to the local media should be more aware of community politics and partisan norms. Table 4g shows, however, that there is no significant difference in the relative sensitivity of respondents who followed politics closely in the local newspapers and those who did not. We must conclude that the community influence process does not involve exposure to community standards, at least via the press.

We have been able to find no evidence relating community influence to either of the two explanatory variables isolated by Campbell. To be sure, none of the items we have examined taps *directly* the suggested dimensions—community identification and perception of community norms—and therefore, no single item would in itself be convincing evidence. On the other hand, the fact that none of these items is closely related to community influence does cast some doubt on the theory. We cannot reject it as confidently as we rejected the "party activity" theory, but we are forced to enter a verdict of "not proven."

THE "SOCIAL INTERACTION" THEORY

Thus far we have examined a variety of evidence tending to show that neither the "party activity" theory nor Campbell's "community identification" theory is an adequate explanation of the community influence process. The social interaction theory emphasizes the individual's social contacts as important media for the transmission of community influence. Let us now consider the relationships between susceptibility to community influence and various secondary and primary group memberships.

If the social interaction theory of community influence is correct, we would expect sensitivity to the community environment to be related to involvement in community associations, since such involvement presumably increases the respondent's interaction with other members of the community. (Our analysis of these membership effects is somewhat hampered by the fact that only a sub-sample of the national sample was queried about organizational involvement, so that N's tend to be low. Fortunately, however, most of the findings are quite distinct.) Consider, first of all, "claimed" membership, both nominal and active. Table 5a shows that among respondents who belong to no clubs or organizations, there is no tendency for vote to be related to the community environment. By comparison, respondents who claim membership in one group show considerable sensitivity to their political environment, and those who claim membership in two or more groups show substantially more sensitivity than single-group members. The differences among these categories are quite striking. Table 5b shows that parallel results obtain when only active membership is considered. Finally, Table 5c combines these results by comparing the relative sensitivity of non-members, nominal members, and active members. It appears that while even nominal membership in community associations increases one's susceptibility to community influence to some extent, active membership increases this susceptibility still further.

These results suggest that community in-

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[16] Another possible indicator of community identification was respondents' agreement or disagreement with the statement that "local elections are often unimportant." In the 1952 survey the *tau* for those respondents who disagreed (hypothetically, the "locals") was .18 (N = 833) and for those who agreed was .13 (N = 127). In the 1960 survey the comparable figures were .21 (N = 932) and .36 (N = 72). In other words, this item, too, fails to support the hypothesis linking community identification and community influence.

TABLE 5. COMMUNITY INFLUENCE AND MEMBERSHIP IN SECONDARY ASSOCIATIONS

	County Environment, in Terms of Democratic % of Two-Party Vote for President, 1952				Kendall's *tau c*
	18%–29%	30%–39%	40%–49%	50%–62%	
Table 5a:					
Non-members:	54%* (11)	46% (28)	41% (29)	52% (25)	.00 (N = 93)
Members of One Assn.:	33% (12)	43% (35)	48% (31)	57% (28)	.16 (N = 106)
Members of Two or More Assns.:	9% (22)	18% (40)	40% (30)	47% (36)	.33 (N = 128)
Table 5b:					
Not Active Members:	39% (18)	44% (57)	40% (57)	52% (46)	.07 (N = 178)
Active Members of One Assn.:	38% (13)	26% (19)	57% (21)	56% (23)	.23 (N = 76)
Active Members of Two or More Assns.:	0% (13)	12% (24)	33% (12)	45% (20)	.38 (N = 69)
Table 5c:					
Non-members:	54% (11)	46% (28)	41% (29)	52% (25)	.00 (N = 93)
Nominal Members:	14% (7)	41% (29)	39% (28)	52% (21)	.16 (N = 85)
Active Members:	19% (26)	19% (43)	48% (33)	51% (43)	.32 (N = 145)
Table 5d:					
Active Members of Informal Assns.:	11% (9)	20% (20)	43% (7)	36% (14)	.22 (N = 50)
Not Active Members of Informal Assns.:	31% (36)	37% (83)	43% (83)	55% (75)	.18 (N = 277)
Table 5e:					
Active Members of Formal Assns.:	17% (23)	15% (34)	47% (30)	54% (37)	.36 (N = 124)
Not Active Members of Formal Assns.:	36% (22)	42% (66)	42% (60)	50% (52)	.08 (N = 200)

* Entries are percentage Democratic votes among respondents in the indicated category. Below each percentage is given the base on which it has been calculated, i.e., the total number of respondents in the indicated category.

fluence is to a considerable extent mediated through community organizations. The social interaction theory implies something further about the sorts of groups likely to have this effect. Since, according to this theory, community influence depends on social interaction with other individuals who, on the whole, represent the dominant attitudes in the community, we would expect groups whose self-selection according to social and political attitudes is *greater* to be *less* effective mediators of community influence. Informal groups, for example, such as bridge clubs, are less likely to represent a cross-section of community sentiment than are formal groups, such as PTA's, and thus the informal groups should be less effective mediators of community influence. Tables 5d and 5e present the relevant data, which clearly confirm our theoretical expectations. Active members of informal groups are, at best, only slightly more susceptible to community influence than non-members of such groups. Activity in formal groups, on the other hand, makes a major difference in community sensitivity.[17]

The evidence presented thus far demonstrates the importance of secondary associations in mediating community influence. What about the relationship between primary group contacts and community influence? There are two questions to be considered here. First, what is the effect of the community environment on the complexion of primary groups which are formed within it, and second, what impact, if any, does the community environment have on political attitudes apart from its effect on primary group composition?

Before examining the data on the first question, let us analyze the possible alternatives. Consider the partisan composition of five-member primary groups. On the one hand, there might be no influence of the community environment on the sorts of primary groups which form within it. This would be the case if all potential adherents of minority opinions were "able to" contain their friendships to like-minded community residents. In this case we would expect that, for example, in a community where the ratio of Democrats to Republicans 1:3, the ratio of Democratic to Republican primary groups would also be 1:3. On the other hand, there might be no such tendency for like to attract like. That is, minority Democrats might draw their friends completely randomly (with respect to political opinions) from the community at large. In this case, we would expect the ratio of Democratic to Republican friendship groups to be 1:40.5. This somewhat surprising figure is simply the ratio of the probability of drawing 4 or 5 Democrats in 5 tries, from a population where there are 3 Republicans for every Democrat, to the probability of drawing 4 or 5 Republicans in 5 tries from the same population.

In fact, our evidence indicates that the partisanship of friendship groups is strongly associated with the partisanship of the county political environment. Each respondent was asked about the party preferences of his five closest friends. In the most Republican communities (18%–29% Democratic) 57% of all respondents have all or mostly Republican friends, and only 5% have all or mostly Democratic friends. In the most Democratic communities (50%–62% Democratic) the comparable figures are 34% and 32%.[18] Though the existence of the phenomenon is not surprising, its extent perhaps is. Figure 1 compares the obtained ratio of Republican to Democratic friendship groups with two hypothetical ratios, one assuming complete "homophily," that is, restriction of friendships to one's fellow partisans, and the other assuming complete randomness in the selection of friends. This figure shows that while there is some "homophily," nevertheless potential minority voters have a disproportionately difficult time finding

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[17] It is not surprising, in terms of the social interaction theory as explicated here, that members of labor unions are less, not more, susceptible to community influence than non-members. We would not expect union membership to involve social interaction with anything like a cross-section of community sentiment. For the 1952 survey *tau* for union members was .11 (N = 299) compared to a *tau* of .14 (N = 659) for non-members. The comparable figures for 1960 were .11 (N = 302) and .24 (N = 701). If community influence is to a considerable extent mediated through social interaction, then we might expect that minority groups would be less sensitive to the overall community environment, insofar as they are excluded from extensive interaction with much of the population. In 1952 the *tau* for Protestants was .14 (N = 619) and the *tau* for non-Protestants was .06 (N = 344). In 1952 the *tau* for whites was .16 (N = 930), while the *tau* for non-whites was −.21 (*sic*) (N = 36). These comparisons were confirmed in the replication using the 1960 survey.

[18] Respondents with "mixed" or unknown friendship groups constitute a constant 34%–38% of the sample in all four partisan environments and are excluded from the present analysis. Their inclusion would complicate the analysis, but not alter the conclusions.



(See text for explanation of the two hypothetical ratios.)

FIG. 1. Partisanship of friendship groups as a function of the county political environment.

social support for their deviant views, especially in communities which are relatively one-sided. Thus, in the most Republican communities the ratio of Republican to Democratic *voters* is 2.5:1, while the ratio of Republican to Democratic *friendship groups* is 13:1.

To be sure, this effect becomes less marked as the community approaches an even division between Republicans and Democrats. In the "moderately Democratic" communities in 1952 the ratio of Republican to Democratic voters was 1.3:1, while the ratio of Republican to Democratic friendship groups was 1.7:1. But empirically, many politically significant "climates of opinion" are quite one-sided. Most American communities, for example, are overwhelmingly favorably disposed to private enterprise, and the present analysis shows how difficult it would be for deviants from that viewpoint to maintain social support for their views. Or consider the case of party loyalties. The neighborhoods from which most Americans draw their closest friends are probably typically characterized by lop-sided distributions of party loyalties. The effect of these lop-sided distributions is, on the evidence presented here, to "smother" deviation from the dominant party. Much community influence is, then, mediated through the extended friendship group. A potential Democrat in a small Kansas town who must find most of his friends among Republicans, and who is eventually influenced by interaction with these friends to vote for Ike is clearly subject to this sort of community influence.

But what can we say about community influence apart from its impact on primary group composition? In Table 6 we find that when the partisanship of friendship groups is held constant, the remaining community influence is relatively slight, at least when "community" is defined at the county level. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee have proposed what they term the "breakage effect" hypothesis, according to which community influence is most marked in its effects on individuals with mixed friendship groups.[19] There is some weak confirmation for this hypothesis in the difference in sensitivity between respondents with mixed friendship groups on the one hand, and those with mostly Republican or mostly Democratic friends on the other.

Thus, we have found, on the one hand, that community influence is to a considerable extent mediated through friendship groups and, on the other, that members of secondary associations are more susceptible to community influence than are non-members. We must now

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[19] *Loc. cit.*

TABLE 6. COMMUNITY INFLUENCE AND MEMBERSHIP IN PRIMARY GROUPS

	County Environment, in Terms of Democratic % of Two-Party Vote for President, 1952				Kendall's *tau c*
	18%–29%	30%–39%	40%–49%	50%–62%	
R's Friends All or Mostly Democratic	83%* (6)	81% (43)	82% (65)	83% (81)	.01 (N = 195)
R's Friends All or Mostly Republican	14% (77)	12% (157)	15% (109)	16% (85)	.03 (N = 428)
R's Friends Mixed or Unknown in Partisan Terms	43% (51)	44% (100)	53% (100)	49% (85)	.07 (N = 336)

* Entries are percentage Democratic votes among respondents in the indicated category. Below each percentage is given the base on which it has been calculated, i.e., the total number of respondents in the indicated category.

try to integrate these findings. There are three mutually compatible possibilities. First, it might be expected that associational membership opens up a broader spectrum of possible friendships, and that it thereby increases the likelihood of members having friends typical of the community at large. Looked at from the opposite point of view, non-members may be more likely to restrict their friendships to their more immediate social environment, which may differ substantially from the community environment. If this hypothesis is correct, we would expect the composition of friendship groups of associational members to show more sensitivity to differences in the overall community environment. In the second place, it might be that members of organizations not only are more likely to have friends typical of the community as a whole, but also are more sensitive to the opinions of their friends, whatever these opinions happen to be. Perhaps members of associations are more "other-directed." If this latter hypothesis were valid, it would magnify the effect of the greater "representativeness" of associational members' friends. Finally, it might also be true that the effect of organizational membership on susceptibility to community influence is not exhausted by these friendship-group phenomena. That is, it might be that even with friendship-group composition held constant, members of associations are still more sensitive to the community environment than are non-members. Each of these three possibilities can to some extent be tested with the present data.

To test the first hypothesis—that members of organizations have friends who are more "typical" of the community as a whole—we can examine the correlation between the county environment and friendship-group composition for organizational members and for non-members. Table 7 provides the relevant data. For members the correlation is .54, while for non-members it is .26, indicating that the composition of friendship groups of associational members is much more sensitive to differences in the community environment.[20] That is, one reason that associational members are more susceptible to community influence is that they are more likely to have friendship groups typical of the community as a whole.

The next hypothesis to be tested is that organizational members are generally more sensitive to their friends' opinions. The correlation between own vote and friends' votes is .70 for group members, while the comparable figure for non-members is only .48. Thus, members of community associations are not only more likely to have friends typical of the community environment; they are also more sensitive to the opinions of those friends.

Finally, we can test tentatively the hypothesis that secondary group membership increases

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[20] Note that if "homophily" were complete the correlations in this table would be identical with the correlation between respondent's vote and county environment, *viz.*, *tau* = .18. The fact that the obtained *tau* for non-members is .24 indicates that even non-members are not able to insulate themselves from the general community environment completely.

TABLE 7. COMPOSITION OF FRIENDSHIP GROUPS AND THE LOCAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT, BY ACTIVITY IN SECONDARY ASSOCIATIONS

	County Environment, in Terms of Democratic % of Two-Party Vote for President, 1952				Kendall's *tau c*
	18%–29%	30%–39%	40%–49%	50%–62%	
Active Members of Secondary Groups	5%* (20)	13% (30)	45% (20)	65% (34)	.54 (N = 104)
Not Active Members of Secondary Groups	0% (6)	32% (40)	33% (43)	59% (29)	.26 (N = 118)

* Entries are percentage of respondents with all or mostly Democratic friends. Below each percentage is given the base on which it has been calculated, i.e., the total number of respondents in the indicated category. Respondents with mixed or unknown friendship groups are excluded.

TABLE 8. COMMUNITY INFLUENCE AND MEMBERSHIP IN SECONDARY ASSOCIATIONS, WITH PARTISANSHIP OF FRIENDSHIP GROUP HELD CONSTANT

	County Environment, in Terms of Democratic % of Two-Party Vote for President, 1952				Kendall's *tau c*
	18%–29%	30%–39%	40%–49%	50%–62%	
Friends Democratic:					
Association Members:	100%* (1)	85% (13)	76% (17)	86% (29)	.03 (N = 60)
Non-members:	—	83% (6)	83% (6)	80% (10)	−.03 (N = 22)
Friends Republican:					
Association Members:	5% (21)	7% (43)	18% (22)	6% (16)	.06 (N = 102)
Non-Members:	50% (4)	27% (11)	28% (18)	25% (8)	−.09 (N = 41)
Partisanship of Friends Mixed or Unknown:					
Association Members:	33% (12)	42% (19)	45% (20)	37% (19)	.01 (N = 70)
Non-members:	57% (7)	46% (11)	40% (5)	43% (7)	−.12 (N = 30)

* Entries are percentage Democratic votes among respondents in the indicated category. Below each percentage is given the base on which it has been calculated, i.e., the total number of respondents in the indicated category.

susceptibility to community influence even when we control for friendship-group effects. Table 8 shows that for each type of friendship group, members of associations do show a greater sensitivity to the community environment than do non-members. To be sure, both the *taus* and the N's are much too low to support any definite conclusion, but the pattern is quite consistent.[21]

CONCLUSION

We began this investigation in an effort to explain a widely-recognized phenomenon, the influence of the local political environment on the attitudes and behavior of community members. We found good evidence that this community influence is not mediated by the activity of party organizations. We were unable to find any evidence to support an explanation in terms of motivated conformity to perceived community norms. We turned to an explanation in terms of social interaction, and found clear evidence that community influence is mediated through primary and secondary groups in the community.[22] We found that the community political environment is an important determinant of the partisan complexion of friendship groups, that members of community organizations tend to have friends more representative of the community as a whole, and that they tend also to be especially sensitive to the opinions of their friends.

What is the relevance of these findings for understanding partisan community influence of the kinds mentioned at the beginning of this paper? Clearly, social interaction processes are important in accounting for the persistence of distinctive community partisan traditions, such as those investigated by Key, and in explaining the impact of suburban residence on political attitudes. The processes analyzed here are an important means of "socializing" newcomers into the partisan traditions of these areas. Similarly, these processes help to account for the difficulties the minority party faces in mobilizing its potential supporters. If our negative conclusions about Campbell's theory are valid, we can say that the political beliefs of one's community are probably *not* absorbed through deep roots long sunk in the local political soil. To vote like an Elmiran, it is not necessary that one "feel" like an Elmiran, that is, that one "identify" with Elmira. One need only be involved in the pattern of social relations through which the contagion of partisan sentiment passes.

The implications of our findings are, however, broader than the explication of some fraction of the remaining unexplained variance in American voting behavior. This study can be interpreted as an introductory exploration of the processes by which more general political beliefs and behavior are affected by the local community. Students of "political culture" and of "political ideology" have brought to our attention the significance of such orientations as tolerance, allegiance, and "subjective competence."[23] It seems likely that one important determinant of these orientations is the community environment, but direct investigation of this relationship is both conceptually complex and operationally difficult. In this situation it is perhaps useful to begin by investigating analogous processes involving simpler kinds of attitudes, such as the partisan affiliations examined here. It seems likely that the processes here shown to account for the transmission of community partisan preferences also operate to spread and maintain community political culture. If so, this would have important implications for our interpretation of the relationship between political culture and the political system. Let us consider a few of these implications.

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[21] As in any cross-sectional analysis, the direction of causality is not definitely established by the above findings. That is, there may be a tendency for members of the political majority in an area to become more involved in secondary associations, rather than (or in addition to) a tendency for members of secondary associations to become more like the political majority. While this alternative cannot be excluded, its plausibility is reduced by the generally low salience of partisan politics for the average American. It is somewhat difficult to imagine that one's position in the political majority or minority in a locality has much to do with one's decision to become involved in non-political associations in that locality. Moreover, the plausibility of the other alternative (that associations mediate community influence) is enhanced by the pattern of findings linking the secondary and primary group phenomena.

[22] Broadly speaking, we have examined three independent variables in this study: party contact, community identification, and social interaction. It may be of interest to note the intercorrelations among these three variables. There is virtually no relationship between party contact and any of the other variables. (*tau*$\leq$.03) There is virtually no relationship between social interaction and intent to remain in the local community (*tau*=.04). There are moderate positive relationships between social interaction and length of residence, homeownership, and parental status (*tau*=.09, .12, and .21, respectively). Thus, social interaction is far from perfectly correlated with our indicators of community identification. The overall effect of these findings is to strengthen our principal findings, for if we were to control for the spurious effect of organizational membership, the correlations between community influence and our indicators of community identification would be even weaker than those shown in Table 4.

[23] As examples of this growing literature, see Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); and Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York: Free Press, 1962). Students of local political systems are

It has been repeatedly shown that social activity, and particularly membership in community organizations, is strongly linked to political participation. In New Haven, for example, Dahl found that "the more a voter participates in local political life, the more likely he is to participate in other forms of community organization, and conversely." Moreover, in Dahl's sample of political "subleaders" the median number of organizational affiliations was more than four.[24] Our findings suggest, therefore, that political activists will be under especially strong (though perhaps imperceptible) influence to adopt those attitudes on which community opinion is relatively one-sided. Stated over-simply, our hypothesis would be that the more active a person is politically, the more conventional his beliefs will tend to become. In the case of partisan attitudes, this tendency will naturally be offset by the tendency for political activists to be strongly committed to a particular party. But in the case of non-partisan attitudes of the sort investigated by students of political culture, we would expect activists to adhere more strongly than non-activists to community conventions and norms. This, of course, is precisely what studies of this matter have revealed.[25]

The importance of our findings for the comparative study of political culture depends on the generality of the processes uncovered here. It may not be that the transmission of all sorts of political beliefs in all sorts of communities follows this same pattern. But insofar as our findings are applicable, we would expect the transmission of political attitudes to be a function of the extent and intensity of formal and informal social interaction. We would expect, for example, the resistance of a closely-knit community to novel ideas to be greater than the resistance of an atomistic community, but once a new attitude had "caught on" in the former, we would expect its diffusion to be faster and more complete than in the latter.[26] Furthermore, we would expect that the individuals most susceptible to novel or deviant ideas would be those most detached from the network of community social relations. This is, of course, a common finding of both anthropologists and political sociologists.[27]

Theorists of democracy, at least since John Stuart Mill, have worried about the "tyranny" of public opinion. Our findings about the "smothering" effect of a lop-sided distribution of opinion reveal in some detail the nature and extent of this danger. Partisans in a three-to-one minority have much less than one chance in three of finding a supportive primary-group environment. In the case of presidential choice their chances are less than one in thirteen. To call this phenomenon "tyranny" is, however, to beg two important questions. In the first place, this "tyranny" is entirely unintentional —the majority does not plan to smother deviant views in this way. It is simply much more difficult for holders of minority views to find like-minded associates. Moreover, whether this effect should be called "tyrannical" or not depends on our assessment of the opinions which are "smothered." It is at least arguable that the "smothering" of racial prejudice or of anti-

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paying increasing attention to the importance of local political culture. See Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 311–325, and Robert E. Agger *et al.*, *The Rulers and the Ruled* (New York: Wiley, 1964), *passim.*

[24] Dahl, *op. cit.*, pp. 298 and 172.

[25] See Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 26–57, and Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," this REVIEW, 58 (1964), 361–382. Of course, I do not mean that the processes discussed in the present paper are the sole explanation for these findings about activists' attitudes.

[26] Here, as at a number of other points, our findings converge with those of mathematically-inclined sociologists who have developed and tested formal models of the diffusion of social attitudes and behavior. See James S. Coleman, *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology* (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 336–353, 492–514, and the works cited there.

[27] For evidence corroborating these hypotheses, see Scott Greer and Peter Orleans, "Political Sociology," in Robert E. L. Faris (ed.), *Handbook of Modern Sociology* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 815–818, and the works cited there.

democratic attitudes is not contrary to those liberal democratic values which we share with Mill. On the other hand, in the case of attitudes less inimical to democracy itself, the "smothering" phenomenon is more alarming, and the need to counter its effects—by the enforcement of freedom of speech and (especially) freedom of association—is more pressing. The important point here, however, is not the evaluation of this phenomenon, but the understanding of it, so that we may better cope with whatever problems it raises for democracy.

Our investigation has also highlighted the political significance of community associations. Numerous social theorists, from de Tocqueville to Kornhauser, have suggested that such groups play an important role in "integrating" citizens into the life of the larger community. We have seen in the specific case of partisan attitudes how this "integration" process works. Group members are more exposed to dominant community opinions and are more sensitive to those opinions. Thus, in a community where sentiments favor democratic processes and values, group membership would tend to encourage the development of democratic attitudes, as de Tocqueville and his successors have argued. On the other hand, in communities where democratic attitudes are not widespread, group membership might have, at least in part, a contrary effect.[28] In a community where prejudice or antagonism to democracy was widespread, the network of community associations would tend to propagate these anti-democratic attitudes, and organizational membership would not have the effect of stimulating support for democratic norms. If this hypothesis is correct, it constitutes an important qualification of the "pluralist" thesis.

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[28] To be sure, there are probably many other effects of group membership besides this sort of "integration" into community social relations, and some of these *other* effects might be supportive of democracy even in a community where anti-democratic attitudes were rampant. See William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), *passim*.

ATTITUDE CONSENSUS AND CONFLICT IN AN INTEREST GROUP: AN ASSESSMENT OF COHESION*

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In America, interest groups operate within the democratic frame of reference. Like all political organizations, they are accorded more legitimacy when they can show that they are representative of the attitudes and values of a particular segment of the population. Consequently, the leaders of interest groups frequently spend a great deal of time explaining just how democratic their organizations are. If one examines the testimony of interest group leaders at state and national legislative hearings, he is likely to find that much of it is begun with an introductory statement explaining that the leadership of the testifying group is merely the voice of the membership. The personal values of the interest group leader are played down, and his function as representative (as distinguished from delegate) is exaggerated.

On the other hand, relatively few political interest groups have systematic and formalized means of ascertaining the desires of members. We know that most of the devices used to solicit member opinion are not very effective. Truman has shown that the affairs of most interest groups are run on a day-to-day basis by a fraction of the total membership. The mass of the membership takes a relatively passive role with regard to the formation of public policies by the organization.[1]

Communication between leaders and followers is spasmodic and cannot provide efficient guidelines for the actions of leaders. Whether or not leadership of an organization seeks to become a manifestation of Michel's iron law of oligarchy, the realities of communication within an organization suggest that most of the communication undertaken by leaders will be with other members of the leadership clique rather than with the larger body of followers in the group.

This situation is not necessarily dysfunctional for the organization. By many criteria the leader's decision is superior to that of the average member. Leaders have more time to give to matters of special concern to the organization. The information on which they make their decisions is likely to be more extensive than that of the average member, and they are likely to be more cognizant of the long-term impact of a particular decision. Unlike the average member, however, the leader's decision is complicated by his need to consider the extra-group and intra-group impact of his various alternative decisions and actions.

In the area of extra-group considerations, he must estimate the probable responses of other actors in the political process and the effect of these responses upon the chances of achieving a desired goal, assuming that he does not possess all capabilities of realizing this goal himself. Concerning intra-group considerations he must consider how the followers will respond to a decision. Will they be aware of it? Do they care about the alternatives, and if so, how will they respond to a decision which is contrary to their desires?

Even in the absence of efficient consultative mechanisms, leaders and followers exist in a functional relationship.[2] That is to say, leaders are limited by the followers' expressed or latent values and expectations. Regardless of the efficiency of corrective mechanisms and apart from how extensive the violation of the followers' values must be before the corrective mechanism comes into play, the leader's position is less secure if he fails to satisfy the followers. If another leader is vying with him for the followers' support, the implications of failing to satisfy the followers are even more threatening. In a political interest group, the functional relationship of leaders to followers is keyed to the necessity for cohesion as a weapon in extra-group competition. The actuality or at least the appearance of unity is essential.[3]

Assuming that the leader desires to maintain

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[1] David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1951), pp. 129–139.

[2] William Haythorn, *et. al.*, "The Effects of Varying Combinations of Authoritarian and Equalitarian Leaders and Followers," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 53 (September, 1956), 210–219.

[3] Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 167–187.

an extra-group competitive position, he will therefore undertake efforts toward the fostering of intragroup cohesion. In a voluntary organization, one of the prime requisites for this cohesion is the extent to which the membership is satisfied with the performance of leaders.[4] There are three ways in which a leader may satisfy the desires of an organization's membership. First, he may unconsciously act consistently with their desires. For example, he may decide to act on the basis of his evaluation of extra-group factors in such a way that the membership will be entirely satisfied. Second, he may respond entirely in terms of his personal attitudes and beliefs and, because he so accurately reflects the attitudes of his membership, again satisfy their desires. Third, a leader may consciously seek to do what he believes the membership of the organization desires. His success in satisfying the membership by this effort is dependent upon the accuracy of his perceptions of their attitudes and expectations.

RESEARCH DESIGN

In this paper we examine the latter two dynamics by which leaders can satisfy members. Our data were gathered from the membership of the Oregon Education Association. Three sets of information were collected: the beliefs and attitudes of the members of the Association, the beliefs and attitudes of the leaders of the leaders of the Association, and the perception of the attitudes of the members as held by the leaders. The analysis consists of comparing these three sets of information and noting changes in their interrelationships on different attitudes. The nature of the analysis is illustrated by Figure 1.



FIG. 1

The sample of group members used in this study is a clustered stratified random sample of 803 high school teachers. This represents 14% of the high school teachers in Oregon.[5]

The sample of leaders includes all nine of the OEA's top administrative officials. These are the members of the executive staff, which is employed by the organization's Board of Trustees. Its official responsibility is to implement the policies of the Representative Council, which consists of 200 representatives elected by local teachers' organizations. The Representative Council is the official policy-making body of the Association. However, both the Representative Council, which meets only once a year, and the Board of Trustees, which is supposed to deal with the specifics of the council's directives, are part-time functions. Thus, the permanent administrative staff is often forced to act in areas in which directives are vague or nonexistent. As is frequently the case in formal organizations, therefore, the permanent administrative staff has great flexibility and is a major delineator of policy.

In interviewing the leaders, we used a majority of the questions included in the teachers' interview schedule. Certain modifications in wording were made to allow for differences in organizational position. Leaders were first asked to answer the questions in terms of their of their own attitudes. They were then asked to take the point of view of the "average teacher" answering the same questions as they thought the "average teacher" would answer them. Only one of the leaders displayed any difficulty in assuming this attitude perspective; he had difficulty in keeping from answering questions in terms of what the teachers *should* believe rather than what he thought they actually *did* believe. The little difficulty the leaders experienced in answering these questions is evidence that the distinction between personal attitudes and the attitudes of the membership is a meaningful one for them.

These three sets of attitudes (teachers' attitudes, leaders' attitudes, and leaders' perceptions of teachers' attitudes) are studied in four attitudinal contexts. They are:

1. Mandates for organizational action,
2. Expectations and satisfaction with the direction of leadership behavior,
3. Abstract political values, and
4. Norms of teachers' political participation

The mandates for organizational action consist of two parts: expectations of behavior on the part of leaders themselves and expectations of action undertaken by teachers' organizations. In both cases, the satisfaction of the members with a particular action is dependent upon a congruence of the attitudes of the leaders with the actual attitudes of the followers.

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[4] Herbert Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1957), pp. 110–122.

[5] Attitudes were assessed by personal interviews. There were 91 teachers in the original sample with whom interviews were not completed.

Attitudes related to satisfaction with the direction of leadership are concerned with three of the Oregon Education Association's most strenuous activities; efforts toward salary improvement, efforts to raise teacher standards and accreditation, and efforts toward the establishment of a state sales tax with the revenues going to the public schools.

Abstract political values describe a set of attitudes, many of which are clichés often used by persons to persuade others to accept their position. They represent the basic "truths" of both the conservative and liberal points of view. A leader perceiving the membership as adhering to conservative values is ascribing conservatism to the membership and at the same time indicating that he believes an argument for action based upon these values would draw support from the membership.

The attitudes dealing with teachers' political participation concerned a broad set of politically related activities which might be undertaken by teachers in the classroom or during leisure time. The leadership's ability to satisfy members in this regard will be reflected in their efforts or lack of efforts to support teachers in trouble in their local communities for various political activities and in the formal or informal articulation of a professional ethic with respect to these activities.

Although it would be possible to analyze these data using contingency tables, the existence of 50 attitude items and three comparisons for each item would tax the reader's ability to follow the analysis. A single measure which characterizes the relationship on each comparison of attitudes is therefore required. Although numerous measures of association and correlation were considered for this purpose, we settled upon Kendall's tau chi (τ_c).[6] This measure has its faults, the principal one being that its maximum value is dependent upon the marginals of the table. Our tables frequently have marginals of 803 and 9 (the N's of our two samples). Such great differences will yield a correlation of only .044 for a perfect relationship on a 2×2 table. Since we are more interested in finding a measure to characterize the comparison of attitude distributions of leaders and followers than in using the measure as a test of statistical significance, it was decided to rely upon a new measure, τ_c over τ_c maximum.

As we are using this measure in comparing the distributions of attitudes of leaders and followers, a high correlation would indicate a strong relationship between attitudes and the person holding them. That is to say, a high correlation would indicate that leaders hold attitudes different from those of the followers. The sign of the measure will indicate the direction of this difference. Notice that a correlation of .000 indicates that leaders share the attitudes of the followers or that the two sets of attitudes compared have the same distribution.

Some may inquire of the statistical significance of the findings. There are two problems with the application of statistical significance tests to these data. First, one of the samples is not a sample at all but the universe of the administrative leaders of the Oregon Education Association. Thus, with no sampling error contributed by the leadership sample the comparing of leaders' and followers' attitudes does not necessitate as strong a relationship to achieve statistical significance as would be normally required. In the data comparing leaders' attitudes and their perceptions of followers' attitudes, clearly no statistical significance tests are applicable because the differences are real differences for the universe of leaders. Even if the leaders did constitute a sample, their small number places an unnecessarily strict requirement on the strength of the relationship necessary to achieve statistical significance.[7] In general, therefore, greater reliance is placed upon the consistency of a relationship within an attitude area rather than on the statistical significance of any one item. However, those single-item relationships which are significant are indicated by a small "s" in the tables (the Kruskal-Wallis h test is used to test statistical significance).

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[6] Our data justify the use of ordinal measures of association, but there are several characteristics of our data and properties of various measures of association which complicate the choice of such a measure. First, on some of the items only two responses are possible while others are seven-point Likert scales. Thus any measure which is sensitive to the shape of the contingency table from which it is computed will decrease the comparability of the data across items. A measure which reached unity when only one cell is zero is also undesirable, as instances in which the leaders are in perfect agreement while the followers differ are common in our data. Such measures would be insensitive to the degree of followers' disagreement with the leaders. The final difficulty is that some measures are sensitive to the marginals of the contingency table. No measure was discovered which did not have at least one of the characteristics. See Hubert Blalock, *Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960), p. 323; and Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 49 (December, 1954), p. 750.

[7] David Gold, "Some Problems in Generalizing Aggregate Associations," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 8 (December, 1964), p. 18.

FINDINGS

Leaders' perceptions of their roles. Before comparing the three sets of attitudes contained in this study, some discussion should be made of the leaders' perceptions of their roles within the organization. We refer here to the extent to which leaders believe they should act primarily in accordance with their own personal values rather than trying to reflect the desires of those whom they lead. We are asking whether leaders believe they should be delegates or representatives.[8]

Two questions were included in the leaders' interview schedule dealing with the problem of whose attitudes should be acted upon, those of the leaders or those of the followers. In one question the leaders were offered a brief dialogue between two persons, one arguing that a leader must do as the members wish and the other arguing that the leader must do what he personally believes to be correct. The leader was given the opportunity of selecting the argument which he found most satisfactory. Only one leader answered that the membership's desires should rule. Five answered that the leader should do what he personally believes to be right, although they added the comment that they thought the problem would occur very infrequently. Three of the leaders said that if this problem could not be resolved the leader should resign.

The second question approached the problem from a slightly different angle and achieved very dissimilar results. The leaders were asked if they felt the organization should do pretty much what the average teacher wants, what the more influential teachers want, what the school administrators want, or what they themselves want. The "pretty much" phrase in the first alternative apparently was easier to accept than the wording in the other question, as five leaders chose this alternative. Two altered the second response to indicate that they believed they should do what the "more informed" teachers wanted while two indicated that they would prefer to do what they themselves thought best.

It would seem, therefore, that the leaders accept the maxim that they should do what the followers want, but they are also jealous of their autonomy to do what they think best. There appears to be a clear internalized conflict between the representative and delegate roles. Obviously the best of all possible worlds for the leaders would be perfect consensus between them and the members. In the absence of this consensus, they appear unable to reach a clear resolution of the conflict and to find a stable definition of their roles.

The leaders' acute awareness of the problem of communication with followers is indicated by a final question. Leaders were asked what policies of the Oregon Education Association they were most dissatisfied with. Seven volunteered the answer that the greatest problem was the OEA's failure to be true to the desires of its membership. Two of the leaders who gave this response explicitly criticized the administrative structure for not administering impartially the policy decisions of the Representative Council. It appears, therefore, that the representative nature of the organization is not only meaningful to leaders but is also potentially divisive of the leadership.

Expectations concerning organizational activity. The exact nature of this potential conflict within the organization will become clearer as we proceed to the analysis of the four attitude areas. We will first consider the mandates for organizational activity.

Table 1 presents the correlations for each of the attitude comparisons for each of the questions. In this, as in the tables which follow, the first column presents the objective attitudes, the "real world," and thus measures the extent of actual conflict. The second column shows the degree to which leaders are accurate in their perceptions of followers' attitudes, while the third column measures the extent of conflict as seen by the leaders. The negative sign of the correlation means that the bottom set of attitudes is more heavily weighted in the direction of believing that leaders of the organization *should* undertake a particular action. For example, in the first column a negative sign means that leaders believe more than the followers that they or the organization should undertake a given activity. In the second column

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[8] The terms "delegate" and "representative" are borrowed from the literature on the legislative process, where they are applied to the role perceptions of legislators. Heinz Eulau presents three legislative role orientations in John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson, *The Legislative System* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), pp. 267–286. The "trustee" of Eulau's scheme has traditionally been described as a "delegate" while the "delegate" corresponds to "representative." These roles are the extremes, with "politico" falling somewhere between them.

TABLE 1. COMPARISON OF THE THREE ATTITUDE SETS IN THE AREA OF MANDATE FOR ACTIONS BY LEADERS, TEACHERS' ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE OEA.

Questions	Sets of Attitudes Compared		
	Followers' Attitudes vs. Leaders' Attitudes	Followers' Attitudes vs. Leaders' Perception of Followers' Attitudes	Leaders' Attitudes vs. Leaders' Perception of Followers' Attitudes
Leaders should:			
1. Fight attacks on educational principles and methods.	−.134	−.134	.000
2. Fight against dismissal of teachers.	−.073	−.073	.000
3. Defend teachers from public attacks from getting involved in controversial issues.	−.059	−.059	.000
4. Eliminate from staff political liberals.	+.284	+.061	−.222
5. Give helping hand to school board members coming up for election.	−.317(s)	+.211	+.528
Teachers' organizations should:			
6. Endorse political candidates.	−.419(s)	+.184	+.603
7. Take sides on public issues.	−.404(s)	+.221	+.625
OEA should:			
8. Endorse candidates in school elections.	−.387(s)	+.058	+.444
9. Try to influence legislation.	.000	.000	.000

the negative sign means that the leaders perceive the followers as being more in favor of undertaking a particular action than they actually are. The positive sign in the second column means that the followers are more in favor of undertaking a particular activity than the leaders believe them to be. A negative sign in the third column means that the leaders perceive the followers as more supportive of a particular activity than the leaders are. A positive sign in the third column indicates the reverse.

The table indicates that, with the single exception of eliminating from the OEA staff people believed to be politically extreme, the leaders are more inclined to favor the involvement of the organization in each of the actions presented. This is shown by the fact that in seven of the nine cases the signs of the first column are negative. The first three of these items are the more clearly "professional" of the set. They involve the traditional academic values of freedom of expression and the protection of teachers against hostile forces in the community. These are at best *quasi* political activities. Yet even here the followers are more restrained than the leaders. Note that on the question of eliminating political liberals from the OEA staff the followers are more in favor of such action than are the leaders. However, it is true that the greatest discrepancy between followers' and leaders' attitudes occur on those questions involving the more purely political aspects of the organization, such as endorsing political candidates, taking sides on public issues, and taking part in the electoral activities of school board members.

With regard to these political activities, the followers are much more restrained than they are concerning more purely educational activities. Granted that the distinction between quasi-political and political is arbitrary at best, the followers do appear to make it. Thus, they are much more inclined to support the activities of the OEA if it defends teachers against public attacks than they would be if the teachers' organization endorsed political candidates.

The glaring exception to the general reluctance of the teachers to support the OEA's political activities is on the question of lobbying. Here there is nearly perfect agreement between leaders and followers. Lobbying is perceived by teachers to be an absolutely legitimate function of the organization. Teachers, therefore, are making a distinction between legislative politics and electoral politics.[9] The Association is currently engaged in a vigorous lobbying program at the state legislative level. With regard to lobbying, it is interesting to notice that not only do the attitudes of the leaders and followers converge, but also the leaders perceive that the followers support the lobbying activities. This is indicated by the zero correlation in the second and third columns.

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[9] Cf. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1965), pp. 250–251.

Notice also that with regard to the first three activities (fighting attacks on educational principles and methods, fighting against the dismissal of teachers, and defending teachers from public attacks) the leaders see *more* support among the teachers than actually exists. Since the leaders overestimate the enthusiasm of followers, they see a consensus which does not hold true in the "real world." Hence the perfect correlation in the third column between the leaders' attitudes and their perceptions of teachers' attitudes is based upon faulty perceptions. This is not true with regard to the consensus about lobbying.

It is in the more purely electoral activities of the organization that discrepancies occur. Notice that on questions five, six, seven, and eight, the negative signs of the first column become positive signs in the second column. This means that, whereas leaders are more likely to want to engage in the electoral activities than are followers, the leaders perceive the followers as far more hesitant than the followers actually are. Consequently, these electoral activities can be contrasted with the professional and lobbying activities. In these professional and lobbying activities, the third column indicates that the leaders see little or no discrepancy between their point of view and the point of view of the followers, whereas the correlations on items five, six, seven, and eight in the third column indicate that the leaders see a considerable conflict between their values and those of the followers. With regard to these political activities, the leaders are correct in perceiving conflict although conflict also exists in educational activities but is missed by the leaders.

At this point in its organizational history, the OEA is in fact more likely to engage in professional and lobbying activities than it is in electoral activities. It is these activities in which the leaders see the followers as being entirely supportive of the organization, although they are correct only with regard to lobbying. If the OEA were to increase its electoral activities, therefore, it would be engaging in practices which are less favored by the followers. However, the fact that the teachers are perceived as being more reluctant to support these activities than they actually are might result in the leaders engaging in these activities to a lesser extent than would be tolerated by the followers.

Evaluations of organizational performance. Turning from the extent to which leaders and followers are in agreement as to what the organization should do, we consider now the relationships between sets of attitudes concerning the extent of satisfaction with the actual behavior of the leaders of the organization. In Table 2 a negative sign indicates that the bottom set of attitudes is less satisfied with the performance of the teachers' organization. A positive sign indicates that the bottom set is more satisfied.

In the first analysis, we found that the leaders consistently underestimate the followers' activism. In Table 2 we find a similar tendency with several notable exceptions. On the question of the importance of the OEA's role in getting improved salaries and benefits in the past, we find a great discrepancy between leaders' and followers' attitudes: the followers are inclined to give the OEA less credit than are the leaders. However, the second column shows that the leaders' perception is accurate. Hence, they perceive followers as exhibiting more dissatisfaction with past performance than the leaders do. Leaders, intimately involved in the successes and failures of the organization, see their role as more significant than do the more passive followers. Only about one-third of the followers think that the OEA was "very important" in securing past benefits, whereas all the leaders are of this opinion.

With regard to current performance a different situation exists. The leaders are more dissatisfied with the performance of the organization and its constant fight for better salaries. Once again, however, they perceive more dissatisfaction among the followers than actually exists. Although accurate in their perceptions of teacher satisfaction with past performance, leaders fail in their evaluation of current satisfaction. In fact, 56% of the followers indicated that they think the OEA is doing enough about salaries. This is not exactly an overwhelming vote of confidence, but it is apparent that more satisfaction exists in reality than is perceived by the OEA leadership.

In view of the current conflict between teachers' unions and professional organizations for the loyalties of teachers, it is interesting to note that the OEA leaders are more likely to denigrate the efforts of the teachers' union than are the teachers themselves. This is indicated by the negative sign of the correlations in column one considering the role of the union in past and present efforts toward salary increases. Again column two tells us that in both

TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF THE THREE ATTITUDE SETS IN THE AREAS OF EXPECTATIONS AND SATISFACTION WITH LEADERSHIPS ACTIONS.

Questions	Sets of Attitudes Compared		
	Followers' Attitudes vs. Leaders' Attitudes	Followers' Attitudes vs. Leaders' Perception of Followers' Attitudes	Leaders' Attitudes vs. Leaders' Perception of Followers' Attitudes
1. How important do you think has been the role played by the OEA in getting improved salaries and benefits?	+.556(s)	+.026	−.667
2. How about the Teachers' Union; how important do you think its role was in getting improved salaries and benefits?	−.297	−.098	+.185
3. Do you think the OEA is doing enough to improve teachers' salaries and benefits?	−.332	−.444	−.111
4. How about the Teachers' Union; is it doing enough in improving teachers' salaries and benefits?	−.396	−.396	.000
5. Do you think the OEA is doing enough in its support for higher teacher standards and accreditation to improve professional status?	−.016	−.016	.000
6. Do you think there should be a state sales tax with the revenue going to the schools?	+.253	+.364	+.111

of these cases leaders perceive that followers are more dissatisfied with the union than they actually are. This distinction between past and present produces some curious results in the third column, showing the extent of conflict perceived by leaders. While they exaggerate the extent of dissatisfaction on the part of followers, perhaps projecting their own desires more than an objective evaluation would indicate, they recognize that the followers are more impressed with past union performance than they (the leaders) are. Yet they persist in seeing perfect agreement between themselves and teachers concerning current union performance, an agreement which does not exist. These distortions lead the leadership to assume a "what-have-you-done-for-me-lately" attitude somewhat along the lines of old fashioned bread and butter unionism. It seems likely that these perceptions will cause them to channel more of their resources into salary increase efforts at the risk of providing less satisfactory efforts in other areas. On the other hand this risk does not appear to be very great. For example, the leaders are extremely accurate in their perceptions of teacher satisfaction with regard to support for higher professional standards and accreditation. A consensus only slightly weaker than that regarding lobbying exists here.

The final item in the table dealing with the question of state sales tax enables us to return once again to lobbying. We may well ask "Lobbying for what?" The OEA has been strongly lobbying for a state sales tax with revenues going to the public schools, but only a slight majority (53%) of the teachers agree that a state sales tax should be enacted, while more than two-thirds of the leadership favor the tax. This is apparently an elite-derived effort enjoying only weak support from the followers. In this case, however, the leaders perceive far more support than actually exists. They actually believe that followers support this effort more than the leaders do, whereas the opposite is the case. Thus, although high consensus is achieved on the legitimacy of lobbying, leaders do not show a great capability of deciding how much effort should be devoted to the pursuit of certain policies by means of lobbying. The leaders want a sales tax, perceive the followers as wanting a sales tax, and pursue this effort vigorously. It is possible that if the efforts to achieve a sales tax are continued with increased intensity, membership support might be reduced beyond the bare majority it enjoys now, and intra-group conflict may result. If this happens the perceptual errors of the leaders could prove costly.

Abstract political values. Up to this point we have been considering the explicit programs of the Oregon Education Association, and the extent to which there is a congruence between leaders' and followers' values with regard to these programs. Members of organizations, however, may have values which are not directly translatable into explicit programs but which nevertheless color the relationship between leaders and followers. The overall ideological pattern of leaders and followers is, therefore, a component in determining the extent to which leaders represent the followers' values. It is this assumption which leads us to inquire about abstract political values. The items in Table 3 are offered as important in the leaders' evaluations as to what programs might appeal to the followers and also what the nature of appeals to the membership for support on a given issue might be. On the basis of their content, the items are separated into those indi-

TABLE 3. COMPARISON OF THE ATTITUDE SETS IN THE AREA OF ORTHODOX VALUES

	Sets of Attitudes Compared		
Questions	Followers' Attitudes vs. Leaders' Attitudes	Followers' Attitudes vs. Leaders' Perceptions of Followers' Attitudes	Leaders' Attitudes vs. Leaders' Perceptions of Followers' Attitudes
Conservative			
1. The American form of government may not be perfect, but it's the best type of government yet devised by man.	−.137	+.078	+.222
2. Democracy is considered the ideal form of government by most of the world.	−.160	−.658	−.407
3. Private enterprise could do better most of the things the government is now doing.	+.365	−.171	−.568
4. The participation of the federal government in local affairs leads to undesirable federal controls.	+.564(s)	−.389	−.926
5. Communism is a total evil.	+.142	−.466	−.630
6. People of most underdeveloped countries are by nature incapable of self-government.	+.303	−.226	−.506
7. Private enterprise is the only really workable system in the modern world capable of satisfying our economic needs.	+.257	−.182	−.469
Liberal			
8. Economic and social planning by government does not necessarily lead to dictatorship.	−.326	+.125	+.444
9. Man is the maker of his own society, such events as wars and depressions could be controlled by man.	−.122	+.161	+.259
10. The growth of large corporations make government regulation of business necessary.	−.190	+.088	+.309
11. We could increase spending for many government services without harming the nation's economy.	−.402	+.035	+.432
12. The federal government represents the needs of most people better than local government.	−.030	+.284	+.259
13. The government should increase its activities in matters of health, retirement, wages, and old-age benefits.	−.205	−.034	+.185

cating conservatism and those indicating liberalism. The first seven questions are the conservative questions, and the last six are the liberal questions. For each group, a negative sign indicates that the bottom set of attitudes shows greater acceptance of the item.

Looking at the first column, it can readily be seen that the leaders are more likely to disagree with the conservative items and more likely to agree with the liberal items than are the followers. Futhermore, the high correlations in the third column show that the leaders believe that the followers differ greatly from them with regard to these items. Once again, however, the leaders' perceptions of teachers' attitudes tends to exaggerate the differences. In eleven of the thirteen cases, leaders perceive followers to be more conservative and less liberal than they actually are. Thus, although the OEA leaders are a biased section of the teachers with respect to their political and economic values, they tend to perceive their atypical posture as more extreme than it actually is. This discrepancy in perception is likely to influence the leaders to use more conservative appeals to the followers in the urging support of particular programs than would be called for by an accurate inventory of their values.

Combined with the bread and butter perception described previously, this perceived conservatism of teachers leads the leaders into the path of heavy emphasis on salaries and other basic issues while at the same time forcing them to restrict their activities in the realm of expansion of organizational activities. If the leadership seeks to venture into untried areas which are not specifically related to educational problems, it may be hesitant to begin for fear that the programs are too liberal for the membership.

Of course, as Krech and Crutchfield point out, the degree of association between cognitive attitudes and action-orientated attitudes is not necessarily great.[10] Thus, a person holding conservative beliefs does not automatically favor conservative actions by government. To ascertain the extent to which abstract values are translatable into immediate preferences for governmental action, we administered the items from the Survey Research Center's domestic attitude scale.[11] As in the abstract value index, the leaders proved to be much more liberal than the followers. Also, the leaders saw the followers as not being as liberal as they actually are. In this case, however, the leaders are not so greatly more liberal and they do not see the followers as so greatly more conservative than they actually are. The main thrust of the conservatism scale is identical to that of the abstract political value index, but the discrepancies are not as great. It may be, therefore, that the leaders are less in danger of undercutting the cohesion of the organization should they lend its support to an explicit governmental program outside the realm of education related issues. The danger to cohesion may be not so much in the undertaking of new programs but in the appeal to followers on the basis of their perceived conservatism.

The political role of the teacher. Teachers, like the holders of any social position, have perceptions of what is permissible behavior by holders of their social position. Others who do not hold this position also have expectations. The interaction of these two expectations constitutes a role. Table 4 presents the comparisons between the three sets of attitudes with regard to norms of teachers political participation. A negative sign indicates that the bottom set of attitudes in the comparison favors teacher participation more than does the top set of attitudes.

Here we see a remarkably consistent pattern. Leaders are, in every case save one, more supportive of actions by teachers in these areas than are the teachers. This is even true of joining a teachers' union, but it is not true of striking to secure higher salaries and other benefits. In this latter case, the teachers are slightly more likely than leaders to be willing to undertake this activity and are much more likely to be willing to strike than leaders perceive them to be. This is the single example of followers being more "activist" than leaders to achieve liberal goals. In every other case, no matter what type of action is involved, leaders are more willing to take a risk, more willing to engage in controversial activity than are followers. When we examine the leaders' perception of followers' attitudes, we find once again the consistent pattern of underevaluation of the experimental nature of teachers. Leaders perceive teachers as being unlikely to engage in these activities whereas teachers themselves, although less anxious than leaders to take part in these activities, are more willing to do so than leaders believe them to be. Thus, the teachers are more willing to join teachers'

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[10] David Krech and Richard Crutchfield, *Theory and Problems of Social Psychology* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1948), p. 251.

[11] See Angus Campbell, *et al.*, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 194–198. V. O. Key gives the items used in this scale. See V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 561.

TABLE 4. COMPARISON OF THE ATTITUDE SETS IN THE AREA OF THE NORMS OF TEACHERS' POLITICAL PARTICIPATION.

Questions	Sets of Attitudes Compared		
	Followers' Attitudes vs. Leaders' Attitudes	Followers' Attitudes vs. Leaders' Perceptions of Followers' Attitudes	Leaders' Attitudes vs. Leaders' Perceptions of Followers' Attitudes
Teachers should if they want to:			
1. Join a teachers' union.	−.135	+.532(s)	+.667
2. Go on strike to secure higher salaries and other benefits.	+.067	+.317(s)	+.250
3. Join a political party organization.	−.036	+.186	+.222
4. Serve as party precinct worker in pre-election activities.	−.064	+.269	+.333
5. Publicly criticize local government officials.	−.268	+.510(s)	+.778
6. In a presidential election, outside school time, make speeches or give other services on the behalf of a candidate.	−.110	+.335(s)	+.444
7. Run for political office.	−.104	+.451(s)	+.556
8. In a presidential election, explain to class reasons for preferring one candidate.	−.055	+.279	+.333
9. Belong to the NAACP or CORE.	−.129	+.316(s)	+.444
10. Take part in a CORE or NAACP demonstration, such as public picketing.	−.112	+.460(s)	+.571
11. Allow an atheist to address the class.	−.126	+.430(s)	+.556
12. Argue in class against the censoring of literature by people who feel it is pornographic.	−.226	+.039	+.306
13. Speak out in class against the John Birch Society and groups like it.	−.153	+.180	+.333
14. Speak in favor of nationalizing the steel industry and the railroads.	−.249	+.307	+.556
15. Speak in class in favor of the Medicare program.	−.169	+.276	+.444
16. Speak in class in favor of the United Nations.	−.043	+.291	+.333
17. Allow the distribution of anticommunist literature put out by the National Association of Manufacturers.	−.254	+.191	+.444
18. Speak in class favorably about socialism.	−.105	+.229	+.333
19. Argue in class that labor unions should be more regulated or controlled by the government.	−.158	+.176	+.333
20. Allow the distribution of anticommunist literature put out by the John Birch Society.	−.443(s)	+.123	+.556

unions, political party organizations, or racial organizations than leaders believe them to be.

CONCLUSIONS

To summarize the findings of this analysis, the following points may be offered. As is true of most organizations, the leaders of the Oregon Education Association are more active than the followers. They are more liberal than the followers and they are more willing than the followers to expand the activities of the organization, but they consistently exaggerate the atypical nature of their position. They see the followers as being more conservative and restrained than they actually are. These discrepancies, both in perception and in actual attitudes, lead us to speculate as to how they came about. Is the relative activism of leaders a function of their social role, their organizational position, or their personality? It is certainly not feasible to argue that leadership positions somehow recruit more daring people. It is more feasible to seek explanations within the nature of the organization and the teaching profession. Consider, for example, the items dealing with political participation by teachers. Leaders would be subject to none of the pressures that teachers would feel from their community. Also, while teachers can recall relatively few cases in which the community made demands upon the school system for the dismissal of a teacher for engaging in controversial activity, those who can recall such incidents are of the opinion that the teachers' organization was ineffective in the defense of teachers. It is also true that the teachers look upon the local affiliates of the Oregon Education Association much more favorably than they look upon the statewide organization which employs the leaders considered in this study. In arguing for organizational position as a fundamental contributor to differential perception, we draw added support from the reaction of the leaders to the competition of the union. Leaders behave in much the same fashion as political party leaders.[12] They are more emotionally committed to the organization than are the rank and file. Hence, they find it difficult to comprehend the problems of teaching and the restrictions traditionally imposed upon teachers by the community.

It might be useful to know something about the leaders' backgrounds. All have at one time been teachers and all have passed through some lower administrative position before achieving their present status. Most have taken graduate work, usually in educational administration. All earn in excess of ten thousand dollars per year. Thus, although they do have a teaching background, they are much more upwardly mobile than the average teacher and make more money. They are also substantially better educated. The upper mobility of the leaders of the OEA can be gleaned from the backgrounds of their fathers. Most of their fathers had less than a high school education and held low status occupations. Thus holding a position in the OEA marks more of a step up than does teaching. Perhaps, therefore, the leaders consider themselves as more sophisticated and advanced than teachers.

When we consider the fact that serving as an OEA administrator is in a sense moving beyond a teaching position, the explanation offered above becomes more plausible. Combine this with the fact that leaders have interaction with a more heterogeneous environment and their perception of teachers becomes even more understandable. Unlike the teachers, who interact mostly with teachers, students, principals, and parents, the OEA administrative staff interacts with lobbyists, legislators, state officials, and national educational officials.

As a final alternative to the explanation offered above, we considered the possibility that, whereas the leaders incorrectly perceive the political values and political role perceptions of teachers, they may base their reactions upon communication with a biased sample. There are, of course, many different shades of opinion among teachers just as there are among the general public. Is it true that the OEA leaders interact with a segment of the teaching population which is more conservative and more restrained? If this is true, then their perceptions of followers' attitudes might not be a function of their social position but might be the result of an unrepresentative sample of opinion being communicated to them. However, our evidence indicates quite clearly that there is no relationship between political conservatism and participation in organizational affairs. There is no evidence that the conservative teachers have any more interaction with OEA leaders than do the liberal teachers. Also, those teachers who take a restrained view of the political role of the teacher are no more likely to communicate with OEA leaders than are those teachers who take a more expansionist view.[13] Thus, we can say that there is no weighting of communication which comes to the attention of OEA leaders in favor of conservatism and restraint.

Assuming, therefore, that being a leader in an organization contributes to a discrepancy between leaders' and followers' attitudes, we may inquire finally into the possibility of having a democratic interest group without frequent and carefully supervised consultative mechanisms. Can leaders be representative simply because they intuitively comprehend what is required of them? In considering this question, let us note that, with the exception of the last table, the discrepancy between leaders' attitudes and followers' attitudes is generally *greater* than the errors made by leaders in perceiving these attitudes. Thus, OEA leaders operating entirely upon their personal values would not be representative of the values of their followers. On the other hand, if they adopted a purely representative role, they would become more conservative and restrained than the teachers would prefer. Yet, with exception of the last set of attitudes, the error would be less than would be true if followers' wishes were ignored. That is to say, if they followed their understanding of followers' values, the resulting conservatism and restraint would be closer to the actual desires of teachers than would be true if leaders used their personal values as the sole criteria of judgment. "Virtual" representation in an interest group cannot serve as a substitute for actual representation, because the position of group leader contributes to the development of attitudes which differ from those of the followers.

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[12] Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," this Review, 58 (June, 1964), 361–382.

[13] It is true, however, that there is more interaction between leaders and small town teachers; these teachers are considerably more conservative and restrained than their big city counterparts.

RECRUITMENT PATTERNS AMONG LOCAL PARTY OFFICIALS: A MODEL AND SOME PRELIMINARY FINDINGS IN SELECTED LOCALES

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INTRODUCTION

An ongoing political system requires a continuing process of recruitment in order to maintain the small but active cadre of citizens who assume the primary responsibility for the operation of the system. These political activists are involved in recruiting the official leadership, campaigning for their election, and sometimes serve as governors of the system themselves. In American politics, the recruitment of political activists is effected through processes which political scientists have only recently begun to investigate in depth. Most of the studies of recruitment to positions of political activism have investigated the social backgrounds and the patterns of recruitment of public officials.[1] Not as much attention has been directed toward the personnel who operate the local political party organizations, and the processes of their recruitment.[2] Our data add to the literature about political party activists at the lower echelons of the party organizations by reporting the findings of research conducted among local party officials in selected locales in North Carolina and Massachusetts. These local party officials constitute the lowest level of party officialdom in their respective party organizations. We have investigated the process of their recruitment to their party positions, and have used the data to test a model of political recruitment. Several questions guiding our research included: What are the social correlates of recruitment to local party positions? What are the patterns and channels of recruitment? What triggers political party activism—is there an identifiable "threshold" or "political opportunity structure" which serves as an indicator of political party activism? Are recruitment patterns and channels related to role definitions? We have also examined the relationship between the recruitment pattern of the party worker and his orientation to his job as party worker.

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[1] See, for example, Lester Seligman, "Recruitment in Politics," *PROD* (1958), 14–17; and "Political Recuritment and Party Structure: A Case Study," REVIEW, 55 (1961), 77–86; John Wahlke, *et al.*, *The Legislative System* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962); Frank J. Sorauf, *Party and Representation* (New York: Atherton Press, 1963); Donald R. Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers* (New York: Random House, 1954), and *U. S. Senators and Their World* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1960); Herbert Jacob, "Initial Recruitment of Elected Officials in the U. S. —A Model,"*Journal of Politics*, 24 (1962), 703–716.

[2] Several recent research efforts have added to our knowledge of local party activists. See: Samuel J. Eldersveld, *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1964); R. S. Hirschfield, B. E. Swanson, and B. D. Blank, "A Profile of Political Activists in Manhattan," *Western Political Quarterly*, 15 (1962), 489–506; Peter H. Rossi and Phillips Cutright, "The Impact of Party Organization in an Industrial Setting," in Morris Sanowitz (ed.), *Community Political Systems* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 81–116; Phillips Cutright and Peter H. Rossi, "Grass Roots Politicians and the Vote," *American Sociological Review*, 23 (1958), 171–179; Samuel C. Patterson, "Characteristics of Party Leaders," *Western Political Quarterly*, 16 (June, 1963), pp. 332–352; Phillip Althoff and Samuel C. Patterson, "Political Activism in a Rural County;" *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 10 (February, 1966), 39–51.

The following research also provides helpful insights about party officials and/or leaders at other organizational levels or through different research approaches than that reported in our study. For more about the activities of county party chairmen, see: Leon D. Epstein, *Politics in Wisconsin* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958), especially, pp. 77–97; Eugene C. Lee, *The Politics of Nonpartisanship* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), pp. 97–119. For information about volunteer party workers, see: Dwaine Marvick and Charles R. Nixon, "Recruitment Contracts in Rival Campaign Groups," in Dwaine Marvick (ed.), *Political Decision-Makers: Recruitment and Performance* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 138–192.

METHODOLOGY AND SETTINGS

We interviewed local party officials in three Massachusetts communities and in two North Carolina communities during the fall of 1963. These communities are not representative of Massachusetts or North Carolina communities, and no such implication is intended. Rather, we selected the communities as research sites for reasons of convenience (proximity), because the party organizations were fairly active, and because they offered some partisan balance. Both of the party systems in the two North Carolina communities can be characterized historically as modified one-party, although the Republicans recently made sizeable inroads on the traditional Democratic strength in one. In the two-party politics of Massachusetts, one of the community's party systems is strongly Democratic, one is strongly Republican and the third is two-party.

We designated the ranking official of each party's precinct organization in the North Carolina communities, and the two ranking officials in each party's ward organization in the Massachusetts communities as our universe.[3] In this universe, a structured interview of one-half to one hour in length was administered to a total of 138 local party officials. The response rate was 80.2 per cent.[4]

A RECRUITMENT MODEL

In a democratic system the recruitment of the highly active political elite may be viewed as a part of the more general investigation of all forms of political participation.[5] Political participation in the American system may range from little more than exposure to political communication to the active extreme of holding either party or public office. This broad continuum may be divided into four levels of political participation.[6] Some members of society never participate in politics. This is the portion of the population often designated individually as "apathetics." They do not expose themselves to political communication and they do not vote. Only slightly more active are those who may talk about politics, and who may read about politics or may be exposed to political events through television and the radio. This portion of the public may vote (particularly in elections of high interest) usually on a party basis because of habit.[7] Those constituting a more active group expose themselves to political communication, vote in almost all elections, and participate in campaign activities in behalf of the candidates they support. A fourth, and the most active group, perform most or all of the previously mentioned activities as well as holding an official position in either the party organization or in the government itself. This is a very small group constituting no more than about one per cent of the total population.

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[3] The organizational arrangement is such in the Massachusetts communities that two officials in each ward had to be designated in order to inflate the universe ot practical size. This means that for the purposes of this study "local party official" has been defined as the Republican and Democratic precinct chairmen in the North Carolina communities and as the two highest ranking Republican and Democratic ward officials in the Massachusetts communities. In some cases these are not exactly comparable because of the wide variations in the legal arrangements of the party systems of the states: nevertheless, these are the "grassroots" party officials in both systems and are comparable in that important respect. They represent roughly comparable functional and organizational levels.

[4] Apparently, a low response rate, while never desirable, must be faced as a usual problem when interviewing "grassroots politicians." See the problems encountered by Hirschfield and his associates, *op. cit.*, p. 490, and by Eldersveld, pp. 103–104.

[5] Two strands of the literature of political science are relevant to the theoretical model used for this study. The studies of the recruitment of party and public officials provide hypotheses for investigation. For citations to this literature generally, see: *supra*, p. 1, note 1. We found Herbert Jacob's review of this literature particularly helpful. The recent work of Samuel Eldersveld, *op. cit.*, also furnishes important theoretical insights and empirical comparisons.

The literature on the more general questions of political participation also offers suggestive hypotheses. See especially: Angus Campbell, *et al.*, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), Chapters 2 and 5; Robert Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959); and Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1965).

[6] See Milbrath, *ibid.*, pp. 5–38, for a general discussion of the problems in conceptualizing political participation.

[7] These are roughly equivalent to the "peripheral voters" described by Angus Campbell. See "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (1960), 397–418.

Past research on political participation and the recruitment of party and public officials suggests a number of factors which help explain why certain members of the polity participate actively and others less actively or not at all. The first broad group of factors has to do with the individual's background. Those who are active in politics come from backgrounds of higher social status.[8] Also, a large proportion of the politically active have occupations of high social status. As one would expect, a high level of education is congruent with the high occupational achievement of most political activists.

A second background factor is the level of political activity in the home environment in which political activists grow up. For example, a study of legislators in four states found that a large number of the legislators came from homes in which one or both parents had been politically active.[9]

A third background factor is the personality development of political activists. Many political scientists have been persuaded that certain personality characteristics lead to a high level of political activity.[10] There has been little evidence that would justify the wholesale generalizations from these hypotheses and tentative findings to all political office holders. However, in his study of political party leaders, Eldersveld suggests that:

> a consciousness of power as the goal of the party is intimately related to the individual's own psychological makeup, his own ambitions, interests, and drives in political organizational life.[11]

The background of political activists produces two types of intervening factors which further help explain why this group is highly involved in politics. One intervening factor is the competence to operate easily in a political environment. Jacob has pointed out in detail the role certain occupations play in providing training in skills which are useful in politics.[12] They are also likely to place the individual in contact with the political environment, thus facilitating the development of political activity. Education also provides training which is valuable to the politician. The ability to conceptualize political issues and verbalize these conceptions is importantly related to educational achievement. The development of skills essential to political activity will also be facilitated if the child sees these skills practiced by members of his home environment. Thus, the political activity of parents contributes to the development of political competence in their children.

The background of political activists also produces attitudes which are important in explaining the involvement of this group in politics. Political efficacy (the feeling that one's actions can have an impact on the government) has been shown to be related to level of political activity. A recent study of this feeling of individual competence (called "subjective competence" by the authors) in five nations showed that subjective competence was related to the level of political activity of the individual.[13] Also, they found that the development of the feeling of subjective competence was directly related to educational and occupational achievement.

The duty to participate in politics is a second attitude which helps explain why some people are active and others are not. Almond and Verba found that a sense of obligation to participate in community life is more widespread in the United States than in any of the other four countries.[14] The more strongly one feels obliged to participate in politics the more likely he is to participate.[15] The belief that it is a part of the duty of a citizen to participate in the politics of his country is an important element of the democratic creed, and those from higher social background, who have had more education, are more likely to subscribe to the creed than are other members of the society.[16]

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[8] The high occupational status of the fathers of public officials has been amply documented by Donald R. Matthews. See his two books, *op. cit.*

[9] See Wahlke, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

[10] For a summary of this work, see Milbrath, *op. cit.*, pp. 72–89. In the main, the various scales relating to trait psychology, rather than psychoanalytic techniques, have been utilized in an effort to operationalize investigation of this factor.

[11] *Op. cit.*, p. 243.

[12] *Op. cit.*, p. 710. He says: "Occupation is the crucial social variable in our model. But counter to the assumptions of elite theories, political officials in the U.S. emerge from all levels of the social structure. Occupational role rather than status alone is the important factor. Certain occupations frequently place their practitioners into a bargaining role where they deal with outsiders (non-subordinates) and try to reach a mutually satisfying agreement. The lawyer is the classic example. . . . "

[13] See Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1963), Ch. 7.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

[15] Campbell, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

The strength of partisan commitment has been shown to be an important variable in explaining political participation.[17] Partisanship seems to be completely unrelated to social status. People of high social status do not seem to be either more or less committed to their political party than do people of low social status.[18] However, party identification is passed from parents to children in a quite striking fashion. It seems reasonable to assume that the same thing would be true of the strength of partisan commitment.

A fourth attitudinal variable which is importantly related to political participation is interest in politics. The more interested an individual is in politics the more likely he is to participate. Interest in politics has been shown to be related to both strength of partisanship and to the social background of the individual.[19]

Past studies of political leadership have clearly shown background characteristics on which political leaders differ from the population as a whole. These background characteristics produce the competence to operate easily in the work of politics as well as a set of attitudes which dispose the individual to take an active part in the political world. However, this is not enough to explain why some people are interested and active enough to become political officials and others are not. There are far more people who have all of these characteristics than there are people who actually hold political office. This larger group forms a pool from which political leadership is drawn.[20] Milbrath points out the apparent necessity of some extra push in moving an individual from one level of political participation to a higher one.

> There seems to be a kind of threshold that must be crossed before a person changes role; this is especially characteristic of transition from spectator to gladiator. A person needs an extra strong push from the environment (e.g., earnest solicitation from a friend) or needs to feel very strongly about an issue or a candidate before he will cross the threshold and become a political combatant. Once the threshold is crossed and the new team member integrated in his role, he usually participates in a wide repertoire of political acts.[21]

The final push from being interested in politics to holding office is the major concern of this paper. What is the nature of this final push for local party officials? By examining this question for local party officials we hope to provide further evidence of the existence of such a threshold and begin to systematically examine the nature of the stimuli which propel individuals across this threshold.

Not all of the suggested model can be tested in this study. The social and political background of the local party officials can be examined as well as their present occupation. Political competence is very difficult to test, but a minimal level of political competence can be assumed, given the fact that the individuals interviewed hold official positions in the party organizations. The attitudes mentioned cannot be examined, but based on the generalizations which have been established in the literature on political participation it is a fairly safe assumption that the party officials would score high on each of the attitudinal scales. It is possible to examine the factors which initiated the party officials' interest in politics, and to investigate the factors involved in their recruitment to office.

RECRUITMENT PATTERNS: FITTING DATA TO THE MODEL

The Backgrounds of Local Party Officials. As expected, more Republicans than Democrats come from families of white collar workers (see Table 1). The fathers of 53% of the Massachusetts Republicans and 43% of the North Carolina Republicans had white collar jobs. Only slightly fewer (37%) of the North Carolina Democrats came from white collar backgrounds, while the Massachusetts Democrats have the highest percentage coming from blue collar backgrounds.

The social status of the local party officials is significantly higher than their fathers'.[22] Eighty-seven percent of the Massachusetts Republicans and 83% of the North Carolina Republicans have white collar occupations. The North Carolina Democrats are again only

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[16] See V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), Ch. 13.

[17] Campbell, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

[18] George Robert Boynton, *Southern Republican Voting in the 1960 Election.* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of North Carolina, 1963), p. 21.

[19] Campbell, *et al. op. cit.*, p. 103.

[20] Jacob, *op. cit.*, p. 711.

[21] Milbrath, *op. cit.*, pp. 20–21.

[22] The slightly larger difference in the North Carolina communities probably reflect the relatively greater opportunity for increased white collar employment for the current generation there as compared to the Massachusetts communities.

TABLE 1. OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF THE LOCAL PARTY OFFICIALS AND OF THEIR FATHERS

	Percent Holding White Collar Occupations*			
	N.C. Reps.	N.C. Dems.	Mass. Reps.	Mass. Dems.
Party officials	83%	79%	87%	50%
Fathers of the party officials	43%	37%	53%	27%
Percentage point difference	40	42	34	23
N =	(34)	(41)	(40)	(23)

* Includes the following occupational categories: professional and technical; managers, officials, and proprietors; clerical and sales.

slightly lower (79% white collar) than the Republicans, and only 50% of the Massachusetts Democrats have white collar jobs. In contrast Eldersveld reports that 69% of the Republican precinct leaders hold white collar occupations, as opposed to only 43% of the Democrats in Wayne County, Michigan.[23]

Education, a second measure of social status, further illustrates the relatively high social status of the local party officials (see Table 2). One-fourth of the officials only have a high school education or less, but 40% have at least a college education and one-fifth have gone beyond the college degree in their education.[24]

Occupational role may be as important as social status in developing political competence and in recruitment. One important source of political activists is the profession of law. The lawyer must learn how to bargain, inspire confidence, and his occupation requires a high degree of the skills which, according to conventional wisdom, are important in a political career. Of the local party officials, 11% (thirteen) are lawyers. However, eight of the thirteen lawyers are North Carolina Democrats, while only three are Massachusetts Republicans, two are Massachusetts Democrats, and there are no lawyers among the North Carolina Republicans. There are, of course, occupations other than the law which may provide training in skills relevant to a political avocation. Jacob has provided a tentative listing of occupations which required a "brokerage" role.[25] He included such occupations as general practitioners, lawyers, newspapermen, auto dealers, fuel dealers, independent merchants, insurance salesmen, local union officials, undertakers, and others. Using the list Jacob developed, we can estimate the brokerage training provided in terms of these occupations (Table 3). Fifty-nine percent of the North Carolina Democrats and 50% of the Massachusetts Republicans work in jobs which provide training in political skills. The Massachusetts Democrats are third, with 39% involved in brokerage occupations, and the North Carolina Republicans are last. The overall difference in the status ranking and the brokerage occupations ranking, and particularly the difference for the North Carolina Republicans, illustrates the independence of status and brokerage role training. Eighty-three percent of the North Carolina Republicans have white collar jobs, which ranks them second in terms of social status, but only 24% are involved in jobs with brokerage roles, ranking them last. The North Carolina Republicans have drawn on accountants, engineers, and other professionals who have high social status, but who have little opportunity to exercise "political" skills in their profession.

Past studies have shown that political leaders tend to come from highly politicized family backgrounds. The local party officials were asked about the political activity of their family. Controlling for state locale, the Democrats were considerably more likely to have grown up in a family having one or more members politically active. The North Carolina Democrats have the largest number of officials coming from politically active families. The North Carolina Republicans and the Massachusetts Democrats fall in the middle (about 40% coming from politically active families), and the group with the fewest coming from

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[23] Eldersveld found less occupational status differential between precinct leaders and their fathers than we have found. See *op. cit.*, p. 52, Table 3.1.

[24] We found a higher portion of local party officials to have at least a college level education than Eldersveld found to be the case in Wayne County, Michigan (see *ibid.*). One plausible explanation is that political parties recruit among "safe groups" more in the five community locales of our study than in the metropolitan area of Detroit. See Eldersveld's discussion of the emphasis on groups who have "deviant potential" rather than emphasizing recruitment among "traditional safe groups" (*op. cit.*, p. 71).

This interpretation is supported by the findings of Marvick and Nixon. (See *op. cit.*, p. 203, Table 6.) They found approximately one third of the party campaign workers to be college graduates but they did not find the party officials making efforts to accumulate helpers among the "deviant potentials" in the fashion Eldersveld describes.

[25] *Op. cit.*, pp. 709–710.

TABLE 2. EDUCATION OF LOCAL PARTY OFFICIALS

	N.C. Reps.	N.C. Dems.	Mass. Rep.	Mass. Dem.	Total
College or more	44%	46%	38%	26%	40%
Some education beyond high school	47	27	33	35	35%
High school or less	9	27	28	39	25%
N =	(34)	(41)	(40)	(23)	(138)

TABLE 3. LOCAL PARTY OFFICIALS HOLDING BROKERAGE OCCUPATIONS

	N.C. Reps.	N.C. Dems.	Mass. Reps.	Mass. Dems.	Total
Involved in brokerage occupations	21%	59%	50%	39%	44%
N =	(34)	(41)	(40)	(23)	(138)

politically active backgrounds are the Massachusetts Republicans.

The background factors, which have been suggested as important components of a model of political recruitment, exist among a relatively large portion of these party officials. Many are of high social status, are highly educated, and come from highly politicized backgrounds. A considerable portion of the party officials hold occupational positions assumed to be conducive to the development of skills needed for success in politics. Tangential questions are suggested by these findings: Do differential social status, education, or politicization backgrounds make any difference in the role definitions which they hold of their party position? Do those engaged in "brokerage occupations" define their roles differently from those holding "non-brokerage" occupations?[26]

In terms of the oft-used "white-collar" and "blue-collar" dichotomy, occupational status for the party officials is unrelated to their definition of their roles.[27] The important dimension of occupational status seems to be mobility (see Table 5). The upwardly-mobile are clearly more campaign-oriented than the others. Although the number of cases are too small for safe generalization, the fact that almost half of those who are downwardly-mobile are primarily oriented toward party organizational

TABLE 4. POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF FAMILY OF LOCAL PARTY OFFICIALS

	N.C. Reps.	N.C. Dems.	Mass. Reps.	Mass. Dems.
One or more members of the family were politically active	38%	49%	28%	39%
N =	(34)	(41)	(40)	(23)

TABLE 5. THE RELATION OF THE LOCAL PARTY OFFICIALS' OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY TO THEIR ROLE DEFINITIONS

Role Definition	Upwardly-mobile[a]	Others	Total
	%	%	%
Campaign	72	46	59
Organization	24	33	28
Other[b]	4	21	13
N =	(71)	(67)	(138)

[a] Includes each local party official whose occupation is at least one status-level above that of his father.

[b] Includes ideological, nomination, or other primary role orientation.

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[26] Of course, other questions could be asked. For example: How are these variations associated with efficacy at party tasks? How are these variations associated with policy orientations? *Etc.* However, our data are not adequate to speak to these questions. We are convinced that further investigations into these and similar questions are desirable.

[27] The four basic role definitions are: campaign-related; party organizational; ideological; and nominations. These were assigned on the basis of the local party officials answers to this question: "How would you describe the job of being (current party office)—what are the most important things you do?"

For a longer discussion of the derivation and of the application of these role definitions, see "Activities and Role Definitions of Grassroots Party Officials," by Lewis Bowman and G. R. Boynton, *The Journal of Politics*, 28 (February, 1966), 121–143.

activities seems particularly suggestive in comparison with the strong campaign orientation of the upwardly-mobile aggregate. This indicates that the upwardly-mobile local party officials are concerned with winning elections, and presumedly moving ahead, rather than with clinging to the party organization and its activities at such a low level in the party hierarchy. Even stronger support for this interpretation is found when one examines the role definitions of those local party officials whose occupational status is two levels or more above their fathers'. These are even more campaign-oriented with less than one-fifth being oriented toward party organizational activities.[28]

The other background factors are not significantly related to the role definitions of the local party officials. The level of education and the level of political activity by members of the local party officials' families show only slight differences when associated with role definition.[29] Most surprising, however, is the fact that practically no variation in rόle definition occurs when one compares those engaged in "brokerage occupations" with those party officials engaged in "non-brokerage occupations."[30]

Initial Political Involvement. The local party officials were asked how they first got interested in doing something more in politics than just voting.[31] A number of reasons were given for their initial involvement in a highly active role in politics. The most frequently mentioned general reason (by 26% of the respondents) was that they were *asked* to take a more active part. Of these, almost one-half said that they were asked by their friends or relatives to take a more active role.

The second general reason most often mentioned was a concern with policy matters. Almost one-fourth of the respondents said that they were dissatisfied with present conditions, they wanted to see better government, or mentioned specific policies that had been of particular interest to them.

Direct party or campaign involvement was the third general reason most frequently mentioned (by 16% of the respondents) as leading to active participation. The party officials mentioned both attachment to political parties and interest in particular campaigns as the kind of political involvement which led to such participation.

"Interest in politics" is closely akin to political involvement as a reason for becoming active. Almost 10% of the local party officials found the excitement of campaigns and the related thrill of "politicking" to be a key factor in increasing their level of activity. Their high level of interest led quite naturally to their taking an active part in politics.

Two other specific reasons for initial involvement were given. Six percent of the respondents said they got involved because political activity would help their business. Five percent said their initial involvement was the result of their admiration of a political figure. Other scattered responses constituted 13% of the answers.

When analyzed by party groups in differing locales, several recruitment variations develop (see Table 6). The most striking variation is by those who give business as a reason for initial activist involvement in politics. Eight of the nine local party officials who gave this as a reason were North Carolina Democrats. More of the Massachusetts officials reported being asked to take an active role in politics and

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[28] This suggests that the idea of "marginality" has not been adequately explored as an explanatory factor in analyzing recruitment to political leadership. See the work of James C. Davies, *Human Nature in Politics* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963), especially pp. 85–94, 287–288, 345–348, for an interesting discussion of extreme examples of marginality as a factor in leadership recruitment.

[29] It should be reported that our data generally support the contention that the dominant party attracts the "best people" (in socio-economic terms). The variations are not very large. however. For support for this hypothesis, see Patterson, *op. cit.*, p. 337ff.

[30] In view of the recent work of Heinz Eulau and John D. Sprague, this is less surprising than one might have thought earlier. They found no significant differences between lawyers (the prime brokerage occupation) and non-lawyers in politics: see their book, *Lawyers in Politics* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1964). They pointed out, "*Preoccupation with real or alleged dysfunctional consequences* of the lawyer's ubiquity in politics has had the effect of orienting research toward analysis of differences rather than of similarities in the behavior of the politician who is a lawyer and the politician who is not" *ibid.*, p. 123.

[31] One must be careful in interpreting this kind of data because it requires the respondent to recall circumstances of earlier periods in his life. Nevertheless, this is almost the only way to collect this important data in a systematic fashion. But it must be kept in mind that these are the "recollections" of the local party officials rather than their feelings at the time they were first interested in active political participation. (See the warning about the use of this kind of data in Jacob, *op. cit.*, p. 713.)

TABLE 6. REASONS FOR INITIAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT BEYOND VOTING

	N.C. Rep.	N.C. Dem.	Mass. Rep.	Mass. Dem.
Was Asked	22%	20%	31%	30%
Concern with policy	30	23	24	20
Party and/or campaign involvement	27	14	10	15
Like politics	11	14	4	10
Business reasons	0	18	12	0
Admire political figure	0	2	8	15
Other	10	9	21	10
	—	—	—	—
	100%	100%	100%	100%
N =	(34)	(41)	(40)	(23)

seven of the eight officials who report admiration for a political figure as a primary reason for involvement are from Massachusetts. The North Carolina Republicans indicate a greater concern with policy matters, and a disproportionate number of them say that prior political involvement prompted them to become active.

Whether the initial political involvement was self-generated or from influences outside the party official seems to have no association with their role definitions. This finding is in line with recent work which has cast some doubt on the earlier assumptions scholars held about the direct relationship between initial political involvement and political careers. For example, Kenneth Prewitt[32] has reported that discontinuity existed between initial political interest and policy decisions by city councilmen in the San Francisco Bay area. Even though Prewitt was concerned with "early" or "late" starting, whereas our concern here is with "self-generated" political interest as opposed to initial interest by "outside influences," it seems to follow that the happenings at the point of recruitment to office may be of greater significance in policy and role definitions than earlier career events.

Variations do occur in sources of initial political involvement according to party and locale. As shown in Table 7, the local party officials in the two North Carolina communities indicate a disproportionate share of outside influence was involved in getting them to participate politically beyond the mere act of voting.

Recruitment to Party Office. After asking how they first got involved in politics, the party officials were asked about the circumstances of their first election to party office. Why did they first decide to run? Sixty percent of the local party officials report that they were recruited by the political party for their present position. (This happened to a larger portion of the Massachusetts party officials than in the North Carolina party officials.) Of all the party officials, 11% report that other groups such as unions, business organizations, and others asked them to seek the position. This is true of a larger percentage of the North Carolina

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[32] See his paper, "Career Patterns of Local Elected Officials," delivered at the American Political Science Association meeting in Chicago, 1964.

TABLE 7. SOURCES OF INITIAL POLITICAL INTEREST

Source of Interest	N.C. Reps.	N.C. Dems.	Mass. Reps.	Mass. Dems.	Total
Outside influence	62%	54%	42%	44%	51%
Self-generated	29	34	40	30	34
Other	9	12	18	26	15
	—	—	—	—	—
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N =	(34)	(41)	(40)	(23)	(138)

TABLE 8. THE RECRUITMENT OF LOCAL PARTY OFFICIALS

	N.C. Reps.	N.C. Dems.	Mass. Reps.	Mass. Dems.	Total
Asked by the party	59%	51%	69%	67%	60%
Self-recruited	35	26	27	33	29
For personal gain	(4)	(3)	(12)	(13)	(6)
For the good of the party	(31)	(23)	(15)	(20)	(23)
Asked by other groups	6	23	4	0	11
	—	—	—	—	—
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N =	(34)	(41)	(40)	(23)	(138)

TABLE 9. RECRUITMENT PATTERNS TO LOCAL PARTY OFFICE

Source of recruitment	N.C. Reps.	N.C. Dems.	Mass. Reps.	Mass. Dems.	Total
Outside influence	62%	70%	45%	44%	57%
Self-generating forces	32	25	18	17	23
Other*	6	5	37	39	20
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N =	(34)	(41)	(40)	(23)	(138)

* Includes "accidental involvement," other vague or uncodeable responses, and single answers.

Democrats than of the other three aggregates. Only 29% of the party officials say that they were self-recruited to office. North Carolina Republicans have the largest percentage who say that they were self-recruited for the good of the party. The party organization is developing there and a higher percentage say that they have joined the organization in order to bolster it.

Eldersveld[33] has subsumed the sources of political recruitment for party work at the precinct level under three main categories: "outside influences," "self-generating forces," and "accidental involvement." Although the comparisons are not exact (due to coding and other variations), the distribution of the recruitment patterns to party office which he found in Wayne County, Michigan, and those we found for the total sample from the five North Carolina and Massachusetts study sites are in the same directions (see Table 9). For example, in Wayne County, Michigan, 56% of the precinct leaders were recruited by outside influences (such as friends, political clubs, etc.). We found 57% giving this as their channel of recruitment. However, we found significant variations between the recruitment channels of the North Carolina aggregates and the Massachusetts aggregates. Many of the Massachusetts party officials maintained that they had come by the party office through default of others to run, or because they were "as good as others holding the posts," *etc.* In Eldersveld's terminology this is "accidental involvement," and when one finds relatively large numbers following this recruitment pattern, the relative unimportance of organizational effects, as compared to individual influences, is probably being underscored.

It seems quite clear, also, that the majority party accumulates a disproportionate share of those local party officials coming into the job through impetus of outside influences (see Table 10). This may be because of more efficient organization on the part of the majority party, or it may be due to its more extensive membership.

Those local party officials who come to party work because of outside influences are more likely to define their primary role in terms of campaign activities (Table 11). This indicates, perhaps, that the majority party accumulates a disproportionate share of the party officials for campaign purposes.

DISCUSSION

In order to develop a conceptual scheme for understanding the recruitment of local party officials, we thought of general political participation as being divided into four levels: no

TABLE 10. THE RELATION OF RECRUITMENT PATTERNS TO THE MAJORITY-MINORITY PARTY DIFFERENTIATION

Recruitment Pattern	Majority Party	Minority Party
Outside influence	63%	49%
Self-starting	23	24
Other	14	27
	100%	100%
N =	(73)	(65)

TABLE 11. THE RELATION OF THE LOCAL PARTY OFFICIALS' RECRUITMENT PATTERN TO THEIR ROLE DEFINITIONS

Role definitions	Recruitment Patterns			
	Outside influence	Self-generating	Other	Total
Campaign	67%	56%	43%	59%
Organizational	26	32	32	28
Other	7	12	25	13
	100%	100%	100%	130%
N =	(78)	(32)	(28)	(138)

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[33] *Op. cit.*, p. 127, Table 6.2. (Our categories include comparable items as outlined by Edersveld in this table.)

participation; only passive participation; quite active participation, but short of being elected to or assuming party or public office; and holding party or public offices. Although our concern was with local party officials—persons categorized in the last, and most active, of the participatory levels—we assumed that part of the explanation of political activism could be found in those factors which are associated with the various levels of political participation among the general population. The model which we developed, and the data which we related to it, sought in a tentative and exploratory way to get at very basic questions: why do politically active people assume positions in local party organizations? What finally triggers such active political involvement?

Certainly several background factors are likely to predispose individuals toward becoming political activists. The social status of the individual and the political "training" which his occupation affords are likely to facilitate, or diminish, skills in interpersonal relationships as well as produce a set of attitudes, more or less, conducive to political activism. Our data (and comparable data) indicate that even local party officials are drawn from higher social backgrounds and more active political backgrounds than are the averages for these two factors in the individual communities of each leader aggregate. But many people possessing the same social and political backgrounds have not become political activists. Without using a control group, which would have been helpful, we have investigated this phenomenon by asking the party officials in five communities about their perceptions of the recruitment factors relating to their rise to official party positions. They were able to recall a number of factors, ranging from admiration for a current political figure to extreme ideological concern about public policy. Almost three-fourths, however, thought the triggering mechanism had involved situations in which some politically active group or individual asked them to seek or to fill a local party position. Thus, the major stimulus to party office holding was external. Many persons in each of the five communities undoubtedly possessed quite similar social and political correlates but did not assume or compete for party posts because external stimuli did not give them a final push across the threshold.

This finding supports that plausible hypothesis, which is oft-asserted in leadership literature: if adequate educational levels and occupational skills are represented among the population of a community, then the proportion of potential political activists actually involved in political activities at a given time depends on the openness of the leadership recruitment system of that particular community. Our data support this hypothesis, illustrating that the nature of a community's politics is an intervening factor between the social and political background variables and actual activist participation. In one of the communities we studied (Greensboro, North Carolina), the Republicans had no long history of adequate party organization. In their recent drive for more active party leaders, the Greensboro Republicans made a point of recruiting "bright, young articulate" business types, who wanted to get ahead fast. Except for the nature of party politics in the community at that moment, it seems unlikely that such a specific drive for upward-mobiles would have occurred. Except for this situation, they probably would have gravitated to the majority party, or have invested their energies in other than political forms of activism. This in turn, illustrates the differential intervention of the community factor, and the interplay between it and individual social background variables.

The important social background factor may not be that preponderance of occupations involving brokerage skills—as has often been assumed to occur under all circumstances of leadership recruitment. Rather than occupations per se being the important social background factor, occupational marginality may be the critical factor. These persons are marginal in the sense that they have moved at least two rungs up the occupational ladder above their fathers' occupations. They are looking for fast avenues to success—in politics as much as in business. Hence, we found that they tended to be self-starting as well as more campaign-oriented. This may have been both because they were interested in winning, and because of the selective process of recruitment used by the minority party in securing their services. It is likely that other comparative studies in differing political cultures will show that upwardly-mobiles are attracted into politics in disproportionate numbers in areas where, and when, politics is unusually competitive and salient. This should be true in very competitive two-party situations or where a long-standing minority party is actually challenging an entrenched but embattled majority party. Relatedly, in communities where relatively "closed" recruitment systems dominant the political landscape—whether because of one-partyism or excessively dominant factional control within each party in a two party situation—persons embodying the social and political correlates associated with the highest level of political activism will not be encouraged to seek party or public offices because wider cooptation of potentially activist elites will be considered unnecessary.

A SURVEY STUDY OF HAWAIIAN JUDGES: THE EFFECT ON DECISIONS OF JUDICIAL ROLE VARIATIONS*

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Contrary to some belief,[1] there are some, and possibly many, conditions under which survey research techniques can be put to use in the study of judicial decision-making. The present note reports on the successful use of such a technique in the collection and analysis of data drawn directly from the judicial bench of the State of Hawaii. In this case the plan to utilize survey techniques arose out of consideration of a problem that has plagued students of judicial decision-making from the beginning, i.e., the problem of getting direct information about those judicial attitudes and orientations which might reasonably be expected to function as determinants of judicial decisions.

In an earlier study of the impact of judicial role orientation upon judicial decision-making, I tried to handle the problem of taking independent measures of actual judicial attitudes and orientations which could then be related to judicial decisions.[2] My approach at the time was to use accessible and measurable law students as stand-ins for actual judges. In contrast to this approach most of the political "judicial behavioralists," while collecting data on actual functioning judges, do not attempt to solve the problem in any way. For these scholars continue to reason tautologically from information contained mainly in judicial votes and secondarily in judicial opinions, leaving us with such essential conclusions, in effect, as: "conservative" decisions are made by "conservative" judges, etc.[3] Who is to say which is the worst procedure: the "judicial behavioralists," which collects irrelevant data from relevant persons; or my own, which collects relevant data from irrelevant persons?

Despite advice to the contrary, I decided to try my hand at direct surveys of a judiciary, i.e., the one closest at hand. My intent was to maximize both the rate of return and the validity of the results. What follows is a description of the technique employed and the results of the research in which it was used.

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

A major purpose of the study was to measure several aspects of potential judicial role orientations which previous work has suggested was pertinent to understanding judicial decision-making.

Judges are all supposed to handle legal precedent in some way and to some extent in various types of cases and under varying circumstances and phases of litigation. This expectation would probably be one major element judges believe to comprise part of their role. Some other elements have been theorized to be: (1) what the public needs, as the times may demand; (2) what the public demands; (3) the decision-maker's view of justice in the particular case; (4) common sense; (5) a highly respected lawyer, *qua* advocate; and (6) a highly respected lawyer, as an esteemed and/or influential member of the community.

Since these six factors are those which jurisprudents, jurists, lawyers, and political scientists believe judges consider influential in their role as judicial decision-makers, they were incorporated as questionnaire items presented to the judges.

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* The author wishes to acknowledge the financial assistance rendered by the University of Hawaii Faculty Committee on Research. Other invaluable assistance was rendered by Robert S. Cahill, Marshall N. Goldstein, Michael Haas, Werner Levi, John Turner and Lucille Takesue. Also, many thanks to those judges of the Hawaiian bench who cooperated in this study. Their cooperation was essential and their motivations in the best tradition of an enlightened judiciary of a democratic society.

[1] "One who would study leadership on a collegial court faces at the outset, what are clearly substantial obstacles. The purple curtain that hides much of the doings of courts of law is no accident." S. S. Ulmer, "Leadership in the Michigan Supreme Court," in Glendon Schubert (ed.), *Judicial Decision-Making* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963), p. 13. There have been several studies where judges have been successfully polled. See my "Surveys and Judiciaries, or Who's Afraid of the Purple Curtain?" *Law and Society Review* 1 (Fall, 1966).

[2] Theodore L. Becker, *Political Behavioralism and Modern Jurisprudence* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).

[3] Among the most recent additions to this literature are: Glendon Schubert, *The Judicial Mind* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965); "Jackson's Judicial Philosophy: An exploration in Value Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, 59 (December, 1965), 940–963.

The judges were first asked:

> "How influential do you believe the following factors to be in your deciding a case?"

They were then instructed:

> "Please circle one number from 4 to 0 in the space to the right of each specific factor. The numbers stand for the following:
>
> 4 = Extremely influential
> 3 = Very influential
> 2 = Influential
> 1 = Not too influential at all
> 0 = Uninfluential"

Thus, the rating sheet read as follows:

"(a) highly respected advocate (as a lawyer) 4 3 2 1 0
(b) my view of justice in the case 4 3 2 1 0
(c) what the public needs, as the times may demand 4 3 2 1 0
(d) precedent, when clear and directly relevant 4 3 2 1 0
(e) common sense 4 3 2 1 0
(f) highly respected advocate (as a member of the community) 4 3 2 1 0
(g) what the public demands 4 3 2 1 0
(h) other (please specify): place a 4, 3, 2, 1, 0 after each such factor"

This questionnaire seems to be one way to discover and quantify specific variations in individual perceptions of judicial roles.

The significance of measuring differences in judicial role variations, however, can only come in how that variable operates (if at all) in interaction with other theoretically critical variations, for instance, the clarity of precedent and the direction of any predisposition to decision (attitude).

My index for clear precedent in this study was almost exactly the same as that used in the original law student study.[4] Respondents were asked to decide a hypothetical case, *Charney v. Mercy Hospital*. The case was rated by four law professors from the University of Michigan and Wayne State University as one in which the precedential guidelines were extremely clear; it involved a suit against a hospital claiming damages for the negligence of a nurse operating within the scope of her employment.

The operations for determining and measuring the direction of the judges' personal predispositions for deciding such a case as *Charney* were precisely the same as in the earlier study. A hybrid open/closed-ended type questionnaire was employed, and this was particularly effective in the last two questions for determining the *personal* predispositions of respondents in cases involving nurses' negligence and hospitals' liability. The last two questions ask the respondents quite directly who should be liable: the hospital? the nurse? or both?

It was hypothesized (quite correctly) that the great majority of judges would have a decisional propensity to decide for a claimant against a hospital. In other words, it is the "enlightened" juridical view in the United States that hospitals should not be immune from liability in any situation where any other corporation and/or association would be liable. And, since corporations are indeed legally responsible for the negligence of their employees committed in the course of their employment, so should hospitals be liable for the torts of nurses committed in the course of their duties. I assumed that almost all modern judges would entertain this "sound view of the law" as their own *personal* view. I was correct insofar as Hawaiian judges are concerned.

On the other hand, the hypothetical *Charney* case was constructed to hold that *the hospital should be absolved from liability*. Thus, the design was set to see under what conditions, if any, respondents would make "objective decisions" in deciding a dispute before them in the role of a supreme court justice of their state. The basic fact I wished to describe was the number of judges who would *adhere to clear precedent which dictated that they come to a decision contrary to their own personal opinions* (this is simply my definition of objective decision). With this information, other background and career data elicited on the questionnaires, and data from the earlier pilot study, hypotheses could be tested in relationship to the following questions: what factors are correlated with variation in objectivity (objective vs. subjective decision)—(1) variation in conception of judicial role? (2) law students vs. judges? (3) difference in level of court in which judge currently sits? (4) social background factors? (5) other background factors?

This paper will discuss the findings related only to hypotheses involved in the first question. This is because this type of study is still mainly exploratory and because of the fact that not enough data have been gathered for an adequate analysis of the latter three questions. In other words, Hawaii has a very small judiciary.

FINDINGS

The three major hypotheses which were put to test were:

1. Judges who consider the existence of clear, directly relevant precedent to be the single

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[4] Becker, *op. cit.*, Chapter 3.

TABLE 1. JUDICIAL ROLE VARIATION AND OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE DECISIONS

Role Elements	*Objective Decisions* N =7							*Subjective Decisions* N =15														
Judge	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	J	K	L	M	N	P	Q	R	S	T	V	W	X	Y
Judge Role Code	**	†	**	**	**		†	#/†	**	†	#/†	†	**		†	†	#/†	#/†		†	†	#/†
(a) highly respected advocate (as a lawyer)	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	0	1	1	1	2	2	④	2	1	0	0	2	1
(b) my view of justice in the case	3	④	2	2	3	④	④	④	1	④	2	3	1	③	3	④	④	④	②		3	④
(c) what the public needs, as the times may demand	2	④	1	2	2	3	2	2	0	2	2	3	0	1	2	④	2	2	0		3	④
(d) precedent, when clear and directly relevant	④	④	④	③	④	④	④	3	④	④	3	④	④	③	④	④	3	3	②	④	④	2
(e) common sense	3	④	3	2	2	3	④	④	2	3	④	④	2	③	④	④	2	3	②	④	④	④
(f) highly respected advocate (*as member of community*)	1	0	0	2	2	3	1	2	0	0	1		1	1	0	3	2	1	0	0	0	0
(g) what the public demands	1		0	1	1	2	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	0		0	2

KEY

4 =extremely influential; 3 =very influential; 2 =influential; 1 =not too influential at all; 0 =uninfluential.

The numbers enclosed within a circle (○) are those ratings which were either singly or modally believed by the judge to be the most influential factor(s).

The judge rating code is as follows:

** Those judges who believed the existence of clear, directly relevant precedent to be the single, most important factor. (See Hyp. 1) A, C, D, E, J, N

#/† Those judges who believed some other factor(s) than clear, directly relevant precedent to be the most important factor(s). (See Hyp. 2) H, L, S, T, Y

† Those judges who considered personal factors (his view of justice; his common sense) to be extremely influential (a rating of 4) factors affecting the judicial decision (whether in conjunction with a 4 rating on clear precedent or not). (See Hyp. 3) B, G, K, M, Q, R, W, X

most important factor in influencing judicial decisions are more likely to make objective decisions than judges who do not.

2. Judges who do not consider clear, directly relevant precedent to be either solely the most or modally a most influential factor are more likely to decide subjectively than judges who do.
3. Judges who consider personal considerations (his view of justice; his common sense) to be extremely influential factors affecting judicial decision-making, whether in conjunction with clear, directly relevant precedent or not, are more likely to decide subjectively than judges who do not.

Thirty judges were solicited, and 26 replied. Of the 26, a total of 22 filled out the questionnaire in a manner suitable for coding. Three, whose responses could not be used, hold the opinion initially that hospitals should not be held liable. Hence, it was impossible to rate their decisions as either objective or subjective as I defined those terms. At any rate, the small size of the population studied limited the statistics available for analysis of the data. Since this is the case, I believe it best to set out in detail the entire profile of judicial role variation of the Hawaiian judiciary in relationship to the type of decisions they rendered (see Table 1).

Table 1 can be viewed as one might observe a bar graph. It shows that of the 22 judges who replied and whose responses were codable (these judges are represented by the capital letters A through Y), 68% (15) decided subjectively and 32% (7) decided objectively. Table 1 also demonstrates visually that these judges have concepts of decision-making role that vary over a wide range of possibilities. Note, for instance, that Judge R sees his role as being equally and intensely determined by 5 factors, while Judge D believes that 1 factor is predominant—and that not too intensely. Note also that judges do not consider factors (f) and (g) to be very important in judicial decision-making. The mean in both these categories is below 1, i.e., it is less than "not too influential."

On the other hand, whether the judge decided the *Charney* case objectively or subjectively, factor (d)—"precedent, when clear and directly relevant"—is considered to be the single most important factor (78%). Moreover, factor (e)—"common sense"—is considered far more important by the subjective decision-makers than by those who decided objectively. Note also that 10 out of 11 (91%) of those judges who considered "common sense" to be the single or modally most important influence or factor in judicial decision-making decided subjectively.

TABLE 2. HIGH PRECEDENT ORIENTATION, OTHER ROLE VARIATIONS AND THE JUDICIAL DECISION (Hypothesis 1)

	N	Objective Decision	Subjective Decision
Judges Highly Precedent Oriented (Note: **)	6	67% (4)	33% (2)
Judges Who Stress Factors Other Than Precedent	16 — 22	23% (3)	77% (13)

The data in Tables 2 through 4 are organized in relationship to the hypotheses. The simple comparison of percentages in these three tables indicates that the results of the study are consistent with all three hypotheses. In other words, it would appear that the findings substantially support the proposition that a judge's view that precedent is an extremely important (if not the main) factor in judicial decision-making will be related to a degree of objectivity we could expect from that judge when he is confronted by clear precedent. On the other hand, a perception by a judge that precedent, in contrast with other more personal factors, is not a very influential factor, will probably be related to a subsequent subjective decision on his part.

The data, when placed in the fourfold context of Tables 2, 3, and 4, suggest various other types of statistical analysis. Some of these are tests of significance of differences and are thus, at least superficially, of greater prestige in the social sciences in testing hypotheses than the simple comparison of percentages. However, given the extremely small numbers here, the only valid reason for employing any of these techniques would be to illustrate their usage. Although the necessary computations of these techniques happen to demonstrate significance in the specific distributions in the tables, a detailed report would imply a substantive value they cannot carry. Suffice it to say at this point that the study of the Hawaiian judiciary utilizing this design and this methodology should surely encourage similar future probes of an expanded judicial population.

TABLE 3. NON-PRECEDENT ORIENTATION AND THE JUDICIAL DECISION (Hypothesis 2)

	N	Objective Decision	Subjective Decision
Judges Who Exclude Precedent as a Leading Influential Factor (Note: †)	5	0% (0)	100% (5)
Judges Who Include Precedent as a Leading Influential Factor	17 — 22	41% (7)	59% (10)

TABLE 4. PERSONAL FACTOR EXTREMELY INFLUENTIAL AND THE JUDICIAL DECISION (Hypothesis 3)

	N	Objective Decision	Subjective Decision
Judges Who Rank Personal Factors as Extremely Influential (With and without Equal Rank for Precedent) (Note: †)	14	21% (3)	79% (11)
Judges Who do not Give Extreme Rank to Personal Factors	8 — 22	50% (4)	50% (4)

CONCLUSION

A "real life" attempt at disconfirmation of several hypotheses developed in an earlier quasi-experimental exploration of the judicial decision-making process has at least initially been rejected. In other words, the propositions that allege that judicial role (particularly in terms of clear precedent-orientation) exists and that it functions toward "objectifying" the judicial process retain possible verity. Moreover, the suggestion that the judicial role is a complex factor varying greatly from judge to judge has found substantial empirical support from this survey of the Hawaiian bench. And that this variation seems to be related to differences in decision-making appears to be a refined hypothesis which justifies further study.

The social scientific examination into the complexities of the judicial decision-making process has barely commenced. It is no shame that we are only now at the stage of hypothesis formulation and technique development. The first toddles are always the shakiest. It is sad but true that in our field the empirically verified "great strides" are still a long way away.

COMMUNICATIONS

RIGIDITY AND FLEXIBILITY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE PUBLICATIONS: ON RESEARCH REPORTS AND NON-BOOKS

To the Editor:

I have recently reviewed *The Electoral Process* (Prentice Hall, 1966), edited by M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler. It is a collection of thirteen articles ranging in their quality from good to excellent. They are written by able, well-trained, mainly young, social scientists. The contributors all know the literature of American politics; they know many of the important questions and have a keen sense of the demands and tactics of the search for answers. They are, without exception, scholars who have been journeymen in the field, and no hint of professorial dustiness or "impracticality" attaches to their work. All the articles have general (but different) middle-level theoretical foci around which the empirical data are marshalled, and they deserve praise.

Reading these very valuable research reports was the occasion for reflection on the adequacy of the publishing arts for channeling current research to scholars and teachers. The question is: How do we most efficiently make available to other researchers and to classroom teachers the ever expanding knowledge about things political?

The answer is that there are two basic forms: books, and articles. And there are two hybrid forms; monographs, and books of readings, The hybrid forms are unsatisfactory because neither serves *both* the research and teaching function—the monograph is a vehicle for communication among research scholars. The book of readings is a vehicle for the teaching function—or that was presumably its origin.

I take it that the current flood of books of readings is not so much a response to a pedagogical demand, as it is a consequence of publishing and book-buying economics. Book production costs being what they are, and college libraries being as many and affluent as they are, the publishers find they can make a little profit on as few as 2,000 sales, perhaps, and they are almost guaranteed 2,000 sales to college libraries and random interested scholars. It is nearly impossible to lose money on a book of readings.

Tie these economics to the dynamics of faculty promotion and professional reputation and you get what we are getting—a flood of readings books. Academic entrepreneurs realize that, while a book of readings is not quite a book in the eyes of their scholarly peers, this distinction fades where promotions are made, namely among the chairmen and deans who believe that a book is a book is a book. Thus associate and full professorships are achieved by the reprint route, or with the assistance of ten or a dozen of one's brethren around the country whose back is mutually scratched because a "chapter in a book" is a smidgeon above a "journal article" in the places where honor and glory are evaluated.

But is this symbiosis of publisher-entrepreneur-collaborator functional for the research needs of a discipline and for the teaching needs of a profession? I submit it is not as useful as possible alternatives. First, despite appearances, journal articles probably have more lasting accessibility: for books go out of print, and articles do not. Furthermore, journal articles are indexed widely and often abstracted, but a chapter in a book is buried there unless one happens to see a publisher's blurb giving the table of contents.

But, if we insist on books of readings, let me suggest what might be done to improve them. Let me also suggest other possible patterns for making material available to researchers and teachers.

We could improve books of readings by (1) planning them as wholes, (2) impressing upon them painstaking editing with interpretations and analyses drawing out the commonalities of the separate contributions, and (3) providing a general and detailed index. Contrast the Jennings-Zeigler volume with another recent volume, *Politics in The American States*, on these points. Jacob and Vines, in their Foreword to *Politics in the American States*, describe their efforts to build into that book some common focus, some comparability of data, and some agreement on levels and techniques of analysis. That foreward needs to be read and reread by editors and publishers.

I suggest that Jacob and Vines might even have gone farther. Why, for instance, could not all authors have read and commented on the drafts of all other authors? Would it be expensive to buy their time to do so (and I believe we *should* pay them for it)? Of course, but we are wealthy now, and hole-and-corner, crust-of-bread scholarship will not do. Would it violate the traditions enshrined in acknowledgments that say, with the modest cant of the ages, "I alone am responsible for what follows?" That tradition we should certainly *not* violate if we are trying to build—to take the authors of chapters 2–5 of the Jacob-Vines volume—a Milbrath, or a Ranney, or a Zeigler, or a Dye, science of politics. But if we are trying to build an everybody's science of politics then some of the postures and pretensions of the past need to be abandoned.

On the whole, the Jacob-Vines "book of readings" is as advanced as the Jennings-Zeigler "book of readings" is primitive. To be sure, the Jennings-Zeigler book jacket promises editorial orchestration of the contents. Prentice Hall tells the naive: "The major dimensions of the electoral process—voting behavior, compaigning and strategies, and contextual and contiguency factors—form the three governing concepts of the structure of this book." They say, furthermore: "Divided into eight general subtopics, the contents of this work offer detailed examinations of local politics and decision making, congressional politics, specific instances of applied strategies (including resources employed), abstract and generalized notions of strategies, subcultural variations, comparative and cross-polity analysis, dynamic processes (including longitudinal analysis), and formal models of behavior."

Whew! It sounds like nothing more than a beginning student at a college of education spewing out all the "good-guy" words from Rousseau, Dewey, Russell, Skinner, and Mrs. Grundy, to impress the graduate student who is his quiz instructor. Or, perhaps more accurately, it sounds like Hamlet's nonsense to Polonius, for it has little relation to reality. The fact is that the Jennings-Zeigler volume is not a book. It has no structure, no development, no general argument, and no discernible substantive editing. Again, the articles are without exception well done and valuable. But putting 13 good articles between hard covers does not make a book.

My second suggestion to publishers and editors recognizes this very point, that a collection of articles is not necessarily a book. To realize the most value from these good separate research reports they should be *published* separately. Why not simply a research reports series, each article to be published as a separate and to be available for bookstore and direct mail purchase? The Bobbs Merrill reprint series might be the prototype format here. Many of the reports issued for the first time in such a way might in fact be used in connection with (or even, to be frank, as substitutes for) the older items in the reprint series. The flexibility of an "original separates series" (to give it a generic name off the top of the head) would recommend it to the undergraduate teacher for purchase as collateral reading in basic courses or for his own matching and mixing in upper division courses, to the graduate teacher for assignments and special collections for more mature students, and to all research scholars according to their special interests.

For example, David Greenstone's excellent piece, "Party Pressure on Organized Labor in Three Cities," might well be assigned to students in American Government courses, in parties courses, in pressure group courses, and in a wide number of graduate courses dealing with American politics. Similarly, the articles by Philip Converse ("The Problems of Party Distances in Models of Voting Change"), and that by Robert Agger ("Panel Studies of Comparative Community Political Decision-Making: Dynamics of Urban Renewal"), would be of use to sociologists and survey researchers as well as to political scientists in advanced undergraduate and graduate courses.

Some difficulties might be posed by an original separates series in political science. (Why not in the other social sciences as well? My impression is that the psychologists have used separates for research communication quite widely.) Libraries and bookstores might object on technical and procedural grounds of difficulty of handling. But librarians and bookstore managers are notoriously unreceptive to innovations in style and use of materials, and may have to be encouraged to improve their ways. The publishers are perhaps the key to the suggestions made here. But if these criticisms and recommendations have merit might they not be persuaded also?

Bernard C. Hennessy
Pennsylvania State University

To the Editor:

We welcome the opportunity to comment on Professor Hennessy's letter since he chose *The Electoral Process* as an example of a practice he questions. While there is considerable merit in his general plea for flexibility, several criticisms can be made of his specific remarks. In the first place, he overlooks the clear distinction between the true "book of readings," which is a collection of reprints, and the book of essays, which contains primarily original material. The distinction exists not only in terms of "a cut and paste job" versus recruitment, organization, and editing. There is an even more fundamental difference. In the case of reprint collections nothing new is added to our store of knowledge, even though accessibility and convenience may be increased. In the case of original works, increments do occur. Professor Hennessy seems to assume that all the pieces in our book, or in comparable books, would have seen the light of day regardless of whether the book had been undertaken. Actually, some might never have been written without a spur. Occasional contributions were not suitable for journal form, either because of their length or the particular audience they were trying to reach. Others surely would have appeared, but even these might have struck different notes if prepared for other publication routes. Because of these contingencies, many of Professor Hennessy's criticisms are irrelevant for a book comprised of original essays, of which *The Electoral Process* is an example.

Some of Professor Hennessy's specific arguments simply reflect his own guesses about the academic world. Take the charge that books of readings are mainly a response to publishing and book-buying economics rather than pedagogic demands. This is at the very least a debatable assertion. The break-even point for a book assumes different sizes, dependent upon many variables—including the publisher's representative to whom one is talking. Whatever the figure, it should be roughly the same for "original" books also. Contrary to his cynical views, our reading of the profession indicates that a number of collections with which we are familiar were assembled primarily on the premise of pedagogical utility.

At another point Professor Hennessy intimates that departmental chairmen and deans do not share the same sharp awareness of one's peers that a book of readings is not the same as other kinds of books. We submit that the demarcation is quite clear in academia, even—perhaps particularly—among departmental chairmen. We also wonder if a chapter in a book really does count for more than an article in a leading journal. In our own case, two potential authors indicated a preference for journal publication because of its greater prestige. At any rate, Professor Hennessy presents no evidence on any of the foregoing issues, which leads us to the suggestion that some hard, empirical data on the uses and abuses of various kinds of published materials might be in order before casual judgments are rendered.

Professor Hennessy enumerates the virtues of the single piece, virtues we would not deny. On the other side, books containing individual pieces are considerably more convenient for both the teacher and the student, particularly the undergraduate. University libraries are hard on students, and vice versa. Try distributing journal articles in one or two bound volumes in the reserve room among some 50 to 100 students. Furthermore, the multiple uses of the separately published piece are no less possible for the piece if it appears in a collection. Indeed, a potential for multiple use was one of the guidelines used in our solicitation plans.

We regret that Professor Hennessy has chosen to compare *The Electoral Process* unfavorably with *Politics in the American States.* Certainly we would not gainsay the merits of the latter work, particularly since one of us contributed to it and both have used it to advantage in the classroom. On the other hand, *Politics in the American States* is essentially a multi-authored textbook, while ours and similar books are symposia designed for supplementary reading in the classroom and specialized reading by scholars. By its very nature a text must have somewhat more structure and appendages. But we do not wish to quarrel with Professor Hennessy about an admirable book. We merely wish he would employ appropriate criteria for books having different purposes.

Why Professor Hennessy chose to pick on the jacket description as a prologue to a particularly sarcastic and misleading statement we can only ponder. Does a social scientist receive his intellectual nourishment from book jackets or books? Does he review book jackets or books? Does he assign his students book jackets or books? In reality, like most editors of symposia we have not promised the reader overarching structure, smooth development, or a general argument. We have promised, rather, a number of essays on particular aspects of the electoral process. We suggest that Professor Hennessy reread our Preface for further enlightenment on the objectives of the book. As for the gratuitous comment about "no discernible substantive editing" we simply ask: without having been privy to the work which went into *The Electoral Process,* how can he possibly know what editing occurred?

We think it ridiculous to argue over whether *The Electoral Process* and works of that genre are books. Whether he wishes it so or not, pieces of paper containing information and assembled in a bound volume have the properties of a book. The ultimate test is whether the publication is useful, and not whether it fits someone's own definition of "book." It seems unbecoming for one who is supporting alternative modes to adopt a position which limits the possibilities inherent in the medium.

The need for flexibility and maximum utility in political science publications is important. There is absolutely no reason why entrepreneurs cannot attempt the introduction of something like an "original separates series." Being advocates of variety we would certainly not object to this or other proposed innovations in publishing vehicles. Hopefully, Professor Hennessy will be as tolerant, and give books of readings and collections of essays the same opportunity to flower in the academic community.

M. Kent Jennings
University of Michigan
L. Harmon Zeigler
University of Oregon

THE PARADOX OF VOTING—A POSSIBLE METHOD OF CALCULATION

To the Editor:

In "A Computer Simulation of the Paradox of Voting,"[1] Klahr measured the frequency of cyclical majorities by the Monte Carlo method. The use of computer simulation is justified for problems in probability only when it is not possible (or extremely tedious) to derive a general equation for the distribution. Although the use of the Monte Carlo technique by Klahr and by ourselves was the result of the inability to find such a general equation, an equation by a French mathematician, Georges T. Guilbaud, has since been brought to our attention.[2] In our opinion this equation raises more problems than it solves, but the problem is such a difficult one that any purported solution deserves careful attention. This is particularly so when such a distinguished mathematician as Guilbaud proposes it. Our purpose in this note is to bring Guilbaud's equation to the attention of those students in the field (presumably the overwhelming majority) who have not heard of it and to discuss the problems that it raises. We hope that other researchers may be able to solve them.

Guilbaud begins by giving the percentage of paradoxical results to be expected with three, five and nine voters choosing among three alternatives.[3] His explanation of how he got these figures is that they were "easily (calculated) by the usual method of combinatorial analysis." No one else has found the problem "easy," and the values for five and nine voters have never been calculated by anyone except Guilbaud. Further, there is evidence that his calculations are incorrect. In Table 1, Guilbaud's figures are compared with those obtained by Klahr and by ourselves. The difference between Guilbaud's results and the ones we have obtained is clear.

TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE OF CYCLES CHOOSING AMONG THREE ISSUES

Number of voters	Guilbaud	Campbell and Tullock	Klahr
3	5.6%	5.7%	5.5%
5	7.0	7.8	7.0
9	7.8	8.9	—

Since the results in the Campbell and Tullock and in the Klahr columns are the result of sampling procedures, there is a possibility of sampling error. The result obtained by Klahr for five voters, however, was derived by the method of exhaustive enumeration and should be exact.

Having presented these values, Guilbaud then gives the following equation for the limit of the series as the number of voters grows:

$$1-3/\pi \text{ arc cos } 1/\sqrt{3})=0.0877$$

If this equation is correct, it is clearly an important discovery. Unfortunately, Guilbaud does not tell us how he got it, and we have been unable to derive it for ourselves. It is, of course, an equation for only three alternatives, but if we understood its derivation we might be able to use the same method to work out similar equations for larger numbers of alternatives. It is this possibility, in fact, that led us to write this note. We have been unable to derive the equation, but perhaps someone else can, and if so, it would be a significant improvement in our knowledge in this field.

Here again, however, the possibility that Guilbaud is wrong must be faced. In Table 2, a portion of the results we obtained by our simulation run are reproduced. This portion consists

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[1] This Review, 60 (1966), pp. 384–390. See also Colin D. Campbell and Gordon Tullock, "A Measure of the Importance of Cyclical Majorities," *The Economic Journal*, 75 (1965), 853–857 for a basically similar approach.

[2] See "Les Théories de L'Interêt Général et La Problème Logique de L'Agregation," *Economie Appliquée*, 5 (1952), 501–584. Our attention was called to it by a brief comment on our paper in N. Lawson, "Spectator's Notebook," *Spectator*, Jan. 14, 1966, p. 38.

[3] *Op. Cit.*, 519.

TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE OF CYCLES FOUND IN SAMPLES OF 1,000 CASES, CHOOSING AMONG THREE ISSUES

	Number of voters				
	21	23	25	27	29
Percentage of Cycles	9.3%	9.6%	8.8%	13.4%	14.0%
	9.6	8.6	10.5	8.8	8.1
	8.7	9.0			
	7.9				
Average	8.9	9.1	9.7	11.1	11.1

of our samples for 21, 23, 25, 27, and 29 voters choosing among three alternatives. Our method was essentialy the same as Klahr's, but we drew our sample 1,000 at a time. Although the numbers do seem to be approaching a limit, this limit appears to be substantially higher than 8.7 per cent. Because our method raises possibilities of sampling error, we cannot say for certain that Guilbaud is wrong. Still the average value for all of the samples (13,000 runs) shown in Table 2 is 9.7 per cent, which seems to represent an extreme sampling error if Guilbaud is correct.

The net result of our investigation, then, must remain inconclusive. Guilbaud may have opened an important new channel of investigation, or he may have made a mistake. The problem is important enough, however, so that further research in the field is called for.

Colin D. Campbell
Dartmouth College
Gordon Tullock
University of Virginia

To the Editor:

I wish to comment on the review of my book, *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia. A Case Study of Agricultural Policy, 1953–1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), by Allen B. Ballard, Jr. of the City University of New York in the December 1965 issue of your journal. I think that a few clarifications are necessary in the interest of improving the understanding of Soviet politics and the standards of book reviewing in certain quarters of the academic community.

First, the reviewer asserts that the book "is not about agricultural problems." I find this assertion to be rather curious since the basic causes of the poor record of Soviet agriculture are generally recognized to be under-investment and over-centralized management. The themes of resource allocation and management policy are treated in the book as fundamental issues in political conflict over agriculture.

Second, the reviewer alleges that "Professor Ploss states that he has used no specialized agricultural journals or newspapers since his main interest is policy-making among Soviet leaders." What I really state in the book is that, "The reasoning of the present study derives almost entirely from an examination of the leading national papers of Soviet Russia, as distinct from the specialized agricultural press. I have felt that the actual state of affairs in the countryside, which has underlain the policy proposals of at least some leaders, may be adequately known by studying the central press together with the production and management reports of Western experts like Naum Jasny, Arcadius Kahan, J. Miller, Alec Nove, Solomon M. Schwarz and Lazar Volin." It is not likely that anyone can show that I have distorted the sense of the technical accounts of the aforementioned specialists. As far as policy proposals and decisions are concerned, the sources which I consulted and listed in the volume are obviously of first-rate importance in trying to establish Soviet political realities.

Third, it is claimed that "faulty logic" pervades the book. The cited examples of faulty logic are apt to mislead all but those who have dispassionately read the book. "Ovechkin, a writer on agriculture," the reviewer points out, "in 1952 praises the practice of raising rank-and-file farmers to the position of kolkhoz chairman. Khrushchev says the same thing, almost *ten* years later, and this is used as one proof that Ovechkin is Khrushchev's 'agent.'" The word "one" is inadvertently significant inasmuch as I have presented a series of items of evidence of an organizational and verbal character to substantiate an inference that there was a personal relationship between Khrushchev and Ovechkin for many years, and that it was a not unusual one of patron-client.

The reviewer next represents the following as an example of faulty logic: "*Izvestiya* attacks money scandals in the Ministry of Agriculture four months before a big meeting on agriculture and Ploss assures us (161) that these exposures were part of Khrushchev's plans to discredit the authoritarian centralists." Of course, taken by itself this kind of speculation would be absurd. In reality, the particular criticism in *Izvestiya* is empirically demonstrated to be part of "a vast press campaign to discredit the leaders of Ministries of Agriculture." Besides, historical precedent is recalled to make the point that in the Soviet environment, charges of bureaucratic corruption may be related to high-level political conflict.

Still another case of faulty logic, I am told, is that "A 1958 party decree (138) condemning Stalinist practices in the regulation of music becomes, in the author's interpretation, a veiled attack against the authoritarian centralists' agricultural views." The coolheaded reader will see that I argue on the basis of textual analysis that in May, 1958, when the music decree was adopted, a dispute occurred over one of Khrushchev's policy initiatives in agriculture; that party leader M. A. Suslov opposed Khrushchev in this controversy; and that the music decree "appears to have been aimed at diminishing the personal prestige of the member of the party Presidium who both regarded the latest socio-economic experiment with tepid enthusiasm and had actively taken part in Stalin's post-war campaign to regiment the musicians." If that seems far-fetched, my use of the word "appears" should cause surprise over the reviewer's choleric statement: "How, one wishes to shout, does Ploss know (*sic*) these things?"

Fourth, the reviewer states that "The author's treatment of the problem of the conversion of collective into state farms is typical of his whole approach." The "whole approach" is not specified, but there are a number of odd arguments to the effect that I err in believing that in 1960, Khrushchev did not promote the massive conversions of collective into state farms. The reviewer complains that I have not offered one quotation from the speeches of Suslov and F. R. Kozlov to support my assumption that they were personally responsible for the many conversions in 1960. If quotations are that important, a study of Khrushchev's speeches in 1960–1961 will show that his only pronouncements on the subject were unfavorable to the cause of massive conversions. The vocal advocate of conversions was the U.S.S.R. Minister of Agriculture, V. V. Matskevich, who approvingly told the Central Committee in December, 1959 that many speakers proposed that the organization of state farms on the basis of economically weak collectives be continued. I failed to note Matskevich's opening remarks agreeing with Khrushchev that the two forms of agriculture, collective and state farms, will develop separately, but ultimately will merge into one form of property because I observed an elementary rule of analyzing Communist texts: "in examining various responses to an official 'line,' it should be borne in mind that verbal assent need not necessarily indicate agreement; it may reflect traditional discipline, a conscious or unconscious suppression of disagreement, a sacrifice of public divergence for the sake of an image of 'unity' or for the pretense of unquestioned loyalty. But verbal dissent may usually be taken as a proper indicator of genuine divergences" (Alexander Dallin and Zbigniew Brzezinski, in *Diversity in International Communism* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1963, p. xxxviii]). In the context of debate over kolkhoz unions in December, 1959, Matskevich's theoretical agreement with Khrushchev may be regarded as "pretense of unquestioned loyalty," and his appeal to transform more collective farms into state farms looks like "verbal dissent" on the practical level. A hypothesis of that kind is supported by the familiar coalescence of bureaucratic and institutional arrangements. Matskevich was demoted at the end of 1960, clearly upon the insistence of Khrushchev, and the conversion of many collective into state farms which had reached a peak in 1960 declined in 1961–1963. True, a large positive increment in farm conversions has been reported for 1964, presumably under Khrushchev, but my investigation of the situation in 1960 has nothing to do with this. The reviewer, who abhors "faulty logic," is hoisted with his own petard once he jumps from my survey of events in 1960 to those in 1965 in order to create an impression that Matskevich could not have been a partisan of massive conversions because he was only recently put in charge of the Ministry of Agriculture by L. I. Brezhnev, who disliked the idea. Disregarding the reviewer's flagrant lack of concern about sequence, he may have second thoughts about Brezhnev's link with Matskevich if it has come to his attention that (a) Matskevich did not enter into the discussion of Brezhnev's report on agriculture at the Central Committee meeting in March 1965 and (b) Matskevich evaded endorsing Brezhnev's proposal for a kolkhoz union at the 23rd party Congress in April 1966. The kolkhoz union scheme implicitly called for a weakening of the Ministry of Agriculture, i.e., a reversal of the decision made in early 1965 to restore more rights to the Ministry (Brezhnev ignored this decision in his March 1965 report to the Central Committee). Moreover, the fact that the kolkhoz union scheme, discussed at length in my book, is once more a political issue in the U.S.S.R. demonstrates the inaccuracy of the reviewer's concluding statement that the book is "an inaccurate guide to Soviet agricultural problems."

I am astonished that you should deem fit to publish a book review that is so recklessly one-sided and consistently unlearned.

Sidney I. Ploss
University of Pennsylvania

To the Editor:

If there is one error in my review, it is that I made explicit what is implicit in Ploss' opening arguments, i.e., that the rationale for his wholesale ignoring of the specialized agricultural press is his interest in policy-making on the national level. Ploss declares that no one can show that he has distorted the meaning of the work of various Western experts on Soviet agriculture. I should guess not: Jasny is cited twice and the others not at all in this "case study of agricultural policy." It is clear that Ploss has not explored the "actual state of affairs in the countryside," and that is why I wrote that the book is not about agricultural problems. It is not, and this ignorance of Soviet agriculture is responsible for many of his tenuous judgments. For example, besides the ten year quotation gap, the other "items of evidence" linking Ovechkin and Khrushchev are Ovechkin's call for more local autonomy and less bureaucracy in agricultural administration, both, according to Ploss, "distinctive Khrushchev remedies." Had Ploss read agricultural journals and newspapers, he would have seen that in the past thirty years, literally dozens of Soviet agricultural officials, national and local, have periodically called for these changes. The same ignorance led to his completely undocumented assertion that Kozlov and Suslov were responsible for the 1960 conversions. Several sources, including Khrushchev, have noted that the primary pressure for these conversions came from local party leaders. The scholar's next step would be to inquire "why?" And this should lead directly to an investigation of the economic, social, and political causes of the conversions rather than to a tenuous effort to make Matskevich the spokesman for the conservatives merely because he said, "Many comrades . . . have proposed a continuation of the organization of *sovkhozes* on the base of economically weak *kolkhozes*." Was Ploss present at this meeting? How then does he know that Matskevich "approvingly" said these words.

I next charged him with poor logic. He does mention a "vast press campaign," but Ploss' saying so does not make it so. The sole direct assault against the leaders of the Ministry of Agriculture is that one *Izvestiya* attack which I cited. Ploss' use of the music decree is, on the face of it, "far-fetched."

As for Dallin and Brzezinski, I'm sure that both would agree that the scholar's task is, at the very least, to mention evidence which tends to refute one's hypothesis. The failure to do so, particularly when one's readers may not have seen the original sources, is negligence of a scholar's first duty: to seek the truth. On Ploss' last-paragraph mention of Matskevich and Brezhnev, I must admit—although I have been studying the problem for eight years—that I don't know who was responsible for what in the conversion policy. Ploss professes to know and he therefore must prove that he knows. The personnel changes which I noted in my original review cast grave doubt on whether he does, in fact, know.

Allen B. Ballard, Jr.
City College of New York

To the Editor:

I noticed the institutional affiliation of Professor S. M. Lipset on p. 17 of the March Review. It read: "Harvard, University." Assuming that anything so obvious would be spotted immediately and removed by the galley readers, I concluded that this peculiar comma was meant to be where it was. But what could it mean? I pondered, fretted, and labored over the significance of the punctuation in question. Only one answer survived: "Harvard" was recognized by the editors and Professor Lipset as having transcended itself and become a brand name. I applaud this print-service to reality. I also applaud your and Professor Lipset's good thoughts of us (the readership) in adding the fact (after the comma) that the good professor was writing as a representative of an institution of higher learning as well, whichever it may have been.

Theodore L. Becker
University of Hawaii

(Editor's note: our staff are sorely tempted to let stand Professor Becker's imputation of such exquisite editorial subtlety. But alas! the puzzling comma was merely the result of our having to insert Professor Lipset's new institutional affiliation on page proofs, which left us no opportunity for subsequent corrections.)

To the Editor:

Work proceeds on the second volume of my projected History of the Study and Teaching of Politics in the West. The first volume was published by the University of Minnesota Press in 1964 under the title: *Man's Quest for Political Knowledge: The Study and Teaching of Politics in Ancient Times*. The second volume will deal with medieval and modern times, down to World War II and a little beyond, in continental Europe, England, the United

States, and other countries that have taken their cues in modern political science from these places. As a first effort in the field, this work—started by me so late in life, and designed to cover so wide an area and so many centuries—cannot be much more than a trail-finding and trail-marking venture, and yet it will also be the beginning of the history of our discipline and our profession.

It would be unfortunate, I feel, if any important development in political science in any western country, in any university, college, research center, or other institution, were to be overlooked entirely.

By my own efforts and those of research assistants under my direction, I have accumulated much information about political science studies in major European countries, in England, and in the United States of America. Furthermore, Anna Haddow in her book, *Political Science in American Colleges and Universities, 1636–1900,* has covered very well the developments in the United States down to 1900, while the UNESCO volume of 1950, entitled *Contemporary Political Science,* provides a somewhat dated and limited cross-sectional survey for a number of countries throughout the world.

These publications are very good as far as they go, but in the archives and current files of the on-going and growing departments and schools of political science in America, in Europe, and elsewhere, there must be a great deal of additional information about developments in political science study and teaching that I need to have to round out my final chapters. Hence my call for help.

Letters from political science professors and others working in the field about significant developments affecting the status, contents, methods, and publications in political science would be most welcome. Besides such personal letters I would be happy to receive printed, mimeographed, and otherwise duplicated items on the same theme; for example: articles about departments, outstanding scholars and teachers, and their methods; departmental progress reports; announcements of new departments, schools, programs, and courses; reports of endowments for political science research, professorships, and fellowships; departmental histories; joint arrangements with other departments in their institutions;—in short, any documents that help to throw light on developments in political science or in any of its subfields. I will be very grateful for any letters and other materials that I receive.

To be most useful, any such letters or materials sent, should be in my hands as soon as possible, *and in any case not later than March 1, 1967.*

Please use the following address for all items sent:

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William Anderson
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BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beginning with the December, 1966 issue Professor Donald R. Matthews will serve as Acting Book Review Editor until Professor Prothro's return from research leave. All materials pertaining to book reviews should be sent to the same address as before: Caldwell Hall, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C. 27514.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

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BOOK REVIEWS

World Politics in the General Assembly. By Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965. Pp. 326. $7.50.)

Professors Alker and Russett powerfully demonstrate that major descriptive and explanatory questions about international behaviors can be answered by quantitative inquiry and do not have to be handled by verbal debate or fashionable opinion. Whether readers are concerned with quantitative research strategies, policy analysis, or verbal theory, they will find *World Politics in the General Assembly* consistently stimulating and informative. For the first group of readers, the volume demonstrates what currently can be done methodologically and some of the problems yet to be resolved. Its conclusions establish for the second and third groups of readers descriptive parameters of the political realities which have to be recognized in policy analysis and incorporated into our theories of international behavior.

The substantive scope of the book can only be indicated in the limited space of a review. Alker and Russett use a variety of quantitative techniques and types of data, principally factor analysis of roll call votes in the United Nations. They also use simple and multiple correlations and frequency distributions extensively to relate national traits and other actions in the U.N. to voting behavior. These tools are manipulated to investigate these questions about international organizations: the nature and stability of issues and alignments during the life of the U.N.; the distribution of power in the General Assembly; the determinants of voting behavior in the U.N.; and the implications of developments in that body for stability and change in world politics. However, the authors investigate the international organization phenomena in ways that let them explore a broader range of political science questions, including: the similarity of domestic to international politics; the effect of cross-pressures on voting; the impact of distributions of votes on the behavior of competitors for system leadership; and the relationship between national traits (demographic, economic and political) and foreign policy.

Because Alker and Russett have shared their problem-solving decisions with us and their research strategy is quantitative, we can question some of their resolutions of two persistent types of research problems. These involve, first, the relationships between indices and concepts, and, second, the implications of data collection and analysis decisions for appropriate inferences. The following comments are designed to continue the intellectual dialogue of which this book is clearly a part.

Indices and Concepts. The use of major social science concepts to discuss manipulated data enhances the cumulative value of the book but raises validity questions which cannot be handled by simply assuming that an index does indeed measure the concept with which it is labelled. The validity problem particularly emerges when the authors assign psychological state concepts to indices composed of public actions. For example, they sometimes treat patterns derived from orthogonal rotation factor analyses of roll calls as patterns of "attitudes." This labelling follows from a more general decision on their part to label rotated factors "cognitive." U.N. delegation members may have attitudes and cognitive structures comparable to the rotated factor patterns, but the authors do not include data to show that they do. In fact, we know that diverse attitudes and cognitive categories can be represented in what appears to be the same response act, e.g., vote, to the same stimulus, e.g., General Assembly resolution. We also question a universal, one-to-one correspondence between intensity of feeling and amount of activity, which the authors seem to assume when they label an index of formal activity as a measure of the "intensity" with which a "nation" cares about an issue. We all know of instances in politics when individuals and groups are publicly inactive in relation to an issue important to them either because they are being covertly active or feel no sense of efficacy. In summary, although one sympathizes with the authors' desire to include psychological variables, the wisdom of measuring them by gross stimulus (resolution subject, national trait and voting distribution) and public action response (speech and vote count) data is an open question.

Data Choices and Appropriate Inferences. Apparently the authors decided to progress with the many questions indicated earlier in this review, rather than to test the extent to which analyses of fewer questions were sensitive to their research choices. This is a legitimate trade, and one which is explicitly shared with the reader, but these research assumptions obviously affect the confidence that can be placed in certain inferences and the appropriateness of certain others. For example, the authors assume that: 1) roll calls are a sufficient indicator of issues, alignments and national roles in the General Assembly; 2) four non-crisis years are a sufficiently comprehensive sample to locate trends and geographical and substantive clusters which account for variance; 3) equal weighting of each roll call does not significantly degrade the usefulness of the located factors and the correlates of national factor scores; 4) the assignment of numbers to votes by relative rank for input data does not distort national positions; and 5) changes in national positions indicate changes in policy orientations, even though they are measured against a moving average. Future research may clarify the tenability of these explicit assumptions.

In terms of the data some specific inferences seem inappropriate. These involve positive inferences about intervening political process variables when only negative inferences seem warranted. Stimulus-response data justify inferences about what was not the case, e.g., the United States did not organize a majority, but not about what *was* the case, e.g., the majority that occurred was organized by the United States.

To conclude, two contributions which this book does not make would enhance future applications of factor analysis to similar problems. The first would be for authors to explicate their reasons for choosing either directed factor analysis runs which test specified hypotheses or non-directed runs from which hypotheses are derived. The second would be for oblique factor rotations to supplement, if not take priority over, orthogonal rotations. Since the oblique operations allow factor interdependence to emerge, they seem highly relevant to analysts concerned with polarization and cross-pressures.

DAVIS B. BOBROW
Oak Ridge National Laboratory

The Unfinished Experiment: Democracy in the Dominican Republic. BY JUAN BOSCH. (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. xvi, 239. $5.95.)

This is an important and poignant book; important because a civilian, popularly elected President of a pillaged, brutalized, and extremely underdeveloped nation provides his image of the situation and a record of his experiences and the obstacles with which he had to deal; poignant because it is the record of a leader who tried at least with initial lack of success to institutionalize democracy under the most disadvantageous conditions, but who achieved remarkable success in citizen education and establishing a standard toward which future attempts at popular government might strive. Finally, it is poignant because, as Bosch himself recently put it, the fruition of the democratic experiment came in the April, 1965 revolution which was then destroyed by the world's greatest democracy.

The book is an important repository of data on political change in a society that experienced a tremendous amount of it from May, 1961 (the date of Trujillo's assassination) through the military coup that overthrew Bosch's constitutional democracy in September, 1963. The information and line of analysis is also extremely useful for reconstructing and comprehending events after the time period covered directly in the book, including the popular revolutionary events of April, 1965 and after.

Bosch analyzes several important components of the situation he tried to guide during his seven months' presidency in 1963. Among these are the meaning of politics, government, nation to a population with experience only of Trujilloism; the lack of agreement on the rules of the political game among the major competitors; the enormous cultural and consequent communication gap between privileged and lower classes, such that the latter have not been considered "appropriate" as citizens and whose votes and acts have therefore been treated as non-binding, or illegitimate; the structure, recruitment, and orientations of the various elements of the military (Bosch recognized that there existed professionally-oriented younger officers, committed to civil rule); one of the few discussions available anywhere aside from hysterical journalistic accounts of the character of the radical nationalist 14th of June Movement (despite its continuous hostility toward Bosch); the character of the Alliance for Progress; the irresponsibility of U. S. news media reports (a condition at least substantially changed during and after the 1965 revolution through television and the major newspapers' coverage); and the strong predisposition of U. S. officials for interaction exclusively with the Dominican establishment; etc.

A relatively civil libertarian, broadly participant democracy should by probability not have been established, even for seven months, in a society such as the Dominican, given its colonial experience, the thirty years of Trujillo terror, and the persistent preindustrial character of its culture and social structure. Bosch argues that these factors have largely destroyed the capacity of the middle class for constructive citizenship, but that the lower class mass of Dominicans retains such capacity by its lack of responsibility for the Trujillo period and its extreme lack of opportunity and consequent freedom from excessive personal ambition and frustration over its socio-economic status. (This judgment will, no doubt, not be widely accepted among those, particularly in the United States, who see a broad middle stratum as the repository of democratic predisposition, but it forms a part of a growing body of Latin American self-analysis holding that much of its middle class is too privilege-oriented and opposed to the concept of citizenship for the masses to support government democratic in a social sense.) In any event, it seems fairly clear that Dominican experience has promoted a syndrome widespread among the adult population of dependency on the U. S. to settle domestic political problems and exploitiveness toward one's fellows, and a perhaps equally widespread sense of shame among the young over their parents' complicity in the Trujillo period and over the depreciated condition of the nation, that results in rabid nationalism and extreme impatience with institution-building.

In such inauspicious conditions, Bosch and the PRD opted to try to govern neither through reliance on the traditionally superordinate United States (though his relations with the Kennedy Administration were close and dignified), nor on the overwhelming coercive power (physical and psychological) of the military, but on the mobilization of the hitherto inert mass. That Bosch and the PRD were substantially successful in their organizational efforts through a highly responsible political education campaign and without strong-arm tactics underscores for students of political development and those committed to popular, libertarian government the extreme importance of the political education process, or formal political socialization, as a variable. So far, few social scientists have sought to build such into theory or research design, let alone rigorously to compare polities along such dimensions, despite the importance that diffuse, normative concepts of the participant, civicly educated citizen have in our own political culture, and despite the manifest importance of our citizens' capacity for political learning for the persistence of our own society.

DANIEL GOLDRICH

University of Oregon

Administration of a Revolution: Executive Reform in Puerto Rico under Governor Tugwell, 1941–1946. BY CHARLES T. GOODSELL. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. xvi, 254. $4.95.)

Party Politics in Puerto Rico. BY ROBERT W. ANDERSON. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1965. Pp. xiv, 269. $6.75.)

The metamorphosis that Puerto Rico has undergone during the last twenty-five years is by now well known, both here and abroad. Less familiar, and indeed less well understood, are the reasons why the island community has moved so purposefully from traditionalism toward modernity since 1941. It is clear that the period of rapid change began in that year with the coming to power of Luis Muñoz Marín and his Popular Democratic Party (PPD), but a comprehensive account of the factors contributing to the success of the modernization effort has been slow to emerge.

The two excellent books under review provide different but complementary approaches to a full explanation of the changes that have taken place. Penetrating, thorough, and remarkably objective studies, they both reflect exhaustive research, especially in the use made of interviews and archival materials.

The Goodsell study focuses on the contributions made by able and imaginative administrators and by well-designed administrative structures—particularly during the all-important early years of the Muñoz Era, when Rexford G. Tugwell was governor. Between 1941 and 1946, Goodsell argues, the reform government acquired the administrative tools it needed to carry out its aims. In so doing, it avoided some of the difficulties encountered by many other developing countries which "are having little or no success in meeting the newly awakened demands of their peoples" because their revolutions are not being adequately administered.

As Goodsell makes plain, administrative reform was accomplished in Puerto Rico mainly because Tugwell insisted on it and was able to persuade Muñoz that changes had to be made in the structure and functioning of the executive branch if the ambitious PPD program was to be realized. With Muñoz's backing, Tugwell strengthened gubernatorial control of administration. He was chiefly responsible for the creation of the Puerto Rico Planning Board, the Bureau of the Budget, and other staff agencies, and for the development of a merit system of public employment. His creative genius as an administrator also showed itself in his brilliant appointments. The young Puerto Ricans whom he selected for top positions in the rapidly expanding government were little known and largely inexperienced when Tugwell discovered them, but they proved to be singularly able, innovative, and dedicated. Most of them went on to become star performers in the subsequent Muñoz administration (1949–1965) and therefore played a significant role in the modernization process.

The Anderson volume examines "the political ingredient in social and economic development" by centering attention on the internal workings of the Puerto Rican party system—its historical and legal background, the programs, styles, and organizational patterns of the three main parties, and the role of each in the Legislative Assembly—and by relating these factors to the political culture of the island. What emerges as an explanation of the PPD's success in implementing its social and economic program is the dominant role of Muñoz as the focus of party cohesion, loyalty, and discipline.

"The single most significant fact about the Popular Party," says Anderson, "is its almost total identification with the person of its founder and leader, Luis Muñoz Marín." Within the party his prestige and power are so great that he has been able to maintain strict discipline and highly centralized control even when pursuing policies disliked or not well understood by many party members. As legislative leader under Governors Tugwell and Piñero (1945–1949) and as governor himself, Muñoz could count on almost monolithic PPD support for whatever policies he put forward. The two minority parties, on the other hand, lacked leaders of anything like comparable stature and had no reform program of comparable popular appeal. They have therefore had nothing to offer except advocacy of statehood or independence—their respective solutions to the perennial problem of Puerto Rico's political status vis-à-vis the United States. Since the beginning of the Muñoz Era, the status issue has remained "at the very center of party politics." But by the same token, interparty competition has been characterized by "a kind of autonomy (the cynic might call it irrelevance)—a remoteness from the sources of conflict, demands, and interests that would normally be the machinery of political cleavage."

Henry Wells

University of Pennsylvania

Australian Policies and Attitudes Toward China. By Henry S. Albinski. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. vii, 511. $12.50.)

Australian policies toward China in the years since Mao Tse-tung's triumph in civil war have been both predictable and logical. For that reason the story of relations between Canberra and the Chinese is not enlivened by twists and surprises. On the other hand, in the development of her Chinese policies Australia has demonstrated that she is an ally, not a docile follower, of her traditional international patron, Britain, and of her military protector for the past quarter century, the United States. Professor Albinski in this book sorts out the details of Sino-Australian relations with systematic thoroughness.

In the twenty-five years since the Japanese thrust toward Australia, Australians have come to regard themselves as irretrievably part of the Asian political scene. China has replaced Japan as the menace from the north, while the postwar retreat of Western colonialism from Southeast Asia has built a bridge of restless, vulnerable Asian states reaching to within 150 miles of Australian home territory. Sukarno's efforts, although stillborn, to forge a Jakarta-Peking axis understandably caused the greatest apprehension among Australians. It thus follows quite naturally that Australia has backed Malaysia against Indonesian confrontation and has been the lone "Western" country to commit significant forces to support the United States in Vietnam.

The question of diplomatic recognition for Peking has on occasion been a domestic political irritant in Australia. In 1949 Canberra was edging quite close to the position of the United Kingdom that recognition can be useful without being complimentary. Had it not been for the fact that general elections and the assumption of power by a new government in Australia caused postponement of a decision on the inauguration of diplomatic relations with Peking, Australia would no doubt have followed the British example. Delay, however, gave Canberra an opportunity to see that recognition of the new People's Republic had not served particularly well to protect the interests and investments of those non-Communist states represented in China. Before long, when the Korean war brought Australian forces into direct conflict with the Chinese, diplomatic recognition became what it has remained, a closed issue.

Australian anxiety over what is regarded as the threat of Communist China is almost matched by an eagerness to sell Australian products in the Chinese market. In phrases strongly reminiscent of Victorian textile millers who anticipated an insatiable market when "every Chinaman added an inch to his shirt tail," the Australian wool industry yearns for a change in Chinese consumer preferences to bring boundless prosperity to its membership. The food crisis of mainland China of course has already created a pattern of trade in which enormous tonnages of Australian wheat are shipped north in exchange for mere token quantities of Chinese exports.

Just as Australia has not cut herself off from China in commerce, Canberra has been generally permissive in the matter of travel by Australians to the Communist mainland. Chinese travelers seeking to enter Australia, however, are not as sympathetically received. Accordingly there is no substantial exchange of persons between the two countries. But it is noteworthy that Australians are far less quarantined against contact with China than are Americans.

All of these subjects and a good deal more are discussed by Professor Albinski. There have been few stones not turned in his exploration, and perhaps the author has been a bit too conscientious in his research. Outside of Australia, not many readers will be able to cope with the vast body of factual material presented. It seems that very few statements on China by Australian public figures or newspapermen have been neglected. Editorial surgery, inevitably painful, could have made for a tighter presentation.

The book is on Australia's stand toward China, and it would have been inappropriate for Professor Albinski to attempt to mobilize facts and quotations indicating the Chinese view of Australia. Yet, as the Australian position is in some measure taken in response to Peking policy, some treatment of the Chinese half of the dialogue would have enlivened the narrative and illuminated the analysis. Despite that, no study of Chinese sources, even those published in English, seems to have been made.

The author ends his investigation with the solidly grounded conclusion "that Australia's China policy has, at minimum diplomatic and material expense, served her national interests well." Americans will reflect that Australia has come close to achieving in her relations with China a realistic form of the "containment without isolation" now advocated by many China specialists in this country.

LEA E. WILLIAMS

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The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East. BY LEONARD BINDER. (New York, London, Sydney: John Wiley & Sons, 1964. Pp. x, 287.)

The League of Arab States: A Study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization. BY ROBERT W. MACDONALD. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. xiii, 407. $8.50.)

Change and search for new socio-political solutions provide the focus of both studies. But while the ideological substance of the change is the main theme of Professor Binder's book, it is the formal organization on a supranational level that is treated in Dr. Macdonald's volume.

The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East is actually a collection of nine essays, most of which have appeared as articles in scholarly journals. In spite of this, the author has succeeded in giving his book a structure and an organization in which repetition has been kept to a bare minimum. Professor Binder views the ideological revolution in the Middle East primarily as a process of change from the traditionalist religious model toward a nation-state. His typology in this context is based on the degree with which the Middle Eastern countries satisfy the prerequisites for the achievement of a nation-state status. Among the three categories thus suggested, he distinguishes the type closest to the nation-state (Turkey, Egypt, and Iran), the type farthest from it (countries of the Fertile Crescent), and the type in between, which has fulfilled some prerequisites but is still retaining elements of the traditional legitimacy (Saudi Arabia, Libya, Yemen, and Afghanistan). Three chapters of the book are devoted to a thorough discussion of the role of Islam in the politics of the area. They include a perceptive review of the role of *ulama* in the Sunni and Shia communities and an exposition of the differences between the *ulama* and the militant fundamentalist movements, such as the Wahhabis or the Moslem Brethren. "The ulama," concludes the author, "are willing to live with the dualism of an Islamic society ruled over by a benevolent, yet secular, government." In his chapter on Egyptian-Arab nationalism the author contrasts the "romantic idea of nationalism," in which community is seen as an extension of individual identities, with the idea of the *ummah* in Islam. On the other hand, nationalism in the Arab East has posed the problem, specific to this area, of the limits of national community—a question involving "subjective identities of whole peoples." Arab nationalism, contends the author, has never become a truly secular movement despite the original intentions of its Christian Arab initiators: once "the Muslims aroused themselves to nationalism, it was a nationalism so heavily laden with Islamic sentiment that it has made both the Christians of the Levant and the Copts of Egypt somewhat apprehensive of their status in an Arab nationalist state." The concluding chapters of the book are focused on modern revolutionary movements in the area, with heavy concentration on the phenomenon of Nasserism. The author warns against equating the idea of nationalism with radical reformism. His chapter on "Radical-Reform Nationalism" is perhaps the most illuminating in the book. The volume as a whole constitutes a most welcome contribution to our understanding of the complex process of modernization of the Middle East.

Dr. Macdonald's book on the Arab League will probably be regarded as the definitive work on the subject for some time to come. No other writer has treated the subject as comprehensively. Not only is the structure of the Arab League described with attention to any relevant detail; the League is also analyzed as a performer of a number of functions. The author examines its decision-making process, its internal dynamics and policy formulation, the role of its Secretary General, and its functional activities and programs: cultural, social, technological, economic, and military. It is to the author's credit that he places his description and analysis within the context of actual Arab politics. This approach provides the necessary dimension in depth, thus enlivening the whole study. Bloc patterns in the League, rivalry between Egypt and Iraq, the impact of the Palestine problem on the destinies of the League, and a review of the integrative and disintegrative processes in the life of the League are thoughtfully explored. Although the author does not consider the League as an agency which has directly enhanced the prospects for Arab unity, he views it as "the instrument through which the Arab nationalist movement has successfully asserted its dignity and power on the world scene." He concludes that "the existing machinery of the Arab League is capable of directing this new national power into constructive channels for economic and social modernization in the Arab world if it is properly employed." All in all, this is a volume to be strongly recommended to students of the Middle East and of international organization in general for its thorough, unbiased, and intelligent discussion of a subject which has long stood in need of a serious and scholarly treatment.

George Lenczowski
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Intellectuals in Politics: John Stuart Mill and the Philosophical Radicals. By Joseph Hamburger. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965. Pp. viii, 308. $7.50.)

The Pursuit of Certainty: David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Beatrice Webb. By Shirley Robin Letwin. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965. Pp. 391. $9.50.)

These two studies of nineteenth century British political theory are particularly relevant to contemporary developments in political science. Modern scholars' preoccupation with scientific methodology appears to be a unique source of contribution to the growth of the discipline. However, the materials assembled by Mr. Hamburger and Mrs. Letwin would seem to indicate that at least the groundwork for such an orientation had been prepared by an earlier generation.

Mr. Hamburger, in this, his second study of Utilitarians in action, confines himself to an intensive treatment of a narrow field of inquiry. He has written a case study of doctrinaire politics during the decade following the passage of the Reform Act of 1832, rather than a comprehensive analysis of the period or a detailed commentary on the prevailing political attitudes. His restricted focus permits a probing account of the Philosophical Radicals as parliamentary politicians. Mr. Hamburger examines the processes by which John Stuart Mill, John Roebuck, Francis Place, Joseph Parkes, George Grote, Sir William Molesworth and their associates translated the doctrines of Jeremy Bentham and James Mill into dogma and into action programs. He also delineates the extent to which journalist John Mill was able to absorb and accept these views during and after his period of self-doubt. But Mr. Hamburger is more concerned with the parliamentary practice than the intellectual history of Utilitarianism.

He suggests that the Philosophical Radicals became isolated and alienated from the legislative arena because their unrealistic, doctrinaire adaptations of Benthamite postulates ill-prepared them for parliamentary experiences. He notes that they were indeed successful in introducing administrative reforms and in influencing the course of the history of ideas (both outside the scope of this book), but in terms of their self-imposed legislative mission, they were admitted failures. Drawing upon their articles, speeches, reviews, and correspondence, Mr. Hamburger exposes their conflicts between incremental and organic reform, cooperative and aggressive parliamentary strategies, and affiliation and separation from the Whig Party.

He attributes their defeats to their indecisiveness, which in turn was a function of their "false perceptions" and "misleading interpretations." For example, in exalting the masses, "The People," as a viable political base, they underestimated the degree of class consciousness among Chartists and also predicted the merging of the "aristocratic" Whig and Tory parties. Consequently, they were torn between their expectations and their experiences. But Mr. Hamburger concludes that these ineffectual politicians were only on the periphery of the ideological tradition, for "their fantasies of new worlds never became grotesque, and their efforts to transform their own world always remained within the ground rules accepted by their contemporaries."

This book sustains interest, but it is chronologically confusing. Its deliberate skimming or omission of major Utilitarian philosophical tracts and lack of a well-defined historical context may unduly limit its contribution to political studies. Moreover, the author's emphasis on parliamentary strategies may be excessively narrow, in view of the other accomplishments of the Philosophical Radicals.

At the risk of being all too encompassing, Mrs. Letwin has sought to capture the spirit of a century by examining seminal thinkers and the shifting intellectual contexts confronting them. Her selection of Hume, Bentham, Mill, and Webb follows the familiar outlines of the ancestry and heritage of Utilitarianism. However, she departs from this traditional approach in the nature and breadth of her focus. She has chosen to integrate the whole spectrum of character, background, taste, and ideas, rather than to confine herself to what is usually construed as political theory.

Mrs. Letwin challenges modern efforts to channel nineteenth century thought into the cleavage between advocates of *laissez-faire* and proponents of the welfare state. Instead, she attempts to reveal previously hidden affinities and divergencies. Her introductory section offers glimmerings of such new alignments and disagreements. Thus, she announces that "John Mill denounces nature in the same terms as the Scots Presbyterian ministers were castigated by Hume" or that "the aversion to magic, that more than any other sentiment unites John Mill to Bentham, leads him to qualify liberty for the sake of progress." But these insights are less apparent in the text, and the absence of a concluding section does not strengthen her undertaking.

The theme which motivates her choice of title is presumably the loss of certainty incumbent upon Hume's attack on the Puritan inheritance. She then traces the impact of residual Puritanism through the lives and works of the four selected theorists. In the course of her survey, she shows how political science emerged from Hume's description of politics as one of many social activities, impervious to esoteric knowledge or scientific technique; through Bentham's attempt to render politics a mechanical sphere of impersonality; to Mill's view of politics as the realm of liberation and constraint, guided by scientific method; finally, to Webb's elevation of politics, as a science, into a pseudo-religion.

Mrs. Letwin offers a variety of thematic material which she does not completely integrate. (However, it may well defy such integration.) In addition, the sparcity of references to recent secondary source materials may tend to exaggerate her claim to novelty. For instance, J. B. Stewart's exposition of Hume's political writings is suggestive of affinities with Bentham rather than with Burke. But Mrs. Letwin does question F. Watkins' and J. A. Passmore's treatment of Hume and E. Halevy's interpretation of Bentham, along with other issues. Despite the preceding reservations, Mrs. Letwin has written a most informative and readable work.

In part, these two books converge and complement each other. Mrs. Letwin's Bentham is a tolerant eccentric whose theories and social gadgeteering were designed to maximize the arena of human choice. In a brief chapter, she depicts James Mill as a secular puritan, who introduced metaphysical and philosophical ideas into Bentham's doctrines and who spoke as if he were laying down universal laws without Bentham's saving qualifications.

Mr. Hamburger is more concerned to show how James Mill transformed Bentham's methods of analysis into political tools. The elder Mill rendered the concept "sinister interest" into a virtual synonym for "aristocracy"; its antonym is "The People." This latter emphasis leads Hamburger to argue that the classic *On Government* is not a defense of middle class interests, as is popularly assumed, but promotes the interests of a broader "The People." Mrs. Letwin accepts this interpretation. He goes on to indicate how the Radicals adapted James Mill's political creed to parliamentary reform.

Both authors note the tendency of young Mill to have developed broader horizons than his parent or colleagues. Whereas Mr. Hamburger suggests that Mill had to reconcile his father's "democratic influence" with the

Comte-Saint-Simon scientific elitism, Mrs. Letwin would seem to conclude that father and son may have shared elitist notions, in view of James Mill's residual belief in a Calvinist elect. She does assert that Mill senior was more concerned with an elite's abuse of power while John Mill expected an elite to lead the ignorant masses. Mrs. Letwin demonstrates how John Mill's resolution of conflicting views contributed to Beatrice Webb's scientism while Mr. Hamburger relegates the alleged debt to a footnote. He indicates that Mill was able to sustain his hopes for the Philosophical Radicals in Parliament longer than his colleagues and that his synthesis of views may have encouraged this. The scope of the books led each author in different directions.

Mr. Hamburger explored difficulties besetting a group of doctrinaire political scientists in Parliament, and Mrs. Letwin traced the emergence of a reverence for scientific politics. While modern scholarly techniques have indeed been refined, neither the pursuit of certainty nor the role of intellectuals in politics is without current applicability. The trends that Mr. Hamburger and Mrs. Letwin have isolated and attributed to the nineteenth century may have intensified in the twentieth.

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A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. By Richard M. Cyert and James G. March. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963. Pp. ix, 332. $9.00.)

Oh joy! to welcome the Review, though belatedly, to the ranks of BTOF reviewers.* For in the bulrushes of the business context of their work lie innovations of theory and method of great promise for students of organizational decision processes—a broad category in which I mean to include a diverse and large group of political scientists.

Chapters 3–6 specify and link together with propositions a set of basic elements of organizational decision processes. Organizational goals are viewed as partly independent (potentially inconsistent) levels of aspiration. Decisions are functions of goals and of perceptions of alternatives, consequences, performance of the organization and other like organizations, and states of the world. Of the set of goals, only some are considered at one time, hence attention-focusing processes occupy an important place in the theory. Organizational search, triggered by problems (discrepancies between aspirations and performance), generates information which may affect perceptions and thus decisions.

Basic processes for changing these elements are proposed: with experience, the organization adjusts levels of aspiration, rules which focus attention on selected goals, and rules for search. The behavior of each of these elements is indicated with propositions, e.g., about the direction and rate of change in levels of aspiration given different kinds of experience, and about the occasions for search. Sometimes a mathematical form for a proposition is suggested as well.

Many of the concepts are intuitively appealing and valuable additions even to the language of less ambitious descriptions. They alert us to phenomena we have perceived or dimly felt but have not been able to specify and to disentangle conceptually from the maze of detailed knowledge. Case studies should benefit immensely from the illustrations in every chapter of the theoretical uses to which case studies can be put.

Chapters 7, 8 and 10 describe the structure and operation of extremely detailed computer simulation models—operational descriptions for some kinds of decisions in firms of some of the aspects of decision-making discussed in chapters 3–6. The authors chose to push very far in the direction of precise and exhaustive statements about the networks of decision rules that result in choice, while setting aside for the moment problems of data collection for the large-scale empirical work that will be necessary to test and (more likely) to elaborate their theories. Variables spill onto the pages of these chapters by the dozen. It is frequently not clear what, if any, relationship they have to a set of data; what, if any, operations one performs to obtain values for the variables; and what, if any, rationale justifies the assignments of specific values to the variables for the simulation runs. (On the other side, comparisons of model outputs with real-world decision series seem to establish at the least the predictive capability of the models.)

The invention of variables and the hypothetical specification of their values are important theoretical tasks, but some of these values and variables are closer to data and to data-gathering operations than others; indications about relationships between variables, values, and data would have been helpful. Among other things, this would have given us some hints about the mode of thinking that constructs simulation models. Invention, precise specification, construction of systems of propositions and variables, and experimentation with such systems, are not the forte of political science. A modest pedagogical effort would have gone a long way.

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* See esp. S. Winter, 54 *AER* 144 (1964); K. Boulding, 29 *ASR* 592 (1964); and R. Day, 32 *Econometrica* 461 (1964).

In the same theoretical context as the simulations, O. E. Williamson constructs in chapter 9 a mathematical model, with analytic solutions, rather than a simulation. Williamson's model by no means does everything the simulations do, but for what it does, it is much more economic, communicable, understandable, and manipulable by other researchers. One really has to try out the simulation models, to work them through either by hand or on the computer, to understand what they mean. The answers to at least some kinds of questions about model behavior are more accessible for mathematical models. Nevertheless, the authors' arguments in favor of simulations, especially in the appendices, cannot be casually set aside. I look forward to the clarification of a division of labor in which simulation is sometimes an uneconomic and clumsy substitute for mathematics, sometimes a useful complement in the analysis of mathematical models, and sometimes a language and logical system of great flexibility that permits theoretical construction in modes presently awkward or impossible in mathematics.

The near future (almost the present) will see the extension of these methods and concepts to political decision-making processes. It is also to be hoped that workers in the field will undertake research into the subprocesses identified here—taking more manageable but still very important phenomena like learning and aspiration change, defining variables operationally, gathering data in a systematic and replicable way on a defined population, developing more detailed and operational models for the subprocess. This research will be, must be, strongly shaped by the suggestions for the behavior of these subprocesses and the relationships among them set forth in this book.

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Program Budgeting—Program Analysis and the Federal Budget. ED. BY DAVID NOVICK. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. 382. $6.50.)

Program Budgeting provides the intellectual framework and rationale for the planning-programming-budgeting system currently sweeping the Federal government. It is a RAND Corporation research study and builds upon other RAND studies, particularly those of Charles J. Hitch and Roland McKean, which have dealt with many of the same ideas in the national defense and water resources fields. The study already possesses more than academic respectability; abridged versions prepared by the Government Printing Office were circulated with Bureau of the Budget Circular 66-3, which announced the new budgeting system.

The book consists of a series of separate but interrelated essays and is divided into three parts, the first and third of which are of most interest to political scientists. The first part analyzes the role of the budget in government decision-making and sets forth the conceptual framework of program budgeting, including the significance of cost-utility analysis. The second part describes actual and potential applications of the concept in such fields as national defense, space exploration, transportation, education, public health and natural resources. The final part discusses the problems to be encountered in implementing a program budget.

The book's major premise is "that a government can determine its policies most effectively if it chooses rationally among alternative courses of action, with as full knowledge as possible of the implications of those alternatives" (p. 26). Program budgeting will facilitate the choice process by "(1) providing a framework for more clearly defining the alternatives among which choices must be made and (2) creating an information system that will assist in measuring costs in relation to accomplishments" (p. 18). The "rationality" the authors seek in government decisions accords with economic theories of "efficient" resource allocation which seek to maximize benefits for a given level of expenditure or to achieve a given level of benefits for the least cost.

To improve the allocation of limited resources, increasing use of cost-utility analyses is encouraged. Indeed, the use of such analyses is a central tenet in the authors' definition of program budgeting. This requirement reduces to nearly zero the amount of program budgeting being done by state and local governments despite the highly creditable improvements being made at these levels in the name of this concept. However, the authors maintain a laudable balance on the role such highly sophisticated and rigorous techniques can play in governmental decision-making. ". . . we visualize cost-utility analysis as playing a somewhat modest, though very significant, role in the overall decision-making process. In reality, most major long-range-planning decision problems must ultimately be resolved primarily on the basis of intuition and judgment. We suggest that the main role of analysis should be to *sharpen* this intuition and judgment. In practically no case should it be assumed that the results of the analysis will *make* the decision." (P. 67, italics theirs.)

Of course, the budget does much more than allocate financial and economic resources. It shows the current status of an enormous and continuing struggle for political power. It evolves from a system of social as well as legal relationships. It entails both commitments and sanctions. Divergent goals, roles, strategies and communications all play a part in its development. The authors recognize these factors which stem from the bargaining nature of the budgetary process and they give careful thought to the kinds of changes, congressional as well as administrative, which are implicit in the full implementation of their concepts. They expect the ultimate characteristics of the new system to be shaped by political realities and necessities, but the attributes of these forces and the limitations they may impose are not given the insightful analysis they deserve. Although the authors may have significantly underestimated these problems, they are, interestingly, much more timid in their timetable for implementation than the President himself.

One other assumption of the study must be questioned. "Implicit throughout our discussion has been the proposition that the program budget is a neutral tool. It has no politics." (P. 370.) "The proposed budget structure is essentially a politically neutral instrument." (P. 358.) These assertions are incorrect on at least two grounds. First, no change in a budgetary process will be politically neutral because it will affect the outputs of that system, to the advantage of some interests and to the disadvantage of others. The authors would probably contend that this situation results from the process of change and not from the instrument employed. However, they are on less secure ground on a second point. They have criticized the existing system because it facilitates certain economically illogical approaches to budgeting by fostering incremental changes and "hold the line" decisions. They do not recognize that the institutionalization of any budgetary system will tend to favor certain approaches to public expenditure decisions rather than others. With its emphasis upon quantitative analysis, it is not too much to suspect that full implementation of the program budgeting they propose would skew decisions and information toward those alternatives most susceptible of reasonably valid quantification. In addition, the Corps of Engineers has long demonstrated the adaptability to political necessities of quantification itself. No tool, particularly one which stresses changes in the information system upon which public decisions will be made, can be neutral in the political bargaining environment of federal budgeting.

The book suffers, particularly in terms of repetition, from the fact that it was written by different people at different times for different purposes. Nonetheless it is the most sophisticated, comprehensive and balanced discussion of program budgeting yet published. It is having and will continue to have an enormous impact, not only within the federal government but well beyond.

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The Assistant Secretaries: Problems and Processes of Appointment. BY DEAN E. MANN, with Jameson W. Doig. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1965. Pp. 310.)

Shortly after the inauguration of President Kennedy in 1961, a veteran officer of the British colonial service, then visiting this country, expressed to me his utter amazement at the wholesale transfer of administrative leadership in Washington, a process he considered appallingly disorderly and inefficient. His reaction was probably not untypical of public officials who are accustomed to strong and stable administrative classes which could survive party changes and even political revolutions with little bureaucratic disturbance. Until fairly recently, not a great deal of systematic attention was given to the "disorderly" process of transition of administrative-political leadership in this country, unique and significant as it is to our system of governance, and to the kinds of executive leadership it produces for us.[1]

The Eisenhower election in 1952, ending as it did twenty consecutive years of Democratic administrations, had something of a shock effect, and it was shortly followed by studies and reports by the American Assembly and the Second Hoover Commission, both of which addressed much of their consideration on personnel to problems of political and career leadership. Since that time, there has been a rising surge of studies and books about the higher public services, about the process of political transition, about the Cabinet, about political and career executives.

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[1] Although, on the latter point, one should mention the pioneering contributions of Arthur W. Macmahon and John D. Millett, *Federal Amdinistrators* (Columbia University Press, 1939) and of the sociologically oriented *Higher Civil Servants in American Society* by Reinhard Bendix (University of Colorado Press, 1949).

The Brookings Institution has undoubtedly been the major contributor to our expanding store of knowledge about these subjects,[2] and Mann's and Doig's book on *The Assistant Secretaries* is a significant addition to the series.[3] This is a study of Federal political appointments at the second level—i.e., under secretaries, assistant secretaries of departments and deputy administrators of certain agencies—in the Truman administration, the Eisenhower administration, and the first year of the Kennedy administration. It is based primarily upon interviews in some depth of, and about, a sample of 108 appointees to these positions. The interviewees include not alone the appointees themselves but also a great variety of others in the executive and legislative branches and elsewhere who had to do with their appointments, and also superior and career officer colleagues for purposes of evaluating their effectiveness. The objectives, as stated by the authors were (1) "to obtain information on the 108 appointments"—their backgrounds, their views of the job, their reasons for leaving, the effect of the jobs on their careers, etc.; (2) "to gain a broader perspective of the whole recruitment process"; and (3) "to obtain additional appraisals on the general level of political executive performance," in this instance the sample being broadened to comprehend 317 different political executives who were rated by 43 officials aquainted with their work.

The product is a well organized, readable, and highly informative account of an important segment of the Federal administration which students of American public administration, administrative politics, and the sociology of our public administration will not want to miss. The text is liberally sprinkled with accounts of individual cases which this reader found interesting though somewhat distracting: partly because I found myself repeatedly trying to identify the characters hidden behind the pseudonyms; partly because the cases seemed to illustrate everything and made generalization almost impossible. The statistical data are interesting and suggestive although some might have been more authoritative had the sample been larger. The authors' own observations, generalizations, and conclusions, interspersed through the book, and the recommendations in the closing chapter are perhaps its most useful features. They sometimes confirm, sometimes question, sometimes refute one's own beliefs and prejudices. There are occasional confusions and seeming contradictions. Thus, "The ratings given raise serious doubts whether there is any important causal relationship between occupational background and performance." But in the paragraphs which follow, " . . . government officials as a group were considered to be better executives than men who came exclusively from the private sector"; and "men from primary careers in banking and finance . . . were given the highest ratings. . . . Executives from private industry (mainly manufacturing) . . . were given much poorer ratings." Are the authors suggesting that the ratings themselves are unreliable? Incidentally, the academic fraternity will be interested, though perhaps not totally surprised, that ". . . those holding doctoral degrees and those who had no college education were the two groups having the highest percentage of *below average* ratings." (Parentheses and italics added; all quotes from pp. 247–250.)

One concludes this work like other studies of this kind, with a sense of vague disquiet: that he has added significantly to his knowledge; but that he needs a conceptual framework about American society and its government within which, or against which, to fit the emperical findings. This is no criticism of the book, which is altogether an admirable and important contribution. Although the authors find things to criticize and to recommend in their concluding chapter, one's general reaction is that on the whole the assistant secretaries are competent, hardworking, and dedicated. But are they representative of the American people and their interests? (In sociological terms, they clearly are not, whether considered geographically or occupationally or economically.) Are they politically responsive, and if so, to whom —and should they be? How do they relate to the age-old issues of policy and administration and politics and administration? Where do they fit in the efficiency syndrome of career bureaucracy? Are they, or are some of them, a part of a "power elite" *a la* C. Wright Mills (or Dwight Eisenhower) or of an "establishment" *a la* Richard Rovere? Perhaps some profound social scientist may soon pull together our accumulating knowledge about our government and governors into a new and fresh synthesis. The models of administration-politics, of bureaucracy, and of elites which we have inherited from the past are hardly adequate for the complexity and pace of America's governmental world today. But pluralism as an end-all and escape-all is not very satisfying either.

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[2] There is not space here for a proper bibliographical listing, but such a list would surely include the studies by David and Pollack on *Executives for Government* (1957), Bernstein on *The Job of the Federal Executive* (1958), Henry on *Presidential Transitions* (1960), Stanley on *Professional Personnel for the City of New York* (1963), *The Higher Civil Service* (1964), and *Changing Administrations* (1965) and Kilpatrick *et al.*, *The Image of the Federal Service* with its accompanying *Source Book* (1964).

[3] It will by no means conclude the Brookings contributions. Probably to be published this year is a study by Stanley, Mann, and Doig, tentatively entitled *Men Who Govern: A Biographical Profile of Federal Political Executives, 1933–65.*

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BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the Origins of Social Theory. By Alvin W. Gouldner. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publ., 1965. Pp. ix, 407. $8.50.)

Enter Plato, Alvin Gouldner tells us, is an attempt at a viable history of Platonic social theory. The author has undertaken what is a substantially new kind of enterprise for himself because of his belief that the histories of social theory written to date are substantial failures. The successful study of social theory, in his view, requires the creation of a new intellectual genre, "'a genre' which will be one part history, one part sociology, one part criticism, the whole encased in a membranous boundary permitting the mutual access of facts to values and of technical analysis to cultural interests."

Enter Plato then is in part a sociology of knowledge which uses our contemporary sociological and analytic sophistication to comprehend both the triumphs and flaws of Platonic theory, not only as those of Plato himself but as culture-linked. The effort is a work of analytic power, creative insight, and breadth of focus that is all too rare among current publications. At times the reader is so swept up by the author's command and use of psychology, political science, anthropology, communications theory, sociology, social psychology, aesthetics, etc. that he lets his critical guard down. Fascination with the author's theoretical agility is liable to inhibit any hard critique of the evidence for and the plausibility of Gouldner's applications of modern theories to the Athenian world.

The book's applications of modern behavioralistic insight to Hellenic culture and Platonic amelioratives for that culture are imaginative and arresting. For example, Gouldner analyzes the traditional Greek "contest system" in terms of game theory and shows such contests to have caused grave tensions for the Hellenic world because they approximated a zero-sum game. He then shows how Plato's emphasis on wisdom and temperance as goals for which men should contest converted the game to a non-zero-sum one, which was less disruptive to the society as a whole. In another application of modern insight, the author uses conflict and communications theory to spell out, more clearly and explicitly than Plato himself could do, why the latter's emphasis on a division of labor and specialization would alleviate the social disunity which plagued Attica. Of course, Gouldner is able to do more than support and refine Platonic insight with his modern perspective. He also uses it to reveal internal flaws in the ideal polis postulated and worked out in *The Republic* and *The Laws*. For example, by using the notion of status congruency he shows that Plato's hope of increasing the prestige hierarchy vis-à-vis the other two basic status hierarchies of wealth and power was destined to face grave difficulties.

Gouldner is more than a critic of Plato; he is also a sociologist of Platonic and Hellenic knowledge. One of the most fascinating parts of the book is his analysis of the cultural and social sources of Platonic metaphysics in which he attempts to connect the Greek distrust of nature as inherently disorderly to the Hellenic institution of slavery. By showing that the Athenian citizen was psychologically compelled to treat slaves as nonpersons, he suggests that the citizen was unable to comprehend them. Since the citizen's interpersonal world was intimately interwoven with these "nonpersons" from early childhood on, he generalized his own experience of their unpredictability and strangeness to his whole social surroundings and thus came to believe in the inherent disorder of nature.

Gouldner not only exposes Plato to this kind of sociology of knowledge analysis, but cites as one of the essential lacunae of *The Laws* the absence of just such an approach by Plato himself. He argues that while Plato focuses on the psychological causes of man's ignorance and anomia, i.e., his natural drives which subvert his reason, he fails to see explicitly and systematically the social conditions which cause and foster ignorance.

Having shown some of the ways in which Gouldner uses modern social theory to refine, analyze, and criticize Plato, we must now examine the methodological validity of the author's arguments. One must have reservations about the kinds of evidence Gouldner musters in supporting his propositions. For example, he cites both the popular drinking songs of Attica and the works of the great tragedians in trying to assess what values the Greeks held dear and how they saw the world. One may well ask whether those two expressive media were addressed to the same audience or, for that matter, created by the same segments of the population. At times Gouldner seems to take the citizenry of the polis as a group sharing the same values and cognitive orientation. Might it not be just as probable, if not more so, that the belief systems of the members of even this select group of freemen substantially varied in depth, structure, and basic orientation. Even if the citizenry were culturally monolithic in some sense, how justified is it to take the works of the immortal poets as guides to the values of the average citizen?

Gouldner tries to anticipate the above criticism by showing that the growth of the philosophic rationalism of Plato was not discontinuous with the intellectualism of the average Athenian urbanite. His "evidence" for this judgment, however the radically rational nature of Solon's reforms, Hesiod's description of the good man, and Homer's characterization of Odysseus, is far from convincing. After all, descriptions of Homeric heroes and of the work of one of the greatest statesmen of Hellenic history cannot be accepted as indicators of the values and orientations of the average Greek citizen. The author's dilemma, like that of many historians, is that he has no better evidence. If he is to try to come to grips with the Hellenic world and Plato from his own modern, sociological perspective, he must make the best use of what he has. His enterprise is a worthy one, and we cannot expect the same methodological standards of his work on Plato that we would were he analyzing a contemporary social theorist. We can, however, expect him to be aware of and to point out the methodological limits and problems of his enterprise.—SIDNEY R. WALDMAN, *Haverford College.*

Marxismus und das menschliche Individuum. BY ADAM SCHAFF. (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1965. Pp. 349. Translated from the Polish, *Marksizm a jednostka ludzka.*)

On October 12, 1965, a Secretary of the Polish Party's Central Committee, Zenon Kliszko, specifically attacked Schaff and this book, claiming that it encouraged "imperialism's present tactic, calculated to make socialism 'softer'." Schaff, in the name of "true" Marxism, defends it as "revolutionary humanism," placing the fullest possible development of the individual human personality as the primary goal of socialism. He bases his arguments principally on Marx's "younger" work, written in 1848. He claims that three factors combine to require a general reassessment of Marxist ideology: the publication only in 1932 of this 1848 work significantly changes the meaning of Marxism, inserting important elements not known to earlier Marxists; the end of Stalinism and the resulting thaw in ideological position; and the fact that socialism now exists in several countries, and is sufficiently firmly established to be able to afford a truly critical look at itself unencumbered by overwhelming concern with survival alone.

Schaff refreshingly deals with *Brave New World* (Aldous Huxley), *1984* (George Orwell), *We* (Zamyatin), and many other criticisms of Communism from all parts of the ideological spectrum. He recognizes all sorts of problems as "real" under both socialism and capitalism, grouping most of them together under "alienation." While insisting that "his" Marx deals far more effectively with the roots of alienation than does capitalism or any other ideology or society, he also delineates many specific causes of alienation in contemporary socialist countries. Tyranny and de-humanization must be countered by "rehabilitation" of the individual. The State continues to be an instrument of fore, and alienates many. The specialized, hierarchical bureaucracy, with accompanying significant differences in standard-of-living of various groups, leads to frustration and dissatisfaction. "Substituting decrees for truth" does not work, and censorship and State interference in science and art cause alienation. Defining the good life from above can never satisfy men, who must define it for themselves, and their definitions inevitably differ.

Schaff also contends that the present socialist elite fails to provide a desirable "model" for new, non-egotistic, socialist man. The fear of the outcome of free discussion and silencing of criticism alienates many. Anti-Semitism and anti-intellectualism are encouraged instead of combatted by the leadership. The educational system abysmally fails to meet contemporary conditions and demands. Conservatism and traditionalism mark many of the leaders, who resist instead of encourage change. Delinquency, hooliganism, and drunkenness are concrete manifestations of alienation under socialism. Some socialist countries are just as underdeveloped as any other countries in the world, and the socialist camp's uneven economic stature causes alienation.

The depersonalization of man in industrial society, the mechanization and automation of production, the ever-increasing specialization of modern life, affect socialists as they do capitalists. But yet, Schaff argues that socialism is superior to capitalism in that it has eliminated two of the many sources of alienation: private property and worship of money.

Loneliness, fear, isolation, boredom, uncertainty, all exist in modern socialist countries. Some of this will always exist; these sentiments are even enjoyed by some people and constitute their version of happiness. They will never disappear completely, but socialism's task is to eliminate as many as possible of the economic and social causes. Socialism to Schaff is "a social order of the true and full development of the individual personality of every single person," although he sometimes transmutes this into the greatest good for the greatest possible number. Communism, states Schaff, does not make *identical* the interests of the individual and of society; to him, this perverts Marxism.

The State will not wither away, and professional bureaucracy is a necessity. Absolute equality of men will never prevail. New professional and social groups form under socialism. He quotes Orwell, "All animals are equal, but some are more equal than others."

The individual must enjoy unforced choice among various alternatives, and that choice cannot be made for him. Socialist man is also "condemned to freedom." Collision of opposing viewpoints is "the soul of the dialectic," and no one, Politburo or not, can prejudge the outcome.

But then Schaff recoils from the implications of his own statements: the State should "interfere no more than is necessary," and "clearly false and reactionary views should be silenced." "The connection between culture and politics must be recognized, and be handled with appreciation of full responsibility for political implications." Schaff in this justifies Kliszko.

Schaff assumes that peaceful coexistence will last a long time, and that changes in capitalism will be evolutionary in character. In these conditions, Schaff also dares to suggest that not only will socialism be influencing capitalism, but also capitalism will influence socialism. He does not go on, however, to postulate an ultimate convergence.

Probably psychologically sound is Schaff's proposition that government by central command, intolerance of criticism and opposition, interference in and censorship of quarrels of all sorts in all areas of thought, "is directly proportional to political and ideological weakness" felt by the leaders; that those who have faith in their ideology do not fear the outcome of the open clash of ideas.

Schaff also argues that freedom and independent thought require practice, all the more in countries which have no history of centuries of practice of bourgeois democracy. The "military" type of command in socialist countries, the requirement of unquestioning obedience, will always alienate, and will cripple the potential range of the individual human personality. Perhaps Schaff's position can be summed up as, "Marx vs. Lenin," although the author himself of course never attacks Lenin or discusses "Leninism."

He hits hard at anti-Semitism (pp. 290–292). He underlines the hypocrisy of East European socialists expressing solidarity with Negroes, when their countries have absolutely no Negro problem. Their specific "racist" problem is anti-Semitism, which the leaders try to hide or to deny. Schaff insists that the Communist Party, as the ruling elite, bears the political and moral responsibility for this, and that the image this elite sets of "new socialist man" is tainted by racism, and racists cannot (in Schaff's formulation) be true Communists.

Schaff argues that the Polish educational system, at least, is "fantastically conservative," and must be changed without delay. He judges that the faults are fundamental: the number of years in school is far too few for the mass of the population, and the use of the present limited school-time is simply not adapted to present and foreseeable future conditions. The education now is much too narrowly technical and job oriented; the masses must be prepared for increasing free time, and need artistic and cultural study.

He sees automation and "electronic brains" as increasingly shortening the workday and work-week, changing the whole pace of "work" in society. This ought to be a turning point: "We stand before the greatest revolution in the history of mankind," and he welcomes it, but believes that happiness will not result without preparation of the mass of the people for it. Otherwise it will be a psychological and social disaster.

Some of his comments and analysis concern Poland specifically. He states that especially in the years 1956–1958, it was popular for Polish young people to picture the "early Marx" as good, and the "mature Marx" as dogmatic and useless. Schaff himself argues that the mature Marx flows logically and systematically from early Marx, and constitutes a positive and unified whole, but he judges that the important humanistic concerns of the early Marx have been ignored by most later Marxists.

He also characterizes Poland's historical heritage as including non-conformity and lack of social discipline. He depicts "one of the most serious results of the confusion after October" as "this sickness" of great popularity of sensational novels, comics, Wild West stories, and movie "sex bombs."

Schaff bitterly condemns the evil done by Stalin and the "personality cult" (pp. 270–271; 280–281), and argues that the phenomenon is impossible to understand, to fight, and to overcome without seriously analyzing its real social causes. It cannot be dismissed as an "accidental" development.

All this seems to come to an honest and thoughtful argument for tolerance, decency, and honesty; clear recognition of serious problems *not* solved by socialism; an "optimistic" expectation that many but not all of the problems can be solved; and all within a context of Marxist ideology. Schaff in a sense presents a blueprint of the way in which

Marxism might in fact "mellow" without ever attacking the ideology of its founder. It should also be seen as one of many arguments in contemporary Communism for far-reaching modifications and changes. The official attack on it probably will not stifle Schaff, and certainly will not stop others from pursuing such lines of thought. The very survival of Communism will probably require the kind of flexibility Schaff wants, and voices like his will be heard in increasing number and intensity. And of course it will be far easier for us to live with Schaffs than with Stalins or Kliszkos. But Kliszko is still the Party Secretary. —ROBERT A. RUPEN, *University of North Carolina.*

Marxism in the Modern World. EDITED BY MILORAD M. DRACHKOVITCH. (Stanford, California: Published for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace by Stanford University Press, 1965. Pp. xv, 293. $5.95.)

Marxism in the Modern World is a by-product of the conference organized by the Hoover Institution in October, 1964, to mark the one hundredth anniversary of the founding of International I—the International Workingmen's Association—in London, on September 28, 1864. The volume covers the to-be-expected topics such as Leninism, Stalinism, Khrushchevism and Maoism, which are handled by some of the most distinguished names in *Western* journalism and scholarship. Unfortunately, however, no one from the "Marxist world" was asked to contribute to this symposium on "Marxism in the modern world," not even a Sartre or a Marcuse. This is partially understandable in terms of the sympathies and purposes of some of the Hoover Institution staff, who were heavily involved in the Goldwater candidacy in the summer and fall of 1964. It is nonetheless lamentable.

With the exception of one author, the low level of whose contribution should have precluded its inclusion in the collection, the renowned contributors do the first-rate kinds of jobs—and take the kinds of positions—that we have come to expect of them. In the order of their presentations: Raymond Aron ("The Impact of Marxism in the Twentieth Century") displays great grasp. Bertram Wolfe ("Leninism") once again demonstrates why he is considered one of our most gifted writers. Merle Fainsod's analysis ("Khrushchevism") is, as always, logical and clear. Adam Ulam's insights into "Titoism" remain, to my knowledge, the best around. Arthur Cohen ("Maoism") is able within the context of his particular point of view. Theodore Draper ("Castroism") is his same convince-through-the-sheer-mass-of-material self. Richard Lowenthal ("The Prospects for Pluralistic Communism") writes with comprehension and movement. My reaction to Boris Souvarine's chapter ("Stalinism") is indicated at the beginning of the paragraph.

If there is anything "new" in the volume, it is to be found in the "viewing anews" of Ulam and Lowenthal. Both are concerned, in part, with the problems and prospects of maintaining even a *formal* unity in the international movement. No Communist Party wants the collapse of the international component of Communism; but no significant Communist Party is willing to accept the control of any other Party. In this context Ulam concludes that "it is difficult to see how the Communist world could really become polycentric . . . the essence of Bolshevism from the beginning was that there was only one correct ideology, one correct road to power, and only one center of power and ideological arbiter."

The observation that the new is generally lacking here is not meant to indicate that the book is without value. It is an excellent, well-written and wide-ranging introduction admirably suited for the layman and the undergraduate.

Nor is it my intention to discourage the holding of "international" meetings such as this one organized at Stanford. (I am only sorry that no one was willing to foot my bill to the Coast.) The contacts and the unofficial exchanges of ideas and information are often of great value. The books that come out of such conferences, unfortunately, usually do not reflect that value, especially to the nonparticipating specialist. However, if we must have books to have conferences, then by all means, let us have books.

A final suggestion: for the editor, Mr. Drachkovitch. He tells us in the Introduction that the papers included in this volume were those presented on the second day of the conference. He expresses the expectation that the papers from the first and third days will be published in two separate volumes to appear at a later date. In light of highly reliable reports that have circulated as to the quality of those papers, I hope not.—DON N. JACOBS, *Miami University, Oxford, Ohio.*

Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict, rev. ed. BY JOAN V. BONDURANT. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965. Pp. xxiii, 271. $1.75.)

What to make of Gandhi? Joan Bondurant offers an answer by way of an impressive analysis of his invention of *satyagraha,* which she defines as a "technique of action" and regards as available to all who would moralize politics. This rather narrow definition reflects her assumption that Asian and Western orientations toward politics are fundamentally similar, and this governs the direction and results of the study. As "technique" *satyagraha* comes not as challenge or alternative, rather as pointing toward fulfillment of the liberal tradition of the west. The implications of this thesis are worked out with clarity and force against a conventional picture of western political theory; its justification is not directly faced.

Emergence of Gandhi's "philosophy of conflict" is examined in several episodes of *satyagraha* against a variety of opponents including Indians and the British. Clearly much more than moral *jujitsu* is involved, the defeat of a powerful adversary by the momentum of his own conscience. *Satyagraha* is a politicized metaethic. Gandhi used moral courage and conflict to discover moral "truth," and ideally the outcome of confrontation should be enlightenment and transformation of all concerned. No better elucidation of his methods has been presented; the interested will wish to consult also Arne Naess's *Gandhi and the Nuclear Age* and J. P. Narayan's *Socialism, Sarvodaya, and Democracy.*

From these perspectives, Bondurant conducts a comparison of Gandhi's ideas with Hindu philosophy, conservative and anarchist doctrine, and with the political theories of idealism, Marxism, and liberal democracy. This manages to be illuminating and yet curiously lacking in penetration, so it seems to me. Consider that Hindu *dharma*, unlike natural law, never translates into natural rights. This suggests that morality and politics are related differently in Indian and Western civilization, but the author has assumed this possibility away.

Gandhi is seen as transcending all types of western thought, although his is held to be in spirit closest to liberal democratic theory and practice, especially insofar as this depends upon faith in rational persuasion. Discussion, deliberation, and compromise are presented as "techniques" common to both Gandhian and democratic politics. Also both aim at justice through objectivity; Mary Parker Follett's "law of the situation" comes to mind. However, the spirit behind *satyagraha* is felt to be the more creative, to aim more deliberately at genuine integration than does liberal democracy. Perhaps comparison with Rousseau and Follett would have been appropriate here. More truly distinctive of *satyagraha* is willingness to resort to "self-suffering" to demonstrate sincerity and resolve, to establish mutual confidence by an ultimate display of integrity. Having defined *satyagraha* as "technique," Bondurant goes on to call "suffering" a "tactic." It looks rather more like a substitute for legal assurance of personal security and reciprocity, a moral stand-in for the *Leviathan.* In contrast to Gandhi's views, liberal and democratic thinking is allegedly characterized by a preoccupation with "ends," and with legally defined procedures and institutions, behind all of which stands the Hobbesian threat. Reliance on legality rather than morality implies violence, guarantees it; for legally defined objectives are sharply defined and inflexible; they preclude that ethical openness possible only to men directly engaged in creatively resolving their differences. Their very legalism implies that not will but force and fear are at the foundation of Western polities and politics. We are invited to move with Gandhi to higher ground, from compromise to integration, from legal to moral politics.

Bondurant does not explicitly consider the possibility that Gandhism embodies a conception of political activity quite different from that dominant in Western theory and experience. On the basis of religious feeling and metaphysical belief, Gandhi opposes potentiality for moral transfiguration to the rigidities of constitutionalism and legality. May it not be that his significance consists in an eruption of Eastern ethicism against Western legalism? He is resolutely opposed to reliance upon law and the state; these instrumentalities impair ethical dignity, hinder our moral vocation. He wants to intensify conscience; this requires repression of instinct, a process central to Gandhi's own life, and which would prevent the growth of a western type of personality. From the standpoint of the liberal tradition, Gandhism means the politicization of morality and inhibition of moral freedom.

Gandhi's ideal is not freedom under law, rather social justice enforced through the mobilization of moral sentiment, the equality and fraternity of *sarvodaya* as developed in the work of Vinoba and Narayan. Can his "experiments in truth" be transferred to a politics designed to release, not to absorb moral energy and individuality? Gandhi provides not a model, but a mirror, one which Joan Bondurant has brilliantly polished.—JOHN W. CHAPMAN, *University of Pittsburgh.*

The Social and Political Thought of Adam Ferguson. BY DAVID KETTLER. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1965. Pp. 325. $6.50.)

This is an interesting and useful study of the moral and political predicament of the 18th century *philosophes* among whom Adam Ferguson belongs. Ferguson was with Hume, Robertson, Smith, and Stewart a man who counted not only in Edinburgh but also in France and Germany for his books had a European as well as a British audience. He does not deserve his present-day neglect. Because he was a more representative figure than Hume or Smith, an analysis of his orientation and the roles he played can show typical problems of the *philosophes* not only in Britain but in Europe. This Kettler has done.

Part I, about a third of the book, is devoted to a description of Ferguson's milieu—the booming economy of Scotland, the '45, the universities and the Edinburgh intelligentsia they produced, the politics of Dundas—and a biographical sketch in which the dilemmas of the 18th century intellectual clearly emerge. Changing Scotland required analysis, criticism, and appraisal leading to action. But the social system separated thought and action by class barriers. The dialectic of social change gave rise to ambivalent feelings. Progress might mean increasing luxury and declining public spirit; the growing division of labor implied a constriction of view and functional inequality among workers which doomed republican ideals of social reorganization. Forced by conditions to seek the pattern and rationale of social change, but viewing ambivalently their results, and in no position to act themselves, *philosophes* like Ferguson tended to think wishfully of a society integrated by "benevolent fellowship" assuming a Republican form, or to accept the *status quo* modified to preserve liberties, or to see a reconciling force in an invisible hand of thé progressive enlightenment of Turgot and Condorcet. Action or passivity, withdrawal or struggle were alternatives not easily chosen and productive of tensions.

The second and final part of Kettler's book deals with these tensions in Ferguson's works. Outlining the epistemic bases of Ferguson's system, he goes on to describe the moral philosophy in which virtue and obligation are defined. Both have political implications; ambiguities here will be reflected in counsels to action. Ferguson largely disregarded Christian ethics; stoicism passive in nature coexists in his works with an heroic ethic requiring "restless perfectionism." Kettler argues that Ferguson appealed to the stoics when in his role as pedagogue he responded to the "pressures of convention" and provided his students with "respectable and useful maxims," and when as an ideologist he appealed to passive doctrines to justify the class structure. As a philosopher he was interested in the truth and validity of arguments, but being too caught up in practical problems, he never worked out a consistent system and stoicism vanished when he considered social progress. Ultimately Ferguson failed: intelligent idealism compromised with evil as it usually does with intellectuals. Kettler comes close to defining the role of the intellectual by this failure. The roles of philosopher, intellectual, pedagogue and moralist were and are, he maintains, practically incompatible.

The analysis is skillful but not always elegantly expressed. Occasionally digressions in the text, such as a discussion of Hume's reaction to *The History of Civil Society*, impede the argument and belong in the notes. Kettler has overplayed the significance of social change as a stimulus to thought. Ferguson's dilemmas are those of his time and owe much to the classics and to French contemporaries who needed no Scottish context to promote discussion. The book lacks a bibliography which would be useful even though it would duplicate material in the notes. We need more analytic studies of this kind; hopefully they will be as fine as this.—R. L. EMERSON, *The University of Western Ontario.*

Man's Nature and His Communities. BY REINHOLD NIEBUHR. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965. Pp. 125. $3.95.)

Reinhold Neibuhr is a very great man who is rightly regarded as one of the greatest, if not the greatest, of American theologians. It can happen, however, that not all of the works of a great man are great. This most recent book, *Man's Nature and His Communities*, is a case in point.

Niebuhr's central theme is the familiar one of man's inherent freedom which is both creative and destructive, of the human mixture of self-giving and self-seeking which undergirds and yet marrs the building of communities. This is a theme which Niebuhr has developed superbly in earlier and lengthier works, and no one can question its importance for politics. But the earlier works have a certain quality of faultlessness which carries through the many details and interrelationships with which he deals. Such is not the case with this book, for there are numerous corrections and changes of emphasis which the informed reader will want to make.

In the theological realm, many readers will take issue with Niebuhr's endorsement of a strictly biological view of the family reminiscent of Locke (p. 33), his assertion that Augustine and Luther "took no account of the persistence of self-love" (p. 43), his dismissal of Aquinas' eternal law as "nothing but a class ideology" (p. 50), his description of evangelicalism as individualist and perfectionist (p. 123). In the political science realm, many readers will also want to balk at a number of Niebuhr's statements, e.g. that Machiavelli "took for granted the parochial community of the Italian city-state" (p. 53), that Hobbes and Locke thought of their social contracts as historical categories (p. 55), that the Bill of Rights guarantees human rights to all "American citizens" (p. 100) when he should have said "all persons."

By far the most interesting part of the book is its introduction, entitled "Changing Perspectives," in which Niebuhr describes the latest evolution of his thought and his reaction to past criticisms. In general, his comment is that he has had an increasing sympathy toward the Roman

Catholic and Jewish traditions because he sees in them a greater appreciation for the social, economic, and political concerns of man. Correspondingly, he states that he has moved away from what he calls Protestant "individualism" and "perfectionism." Unfortunately, Niebuhr does not make it clear that he is speaking of the specifically 19th century American distortion of Protestantism which has no authentic basis in the thought and life of the great Reformers.

The most probable source of the retreat in content and quality of *Man's Nature and His Communities* from the heights of *The Nature and Destiny of Man* is to be found in the following statement: "But my pedagogical error consisted in seeking to challenge modern optimism with the theological doctrine which was anathema to modern culture." (P. 23.) This diagnosis caused Niebuhr to "use more sober symbols of describing well-known facts." (P. 24.) In doing so, Niebuhr downgraded the very thing which has been his life work's outstanding and distinctive contribution, namely: the theological dimension. There is a vast difference between communicating effectively with modern culture and surrendering to it.—RENE DE VISME WILLIAMSON, *Louisiana State University.*

Freedom and the Public: Public and Private Morality in America. BY DONALD MEIKLEJOHN. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965. Pp. ix, 163. $4.95.)

In this stimulating little volume, the author addresses himself to what he describes as "our most urgent need in political theory," the clarification of the American public interest and the public morality which it requires.

The author finds the origins of the current problem of American public morality, as well as its potential solution, in the ambiguous legacy of political thought bequeathed by the Founding Fathers. The tendency to regard public and private interests as inherently opposed and to identify freedom wholly with the private sphere is to be fought by a re-dedication to the positive side of the Founders' teaching and example, which found the fulfillment of individual freedom in public service. Taking his direction from Kant and Rousseau, the author seeks to discover the foundations for a more truly "popular" government and the means of bringing into being a true "public."

Following Kant, the author insists that the universal principle which is to define the appropriate public morality must be formal or procedural. And the form appropriate to a respect for human dignity is the democratic form. The primary popular commitment must therefore be to the form of decision making and to the conditions necessary to its successful operation; commitment to the resultant substantive policy goals is secondary.

Whether or not this can suffice as a practical solution to the problem of interest group politics and the lack of popular commitment to the public interest hinges on our acceptance of the author's belief that the commitment to form can "be practically an end of primary importance" to members of the public even though it may be "temporally or psychologically secondary." The available evidence on this point is far from clear-cut, but for these purposes, psychological primacy may be indistinguishable from practical primacy. The commitment to the form may ultimately depend on the palatability of the substantive results, even for the most sophisticated democrats. And adherence to proper form may be insufficient to insure the requisite popular enthusiasm for the public policies which result. Perhaps this is the lesson of our ambiguous legacy.

In what is perhaps the least satisfactory aspect of his analysis, the author takes extensive issue with contemporary "liberal" and "conservative" thinkers. "Liberal" thought is characterized as "Praise of the Private Association," and is criticized for its tendency to assume that only the individual or the private association, but not the public, can be a valid source of authoritative moral claims. The result is a "traffic policeman" conception of government as a neutral adjuster of conflicting group claims, lacking scope and initiative as well as any principle to direct the adjustment. "Conservative" thought is characterized as the "Call to Public Virtue," and is criticized for its insistence on a detailed substantive moral code, the discovery or acceptance of which is necessarily restricted to the few, but which is to be "imposed willy nilly" on the populace when persuasion fails. Where the "liberals" err in emphasizing an individualistic conception of freedom, the "conservatives," in their enthusiasm for virtue, err in relegating freedom to a lower order of political ends. Where the "liberals" err in an excessive preoccupation with "facts" to the exclusion of judgments of value in the course of their analyses, the "conservatives" err in phrasing their arguments in metaphysical terms and excluding "facts," "particulars," and "everyday experiences."

Doubtless, many students of politics, like this reviewer, will have difficulty in locating themselves within these simple categories as they are described. And some of the specific authors discussed will be aggrieved at some of the views implicitly attributed to them in the author's criticism by categories.

The author persuasively maintains that only a "positive" government can elicit the necessary enthusiasm of the people. In the sphere of business, government is to intervene to insure fair competition and the channeling of individual talents into socially significant activity. Education is to be the preferred style of intervention; coercion is to be employed only as a last resort. The author concludes that government must bring more social scientists and related experts into governmental service to analyze and appraise business activity and its effects; and it must also bring business talent to bear on the educational system via participation on a government board which is to plan the broad outlines of educational policy for the nation.

In his discussion of the responsibility of government to foster free and searching public discussion of public affairs, the author defends the "absolutist" view in a semantically confusing way, arguing that "freedom of discussion can be absolute without a commitment to the unimpeded liberty of all utterance." The argument tends to obscure the real issue which has so frequently divided members of the Supreme Court and academic writers.

In the final chapter, the author argues for the application of the same formal moral principles in the field of foreign policy, while avoiding the excess of "Moralism." This rich and teasingly brief expansion of three lectures delivered by the author at the Carnegie Institute of Technology in 1960 is a useful contribution to the continuing dialogue on democratic theory.—ALLAN D. NELSON, *University of Waterloo.*

The Political Theory of American Local Government. BY ANWAR HUSSAIN SYED. (New York: Random House, 1966. Pp. 211. $2.25.)

Professor Syed has produced a sorely needed work—an analysis of the political thought behind the development of American state and local governmental institutions. There are few, if any, books which probe the underpinnings of American self-government so thoroughly as does this particular document.

The author examines certain political myths which are connected with state and local government. Some of the myths dealt with are: (1) the notion that the government closest to the people is the best; (2) the idea that the government that governs least is the best; (3) the belief that local and state institutions are the training ground for democracy; (4) the Jeffersonian teaching that the "ward republic" is the most desirable unit of government because of its closeness to agraria (related to this is the notion that the agrarian-oriented unit of government is far superior to the depraved urban-oriented unit); and, most importantly, the author opens up to inspection the fifth myth of American democracy, which states that, because of the previous four "facts" and on account of the concomitant "fact" that a democrat will be interested in, informed of, and an active participant in, public affairs, local government will function well because the citizenry will desire it.

The author relies quite often upon what he refers to as the Jeffersonian and Madisonian schools of American political thought. He examines the relevance of these schools of thought to the question of state, local and national sovereignty as well as their effect upon the above myths. Professor Syed succinctly states the crux of the problem underlying not only the academic problem of relevance, but also the practical political agent's dilemma of advocating certain "truths" publicly but knowing full well that these enunciations are nothing more than rhetorical platitudes which *must* be forgotten and ignored when it comes time to execute the governmental act:

> If Jefferson's theory is poor, if it cannot be followed in practice, a widespread belief in its essential goodness and efficacy must engender cynicism among the people, hypocrisy among politicians, and disorderly thinking among planners and reformers. (P. 20.)

Although Professor Syed's endeavor is a most impressive one, it is not perfect. One of the most disturbing imperfections is analogous to that human trait known as being able to see someone else's failing but not your own. The author admonishes those who have written in the past and who will do so in the future "to state their fundamental political values and assumptions. The experience may have an educative value for them as well as for their audience." (P. 5.) But nowhere does the author take his own advice. Even after reading his work in toto one wonders just what position the author has taken on any one of a number of issues. Closely related to this problem is the fact that at many points throughout the work the reader is at a loss as to where Jefferson, Hamilton, Merriam, Burke, Dillon, Cooley and Syed end and begin.

The author is also guilty of committing a lapse in logic. He quotes *Federalist* No. 9 and C. E. Merriam proving that Hamilton was really convinced that two sovereigns could exist and act in harmony (p. 7). However, Syed then states that Hamilton, "In the secrecy of the Philadelphia convention . . . expressed *different ideas*" (italics added) by stating that "two sovereignties cannot co-exist within the same limits." (P. 8.) Having thus brought into question just where Hamilton really stood on this issue, the author then states that Hamilton "had no doubt that governmental functions could be divided." (P. 8.) No one would argue the veracity of the Hamiltonian *Federalist* or "secret" Philadelphia statements, but the conclusion presented by Syed is therefore quite questionable—questionable, that is, due to the line of reasoning used, not because of objective reality. He manages to rescue himself very effectively by pointing out that Hamilton believed in both cases that two sovereigns could exist harmoniously as long as their sovereignty did not overlap or otherwise come into conflict. This being so, then, the Philadelphia statements were not really "different ideas."

Later in the book the author discusses the principle of direct legislation in the chapter entitled "Government by the People." He notes that Oberholtzer pointed out that the founding fathers had "deliberately rejected direct democracy . . . the progressives (on the other hand) would not only give the alien, the Negro, the poor and the ignorant the right to vote for elective office but also the right to make, interpret and enforce the law." According to Oberholtzer, "This might all be democratic; unfortunately, it was also un-American and un-English!" (P. 86.) Syed jumps to the offense and states that "Oberholtzer's observation . . . is only partly correct." (P. 86.) He then shows that Thomas Paine spoke of the "whole" body politic of England in his *Common Sense*, but then the author equivocates and admits that both Paine and Jefferson got their inspiration from the French Revolution; thus perhaps Oberholtzer was right after all. Yet, the author never attempts to explain, one way or the other, Oberholtzer's charge that popular suffrage was un-American, perhaps the *most* relevant concept to be dealt with.

In his final chapter, "Reflections," the author does a trifle more recalling than reflecting. The first few pages are especially redundant. He does make one recommendation for fighting the growth of big government, but one wonders which would be worse, the sickness or the "cure." Says the author:

> When we proclaim the departure of the horse-and-buggy age and insist that government must adapt its fundamental principles and structure to the socioeconomic consequences of our modern technology, we might well pause to ask if it would not be appropriate also to guide the movement of technology, to control its 'problem-creating' potential in such a way that the governmental order does not have to be altered radically in order to accommodate social change. (P. 171.)

Thus, to help solve the problem of the growth of government, he proposes a governmental concept which would require a penetration of the economy by the government to such an extent that it might help the problems of "social change." But what about economic growth and governmental responsibility?

Perhaps the most valuable analytical summation is in fact the author's last observation that, although the historic and contemporary theoretical and practical political debates *vis-à-vis* local self-government revolve around the Jeffersonian and Madisonian schools of thought, both schools' basic premises ["natural right, the social contract, sovereignty of the individual, direct democracy, individualism" and "the sovereignty of reason . . . disinterestedness in the pursuit of truth and justice . . . representative democracy, vigor of government in the service of the people" (pp. 186–87)] are all basic and well-accepted American political values. We are left to mediate three possible resolutions: (1) the Jeffersonian school will become totally accepted (which the author has discounted as a real possibility at several points); (2) the Madisonian ideals will prevail (there is some indication that the author sees this as a likely course to be taken); or (3) we will continue on our present course, mouthing Jeffersonianism but practicing Madisonianism (as Syed indicates, this represents a real danger to our system because of its inconsistencies as perceived by the already apathetic public).—RONALD C. GREEN, *Millersville State College, Pa.*

The Uncommitted: Alienated Youth in American Society. BY KENNETH KENISTON. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965. Pp. 500. $8.50.)

> "The historical gains of Americans—in health, material goods, opportunities for choice, freedom from dogma, in pluralism, political freedom, and in sociability—may well outweigh the problems I have detailed, yet the human toll of our society should still concern us most. In fact, however, I think it concerns us hardly at all: we attend too fully to the technological achievements, values, virtues, and skills of America, and forget the price we pay." (Pp. 400–1.)

This book is about a severely "alienated" group of Harvard undergraduates; the personal factors that have led to their rejection of American society, and the demands of our achieving society that led to their *choice* of private alienation. Keniston is saying that the rate and direction of change in America, modified by personality development, are sources of modern stress—historical dislocation interacts with personal dislocation. The historical dislocation includes our emphasis on technological values and the institutional structures in which they dominate. The personal dislocation, among his selected group of those who will not conform to these expectations, is an emphasis on experience rather than competence, a longing for the incomplete childhood (and the father who was not there) and a denial of "the tyranny of the ego" that sustains contemporary organizational life with its adult responsibilities.

Based on comparative analysis of clinical data (a more technical, companion work is forthcoming), the author investigates the intimacies of childhood fantasies and the public symbols of our culture's intellectual tradition. It is all there: the repressed idealism and impulse life attendent on our loss of utopian faith, the compartmentalization of work and family, the specialization of a functioning, complex society, the childhood "victor who lost" by cultivating the intellect—in part to meet his mother's thwarted artistic needs—so that his estrangement was not acted out but remained within himself.

But Keniston goes well beyond psychoanalytic interpretation in stressing that his subjects (and his students) are intensely affected by the "normal" strains and stresses of our highly developed society. In an elite university to which many apply and few are chosen, they are in the vanguard of estrangement; a self-conscious, introspective anti-elite. Just as in nineteenth century Vienna cases of hysteria were the most overt costs of a functioning bourgeois society, the debts of our fruitful, overdeveloped culture, contends Keniston, are most visible in the human waste among sensitive and talented youth.

Moreover, in a clear restatement of alienation theory, the author summarizes that "the young men with whom this book begins are a group of *individually alienated* youths, whose alienation is manifest primarily in the areas of ideology, culture, and internalization as criticism, repudiation, and withdrawal. Their alienation is explicit and 'chosen'; its immediate *agent* is the self. Its *focus* is on the dominant cultural values of their society; its *mode* tends to be somewhat autoplastic." (Pp. 474–5.) Rooted in the historical and social losses of modern technological society, *this* form of estrangement is not manifest in either "acting out" within youth culture or in political ideology and behavior. Thus, in a viable, democratic society, politicization attached to some degree of utopian ideology would enrich both the individual and his political system. A moderate increase in structured, non-violent public conflict and tension can benefit the body politic.

The subtle and intricate development of this thesis are to be found in the book. For this is a book, not a research report, within the genre of social criticism and interpretation to which Fromm, Mills, Rieff, and Riesman are prominent contributors. Moreover, it is written with grace and without rancor. Refreshingly free of ideological posturing against a political or academic establishment, unconcerned with upholding or debunking ideology, aware of the complexities that do not lead to the womb of a regressive community, Keniston contributes the complex and sensitive product of a mind at work with a substantive problem, namely the reduction of social costs in a culture where change and progress are synonyms.

Mr. Keniston, a psychologist, assumes that the American political system is highly stable, that there are no public models for our own development, and that social science theory and analysis can serve to enhance human development. He urges the liberation of affect and impulse life in the commonweal's service. ("The Utopian impulse . . . runs deep in all human life, and especially deep in American life. What is needed is to free that impulse once again, to redirect it toward the creation of a better society." P. 444.)

What, then, are the uses of this book (this kind of book) to the professional political scientist, his research in progress, and his students in the classroom? What, indeed, is its relevance to extant theories of modernization and socialization which ask, and in turn answer, different questions about system stability and functioning? And, to make sure I am understood, what is the relevance of a book about the costs of economic and intellectual reductionism on behalf of technological values to our behavioral persuasion now "with tenure" in the discipline and the academy?

These are, of course, structural questions and their applicability to empirical research and viable theory are critical. Mr. Keniston, then, has something to say about personal and political freedom. And the use of his book in framing research questions may provide not only the playfulness of ideas to be served by an unguarded ego, but the political and educational supports to enhance "a society (which) enjoys and supports human fulfillment." Social scientists, it is painfully clear, are neither Deified Scientists nor Omnipotent Critics. But we have, as Kenneth Keniston illustrates, an intellectual and public sensibility to guide model-building and the uses of our own technological apparatus.—EDGAR LITT, *University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee.*

Political Theory and Ideology. ED. BY JUDITH N. SHKLAR. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966. Pp. ix, 134.)

This volume of essays could perhaps be more accurately entitled *Political Theory Interpreted as Ideology.* The majority of the essays assume the perspective of the "sociology of knowledge" and see political thought as a reflection of class interests or collective psychic needs. There is scarce recognition by most of the authors that the relationship between political theory and ideology is a problem, and that the two modes of reflecting on politics may well be distinct from each other. Thus, we learn from Alfred von Martin that Machiavelli was the spokesman of the *haute bourgeosie* in an age of decline, and that the Florentine secretary adopted a "proto-Fascist point of view. . . . " (P. 23.) Christopher Hill writes that "the whole essence of Hobbes's approach to politics, his mental atmosphere and presuppositions, are 'bourgeois.'" (P. 37.) To C. B. Macpherson, Locke is a "bourgeois philosopher" whose political thought can best be understood in the light of presuppositions, taken for granted, which he "in common with many others of his class and time, entertained about his own society." (P. 66.) Harold Laski's well-known interpretation of liberalism (in this case, the liberalism of the French Enlightenment) as the ideology of the bourgeoisie is included. Not unexpectedly, selections from Karl Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia* occupy a central place in the volume. From Mannheim we learn that "Marxism discovered anew that in historical and political matters there can be no 'pure theory'" and that "behind every theory there lie collective points of view." (P. 106.) Mannheim finds that "every form of historical and political thought is essentially conditioned by the life situation of the thinker and his groups" (*ibid.*) and that "our thinking is determined by our social position" (p. 107). (Apparently, for Mannheim, "condition" and "determine" mean the same thing.)

Balance is provided in the volume by several essays and excerpts contributed by scholars who are teaching or have taught at Harvard: Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Michael Waltzer, Louis Hartz, and Judith Shklar. Their contributions are diverse enough to make this reviewer inclined to doubt that their thinking has been "determined" by their common Harvard milieu, however. Shklar's introductory essay, written especially for this volume, is excellent, and she pinpoints the major failing of the ideological interpretation when she observes that

> the 'reductionism' of the recent past, which was so concerned to 'uncover' the common social sources of all thinking and the deceptive function of ideas, has obviously nothing to say about the vast qualitative difference between the sloganlike utterances that act as cohesives for mass parties and the reflections of the great political theorists of the past and the work of the best contemporary social scientists. (P. 18.)

Leo Strauss put the matter very well when he wrote in *Persecution and the Art of Writing* that the sociology of knowledge "failed to consider the possibility that all philosophers form a class by themselves, or that what unites all genuine philosophers is more important than what unites a given philosopher with a particular group of nonphilosophers." Indeed, perhaps it would have been wise to include a selection from Strauss's work, as well as Hannah Arendt's exceedingly important essay on "Ideology and Terror," in this volume. Despite certain omissions, however, this is a useful volume for students of the history of political thought in that it reprints several essays that are not readily available and, particularly in Shklar's essay, focuses on the deficiencies of viewing all political thinking as ideological in nature. Through reflection on the deficiencies of such an approach we have good prospect of recovering the authentic meaning of political theory in the coming decades of what Mrs. Shklar calls the "post-ideological age."—DANTE GERMINO, *Rockefeller Foundation and University of the Philippines.*

The Masks of Society. BY JOHN F. A. TAYLOR. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966. Pp. viii, 273. $5.00.)

The search for principle is characteristic of troubled times. The trouble as seen by Taylor is to be found in the market of ideas, and in the prevailing ideas—Marxism, naturalism and positivism. He contends that these ideas have failed us and caused the confusion that befuddles us. Therefore, he sets out to rediscover the covenants of civilization, and he finds them in Juristic philosophy, which is an inquiry into "the phenomenon of obligation in each of the several domains of civilized activity." (P. 11.)

The question posed by "Juristic philosophy" is, "What is the fundamental convenant of human community in any of its forms," or, "What conditions are essential if men are to stand in the dignity of persons in each other's presence?" (P. 12.) The method for discovering "the fundamental covenant" and "conditions" is the method of Michelet, which is that of climbing inside one's subject, and having a capacity for objective sympathy, "for entering vicariously into the past of another, for resurrecting into life, and out of old forms, the spirit of the dead" (p. 16); that is, to grasp the innermost feeling of our subject, we must adopt the point of view of the participant, not the external spectator. This is the only approach to overcome "dogmatic scepticism" (positivism), a scepticism that advocates the universal priesthood of disbelievers and "sets itself a problem which it forbids itself to answer." (P. 4.) The nemesis of this angle of "blind" vision is that "our sceptic generation has lost sight of its own artifice" (community) (p. 111), and we have begun to assume that "men have peace wherever outwardly they have no war, that men have community whenever, as the positivist phrase has it, convergent patterns of behavior preponderate over divergent ones." (P. 255.) The by-product of this scepticism is manifestly a political science of "police administration" that "celebrates the constable" and forgets the consensual community, which alone can ever justify the constable's act or require it (p. 105).

To answer Marxism and reverse this ominous trend in contemporary political science, we must delineate the underpinnings of western civilization; and this task consists in rediscovering the western tradition and internalizing its values. In brief, we must disclose the convenants of history, nature, inquiry and art, which is to say, the moral community, the moral agent, and the free and creative individual.

The convenant (the term refers to agreement to which one consents and to the act of giving consent) of history, according to Taylor, is the Hebrew tradition whose hallmark is "I put on justice and it clothed me" (Job 29:14 and p. 23), which is a declaration of the acquisition of the "masks" (roles) of community, and the end of amoral nature. How the "masks" were discovered and articulated was the essential contribution of the Hebrew tradition—a tradition produced in "seclusion" as a result of the "soliloquy" in which the Jew was engaged that enabled him to belong "at one and the same time to the nation of fact and the nation of promise." In other words, the Jew conceived of himself as inhabiting a "covenant community" in which he had a "moral commission," and regarded himself as the bearer of universal truth (pp. 24–27). Because of his "solitude" the Hebrew was the "first protestant in the life of men and nations, and whatever is valid in Christianity is valid because his example has been kept." (P. 29.) Moreover, Mr. Taylor points out that there has been a "Hebrew pattern" in American life which is "an aspiration after covenant relations made visible in our every day's most quiet act" (p. 46), and that is the source of America's election and the moral superiority of its pluralism.

The covenant of nature is the Greek affirmation of nature as a "measure" and a "proper object of knowledge, since it alone is constant, equal to exacting obedience and the consent of a free mind, beneath all vacant human vicissitude." (P. 51.) However, the Greek genius is "childlike" in comparison to that of the Hebrew, because Hellenic "innocence" or objectivity is "unaware of itself"; therefore, it is "defenseless against assault" and the "delusion that innocence is by right of nature impregnable" is what imperils the Hellenic spirit in the Western tradition (p. 59).

The discovery of covenant as the mycelium or principle of civilization provides us with an operative principle of community, as distinct from an ecological society or a mere aggregate of people whose "common habitat dissembles actual solitude." (P. 254.) The distinctive feature of the new society is its deference for the covenant of inquiry, law, obligation, and property. Under this regime, we will not be solely concerned with the standard of living, but also the standard of life, not only with the effectiveness but also the validity of law—law based on mutuality to preserve the distribution of power in society. Freedom here does not reside in the freedom of property or caprice of tyrants, but in "man's unlimited capacity of assent, in his capacity to commit himself to ends and to withhold his commitment from them." (P. 133.) And this means that the corporation—"the jealous God" (p. 210)—and the barons of industry must be deprived of their "irresponsible and arbitrary" power, however benignant their intentions may be, because in practice they are beyond law, though in theory they are its creature (pp. 218–19).

Like most contemporary generalizers Mr. Taylor employs his social context (America) as a framework. What he does is to offer an intellectualized version of America as "the land of the free." His effort at answering Marx is a dismal failure, because all he does is to ask us to share his belief while refusing to recognize that Marxism and positivism too are a part of the Western tradition. To select the Hebrew tradition as the unique aspect of Western Civilization is no more than a sophistical ethnocentrism, victim of its delusions. The Western heritage has many strands. Marxism and positivism are an integral part of this heritage and both have made significant contributions. The one stresses the economic factor in history and social consciousness and the other highlights individual and group interaction. To have a synoptic view of the West we must look on it as an integrated whole with vital parts, rather than highlighting one aspect and subordinating or ignoring others. Such an approach, thus, would not neglect the Hebrew contribution.—George Haggar, *Waterloo University College.*

The Intemperate Professor and Other Cultural Splenetics. By Russell Kirk. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965. Pp. xii, 163. $5.00.)

Although Russell Kirk can hardly be considered *persona non grata* among the "professionals" in American political science, it is quite clear that he does not qualify for membership in the club. Virtually all of the clichés of rejection—"journalistic," "value-oriented," "impressionistic," "metaphysical," "business conservative," etc.—have been used against him as a hypothetical black ball at one time or another. Yet he continues to confound his critics by preserving his independence in relation to their particular orthodoxies, while simultaneously contributing articles to professional journals, lecturing on politics, and chiding the social-scientific fraternity about its deficiencies. He may not be in, but neither does he suffer the intellectual humiliation of being ignored.

The collection of essays at hand reaffirms my conviction that the characterization that Kirk might appreciate most is *amateur,* if the term is used in the special English sense of denoting one who has mastered his subject without making too public a display of its more burdensome aspects. The willing acceptance of amateurism has been a contributing factor in making Englishmen the best essayists in the world. Kirk can be included among a small group of Americans who write in the traditional manner of the English essayists; and he may also take some pride in belonging to an even more exclusive section of American essayists who are cultural conservatives. Except for Dwight MacDonald, who is otherwise redeemed by his political radicalism, Kirk is probably the most accomplished writer in the latter category.

To work effectively in this genre a writer must have strong commitment to principle, style, wit and the scope necessary to develop the complex nuances of his themes. As a journalist, Kirk is not satisfying; his syndicated column is attenuated and the opinions are stark and unsupported. He requires the less restricted space of a journal of opinion or a literary review to be at his best. And since the collection embodied in this book is drawn from the latter sources they effectively reveal his special temperament and skills.

Like most of us, Kirk is at times open to charges of indulging in moral cant, of rationalizing untenable preconceptions, and of indiscriminate selection in marshalling empirical evidence to support his position. But the reader is never in doubt as to what his position is. The theme which gives coherence to the pieces in *The Intemperate Professor* is his view of the underpinnings of modern western civilization. Civilization, as he sees it, rests on three great bodies of principle and conviction: Christian faith, the humanism revealed in great literature from the classical period onward, and social and political institutions grounded in the concept of ordered liberty. The essays, which range over a broad panoply of institutions and attributes of this civilization, are divided into four sections: the colleges as an embodiment of the higher learning, religion and morals, wealth and its uses, and aesthetics in its relation to a sense of community. Each of the topics is treated as an aspect of culture in the broadest sense of that term, and the threats to each of these aspects of culture are the main object of Kirk's concern.

For the most part the threats take the form of a denial in ideology or in practice of the foundations on which these attributes of culture rest—the failure to live up to or the explicit rejection of the standards that Kirk sees as generically characteristic of liberal education, religion, the aesthetic articulation of a sense of community, and the legitimate uses of wealth. Kirk is most bothered by the illiberality of liberal professors, lack of emphasis on humanistic learning in the colleges, the confusion of science with technology, the secularized insipidity of the religious establishments and their congregations (his survey of contemporary American Protestantism may well be the best selection in the book), the dehumanization of both the pursuit and the use of wealth among American businessmen, and the conformity and ugliness of a (planned?) commercial civilization which simultaneously stresses anarchic liberty and unqualified equality.

Ritualistic liberals cannot easily abide Russell Kirk, and even humane liberals may be somewhat cynical about the extent to which his exaggerated Burkean posture and antiquarian romanticism can be reconciled with his apparently Riccardian views on property and economic policy. But if he sometimes conjures up absurd pictures of knightly American corporation presidents exhorting boards of directors arrayed in cowls or academic regalia, he is also capable of calling attention to our faults, our limitations and our hypocrisies. As a quondam political scientist he is especially adept at probing the peculiar vanities and sins of omission and commission of our particular band of sectarians. We may not always like what he has to say, but he says it with grace and wit, and the substance of his essays is, at the least, worth quarreling with.—William C. Havard, *University of Massachusetts.*

Political Science: A Bibliographical Guide to the Literature. By Robert B. Harmon. (New York: Scarecrow Press, 1965. Pp. 388. $8.75.)

Guide to Reference Materials in Political Science, Vol. 1. By Lubomyr R. Wynar. (Denver: Colorado Bibliographic Institute, 1966. Pp. 318. $6.50.)

There had been no general guide to the literature of the discipline since Burchfield's *Student's Guide to Materials in Political Science* (1935) until these two volumes appeared within six months of each other. Both are listings, with brief annotations, of bibliographies, indexes, and other reference materials, with a selection of "substantive" volumes. Though of little value to the specialist within his own field, they should be useful as sources for students and as book lists for new or expanding departments building library collections.—C. B.

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S. Sidney Ulmer
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2. Purdue University
3. Queens College, CUNY
4. University of Colorado School of Medicine
5. University of Chicago
6. University of Oregon
7. University of Michigan
8. L'Ecole des Hautes Etudes, Sorbonne
9. University of California, Berkeley
10. University of Manchester, England
12. University of Pennsylvania
13. University of Wisconsin
14. University of Strathclyde, Glasgow
15. Moray House, Edinburgh
16. Technion-Israel Institute of Technology
17. Michigan State University
18. United States Navy Medical Neuropsychiatric Research Unit, San Diego, California
19. University of Rome, Italy

20. Liverpool University
21. Harvard University
22. University of California, San Francisco Medical Center
23. St. Johns University
24. Northwestern University
25. Yale University
26. University of Iowa
27. University of Colorado
28. University of California, Santa Barbara
29. New York University
30. Wake Forest College
31. Wayne State University
32. Rutgers—The State University
33. Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta
34. Temple University
35. University of Missouri at Kansas City
36. University of Illinois
37. Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, Maryland
38. The Johns Hopkins University
39. United States Army Medical Research Laboratory, Fort Knox, Kentucky
40. University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
41. University of Kentucky
42. Duke University
43. University of Washington
44. University of California, Los Angeles

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The Politics of Reconstruction, 1863–1867. By David Donald. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965. Pp. xviii, 105. $4.00.)

The Right to Vote: Politics and the Passage of the Fifteenth Amendment. By William Gillette. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965. Pp. 181. $4.50.)

Just as institutions often appear to be impenetrable monoliths to those outside them, the politics of the distant past tend to take on a rather undifferentiated character with a few great themes and large interests predominating. In the case of Reconstruction, a revisionist school of American historians in the last couple of decades has turned the traditional view on its ear, if not on its head. It has done so in good part by more detailed study of the era's obvious complexity in order to expose the shades of gray that lie between the black and white of the old interpretation.

Of the two small volumes to be considered here, that of William Gillette is a straightforward piece of reporting "of how and why the Fifteenth Amendment came to be." The other, a series of lectures by an eminent historian of the Civil War and its aftermath, is quite another matter and should provoke interest among political scientists who bake their bread in the oven of contemporary legislative behavior.

In Gillette's study, the Fifteenth Amendment and the politics surrounding it emerge as archetypes of the product and process of American politics. The Amendment itself was a compromise that fell between the hopes of Radical Republicans and the fears of most Democrats. Somehow, despite haggling and stalemate between the two houses of Congress, weak party discipline, collapsing coalitions in the Republican majority, and general obstruction by House Democrats, a moderate measure found the support of a two-thirds majority. Because the Amendment was designed among other things to secure the needs of the majority party by enfranchising the Northern Negro, a majority of Republican Congressmen ultimately found that they could "rise above principle" to support its passage.

The greater part of the book deals with the ratification process and here Gillette has probed farther and more comprehensively than any previous author. Relying principally on newspapers but also on state legislative debates and other documents, he summarizes legislative and political developments in the six major regions and offers some detail from two or three states in each region. In drawing conclusions from the varied assortment of political situations he found, Gillette stresses the "fusion of power and justice" represented by the moderateness of the Amendment's conception and the partisan meaning of its acceptance. Its designers were moderates who rejected "the extremism of those who wanted to do nothing and the radicalism of those who wanted to do everything," and its principal ratifiers were shrewd Northern Republicans who needed the Negro vote.

Gillette's extended descriptions of state legislative politics and his sympathetic treatment of the frankly political motives of the Amendment's supporters contribute to the revisionist effort at providing a more balanced view of Reconstruction. There are also occasional forays in passing into more intricate questions of legislative tactics and relationships. But Gillette's treatment stops some distance short of the "fresh, general approach to the entire Reconstruction era" that David Donald seeks.

"The rewriting of Reconstruction history," Donald says, "appears to have become curiously stalled." This situation he attributes to boredom with conventional questions, overemphasis on biography, and the exhaustion of the usual sources. His principal remedy is to move historians off the dime of method and approach by suggesting that they try out "techniques more frequently used in the behavioral sciences." What follows then are three "exercises" in the application of such techniques.

The intent behind Donald's behavioral prescription for his colleagues is, however, more sharply defined than the precise character of the techniques that are to be used. Of the three exercises only one represents a departure from historical method. The first lecture, "The Mechanics of Moderation," is an entirely conventional description of the political facts of life that moved Lincoln and Johnson to adopt a moderate course designed to preserve their electoral coalitions. The third lecture, "The Pendulum of Legislation," makes a claim to novelty because it rests not on motives, ideology, status, or geography, but on "the simple arithmetic of politics." Donald uses the pendulum metaphorically—"once set in motion, [it] vibrates in ever diminishing arcs until the bob comes to rest at dead center"—and graphically to describe the legislative process by which Congress passed the Reconstruction Act of 1867. As a metaphor for legislative compromise the "ever diminishing arc" is ingenious and it permits the use of equally ingenious figures showing the cycles of the legislative process. Whether it adds appreciably to the understanding of the process may be doubted. Gillette's descriptions of state legislative politics are lucid without such a device and Donald's own prose is rarely in need of mechanical supplements.

Of greater methodological interest is the identification and explanation of voting blocs within the Republican party. This occurs primarily in the second lecture, "The Congressional Equation," and is accomplished by means of roll call analysis. Donald selects six roll calls on Reconstruction issues in the lower house in both the Thirty-Eighth and Thirty-Ninth Congresses that show patterns of bloc voting and serve particularly as tests of Radicalism. He compares these patterns with Congressional election returns and produces a constituency-pressure explanation to account for the Republican blocs. His explanation rests on the "safe seat" thesis: the greater the size of the Republican majority in a Congressman's district, the greater the likelihood that he would be a Radical. Donald's application of the roll call technique seems to be within the canons of acceptability used by political scientists but it also is subject to the problems of that kind of analysis. Constituency-pressure explanations of legislative behavior still depend upon a strong dose of inference about the political knowledge and activity of constituents and Donald resolves this by the implicit assumption of popular Republican Radicalism rather than by reference to independent evidence. One might as justly assume confusion or ill knowledge on the part of voters, given the perplexities of the legislators themselves, and make an equally valid inference. What is missing in Donald's analysis is separate information on constituency characteristics. Without it his assumption of a causal relationship between a Congressman's political security in his district and the extent of his Radicalism has, at the very least, somewhat less plausibility than the studies of constituency-roll call relationships in contemporary legislatures.

I have slighted the substance of Donald's findings largely because of his own strong emphasis on matters of technique. It remains to be noted, then, that the clear primacy of political considerations and the severely qualified role of ideology are the substantive themes that he accents. If conclusions of this kind are not exactly a far cry from the old way of looking at Reconstruction, they are at least a pretty good holler in a new direction.—Donald R. Reich, *Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.*

Negro Political Leadership in the South. By Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell U. Press, 1966. Pp. x, 348. $7.50.)

While this book is slightly less comprehensive than its title suggests, it is nonetheless an interesting and valuable work. It is really about *urban* political leadership, and most extensively about leadership in two cities. Greenville, South Carolina, and Winston-Salem, North Carolina, were chosen to represent deep south and rim south settings respectively.

The book's value is greater as a timely description of southern Negro political leadership than as an original contribution to political science. It is a particularly valuable book for the layman who is not very familiar with the subject. A third of the volume is devoted to a general treatment of postwar developments in southern race relations and to an extended description of racial aspects of the Greenville and Winston-Salem community settings.

The community setting is said (correctly, of course) to be causally related to Negro leadership patterns in the two cities, but the author unfortunately disavows any attempt to systematically connect them (p. 49). Are the "patterns of discriminatory treatment" meant to be considered as independent or dependent variables when related to Negro leadership? Is the "level, structure and content of Negro political participation" a cause or effect of leadership patterns? Admittedly it is a complicated problem, but the author sidesteps it completely. This limits much of the book to a descriptive, rather than an analytical effort.

Perhaps the most interesting chapter from an analytical perspective is one of the shortest: chapter three on "The Selection of Race Leadership." Here the author suggests that Negro political leaders have in the past been selected in large measure by whites, and that it is a relatively recent development that they are being selected by Negroes themselves. He also points out that in the pre-civil rights era, Negroes dependent on whites for their income were prevalent among Negro leaders. With the growth of racial conflict, such persons withdrew from leadership positions, but have re-emerged with the growing legitimacy of Negro political activity in the South. Negro political leadership is said to be an issue-based leadership, which has a "high fluidity potential." This means that successive racial confrontations will produce important changes in the personnel of Negro leadership.

Fully half of the book is devoted to a treatment of styles of race leadership and race organizations. The Negro leaders are identified entirely by the positional and reputational methods. A ninety-page chapter describes the goals, means, rhetoric and effectiveness of conservative, militant and moderate leaders, and another ninety-page chapter describes recruitment, structure and function of welfare, protest and voting organizations. Different types of leaders are shown to be prominent in particular types of organizations.

These chapters are thorough and readable, if not terribly original. But here again, the author forfeits an opportunity to make causal inferences, and the treatment is little more than descriptive. In most of the tables in these two chapters the percentages add according to the dependent variable, and are therefore useful only for descriptive purposes. For example, Table 16, p. 219, shows what percentage of conservatives are of what social class, rather than what percentage of a given class are conservative, etc. The latter arrangement would enable the reader to infer the effect of class on style of leadership, but this is impossible as it stands.

On some of the few occasions when the author does try to systematically relate variables, his evidence does not directly support his inference. For example, he says that "As Table 22 shows, the welfare leadership in both cities contains a disproportionate number of economic vulnerables" (p. 241). To support this statement, he should compare welfare leaders with other leaders. Table 22 in fact considers only welfare leaders, and shows that a minority of welfare leaders are highly vulnerable at that. One has to look also at Tables 26 and 33, much further into the chapter, to see that welfare leaders are in fact more likely to be highly vulnerable than are protest leaders and "politicians."

In sum, the book is a generally sound, interesting and comprehensive effort. It will be most valuable to the general reader interested in urban Negro political leadership in the South. For the political scientist interested in testing hypotheses and relating variables it is not totally satisfying, although nevertheless useful. Indeed, it compares very favorably with several books available on the topic.—William R. Keech, *University of North Carolina.*

Changing Administrations. By David T. Stanley. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1965. Pp. x, 147. $3.95.)

Until the Presidential Transition Act of 1963, the transfer of executive authority and responsibility was left to informal improvisations and the cooperation of outgoing and incoming officials. How these ad-hoc arrangements worked during the Eisenhower-Kennedy transition is described by David Stanley in this brief Brookings volume, a sequel to Laurin Henry's *Presidential Transitions.*

Stanley concentrates on the changeovers in five executive departments and one independent agency. In each case he reports that due to goodwill among old and new officials, advance preparations, and the yeoman efforts of volunteers, the transition was accomplished effectively despite the lack of formal machinery. In each agency, the new leaders were briefed by their predecessors, received the assistance of career employees, were given office facilities, and were provided detailed handbooks on the organization and operations of the agency. Moreover, the Kennedy team established its own army of task forces to prepare for the takeover and to chart organizational and policy changes. These preparations, coupled with vigorous leadership from the top, gave the incoming administration a running start, but one that did not disrupt the orderly conduct of national affairs. Once again, the vital art of turning the reins of authority over to new men was managed successfully.

Only a handful of pages is allotted in each of the six cases to the transition process itself. Stanley's larger, albeit implicit, purpose is to describe and appraise the first three or four years of the Kennedy-Johnson administration. For the most part, this book is an interim audit of the personnel, organizational, and policy changes made by the new administration. The major personnel changes are identified, along with occasional biographical and evaluative tidbits. Policy moves are surveyed, also with some of the author's judgments about their effectiveness. And organizational developments are given brief attention, though in the case of the Defense Department they take center stage.

This reportorial approach fails to probe the intimate problems of transition as they touch on the day-to-day workings and routines of the agencies and the anxieties and relationships of their members. For this purpose, a detailed in-depth study rather than a rapid review would have been appropriate. Nowadays, the biggest transitional problem is not how to change the guard but how to avoid the mistakes that tend to beset administrations during their precarious shakedown periods while the new men are still incompletely informed about the affairs of state. For this purpose, the survey that is compressed into this slim volume is necessarily superficial.

Stanley relies unduly on newspaper accounts and on the Washington grapevine, on the transient interpretations of dateline-bound journalists, and on the hearsay shadows of political inside-dopesterism. The chapter on the State Department suffers mostly from this tendency, though none of the other agencies is entirely spared this treatment. This would have been a better book if the author had invested more in interviews and documentation. As it stands, the book adds to our knowledge of presidential transitions and shows how we handle a problem that still troubles many nations.—ALLEN SCHICK, *Tufts College.*

Politics and Power: The United States Senate, 1869–1901. BY DAVID J. ROTHMAN. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. x, 348. $6.95.)

This book makes a substantial contribution to our knowledge of party politics in the United States Senate. While the book is not altogether flawless, its faults are largely counterbalanced by the freshness of the way in which David Rothman formulates his problem.

The existing literature on the parties in Congress—and in legislatures generally—often formulates its questions within the confines of a flattened time perspective. How cohesive *are* the parties? How *do* party leaders try to control the behavior of the party's membership? *Politics and Power* deepens our time perspective by asking developmental questions. How *did* existing patterns of cohesion and leadership come into being? More exactly, how did these patterns change in the last three decades of the 19th Century? By asking these questions, Rothman sensitizes his analysis to new questions.

One of these new questions appears in Rothman's analysis of cohesion in the Senate parties. It is customary to ask why these parties show so *little* cohesion on many issues; Rothman asks instead how these parties came to demonstrate so *much* cohesion. The first question is provoked by comparing the Senate parties with European parliamentary parties. The second question follows from Rothman's comparison of the Senate parties at the turn of the century with their precursors just after the Civil War. The developmental perspective of this book has, in effect, called our attention to a new dimension of analysis. And therein lies the book's greatest value.

Quite unnecessarily, Rothman argues one part of the case for his historical analysis of party development by attacking cross-national analysis:

> . . . the interpretation of congressional voting patterns has been too colored by cross-national comparisons. These contrasts may often illuminate unique sorts of behavior, but American performances should ultimately be viewed within their own sphere. (p. 74)

This rejection of the comparative perspective detracts visibly from the book's value. Perhaps single-case historical analysis is preferable to single-time comparative analysis, but the cross-national comparison of historical development is not, for that reason, to be rejected. Only if we accept the premise that national and institutional histories are absolutely unique does Rothman's position make sense, and I am inclined to disagree. A mature understanding of any behavior, including legislative behavior, will certainly rest upon cross-national as well as inter-period dimensions of comparison.

When Rothman compares the Senate parties at the beginning and the end of his thirty-two year period, he finds that the parties came during the period to vote more cohesively, and that the caucuses came to function as key policy-making instruments. To explain the rising power of the Senate parties, Rothman introduces interesting and inventive analyses of recruitment patterns, state party structures, lobbying, and the "folkways" of political life. These threads of analysis are woven together as the fabric of a very thorough and essentially convincing developmental analysis. One finishes the book knowing something new about the ways in which the Senate parties came to be integral components of the legislative process.

The book's methodology is uneven. In examining the roll-call votes to measure party cohesion, Rothman criticizes A. Lawrence Lowell's conception of "party voting" but fails to adopt the more sophisticated tecnhiques available today. Instead, he relies heavily on inspection of bargraphs for arbitrarily selected collections of roll calls taken from the periods in which he is interested. And the "scale of occupational success" used to study recruitment contains a number of ambiguous operational standards. The reader is told that income criteria for business "success" are or "should be" twice as high as those for legal "success." Meanwhile, "local merchants" and "county lawyers" are automatically classed together as men of "average success," their incomes notwithstanding. The reader finishes these parts of the book uneasy about the reliability of data which are grouped and analyzed by these methods.

A bonus is provided by an essay titled, "In Defense of Party Government." Here Rothman analyzes the changing moral positions occupied by American political parties in the late 19th Century, and records his own approval of their increasing legitimacy as democratic institutions. Whether one shares the author's position or not, this essay alone is probably worth the price of the book.

Even conceding its uneven methodological quality, *Politics and Power* must be given a minor place of honor in the literature on legislative parties. And Rothman's opposition to cross-national comparison does not render the analysis useless for those of us who disagree. The book, in short, deserves our attention.—DOUGLAS W. RAE, *Syracuse University.*

Republic in Crisis: Congress Against the Executive Force. BY ALFRED DE GRAZIA. (New York: Federal Legal Publications, Inc., 1965. Pp. 303. $7.95.)

This is a polemical assessment of the present and prospective distribution of power between the Executive and Congress. It expresses a frank bias in favor of legislative hegemony, and contains recommendations for institutional changes aimed at strengthening the Congress with attendant (although necessary?) weakening of the Executive power and that of the Courts.

De Grazia is sometimes irreverent but always forthright and consistent in his effort to twist the ideological tail of the political science profession. Outraged reviews of the book, and its treatment in future works on "responsible party government" probably will proclaim the success of his effort. Certainly the book is an effective means of calling attention to the possibility of constructing a "Republican" or legislative-strength model of government, as an alternative to the popularly accepted "Executive Force" model (the author's term for the arguments and proposals of the "responsible party government" advocates).

Ideas, documents, institutions—indeed an entire intellectual paraphernalia—regarded as hallowed by many, if not most, American political scientists are questioned, even ridiculed, in the book. The 1950 A.P.S.A.-sponsored report, *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System*, provides a convenient (if not unusual) point of initial onslaught. He regards it as a naive compendium of myths and expressions of preference, disguised in the language of scholarship then in vogue. "The people" and "program"—as used in the report, and as favorite words in the lexicon of the discipline—are "mysterious" entities (p. 54). And this is true whether they are employed in the advocacy of legislative or executive dominance: " . . . the executive and congressional populist theories are equally myths. Both rely upon a fictitious 'people,' which . . . does not exist; nor can it exist" (pp. 21–22).

While the *New York Times Magazine Section* features articles extolling Chief Justice Warren (by Fred Rodell, March 13, 1966), and political scientists generally congratulate our society upon having such a bastion of protection for civil rights, de Grazia finds the Supreme Court a threat to legislative strength. "The Supreme Court has no longer any shame about reading the Constitution as if its words meant nothing" (p. 254). Political parties, among their chief functions, help to rationalize "ignorant behavior." "The people are diverted by the party into accepting the disappearance of direct democracy, with its attractive but impossible promises, while keeping the myth" (p. 222).

In effect, the responsible party government advocates, consciously in some cases, without understanding their motives in others, are working toward a monarchical kind of Executive control of government and policy-making in the United States (pp. 20–21). Ironically, much of the force for enlarging and intensifying executive control over the legislature is expended upon professional-sounding appeals for the reform and strengthening of Congress. These appeals find much support within the Congress, as Senators such as Case and Clark who cannot "be accused of wishing to bring the house down upon their heads," vehemently advocate kinds of congressional reform that would strengthen Executive control of that body (pp. 15, 194–96). Invariably, however, such recommendations would have the effect of strengthening Executive control of Congress.

"The mass media do not see the issue" of legislative control vs. executive control, "and if some aspect of it strikes them occasionally they do not dwell upon it" (p. 254). The people generally are President-oriented, rather than Congress-oriented. The tendency toward a larger presidential than congressional constituency stems not merely from his superior opportunities for being singled out from the herd, but from a kind of monarchical psychology on the part of the people. "That there is a primitive attractiveness to rule by a single man appears to be a fairly well established anthropological principle" (p. 37).

This reviewer has emphasized the polemical aspects of Professor de Grazia's work with the frank purpose of titilating reader interest in the book. What may seem to some egregious statements, and to others, way-out proposals for change, are consciously contrived efforts on the author's part to stimulate and lay the foundations for a re-examination of the balance of power within our national structure of government today. It is also his purpose to cause the reader to probe his own underlying value system and its possible influence upon his performance in his role as student of that balance of power.

De Grazia argues that the Cihef Executive is more influenced by the bureaucracy than a force for control and direction of it; that the very pluralist values which so many advocates of responsible party government argue for are more likely to be preserved in a political system having a strong and independent national legislature; and in forthright neo-Calhounian fashion, for the value of legislating by "successive majorities" (why not "concurrent majorities"?) in the Congress.

His is not an apocalyptic analysis. Congress retains much power today. The Republican Force cause is far from lost. De Graiza proposes specific institutional changes for strengthening the Congress (these include an omnibus bill removing all delegations of emergency powers from the President). The hard pill for many to swallow will not be the proposals for institutional reform, but the general call for curbing the executive and judicial powers, and the hostility to strengthened and centralized parties which the author associates with any effort to retain a Legislative Force in the United States.—CORNELIUS P. COTTER, *Wichita State University*.

Individual Freedom and the Economic Organization of Agriculture. BY HAROLD F. BREIMYER. (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1965. Pp. 306. $6.50.)

The author, a U. S. Department of Agriculture economist-scholar, is a broad-ranging expert on the organization of agricultural production and marketing. He has capitalized the wealth of data and analysis on this subject, joining to it the commentary of economic and political leaders whom he interviewed. His style is clean, gentle, and literate.

As the title implies, he offers a discourse on freedom, directed to the use and relevance of the term with respect to agricultural policy. However, he then uses criteria in addition to freedom, which are not well defined: equity, "if public policy should be," public interest, and consumer interest. He also asks what is acceptable and what works well.

Agriculture is unique because the typical production unit is still a family enterprise in which labor, management, and capital are joined. These enlarging units are capable of taking full advantage of economies of scale, with the assistance of many public and private agencies. The fate of these service agencies is tied up with the fate of family enterprise. Together they constitute the agricultural system.

The author suggests that as long as "there is room for skepticism as to whether the industrial economy has solved its institutional problems," much may be gained by permitting the agriculture system to survive. He tries obliquely to dissuade those who would write off that view as sentimentalism.

This is an unequaled reference book on the organization, functions, and limitations of the mechanisms and agencies of agricultural production and marketing. However, the author fails to discuss the status of hired farm labor. He points up the gravity of his omission by noting that few farm spokesmen would point to that subject with pride. His freedom criterion virtually commands attention to hired farm labor, and also to the small townsmen and the other nonfarmers of rural America. By overlooking them he inadvertently lends support to the tenacious bigotry dominating agriculture policy, which assumes that the only people with legitimate rights and interests are the sliver of successful farmers.

The author looks for ways to achieve functional coordination in agriculture while preserving individual freedom. He is pleased with the abundance of coordinating mechanisms, each limited in capacity, and somewhat competitive with others. Comparing them, he finds that farm organizations and farmer cooperatives can be more arbitrary than government agencies.

He is worried about the vulnerable spots in the agricultural enclave. In the vertical integration of the broiler industry, his subject in one of several interesting case studies, each step was dictated by a temporary advantage—tax write-off, sales outlet for processed feed, retailers' desire for loss-leaders, and competitive pressures to exploit economic weakness.

By itself vertical integration may sometimes be beneficial, but the process tends to go on, the author fears, until a few retailers join hands to control the industry. While he does not commend this situation, the author is never insistent, and throughout is more intent on describing than on judging.—DON F. HADWIGER, *Iowa State University*.

Council-Manager Government: The Political Thought of Its Founder, Richard S. Childs. BY JOHN PORTER EAST. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965. Pp. vii, 183. $4.50.)

Considering the usual approaches to philosophies of local government in general and the council-manager form in particular, John Porter East's book is refreshing. He traces the origins of Richard

Childs' ideas; he reconstructs Childs' council-manager model; and he compares Childs' "model" to the findings of modern empiricists. In this last pursuit, East seeks to prove that Childs' arguments for the council-manager form are at best simplistic and at worst out of step with local political realities.

Richard S. Childs was the product of a variety of turn-of-the century American reform currents: pragmatism, progressivism, and Taylor's scientific management. With remarkable energy, he set out to remake municipal government, beginning with the Short Ballot Organization in 1908, pushing the council-manager system by 1911, and fusing with the National Municipal League in 1920. To this day, the League is Childs' home base.

East shows that Childs wanted to take the politics out of local government by removing parties and politicians and substituting a nonpartisan city council with an appointed city manager. But in analyzing Childs' "model" of council-manager government, East falls short of perfect clarity. He refers to Childs' "machine model," when he means *mechanistic* model; in political science terminology, "machine" connotes exactly what Childs did *not* have in mind. Then, East never defines what *he* means by "model." Thus he does not set down in logical form what Childs said; rather, he carries on a running debate with his subject. In planning a critique, is it not only fair to begin by summarizing the other's case in the clearest possible manner? Instead, East keeps referring to what he, East, said in the last chapter or will say in the next one. He reiterates again and again his conclusion that Childs has a "closed system." Yet in subsequent chapters, East does not make clear whether Childs' theories are "closed" philosophically or "closed" because they fail to describe reality. Usually he maintains Childs' system is "closed" because it "lacks any theory of empirical testing."

East maintains that Childs is a representative of a bygone political science; he compares him to the new behavioralists. Needless to say, on the grounds of who is best able to describe local politics, the modern breed properly comes out ahead. East's best section is his excellent summary of the new literature on city politics, including the work of his mentors at the University of Florida. Insofar as Childs is concerned, however, the question is, is the comparison sporting? Did Childs intend his writings on council-manager government to be taken as theory in the empiricist sense? Did he want to *explain* how local communities function? Or did he want to change the world? I think he wanted to persuade people, not explain social phenomena. As East says: "Though the reformers might disagree on the appropriate mechanical device to achieve 'true democracy,' *zeal* is one constant element found in all the reform programs of this era. Behind the façade . . . one finds a simple, moralistic fervor."

However lacking he might have been in developing theory with explanatory power, Childs did succeed, through his own drive and through having a system to sell which met the needs and desires of some people in communities of less than 500,000 population. Over 1,100 cities use his council-manager system today. In a very real sense, East, who is fervently at one with most modern students in stressing the diversity of demands at the city level and the importance of political leadership, wins a battle in a war which Childs won long ago.

For better or for worse, open system or closed, Childs' plan is widely adopted. Given an option of having a theory which bears muster alongside modern empiricism or having a marketable product to advocate across the land, Childs would, I think, choose the latter. He recently wrote: "Being now 83, I have only seventeen more years in which to follow the spread of the council-manager plan as I have in the past."

These points notwithstanding, East has performed a service in bringing together many of Childs' writings and much of the modern literature in one book. If Childs and the new social scientists may not be comparable intellectually, it is not East's fault; perhaps his most important point is that the old way and the new way indeed do not fit.—JAY GOODMAN, *Wheaton College (Massachusetts)*.

The First Fifty Years of the Council-Manager Plan of Municipal Government. BY RICHARD S. CHILDS. (New York: National Municipal League, 1965. Pp. ix, 117. $2.00.)

When the definitive history of municipal reform in the United States is written, Richard S. Childs will undoubtedly be recognized as one of its leaders. Childs' greatest contribution to the movement was the invention of the council-manager plan. His biographer tells us he "pieced [it together], gave it a rationale, and offered it as the major weapon in the arsenal of municipal reform." Childs has led three lives, and each contributed to the conception of the plan. As political scientist, he served as Vice President of the American Political Science Association and Chairman of the Institute of Public Administration; as civic leader, President of the National Municipal League and the City Club of New York; as business man, advertising writer and corporation officer. The city manager plan was obviously related to his interests in political science and civic reform; it also reflected his commitment to efficient business management, for the city manager is the counterpart of the business manager and the council which appoints him, of the board of directors. (This resemblance is not merely structural—behind it is a theory that civic government is basically a business operation.)

This exposition of the city manager plan cannot properly be understood without an appreciation of its purpose. That purpose is not to promote new academic theories. Indeed, Childs humorously informs us he did not propose one of those "massive and sombre papers which the huge modern array of political science professors has been issuing to each other" and that he did not care to impress us with a "scholarly fringe of appendices, footnotes, *ibids* and *passims*." What it offers is a brief, systematic exposition of the municipal reform doctrines Childs has developed over a half century. It is the reformers' *Civic Manifesto.*

The First Fifty Years is not the creed of a single individual. It represents the official doctrine of the National Municipal League, an organization that has spawned most American civic movements in this century. The relationship between Childs and the League has been close. Childs has zealously served it for many years, offering it ideas and slogans as well as his exceptional organizational talents.

One of the principal assumptions on which this book's doctrines rest is that many civic problems grow out of "ramshackle" governmental organization and that properly constituted structural arrangements are essential for good government. "The difficulties of democracy are mechanistic and respond to mechanistic corrections," Childs declares. As the title indicates, the chief structural reform it offers is the council-manager plan. This plan is based largely on the theory that government should be integrated into a strong and simple structure, without loose links. This is achieved by vesting all power, including the selection of the municipal executives, in a single small council and eliminating most separate, unconnected elective officials. Certain ancillary principles are linked to this doctrine. One is the short ballot idea—that the voters are most likely to make intelligent choices if they elect a limited number of officers. Another is nonpartisan elections, designed to detach local from national issues. Finally, Childs advances his concept of "wieldy districts," small enough to enable independent candidates thoroughly to canvass them. Metropolitan centers, of course, are likely to have large districts. In such areas Childs suggests the use of proportional representation, which permits independents to gain seats in the council without majorities of pluralities.

As indicated above, Childs is primarily an activist, and one whose endeavors have attained remarkable success. Today more than half the American cities with populations over 25,000 have accepted his plan. Except for Lenin and Mao Tse-tung, few political activists in our time and his can boast a comparable record of achievement. One way to appreciate the magnitude of his accomplishments would be to imagine a successful campaign to resolve another contemporary problem—area-wide planning for metropolitan regions. Were an individual with good powers of analysis and a pungent style of writing to study the present planless and chaotic state of most metropolitan areas, to devise a rational and viable solution to the problem, and to persuade most areas of this kind to adopt his plan, his achievement would be no more remarkable than Childs'.

It would be even more remarkable if all the details of the original plan, devised in this decade, would be unquestionably accepted in the year 2016. In this connection, it is hardly surprising that the behavioral scientists, who have challenged many of their own colleagues' concepts, have questioned some of Childs' as well. They want to know, for example, whether Childs' model of local government has universal validity for all communities, whether a municipality can always preserve the dichotomy between policy and administration, whether the municipal executive should be a technical expert or a community leader, and whether he can always maintain political neutrality. The answers to these difficult questions do not necessarily reflect unfavorably on Childs' doctrines. Some smaller cities, for example, have not adopted the manager plan simply because they believe they cannot afford a manager's salary. Many larger cities retain the mayor council plan, but have shifted from the weak-mayor to the strong-mayor form partly in response to Childs' arguments in favor of a well-structured government. And in those big cities that have adopted the "mayor manager" or "city administrator" plan, some of the values of the managerial idea have been carried over in another structural form.

Since the manager plan was first instituted, city government has been raised to a higher level. The political boss now plays a distinctly less conspicuous role, the most sordid practices in municipal politics have been eliminated, and a sense of professionalism and integrity has begun to permeate the ranks of city administrators. Best of all, civic reform has become respectable. A half century ago, municipal politics was regarded as so degrading that no honest person would approach it. Today enlightened citizens have become interested and involved in municipal affairs to a degree previously unknown. The ideas expressed in *The First Fifty Years* have played a conspicuous part, not only in transforming the public's image of municipal politics, but the reality as well.—FREDERICK SHAW, *The City University of New York.*

LaGuardia Comes to Power: 1933. BY ARTHUR MANN. (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1965. Pp. 199. $3.95.)

Arthur Mann deserves special commendation for his exciting narrative of the 1933 election of Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia. The book, *LaGuardia Comes to Power,* is the second installment in Mr. Mann's comprehensive biography of the colorful, popular Mayor. In his earlier work, *LaGuardia: A Fighter Against His Times,* Mr. Mann discussed LaGuardia's early career as a progressive Congressman until his defeat in the Roosevelt landslide of 1932. This latest work details his battle against Tammany Hall and the vindication of his 1919 expose of municipal corruption.

Mr. Mann's easy-going style makes the 1933 election, which was one of the most dramatic and complicated in New York's history, both understandable and engrossing.

A central theme of the book is the LaGuardia personality. As Mr. Mann points out, just the thought of opposing the powerful Tammany machine had been enough to dissuade many good men from running. But LaGuardia had fantastic energy and an unyielding commitment to prove that fusion and reform could work. This spirit propelled him past two opponents and into City Hall.

Many books written about LaGuardia have described his accomplishments as a dynamic individual and the lasting improvements which a nonpartisan, expert government brought. *LaGuardia Comes to Power,* however, is the first to concentrate on the key question of how he was able to win initially.

Mr. Mann, by tracing the Mayoralty race chronologically and analyzing returns of bellwether Assembly Districts, explains how LaGuardia built his coalition of ethnic and economic groups. As several reviewers have noted, Mr. Mann has compiled an important historic study on urban elections. This alone makes his book worthy of attention by scholars and political leaders alike.

The author also restates the fundamental message underlying LaGuardia's policies and personality, which is that New York City is not ungovernable, if the spirit and the will are present. Without the enormous fortitude LaGuardia displayed, the pressures of daily business, to say nothing of the recurring emergencies, would have been overwhelming.

As LaGuardia demonstrated, and Mr. Mann relates, a Mayor must have the courage to tell the people the truth: that cynical, inbred, political machines can bring a city to near bankruptcy, both financial and social. The assertion is documented in the book.

Although the evils detailed in *LaGuardia Comes to Power* existed thirty years ago, they survive in many ways today. The City of New York faces the same urgent problems brought on by the same cynical attitudes towards the people and their welfare. Mr. Mann proves that only vigilance, persistent and public, guard the city against those who would mismanage or exploit it.

I think we can look forward to the completion of Arthur Mann's biography of LaGuardia.—JOHN V. LINDSAY, *Mayor of the City of New York.*

Decade of Fear: Senator Hennings and Civil Liberties. BY DONALD J. KEMPER. (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1965. Pp. 252. $5.95.)

Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., spent the last ten years of life in the United States Senate. In earlier years he served in the House of Representatives and as circuit attorney in St. Louis. These prior positions are of interest only as they shed light on the character of his later career. He supported procedural reforms as a prosecutor that would have made convictions easier to secure, yet later he defended the Supreme Court's decision in the *McNabb* case. In the House he was prepared to back the Roosevelt court-packing plan. As a Senator, he opposed conservative efforts to limit the jurisdiction of the Court. He was, to use Anthony Lewis's phrase, "result oriented." He was not much concerned about the continuing role of institutions. He was greatly interested in some policies and he had a strong political sense. He backed President Truman's withholding of materials from Congress in the early fifties, but he led the Senate "right to information" movement during the Eisenhower administration.

The author tells us in detail about the work of the Senator as a member of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections when he took on the late Senator Joseph McCarthy. He credits Hennings with a major role in the ultimate downfall of McCarthy since materials he developed were later used against the Wisconsin Senator.

Senator Hennings, according to the author, also played an important part in the defeat of the Bricker Amendment, in defending the Court against legislation proposed by its critics in the late fifties, and in pressing for changes in the State Department's restrictions on the issuance of passports. Special attention is given to his efforts to protect persons against decisions of federal security offices. His Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee was responsible for the re-examination of a hundred cases and the modification of some 20 decisions.

Senator Hennings sometimes failed to attain his own goals because of his "personal habits, especially his frequent lapses into lethargy or boredom, and his periodic bouts with alcoholism."

The author attributes an importance to the Senator's work that others might dispute. In any case, he provides many details of interest from the files of the Senator that were made available to him by the Hennings family.

A word about the title and the fascination of some historians with the labeling of decades, centuries and eras. These labels are always misleading and partial. The author's "decade of fear" might well have been a "decade of hope" to a reformer looking back on Court decisions and congressional efforts in the civil rights field. Depression and the rise of Nazism made the thirties a "decade of fear" as did war and nuclear bombs in the case of the forties. Perhaps, in this "decade of consensus" we might agree to skip labels altogether and use titles simply to say what books are really about.—HOWARD PENNIMAN, *Georgetown University*.

Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787. BY JAMES MADISON, with an introduction by Adrienne Koch. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966. Pp. xxiii, 659. $10.00.)

The first complete edition in over thirty years of James Madison's record of the Constitutional Convention of 1787. This edition carries the additional benefit of a thoughtful introduction by Adrienne Koch.—J. W. P.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

The Santo Tomas Story. By A. V. H. Hartendorp. Edited by Frank H. Golay, Forward by Carlos P. Romulo. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964. Pp. xvi, 446. $12.50.)

Political scientists have used almost every type of human organization, ranging from the small group to the international system, to demonstrate the ubiquity of politics. One of the few units of analysis that—for rather obvious reasons—has been relatively immune to systematic examination is the concentration camp. There are a number of serious (i.e., scholarly) studies of the prison camp milieu, it is true, but most of these are by sociologists. Of the politically-oriented literature in this area, probably the best-known is Alexander Leighton's *The Governing of Men* (1945)—which, as it happens, provides an instructive comparison with A. V. H. Hartendorp's *The Santo Tomas Story*.

Like Leighton's work, Hartendorp's deals with a civilian rather than a military camp. This is an important point, since typically civilian camps—excepting such "abnormalities" as the German-run camps of the Nazi era—are less "structured" (in terms of internal relationships) and somewhat more "autonomous" (in terms of external relationships) than military camps, and thus in certain ways should serve as better "laboratories' from the standpoint of the social/behavioral scientist. On the other hand, there are a number of differences between the Leighton and Hartendorp books. For one thing, the former deals with Japanese interned in the United States, the latter with Allied nationals (mostly Americans) imprisoned in the Philippines. While this is only a minor difference, it is worth noting that, in Hartendorp's words, "never before was such a large body of American citizens (about two-thirds of the 7,000 who passed through the camp were American) . . . compelled to maintain itself under such difficult . . . conditions." A more significant distinction is that Leighton's was explicitly designed as a politico-administrative study and was written from the viewpoint of the administrator. By contrast, Hartendorp provides seldom-encountered insights into the "normal" civilian internee mentality; his central focus is on the activities and conduct of the Santo Tomas inmates in response to the increasingly restrictive circumstances of their internment. The result is a chronological narrative covering the more than three years of the camp's existence during 1942–1945.

Yet this is far more than a mere descriptive chronology. Because its emphasis is on the "sociological, psychological and medical aspects" of camp life as well as on the camp's development as a polity in microcosm, the volume has relevance for the social sciences generally and for many of the heterogeneous sub-fields within political science. In effect, *The Santo Tomas Story* is a sourcebook, one which can be drawn upon for illustrative material by specialists in administration (e.g., the organization and administration of the camp community), public law (e.g., the question of whether and to what extent such principles as "the rule of law" could be applied within the camp), international law (e.g., the question of Japanese acceptance of the 1929 Geneva Convention pertaining to civilian war prisoners), political theory (e.g., the camp population's preoccupation with, and insistence on, internal "democracy"—as seen in its demands for "free elections" and "self-government"), and public policy (e.g., formulating and implementing camp rules and regulations). There are, finally, innumerable instances of the "informal" elements of politics in the camp: the interplay of competing pressures on specific issues; the influence of public (i.e., internee) opinion; the existence of conflicts of interest, on both the individual and group level; and so on. Perhaps most interesting and revealing are the passages concerning the subject of power, its uses and its effects. Particularly notable in this connection was the role of the Executive Committee, on which the camp's representatives served; the Committee was almost constantly engaged in controversies on any or all of at least three fronts: with the Japanese commandant and his staff; against internee sentiment; and among its own members.

It should be stressed that this book represents only a small portion of the original manuscript, which runs to more than 4,000 typed pages. (This total comprises the official camp history, which Hartendorp was secretly appointed to write soon after the camp was set up, on the premises of the University of Santo Tomas in Manila. The effort behind his monumental achievement, completed wholly within the camp and in the face of a Japanese proscription of such activities, is a story in itself. Because Hartendorp was too emotionally involved in his manuscript to reduce it to publishable length, the editing job was performed by Cornell University economist Frank Golay, author of several studies on the Phillippines.) The significance of this is not only that there exists a minutely detailed record of Santo Tomas Internment Camp, but that this record, if accessible, would be an invaluable source of data for social and behavioral scientists. (In case this assertion sounds too extravagant, I should note that, as a "graduate" of Santo Tomas myself, I have some authority to speak to this point.) It is to be hoped that the entire Hartendorp manuscript eventually will be made available, at least to researchers, in one form or another. Meanwhile, this briefer version merits scholarly attention—more attention than its non-specialized nature makes it likely to receive on its own.—MARTIN MEADOWS, *The American University*.

The Government of Northern Ireland: Public Finances and Services, 1921–1964. BY R. J. LAWRENCE. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965. Pp. 198. 35s.)

For as long as this reviewer can remember, students have learned—and their professors have taught—that Great Britain is somehow synonymous with the United Kingdom and the British system is the textbook example of the unitary state. Yet (discounting the Isle of Man, of course) since 1921 this has not been the case at all. Usually known as Ulster, albeit incorrectly, Northern Ireland is the textbook example of devolution of centralized authority, and Lawrence's work is one of the best contemporary studies made of this rather unique "other Ireland."

The book is based upon a Ph.D. dissertation written at Queen's University, Belfast, and does suffer from the dissertation syndrome . . . a superfluity of factual nitty-gritty. Nevertheless, Lawrence has done a good job of structuring his text and marshalling both his facts and arguments. The author's "primary aim" is to provide data for the formulation of conclusions about parliamentary devolution, especially as seen in Northern Ireland and perhaps projected for other regions. The six counties of Ulster still under the Union Jack are not a colony, and do not form a dominion, but rather are an integral part of the United Kingdom while at the same time they possess a separate written constitution and their own parliament and prime minister. The problems then, that Lawrence raises (and answers to a greater or lesser degree) deal with the historical origins of devolution, its failures and successes, and most intriguing of all, perhaps, its possible extension to other areas of the U. K., such as Scotland and Wales.

The emphasis of the work is upon public finance and public services, and thus there is perhaps a slighting of other facets of Orange politics and government—including the omniprevalent religious issue. Instead of a detailed historical account of the morphology and physiology of the Northern Ireland Ministry of Education, Lawrence might have been better advised to examine Ulster's educational practices in the more socio-cultural manner of Barritt and Carter's now famous work *The Northern Ireland Problem* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962). Nevertheless the author does not by any means ignore the "Orange-and-Green" issue, and at times actually does a quite good job of a cross-sectional analysis of Ulster politics and Ulstermen's religions. This analysis runs from the poles of the horizontal religious-racial spectrum to the extremes of the more vertically oriented class-party continuum.

As for regional self-rule for Scotland and Wales, Lawrence seems pessimistic. Northern Ireland is indeed quite a special case, and the application of Ulster's experiences in other places does not seem warranted. This reviewer does feel, however, that a bibliography is always warranted in a work of this nature, and notes with regret that none is included.—GERALD F. RUTAN, *Seattle University*.

Le Parti Démocrate Chrétien en Italie. BY JEAN-PAUL CHASSÉRIAUD. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1965. Pp. 426. Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Partis et Elections, 125.)

This is an interesting and useful book. It is divided into three main sections. The first deals with the organization of the Italian Christian Democratic party; the second with its electoral clientele, membership and parliamentary members; the third with the dynamics of the party, in terms of the party's relations with leading interest groups and of its internal factions.

The section on the party's organization is excellent. The functional utility of the organizational structure in the light of the nature of the party's electorate and of its factionalism is well stated, and there is a clear description of such matters as the roles of the various party units, the party's efforts to multiply face-to-face contacts with the public and the propaganda themes exploited by the party.

The most fully developed part of the second section seeks, through the use of such relevant census and published survey data as are available, to determine the characteristics of the Christian Democratic electorate. The treatment of the party's membership rests on official party figures, and although the author gives us all the reasons for skepticism about them and suggests that as many as 20 per cent of the total may be phantom members, he treats the widely fluctuating figures reported from the south with solemnity and states: "Les conditions sociales et économiques du pays sont telles que les Italiens s'intéressent à toute forme de revendication collective, et plus généralement, à toute forme d'action collective, qu'elle soit sportive, culturelle, confessionnelle, ou politique." (P. 204.) Readers of *The Civic Culture* (which appeared too late to be consulted by the author) will be surprised at that.

The discussion in the third section of the various factions which have formed within the party at different times is particularly valuable, and the author not only describes them but also tries to explain their existence. He might have done more here by examining closely the electoral situations of the members of the different factions. This would have deepened the analysis and, perhaps, also helped to answer two questions which the author asks near the close of the book (and which do not conceal his sympathies); "Pourquoi la Démocratie-Chrétienne n'a-t-elle pas profité du climat particulier de l'aprés-guerre pour faire adopter les quelques réformes essentielles dont son idéologie lui faisait un devoir et que lui permettait sa force parlementaire? Pourquoi y a-t-il des démocrates-chrétiens italiens ou étrangers, pour qui cette carence est insupportable, pourquoi y en a-t-il d'autres qui s'abritent derrière de menus prétextes de trésorerie, voire de pression communiste dans le pays, pour repousser les mesures de 'justice sociale' qu'ils prétendent poursuivre?" (P. 362.) A book on the Italian Christian Demo cratic party which raises such questions ought to try to answer them.

The book contains valuable maps, tables and documents, including the rules of the Christian Democratic party.—ROY PIERCE, *The University of Michigan.*

Rumania—Russia's Dissident Ally. BY DAVID FLOYD. (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. XVI, 144. $4.50.)

Albania's Captives. BY PYRRHUS J. RUCHES. (Chicago: Argonaut, Inc., 1965. Pp. IX, 213. $5.00.)

It is difficult task for the reviewer to survey jointly these two recent books on Eastern European politics. One of them, David Floyd's, is a distinct contribution to our field, particularly in view of Rumania's significant role in the continuing Sino-Soviet dispute. The other, however, is an emotional tract presenting a small problem from a distorted perspective.

Turning first to the volume on Rumania, we must note the author's careful build-up ranging from "land and people" through the first fifteen years of post-World War II exploitation by the Soviet Union (a truly abject colonial dependency!) to the exhilarating story of the nineteen-sixties. The last five years, ably chronicled by Floyd, are punctuated first by a Rumanian victory in the economic struggle within the intra-bloc confines of Comecon, progressing from there rapidly to a "more than economics"-pattern triumph of ideological parity with the U.S.S.R., and finally to the firmly established "new-type relations" marking the end of the Stalinist satellite era.

Floyd's lively narrative reflects the skills of a good journalist. Unhappily, his book suffers from the journalist's built-in affinity toward "today's news today," and thus the gradual evolution of the Rumanian story is abruptly interrupted, first by the political demise of Nikita Khrushchev (briefly covered here) and subsequently, even more drastically, by the death of Gheorghiu-Dej, the leading protagonist in the Rumanian resistance movement against the Soviet Union. The emergence of a new leader and the shifting around of top-level party and government jobs have tended to blur the outlines of dissidence on the Rumanian side fully as much as the new rulers have modified some of the Soviet policies in the course of the post-Khrushchev era. Breathlessly spaced journalism unfortunately is apt to result in a rapid rate of literary obsolescence.

Within the limitations of this self-imposed framework, Floyd presents much useful information. Statistically the 1950 merger between the Social Democratic and Communist Parties, producing a total membership of 720,000, is interesting since by 1956 the new Rumanian Workers' Part had been reduced to 580,000—as a result of ceaseless intra-party purges. The subsequent internal relaxation is also best evidenced by more liberal admission policies: the current party-membership figure is 1,240,000, one of the largest such organizations in Eastern Europe and a far cry indeed from August, 1944 when no more than 1,000 Rumanian Communists welcomed the Red Army as the "glorious liberator." This reviewer also appreciated the author's shrewd analysis of what might be called *preemptive* de-Stalinization in Rumania where the Communist leaders rightly claimed that "they had de-Stalinized even before Stalin died, . . . they had removed those leaders who were utterly committed to a policy of subservience to Moscow." (P. 126 et seq.)

The results of Rumania's increasingly independent and dissident course are optimistically, and yet carefully, summarized. Floyd is justified in stressing that the post-Khrushchev Soviet leadership will not be able to halt the process of disintegration or find a new basis for holding together the once monolithic empire. (See especially his Epilogue, pp. 131–138.) Rumania thus startlingly exemplifies the "Triple D" policies so hopefully pursued by other East European regimes as well: the "order of the day" is a combination of *de*-satellization, *de*-colonization and, last but not least, *de*-Russification.

The book by P. J. Ruches is truly a puzzler to the reader. The title, *Albania's Captives*, would normally indicate a discussion of the people of Albania living under Communist control, victimized by the regime of Enver Hoxha. Yet, this is not the case at all. The "Red Terror" receives no more than a cursory four-page treatment, mostly a string of quotations stretching from Milovan Djilas to Harry Hamm's recent work on Albania. (Chapter XIII, pp. 173–177.) "Albania's Captives" turn out to be the long-suffering people of Northern Epirus, a Greek minority grievously mistreated by its Albanian overlords. The Epirote problem is a serious one and should not be minimized as one of the long-range responsibilities of certain Western free world governments. The author sketches the historic background quite ably through the stages of Islamization, Austrian and Italian imperialism. Nevertheless, the reviewer is compelled to record two expressions of major criticism.

First of all, it is impossible to present a *serious* historical review of Balkan politics from the microcosmic perspective of one isolated minority and boundary problem. Such an over-concentration on one issue avoids the broader implications and obscures the far more important aspects of the macrocosmic picture. Unfortunately, the history of Eastern Europe cannot be evaluated from a Northern Epirote base any more than the story of Danubian Europe could be understood on the basis of, say, Transylvania's Székely minority and its multiple problems. Furthermore, the documentation of this book has serious flaws. Obscure magazine articles are cited to buttress major conclusions (*Collier's*, Sept. 15, 1951, no author given, p. 185), while scholarly students of Balkan politics, such as Harvard University's Robert Lee Wolff, are either ignored or lightly dismissed. In a characteristic vein, Professor Stavro Skendi of Columbia University is described as "an active professional Albanian nationalist intellectual"!? (P. 190.)—ANDREW GYORGY, *The George Washington University*.

Economics and Prestige in a Maya Community: The Religious Cargo System in Zinacantan. BY FRANK CANCIAN. (Stanford, California: University Press, 1965. Pp. 238. $6.50.)

This is a detailed, competently written description and functional analysis of the complex life of the 7,650 Tzotzil-speaking Mayan Indians in Zinacantan township in the Chiapas highlands. Specifically, it is a study of the religious hierarchy, its role and meaning in Zinacantan life.

This is, of course, a narrow topic which on the surface would seem to be of little interest to those not concerned with this corner of Mexico. However esoteric and specialized his subject may seem, Cancian gives us a solid theoretical treatment which affords a series of valuable cultural, economic and political insights into the functioning of this peasant community. In addition to its ethnological importance, this work will be of interest to those who concern themselves with the problems of economic, social and political integration of multicultural nations such as Mexico.

The "cargo" system of Zinacantan is the hierarchy of religious offices through which virtually all the men of the township have traditionally passed. The purpose of the institution is to "guarantee performance of rituals for the saints in the local Catholic churches. Tradition dictates that these rituals be performed and it is believed that harm will come to the community if they are not performed." Thus, a man is favored by the saints if he does well and punished if he fails in his obligations.

The "cargo" system incorporates fifty-five offices arranged on four different levels in addition to four types of auxiliary personnel. Each position has its own attributes and special duties and participants must pass through the offices in the proper sequence, performing the rituals which constitute the principal activity. Moreover, "the cargo must be a financial burden to the cargo holder and he must accept this burden in good spirits, happy that he is sacrificing for the gods and saints." The most affluent Zinacantecos participate in the system to a high degree, going into debt in payment for their prestige-building activities.

At this point Cancian departs from the traditional analyses that have been made of Maya communities (and, we might add, of many others, elsewhere in the world). The author concludes that the "cargo" system is not merely a leveling device which inhibits the accumulation of capital and "homogenizes" the society. Instead, he convincingly shows that the "cargo" system is the means by which social rank is established, differences in economic status shown, and access and ability to handle power demonstrated. Active participation in the system serves to maintain, not diminish these differences. The system rewards the Mayan values of hard work and community service, which contrast sharply, we are told, with those of the Ladino population of the nearby towns. The "cargo" system is thus perpetuated, not on the basis of a socio-economic leveling process, but rather on the basis of highly competitive behavior within a system which distributes social rewards in accord with success.

Consequently we should not be surprised (although you will be!) that the best positions in the "cargo" system, like a Big League baseball schedule, are arranged ahead until 1981. We also learn that the hierarchy is "the only sector of public life in which almost all Zinacanteco males participate," and that "the few individuals who do not take any roles in public life are usually at the bottom of the social scale in Zinacantan."

Cancian might have stopped here, concluding that the system and the closed community were thus assured of everlasting life. Instead, he proceeds to ask some appropriate questions leading to an examination of the consequences of both the increasing population and prosperity of the area. From this he concludes that the religious hierarchy will be destroyed as the institution which integrates the community, despite such "equilibrating" factors as the present cargo system now has. Cancian does not see that the Indian community, per se, can find an "Indian" alternative to the destruction of its internally directed and controlled organization. He does not consider, however, the possibility that the civil government positions in Zinacantan township might acquire greater relevance in this regard.

If we compare the "cargo" system of Zinacantan with the similar *varayoc* system of Vicos, Perú, where population growth and prosperity have also recently taken place, we see that the *varayoc* have been partially eclipsed and paralleled by a vigorous Indian civic administration. This new civic organization offers more rewards and opportunities for upwardly mobile individuals than the old, inflexible *varayoc* hierarchy. If indeed, it is the "cargo" system which is the key in maintaining Zinacantan as a society apart from Mexican national life, then the possibilities for growth in the area of civil government would seem to be especially worthy of exploration if the present system declines as Cancian predicts. In relation to this and to the discussion in general, I would have liked to have seen further attention paid to the role of Ladinos in Zinacantan life and some additional remarks on the impact of the Mexican government programs in the area, particularly as they concern the institution described.

The detailed analysis presented is owed to the great depth of the field data, which, as Evon Vogt indicates in the introduction, is the result of continuous field study in Zinacantan since 1957. This has involved numerous faculty and students, many of them undergraduate participants in the Columbia-Cornell-Harvard-Illinois Summer Field Studies program. As the first substantial publication of the Harvard Chiapas Project, this is an excellent beginning. The book is of modest length and is most carefully reasoned (aside from a few minor indiscretions). One's major quibble would seem to be with the Stanford University Press for making its customers pay as dearly for the book's possession as the "cargo" holders of Zinacantan do for their offices.—PAUL L. DOUGHTY, *Indiana University.*

New Perspectives of Brazil. ED. BY ERIC N. BAKLANOFF. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1966. Pp. 328. $7.50.)

New Perspectives, according to its editor, "derives its unity from the examination of salient aspects of Brazilian society undergoing transformation." This interdisciplinary collection of essays focuses on the period following World War II and includes interim assessments of the military-civilian coups of March 31, 1964.

Several critical comments may be offered. First, a collection of diverse essays drawn together by a loose, general theme is dependent on its editor, whose concern should be not only the coordination of views but also the analysis of parallel trends and patterns of ideas. Eric Baklanoff does not fulfill this important task. His weak introduction lacks synthesis and merely surveys the basic themes of each of the ten essays. As such it is difficult to find the links among varying thoughts. It is not altogether clear why the author has selected these particular essays, which he admits do not provide a comprehensive view, since there is a detailed discussion of non-Catholic movements but not Catholicism, industrialization but not agricultural development, language patterns but not the fine arts, and the like. Second, the essays lack continuity. Furthermore, they suffer from unevenness in quality. Third, it is not certain why some essays include bibliographical references while others conspicuously omit such references. A single bibliography, perhaps annotated and in essay form, could have been placed preferably at the end of the book.

In the introductory essay, John W. F. Dulles offers a highly readable and interesting historical sketch of the period 1945 to 1964, although he omits much detail of events leading up to the March 1964 coup. Former President João Goulart is portrayed accurately as an agitator, irresponsible, and a friend of far leftists, but Dulles ignores other details. Goulart, for instance, was basically incompetent and indecisive as a leader. Furthermore, most of his decisions tended to favor pressures and demands emanating from the political right, not the left. At the end of his essay Dulles includes a glossary of terms which could have been integrated in footnotes to the text; a lengthy table of exchange rates also could have been explained in a one-sentence footnote.

Juarez R. B. Lopes, a sociologist at the University of São Paulo, follows with one of the best of the collection's essays. Focusing upon the attitudes, values, and behavior patterns that facilitate or resist change in the direction of economic or social development, Lopes contends that "such socio-cultural phenomena, rather than favoring or opposing economic development—may be better viewed as attributes of groups and masses within a changing power framework. At given moments in the process of development they impede or facilitate that process by their stand or action." This proposition leads the author to an analysis of the Brazilian "power structure." He analyzes the period from 1945 to 1964 as one in which there was the development of a "composite state" in which many interests, in contrast to the dominant agrarian interest of the past, developed agreements and compromises in which the urban lower and middle sectors of the population had to be considered, although they did not participate directly in "the power structure." Recent accelerated processes of change, at the lower levels of society, Lopes argues, contributed to the growing alarm of the dominant classes who in turn seem to have forgotten some of their own internal conflicts.

The essays by Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, Eric Baklanoff, and Werner Baer complement each other. Dubnic notes three historical trends in Brazilian foreign policy: territorial diplomacy, extra-continental initiation, and experimentation in world politics. Unfortunately, most of the essay is confused by polemics over Cuban subversive activities in Brazil (p. 82); simplistic analysis of the extreme left under Goulart which "was gradually capturing the policy-making apparatus" (p. 89); and insistence that the coup of 1964 brought Brazil "revolution," "new ideological orientations," and a "new foreign policy" (pp. 98–99). Baklanoff presents a technical yet useful discussion of foreign private investment and industrialization, while Baer deals with "socio-economic imbalances." Baer's excellent analysis treats imbalances in education, agriculture, regional development, import substitution and inflation.

Roland E. Chardon reviews demographic shifts in population from 1950 to 1960 while another geographer, Armin K. Ludwig, focuses on the development and potential of Brasília as an urban complex in a unique regional environment.

Among the remaining essays, John F. Santos reflects upon the Brazilian himself. His valuable contribution deals with personality traits, attitudes, and behavior found in everyday life. Emilio Willems concerns himself with the role of non-Catholic religious movements in the process of cultural change—a fascinating introduction to an important subject. The concluding essay by Earl Thomas appropriately identifies emerging patterns of the Brazilian language.

Although this reviewer has recognized in this book several problems in organization and interpretation, Baklanoff and his colleagues present us with a useful and interesting survey of recent Brazilian developments which must be recommended reading for laymen and scholars alike.—Ronald H. Chilcote, *University of California, Riverside.*

White Laager: The Rise of Afrikaner Nationalism. By William Henry Vatcher, Jr. (New York, Washington, London: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965. Pp. x, 309. $6.95.)

Because of its affluence, its crucial geopolitical and strategic position, and its resilience to the advance of decolonization in the African continent, the Republic of South Africa today is the object of curiosity, opprobrium, and (for some) admiration. It is the keystone of the southern African arch as well as the command post of the southern white redoubt in Africa. But it is still something more: it has the oldest nationalist movement in sub-Saharan Africa, Afrikaner nationalism.

Afrikaner nationalism, though, is not *sui generis;* it bears a remarkable resemblance to nationalist movements in the rest of Africa and offers interesting parallels to German nationalism after 1918 and before 1945. Consequently, it can be most fruitfully analyzed in a multi-contextual manner which allows the investigator access to the concepts and techniques of contemporary comparative politics. Unfortunately, such an approach to South African studies is still quite uncommon. [Leonard M. Thompson's *Politics in the Republic of South Africa* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), is a refreshing rarity.]

The late Dr. Vatcher, Professor of Political Science at San Jose State College, has written an interesting book and one which will no doubt appeal to many general and perhaps some specialized readers. To a large extent, it was based upon numerous interviews with important Afrikaner opinion leaders and upon both the Afrikaans- and English-language press in South Africa. Although it contains an extremely impressive bibliography (of 49 pages), it lacks documentation in several critical places in the text. The most egregious omission of sources was the South African Hansards of the House of Assembly and the Senate. In addition, it appears from his citations that he may well have relied upon summaries of the South African press rather than upon the original articles themselves—an altogether commonplace fault among those who write about South Africa.

The book, then, is partially overwritten and definitely underconceptualized, and while it might well be regarded as a success from the standpoint of the general audience, it is surely not a classic in the field of political science. What is needed are more insightful, more rigorous studies of Afrikaner nationalism, not simply the accretion of more (esoteric) data. Professor Vatcher, for example, devoted an inordinate amount of attention in the text and in the appendices to the *Broederbond* (the League of Brothers), which he regards as the *élan vital* of Afrikaner nationalism; while it is probably true that this coordinating body of Afrikaner zealots wielded considerable influence during the premierships of General Hertzog and General Smuts, it may be questioned whether its influence is still so decisive at the present time. Professor Thompson of the University of California (Los Angeles), an acknowledged expert on South Africa, takes the position that the Cabinet is now the major repository of power in Afrikaner nationalism (Leonard M. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 136).

Moreover, the writer failed to give fuller attention to the significance of the bureaucratic element of the National Party, an element which is somewhat similar to the *partitocrazia* in the Republic of Italy, a group which has been investigated carefully by Professor Norman Kogan. Dr. Vatcher could have greatly improved his study of Afrikaner nationalism if, for example, he had attempted to apply the findings of Robert Michels and R. T. McKenzie to the question of the distribution of power within the National Party of South Africa.

The development of Afrikaner nationalism in the twentieth century has entailed the increasing urbanization and prosperity of innumerable so-called *bywoners* (tenant farmers or sharecroppers), and Dr. Vatcher properly devotes considerable space in his book to the economic implications of the rise of Afrikaner nationalism, which takes on some of the attributes of an ethnic welfare state or protective guild. Yet he fails to go beyond the mere taxonomy and description of such ancillary bodies of the National Party into the more significant question of the interrelationship of the Afrikaner socioeconomic and political systems. Stanley Trapido's article, "Political Institutions and Afrikaner Social Structures in the Republic of South Africa" [this *Review*, vol. 57, no. 1 (March, 1963), pp. 75–87], would form a useful starting point for the analysis of the dimensions of social stratification in Afrikaner society, a study which would facilitate the examination of micro- and macropolitics in the Republic.

Finally, *White Laager* is woefully deficient in terms of the concept of political culture. The data for this kind of analysis are certainly contained in the book, but they remain in an inchoate and unorganized form. Had Dr. Vatcher drawn upon the works of Almond, Verba, Hyman, Wylie, Kogan, Banfield, and Kornhauser for direction and guidance, he surely would have made a significant contribution to the analysis of Afrikaner nationalism. Because he did not, his book will probably pass into obscurity, along with quite a number of others on South Africa, and South African studies will, for the most part, still remain in the formal-legal, configurative stage.—RICHARD DALE, *Southern Illinois University*.

One-Party Government in Mali: Transition toward Control. BY FRANK GREGORY SNYDER. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965. Pp. ix, 175. $5.00.)

This book is a welcome addition to the still very thin body of literature on Mali politics. Though originally written as an undergraduate senior essay for the political science honors program at Yale University, *One-Party Government in Mali: Transition toward Control* bears all the trademarks of serious scholarship—a meticulous documentation (drawn from relatively untapped sources), a coherent conceptual framework, and a harmonious blend of descriptive and analytical skills. What is more, no other study, as far as I am aware, has so thoroughly investigated the pre-World War II complexities of Mali politics, and their relationships to political developments in metropolitan France.

The main theme of Snyder's study is summed up in the sub-title. In essence, the author has written a political history of the *Union Soudanaise* (US), focused on the techniques and strategies employed by its leadership, first to build up an elite-mass nucleus, and then to overcome and eventually eliminate the opposition. Part I traces back the origins of the US to the growth of voluntary associations in the days of the Popular Front, and relates these early forms of self-expression to the emergence of an intellectual elite; Part II deals with the transformation of the US into a *parti unique*, with appropriate emphasis on the issues involved in the long and bitter rivalry between the US and the *Parti Progressiste Soudanais* (PSP); Part III offers a brief discussion of the "problems and prospects" currently faced by the US leadership, in which the author stresses the priority given to short run political objectives over long range goals of economic advance. In conclusion Snyder quotes Professor Aristide Zolberg to the effect that in Mali, as in the Ivory Coast, the party, though "remaining essentially a political machine, capable of neutralizing many of the threats to its maintenance, capable of absorbing change," is "not yet capable of constructing a new society"—a statement which this reviewer finds difficult to reconcile with the general drift of the argument developed in the previous chapters. For if in the Ivory Coast the incorporation of autonomous ethinic constituencies into the party structure made the *Parti Democratique de la Cote d'Ivoire* (PDCI) look more like a party of representation than a party of solidarity, in the case of Mali the reverse was probably closer to reality. It may be that Snyder has exaggerated the importance of the US as a political machine at the expense of the "ideological reconversion" function performed by the party through the manipulation of various themes and symbols borrowed from indigenous and Western sources.

As one surveys the contributions made by other scholars one becomes aware of other minor weaknesses in Snyder's treatment. For example, nowhere does one get even a hint of the relevance of precolonial history to the ideology and functioning of the US; there is no mention of the influence of the precolonial "urban tradition," of the 19th century Islamic reform movements, of the traditional forms of collective leadership, of what Professor Ki-Zerbo calls Mali's "tradition étatique." Only passing reference is made to the ethnic and stratificatory underpinnings of the US-PSP rivalry. No attempt has been made to explain the option of the US leadership in the 1958 referendum, despite the obvious questions raised by the lack of congruence between its "oui" vote and its stated commitment to "immediate and complete independence." Nor does the author attempt to relate the factors that led to the break-up of the Mali Federation to the structural and ideological differences between the US and the *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise* (UP), or to point the conflict between the commitment of the party leaders to the notion of African unity and its short run political options.

Admittedly, Snyder's book lacks the broad historical sweep and imaginative insights of the Hodgkin-Morgenthau chapter in *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*, edited by J. S. Coleman and C. Rosberg (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964); nor does it pretend to match the Deutschian predilection for data quantification displayed by Professor William J. Foltz in parts of his interesting study of the eclatement of the Mali Federation [*From French West Africa to the Mali Federation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965)]. Nonetheless this is a book that deserves to be read attentively by all who are interested in the history of African parties; no other work pinpoints with greater accuracy and in more detail the crucial bases and stages of party development in one of Africa's leading single-party states.—RENÉ LEMARCHAND, *University of Florida.*

Re-Orientations: Essays on Asia in Transition. BY HUGH TINKER. (New York, Washington, London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. 175. $5.50.)

In his urbane preface to this collection of ten essays, Professor Tinker rejects the title "political scientist" despite his occupancy of the chair of Government and Politics at the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies. Preferring to identify himself as a contemporary historian, he holds that an observer of politics can conceivably surmount his personal bias, but never the bias of his time. His ready admission of his own bias as an English Liberal sympathetic to India permits him to write with feeling and express his judgments freely.

His most analytical piece, "The Broken-Backed State," masterfully characterizes an increasingly common form among ex-colonies. He adapts a metaphor invented by military strategists to describe warfare after a nuclear holocaust in order to characterize the breakdown of governmental functions following hasty independence. A broken-backed state possesses all the trappings of a highly centralized government including even a Five Year Plan, but the writ of central government hardly runs outside the capital and the economic plan is taken seriously only by Western graduate students. In the absence of a strong middle class, a competent civil service, or a professional army, power disperses to local bosses who, Tinker unjustifiably assumes, will necessarily base control on their command over the instruments of violence. His conclusion rings true—the breakdown of national political and economic life does not destroy the social fabric, which is composed of religious, familial, and communal ties that meet many of the needs filled by government in more complex states. As Tinker points out, observers who have predicted Indonesia's imminent collapse for the last decade have failed to appreciate the enduring character of the broken-backed state.

Four other essays succinctly summarize the development in Asian countries of phenomena common to the non-Western world. They treat community development projects, the demise of the leaders of independence movements, foreign aid, and communalism. The merit of these essays lies in their balanced and lucid treatment of complex topics, not in the formulation of new insights.

Two essays on India are among the finest in the book. His bibliographic essay on national development is an excellent introduction to the literature on Indian politics as well as an inquiry into the forces of disintegration in India. The essay on Gandhi's thought is a penetrating interpretation of the manner in which his deification as a freedom fighter obscures his humanitarian message. Moreover, in their pursuit of power his disciples have forsaken Gandhi's creed of conciliation, a test of which has been India's relations with Pakistan.

In his final essay Tinker maintains that students of British politics could learn much from writers on Indian politics. He criticizes British political studies for being superficial, ignoring community loyalties in electoral politics, and misunderstanding the nature of local party leadership. He finds that studies which do give due weight to social and personal factors are more advanced in India than in Britain. This is no doubt due to the long shadow cast on the study of Indian politics by methods developed in the study of American politics. Of an entirely different order is his criticism of the concentration of power in the British executive as a "perversion of the parliamentary system." Reacting strongly to the exhibition of citizen incompetence in the Suez fiasco, he condemns tight party discipline and undemocratic structure for creating a politics of confrontation devoid of inter-party cooperation and discouraging of citizen participation. He draws on M. N. Roy and Jayaprakash Narayan to buttress his call for increasing participation of individuals and eventually a partyless democracy. He might be less sanguine had he observed American experience with the ethic of citizen participation, loose national party structure, and non-partisan local politics. Yet Tinker cannot be accused of idle academic speculation here. His entry as a Liberal candidate in the 1964 campaign is evidence of his commitment to the improvement of British politics.—DOROTHY GUYOT, *California Institute of Technology.*

Behind the Great Wall: An Appraisal of Mao's China. BY LORENZ STUCKI. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. 154. $4.95.)

After a visit of two months to Communist China, Dr. Stucki has written a perceptive book on those aspects of life in China which fit his preconceptions. His conclusions do not derive from his observations in China but from his notion of the way totalitarian systems function and from his conviction that the Chinese Communists have transformed Marxism into a new missionary imperialism. He believes, for instance, that in totalitarian countries one can uncover more of the truth about real conditions from people who are not, or who do not appear to be, ardent supporters of their government than from those who believe in the essential rightness of the system and who trust their political leaders. He expected that life in China would be dull, the propaganda dreary, the people apathetic or discontented, and the general conformity stifling: and those are the feelings he records. He found most factories he visited operating at half their capacity (except for those manufacturing chemical fertilizer) and attributes this more to economic mismanagement than to the withdrawal of Soviet advisors and the end of Soviet aid. He missed the nightlife of Hong-Kong but discovered that the people approved of the abolition of prostitution and of the general puritanism of the government. He expected to find the rulers arrogant, self-isolated, ignorant of the world outside China, and filled with the zeal of new imperialists carrying a new truth to the outside world. He states that the Chinese leaders dream that their revolutionary example will inspire new revolutionary wars beyond China's borders.

His only contact with a high official, Foreign Minister Chen Yi, did not entirely fulfill his expections. "Despite all its threatening pronouncements," he writes, "China is pursuing a foreign policy of extreme caution." This caution can be illustrated by the fact that Chen Yi refused to answer Dr. Stucki's question on Vietnam, "In the case of a military attack against the People's Republic of Vietnam, would China take military action to support the P.R.V.?" Chen Yi answered another question instead, referring less pointedly to military involvement. "What would be the Chinese reaction if the war in Vietnam in one or another form should be extended to North Vietnam?" Comparing the mutual dependence of the P.R.V. and China with that between lips and teeth, Chen stated that if there were any encroachment on the P.R.V., the Chinese people would not stand idly by. Implied here is the useful distinction between people and government. Our State Department does not worry too much when a Chinese government spokesman talks about the attitudes of the Chinese people. By choosing the right question, the Foreign Minister avoided saying anything about what the Chinese government might do. Given the alternatives presented, his response was extremely cautious.

It is Dr. Stucki's final judgment that the Chinese have every reason to preserve peace for many years, that they need decades to solve their internal problems of population control and industrialization. But he does not really believe that the present generation of Chinese leaders is willing to wait. His visit to China did not alter that conviction.—JOHN E. RUE, *Stanford University.*

Los Organismos colegiados del Ministerio de Información y Turismo: composición y funciones. BY JAVIER DIETTA, Jefe de la Sección Informativa de la Secretaría General Técnica. (Madrid: Secretaría General Técnica, Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1964. Pp. 391.)

The function and activities of committees and boards in determining the administration of a Spanish Ministry and its various agencies seems never to have been set down in detail previously. Enumerated are 100 committees and boards within the Ministry of Information and Tourism, arranged in the order of the chairmanships of each, from the Minister himself down through the Director Generals. For each is given citation to the authority, the statement of functions, and the membership. The 96 boards in other organizations and ministries on which the Ministry of Information and Tourism is represented are similarly treated. The Ministry likewise has membership on 39 provincial boards, including 10 that are common to each province, and these are also treated. In the international field, the Ministry participates in 11 more. At the conclusion is presented the text of "Normas de procedimiento de los organismos colegiados" from the "Ley de procedimiento administrativo de 17 de julio de 1958." This statement in the work of the 256 boards relating to the action of the Ministerio de Información y Turismo is most likely paralleled to a considerable extent by a similar but not too easily visible number of commissions and boards relating to the thirteen other Ministries, as well as to the Presidencia del Gobierno and to the Secretaría General del Movimiento. The net effect of the existence of the not too easily determinable total number of such boards on the action of the Spanish government remains to be studied.—JAMES B. CHILDS, *Library of Congress.*

Handbook of Commonwealth Organizations, with a Message from The Right Honourable Arthur G. Bottomley, O.B.E., M.P., Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. COMPILED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM COMMITTEE OF THE FEDERATION OF COMMONWEALTH CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE. (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1965. Pp. xvii, 236. 30 s.)

Two hundred and fifty-three organizations are described under thirty-four headings. The principal departments of the British Government concerned with the Commonwealth are not described but only listed at the end. A few agencies relative to the field of government may be mentioned. Two paragraphs on page 152 describe the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. On pages 45 and 46 is an account of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. Nearly a page is devoted to the Crown Agents for Overseas Government and Administrations. Yet, the great number of other British organizations having Commonwealth interests are also for the most part not easily to be located with a note as to what their Commonwealth activities are. The handbook should be useful for all having any interest in Commonwealth relationships.—JAMES B. CHILDS, *Library of Congress*.

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COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Tanganyika Preplanning. By Fred G. Burke. Preface by Bertram M. Gross. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965. National Planning Series, 3. Pp. xi, 108. $3.25.)

In an era when we sometimes feel that we are inundated with political studies that tell us more than we care to know about the intimate workings of obscure "systems" in remote corners of the world, it is perhaps refreshing to come upon a book that reveals too little. Professor Burke, the able Director of the Program in East African Studies at Syracuse, sprinkles his survey of planning from colonial through post-colonial times with a number of interesting suggestions for approaches to future study, but it serves only to whet our appetites for the actual descriptions and analyses of "politics and planning" in Tanzania. In the absence of more than suggestions of approaches the present book adds very little to the stock of knowledge or conceptual devices in the hands of contemporary students of comparative politics and development planning.

The reader will be left wondering what scholarly advantages were seen in introducing the problem of planning in Tanzania in thirty-five pages of a seventy-five page survey instead of waiting perhaps three or four years for evidence of the operations and preliminary results of Tanzania's first Five Year Plan. One suspects that the notion of "preplanning" (never fully clarified) is meant to turn aside those who counsel patience in assessing patterns of political development. Indeed Professor Burke notes that "national planning, in the proper sense of the term, has never existed" in Tanganyika. By what standards then are we to judge the present study? Answer: "The major significance of this preliminary survey does not rest in new data that it might uncover but rather in the extent to which the process of postulating, projecting, and then moving toward a certain state of affairs in a new African country gives rise to some new insights into the general nature of this uniquely human process." It is the author's intriguing suggestion that "planning" should be viewed as projecting a desirable state of affairs to some future point and supporting it by an outline of steps necessary to accomplish that state. Aside from the fact that such a view of planning barely separates it from the literature of political utopias, it makes the first quote—which indicates the "significance" of the survey—sound suspiciously like another admonition that we must study politics everywhere to learn something about planning in general. If so, then we need a study of Tanzanian politics and not a history of non-planning in Tanganyika.

The fact is, however, that Professor Burke is a shrewd observer and that his bird's-eye tour is not without reward. For instance, he points out that the colonial political system set in motion forces within the economy of pre-independence Tanganyika which were handled by the administration in a way that constructed the scaffolding of a planned society. Unfortunately the links between colonial marketing boards and present national planning are not explored further. It might be interesting to judge at some future date the extent to which "socialist" governments in Africa are tied to the structures, procedures and ideologies of colonial administrators long departed. Regarding the colonial system, Professor Burke also suggests (somewhat at variance with the previous observation) that provincial administrations were able to lobby for increasingly larger investments in local government and development. Another stimulating thought, although this reviewer believes the situation less clear than that, but again, its implications must be dropped for another headlong charge through "the Groundnut Scheme" and its famous failures.

An important theme emerges in the final section of the book: the dependence of planning on international arrangements and the management of local communities. In this way one is justified in firmly tying the analysis of national planning to the total picture of politics in any of the underdeveloped countries. Perhaps this is what distinguishes development planning from other sorts in our time. The dilemma in transforming "primordial sentiments" in parochial communities via a planning mechanism that functions in large part as a reflection of international forces outside its control is a cruel one. It makes the future study of politics/planning in Tanzania poignant as well as illuminating.

At least three other problems are related to Professor Burke's remarks on present-day planning in Tanzania. They all deal with the possibly unique politics of planning deliberation. Tanzanian political leadership has brought in a French approach to national planning (replete with a French advisor at the outset) in a setting of English procedures and bureaucratic style. The results of this "marriage" will interest students of public adminsitration everywhere. There is, in addition, the emergent problem of the interplay between the planning secretariat and the politicians. The formal arrangements are outlined by Burke; what we need now is discussion of the dynamics of decision-making. This discussion will have to take account of the role of the para-governmental corporations in Tanzania, a development which augurs a new wave of "corporatist" devotees in the tropics. Finally, the struggle over the planning arrangements for the country can be seen as reflecting the conflict between "centralizers" and "pragmatists" in the government. This doctrinal dimension to planning probably ought not to confine one's concern for African politics, but neither should it be ignored.—HARVEY GLICKMAN, *Haverford College.*

Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya. BY ROBERT O. TILMAN. (Durham: Duke University Press for the Duke University Commonwealth Studies Center, 1964. Pp. vii, 175. $6.50.)

This is a pioneering introduction which makes available important data concerning the development and composition of the Malayan bureaucracy. It is particularly valuable for its description of the process of Malayanization of the civil service in the period subsequent to independence in 1957. Professor Tilman describes the rapid decrease of expatriates in the senior bureaucracy—a drop from 61 per cent of the total in 1957 to 40 per cent in 1962—and notes that in general the Chinese and Indians have tended to gravitate toward the professional and technical services, while the Malays are concentrated largely in the administrative and police services. One of his most significant findings is that the senior bureaucracy as a whole is not—as has often been assumed—the preserved domain of the Malays, but in fact incorporated as of 1962 an even larger Chinese than Malay component—34 per cent Chinese, 29 per cent Malay, and 16 per cent Indian. Thus, by 1962 the Malays held posts in the senior bureaucracy equal to 67 per cent of the Malay proportion of the total population compared to 117 per cent for the Chinese.

Some of Tilman's material may, however, prove misleading for readers with little knowledge of the Malayan political setting. He discusses the MCS (Malayan Civil Service)—the elite level of the bureaucracy—some thirty pages after his section analyzing the ethnic composition of the senior bureaucracy as a whole. This aspect of the book's organization may confuse readers, for it is in the MCS that adminisstrative decisions of greatest political consequence are made; and, as Tilman points out, this body is overwhelmingly Malay in composition. He notes that in 1962 it included 219 Malays and only 17 Chinese (15 were Indian and 26 expatriate). Here Professor Tilman takes a deep speculative plunge. Noting that recruitment to the MCS is on the basis of a quota of four Malays to each non-Malay, he concludes: "Even if all other conditions were equal, it is statistically probable that a non-Malay would have to be four times more qualified than a Malay if he were to be acceptable in the eyes of the MCS. Thus, if the objectivity of the organs of internal administration of the bureacuracy continues, it seems not unlikely that positions of major responsibility may increasingly be assigned to those most qualified for the posts, and in time it may be discovered that while the MCS is still predominantly Malay in character the decision-making process could be monopolized by a group that is disproportionately non-Malay."

This speculation points up the major weakness of this study, which detracts from its value as a whole and at the same time is likely to result in serious misunderstanding on the part of students of public administration who do not already have some knowledge of post-independence Malayan politics. For this study of bureaucracy is largely devoid of political context, and in Malaya that is quite as germane as in any other country. The salient features of this setting must be understood if one is to have the necessary basis for assessing the relevance of any breakdown of the bureaucracy's ethnic composition—especially at the upper levels of the administrative civil service. For there is a startling lack of congruence between the proportion of positions held by the Chinese in the senior bureaucracy as a whole and their power in the government. The Malays, though less numerous than the Chinese in the new state of Malaysia (39 per cent as against 42 per cent) continued to dominate the national government quite as overwhelmingly as they did that of Malaya (where they constitute 50 per cent of the population as against 37 per cent for the Chinese). They insisted upon maintenance and even expansion of constitutional provisions which discriminate sharply against the Chinese and are calculated to maintain continuing domination of the government by the Malays. (This attitude was a major reason for Singapore's secession from Malaysia in 1965, subsequent to the publication of Professor Tilman's book.) Surely the reader needs to be aware of this and of other special attributes of the country's political system if he is to have a minimally sufficient basis for understanding the nature and role of its bureaucracy. For this particular political setting does severely condition the way the bureaucracy functions and undoubtedly accounts in considerable measure for the virtual monopoly by Malays of the administrative decision-making level—the elite MCS. Indeed, an estimate of the actual ethnic division of political power could better be drawn from the figures Professor Tilman cites for the ethnic composition of the MCS than from his figures for the senior bureaucracy as a whole.

Tilman's treatment of the colonial bureaucracy is comprehensive and very useful to an understanding of many important factors of the bureaucracy of independent Malaya. However, his coverage of what he terms "the political system of traditional Malaya" is weak. Despite the caveat proffered him by J. M. Gullick that the latter's study, *Indigenous Systems of Western Malaya,* should be regarded "as purely and explicitly as 19th century material," Tilman nevertheless appears to be heavily dependent upon this material in his efforts to infer the nature of the indigenous system in previous periods. There is, moreover, a major omission in his account of the situation in the 19th century just prior to the extension of British rule. This is his disregard of the significant role of the powerful Chinese tin-mining Kongsis in the East coast sultanates and their important political and administrative relations with the Malay rulers. One could read this early section and be quite unaware that one of the major administrative problems for some of these rulers was their relationship to what were sometimes large enclaves of autonomous, or largely autonomous, Chinese administration within their realm.

This is a book, then, which should be of value primarily to those who already have sufficient background knowledge, especially an understanding of the local political environment, to appreciate the author's important findings concerning the development and current character of Malaysia's bureaucracy—particularly that major part of it which operates in Malaya itself. —George McT. Kahin, *Cornell University.*

Foreign Aid and Politics in Nepal. By Eugene Mihaly. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. viii, 202. $6.75.)

This fascinating book is a chronicle of failure, if not hopelessness. One can learn much from failure, though the author's lessons offer scant encouragement to the revolutionaries of rising expectations. He reminds us that economic aid should not appear in forms and amounts that might displace indigenous efforts or reforms; that aid donors should not expect all governments and peoples to be ready for change; that aid should not depend too heavily upon the administrative resources of the host government. If the sole purpose of aid were to force-feed economic growth and technological improvement, these lessons would become iron laws. That there may be reason to offer aid where economic prospects are slim, the writer does not appear ready to concede.

Important methodological questions are posed by the uses made of the case studies in this volume. The incidents described do not seem connected to their imputed consequences, which are almost invariably negative. Yet failures in technical assistance lead the author to suggest that foreign aid should concentrate on large-scale capital projects, which are fairly independent of government intentions and apparatus and which require no public support. [This view is now dominant in American foreign aid circles, which, despite the current emphasis on reform, prefer to avoid involvement in the activities and operations of foreign aid projects in the hope of improving the prospects of success.] The hypothesis is certainly justified if success is defined as avoiding unpleasant complications. But if important technological change is required, either within small groups of the host nations' specialists or in the mass of its peasantry, some complications must be expected. In the case of Nepal the real issue was not how to avoid complications but how to stimulate favorable change.

The author considers Nepal "a microcosm of the challenges and difficulties that major aid-giving countries face everywhere." Upon this dubious proposition some major conclusions depend. In criticizing aid administrators for generalizing too much, the author joins them in assuming the virtual universality and interchangeability of cultures and approaches. Perhaps Ethiopia is the country that most closely resembles the conditions described in Nepal, although it was obviously the more developed and stable of the two during this period. But the consequences of aid in Ethiopia seem quite different from those in Nepal. The pervasive scent of failure in Nepal leads the author to regard the "revolution of rising expectations" as a mirage everywhere because the peasants and government leaders in Nepal are "unwilling" to accept change. The Gilbert and Sullivan quality of the Nepalese case weakens these convictions, since the author did not cite aid experiences elsewhere.

This story of unmitigated failure offers only one real consolation, that practically everyone failed: The Americans, of course, being Americans; the Indians, who were kicked out; the Chinese, some of whose money was used to pay for American projects; and the Soviet Union, which was too late in starting to have chalked up any "successes." The Swiss and Israeli did succeed, in very small projects, some of which were financed by the U.S.; and the Indians in several rather large ones which represented the work of their own personnel exclusively.

The best, most interesting, and most useful parts of the book are its views of project planning and field operations, which are still largely neglected in the available literature of foreign aid. It is a thoughtful and perceptive specimen of this genre.—JOHN D. MONTGOMERY, *Harvard University.*

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

NIMROD RAPHAELI
The University of Michigan

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

Secrecy and the Arms Race: A Theory of the Accumulation of Strategic Weapons and How Secrecy Affects It. By Martin C. McGuire. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. 245. $5.95.)

The first four chapters of this book, which owe much to the work of Richardson and Schelling, should properly be called "Resource allocation between intelligence and hardware in an economic model of a bipolar arms race." One must emphasize that the author discusses *"an"* arms race, which derives its characteristics from that abstracted, rational, calculating utopia where economists so often seem to find their assumptions, and thus has little in common with *the* ("our") arms race. Those intellectual puzzle addicts who like to see how many and how complex are the equations that can be generated by a few simple assumptions and a few varied constraints, will enjoy McGuire's display of deductive brilliance. Those desiring information about problems of *the* arms race will find, unfortunately, that most of the questions they consider important (e.g., how national leaders who don't have the benefit of utility indices actually go about valuing conflicting national goals) are treated as "givens," or dealt with by the *ceteris paribus* principle. "Sharpening the tools of analysis" is a phrase one thinks of in considering this part of McGuire's work (he uses the word "heuristic" throughout). And since none that I can recall of his conclusions falsify simple common sense, the student of foreign and defense policy will find but limited use for the work to this point (and will wish there had been more and better verbal explanations of the equations).

The separate essay contained in Chapter V is another matter, however. Here McGuire points out that the similarity between the theoretical structure of duopolistic markets "and our arms races is striking." He therefore goes on to apply various "solutions" for the case of duopolistic competition to analogous versions of "duopolistic" arms race competitions. Discussing questions that are of profound interest to everyone—whether to arm or disarm, when and how—he develops several fascinating insights that are not easily reached by simple intuition, that do falsify "common sense." Every reader will have his own favorite; mine is the suggestion that partial disarmament may be a stable solution in a deterrence-oriented arms race, but that in a "two-sided contest to acquire first-strike potential" the "best (joint-utility-maximizing) solution would be complete and total disarmament." As an heuristic tool, then, McGuire's method justifies itself: it produces provocative hypotheses (but did he have to choose such a complicated way of saying: Let's imagine a duopolistic arms race?).

However, his attempt to produce conclusions as well—to link this essay on arms control with the earlier essay on arms *secrecy*—is largely a failure; the economist's abstractions remain dominant in the end. To reach decisions about the proper mix of openness and secrecy in arms control negotiations on the basis of McGuire's formulations, we would have to be able to compare our own arms race precisely with the appropriate variant in his model—and we cannot do this. Policy-makers have never based their decisions about military strategy on rigorous, "rational" cost-gain analyses; nor can the policy structures that have resulted from those decisions be translated back into economic categories. Insubstantial opponents with timeless omniscience about their own and everyone else's utilities are politically bloodless—and an argument which has no politics in its premises can produce none in its conclusions.

McGuire himself is genuinely modest about his accomplishment: "the model," he writes toward the end," is stylized and can be used only with caution." So long as the reader heeds this warning and ignores the book's titular pretensions, the effort involved in following the reasoning of a fertile mind will be repaid.—PHILIP GREEN, *Smith College.*

An Inquiry into Enoughness: Of Bombs and Men and Staying Alive. BY DANIEL LANG. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965. Pp. xi, 216. $5.50.)

Good News! Not even specialists in national security policy need feel guilty if they have not read this book. The author is a member of the staff of the *New Yorker*, where the chapters of the book have been previously published, and he has written a highly readable, well-organized, interesting series of essays on the most important political problem of our time. But unless a reader is making a belated first acquaintance with nuclear weapon systems, scientists, and problems of disarmament and arms control, the book will not provide him with any insights on these subjects he did not have before. He will, however, find some fascinating information to support his insights.

The structure of the book is strong and dramatic. The first chapter is an account of Project Gnome, an underground test in December 1961 that resulted in an accidental venting of radioactive matter into the atmosphere (the theme is set: nuclear weapons are a force that can get out of hand despite the best of plans and controls). The second chapter describes an Aldermaston March in 1963 (nuclear weapons worry people, and while those marching in protest may be politically naive, their actions are expressive of their unease and distrust of government policy). There follow three vignettes of the negotiations at Geneva to achieve a test-ban treaty (see the diplomats, jaded and suspicious, search year on end for a formula that can express their fears of both the bomb and each other). The author next presents a sympathetic profile of Jerome Wiesner, President Kennedy's science advisor (the scientists in Washington are just as bright, hardworking, earnest, and imaginative in their search for ways to end or moderate the development of weapons as they are in their efforts to design and build new weapons), and an account of the Pugwash Conference in the fall of 1963 (there are "Wiesners" in other countries too, including the Soviet Union). The final chapter, from which the book secures its title, describes the answers Lang secured from a variety of members of the State and Defense Departments, the Atomic Energy Commission, and Congress to the question of whether anyone could see an end to the accumulation of nuclear weapons (not really, this thing has gotten bigger than all of us, even McNamara).

This summary is not meant to indicate that the book is unsophisticated in its treatment of the political or military subjects discussed. Daniel Lang has been reporting atomic energy policy since 1945. His eye is as experienced as his pen is talented, and while the analytical points he makes may not be especially novel, the detail with which he supports them is perceptively chosen and at times striking. Lang appears to subscribe, for example, to the theory that the policy debates and dilemmas in Moscow are the mirror image of those in Washington, and his accounts of conversations with Soviet diplomats and scientists will provide some excellent illustrations for those seeking evidence in support of this theory, especially with regard to the perspectives of physical scientists on military policy and policy-making (e.g., scientists are brighter than anyone else thinking about these problems, and they can establish common ground for analysis and proposal where politicians cannot).

Lang concludes his book on the same theme with which he began—the problem of exercising control over nuclear weapons—and describes the efforts of the Defense Department's Human Reliability Program to screen members of the armed forces who have access to nuclear weapons and remove those whose judgments may be erratic. The comments of one colonel connected with this program provide as fitting a commentary on the intellectual spirit of our times as one could want. Referring to the troubled conscience of men who become "disturbed about the consequences of using the weapons to which they've been assigned," the Colonel told Lang:

> It impairs their motivation. There's a man who's flying a transport right now for that reason. He had to be reassigned from an ICBM silo, and I understand that until he started having doubts about what he was doing, he appeared as happy and integrated as a man could be.

—WARNER R. SCHILLING, *Columbia University*.

After Nuclear Attack: A Demographic Inquiry. BY DAVID M. HEER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. xxxiii, 405. $15.00.)

Demography, in distinction to political science, has the advantage that the events and attributes with which it is concerned can be unambiguously defined and that it can go a long way with mathematical-deductive reasoning. It has the disadvantage that it cannot use obscurity to simulate profundity; hence, wherever the cupboard is bare it looks bare—unlike in other social science writing.

This book reports on a study of the demographic effects from a large-scale nuclear attack on the United States, one of the most catastrophic events that could befall us. It is strictly a monograph, in the sense that it does not stray from the well-defined topic. Accordingly, many related aspects that might leap to the reader's mind are not considered. Heer starts from two given geographic distributions of fatalities (computed in other studies), adds a simple assumption regarding the distribution of fatalities between central cities and outlying areas, and then proceeds to compute the characteristics of the surviving population: age, marital status, party identification, religious affiliation, race, education, etc. In addition, he gives twenty-year projections for the post-attack population size. The quiet, factual prose conceals the enormous tragedy that is here being sketched out in hard figures. For instance, the author estimates that after an attack which would have killed 30 per cent of the US population, 17 per cent of all the surviving husbands and wives would be widowed, and 26 per cent of the surviving children would have lost one or both parents.

Two vast uncertainities fall beyond the confines of this study. One, of course, is the size of attack, its targets and the types of nuclear explosions. Estimating these variables is the business of the intelligence expert and the strategist. But the demographer's skills do become relevant when the particular weapon effects in specified areas have to be translated into fatality and morbidity figures. (Incidently, this book makes no attempt to grapple with the difficult problem of post-attack morbidity.) For these estimates—which are also highly uncertain—medical and public health experts have to deal with demographic figures (poplation densities, movements, etc.). The demographer who does further work with the fatality figures should be familiar with the uncertainties and assumptions that went into them; or better yet, he should be able to collaborate with the medical and nuclear weapon experts.

This book will be of interest to researchers who work on various aspects of civil defense. It does not pretend to give the whole story of the effects of a nuclear attack, but it presents in great detail the most basic aspects of the effects of two particular, hypothetical attacks.—FRED CHARLES IKLÉ, *M.I.T.*

Beyond Sovereignty. BY MAX MARK. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965. Pp. 178. $3.75.)

Regionalism and World Order. By Ronald Yalem. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965. Pp. 160. $4.50.)

The concern of these two interesting little books is the kind of world order that is replacing the nation-state system of the past three centuries.

Max Mark's *Beyond Sovereignty* is a carefully done analytical essay in which, through historical interpretation, he argues that the nation-state is already obsolete, that Woodrow Wilson was correct in seeing this, and the best hope for the world is a revival of the Wilsonian ideal, in modified form, of a world order based on a harmony of interests.

It is easy enough to accept Mark's argument that contemporary men have been making demands on the independent sovereign state that such states (except perhaps for the superpowers) were not meant to satisfy and cannot satisfy. We must agree that modern technology, the rise of transnational ideologies, demands for social justice, problems of security in a nuclear era, and so on have imposed burdens that few if any national states are able to manage effectively. More debatable is the author's insistence that non-military values are rising in importance and that their rise has begun the dethronement of physical power. The most interesting thesis Mark presents is that contemporary man is now experiencing a rise in a hitherto minor psychological urge—the urge to be of service to one's fellow man, to be concerned with the welfare and dignity of men everywhere—that this urge is being greatly stimulated by the demands of underdeveloped peoples, and that it is rapidly extending a sense of fellowship and welfare interdependence across national boundaries. This attitude had its genesis, Mark argues, in the economic liberalism of Great Britain where the concept of a world with a perpetual struggle for power was challenged by the concept of a world with a harmony of interests.

Mark agress that the increasing obsolescnce of the nation-state might be difficult to see due to uneven developments in different places and forces; but he protects himself well enough by insisting that if you cannot see the evidence it is because you have not peered deeply enough into the phenomena of our time, or have not interpreted the phenomena properly.

It is only in his last chapter, in which he calls for a revival of a modified Wilsonianism, that Mark lets himself in for severe criticism. Here he ceases to be the wise and objective analyst of the international system and descends to sheer pamphleteering.

In *Regionalism and World Order* Professor Yalem looks at a different development in the international system—the failure of regional and universal international organizations to develop a satisfactory relationship to one another. After reviewing briefly a variety of theories of regionalism, the author examines the relations between regional and universal organizations during the eras of both the League of Nations and the United Nations. He found little or no disequilibrium, he claims, during the League era, since both types of organizations remained relatively ineffective and there was no serious challenge to the dominance, such as it was, of the League. During the era of the UN, however, a considerable degree of disequilibrium has developed, with regional organizations superseding the UN in peace and security problems and reducing the UN to a mere mechanism for conciliation.

This disequilibrium has promoted disorder rather than order in the international system, in Professor Yalem's view. This has occurred not only with regard to security problems, moreover, but with regard to economic and social problems as well. A proper relationship obviously requires regional organizations to be subordinated to and complementary to universal organizations rather than to compete with them; but the trend is not in that direction, claims Yalem, nor is it likely to be unless substantial change occurs in the politics of the international system.

Yalem's well-reasoned study suggests, in fact, that if present trends continue, the struggle for power among states will be replaced by a struggle for power among regions, and international conflicts will simply become bigger than ever before.

It is safe to conclude that while a Wilsonian harmony of interests might be developing, it has developed only enough to bring some states together—often against some others—and has not moved us much beyond the alliances we have known for centuries or the European administrative unions that seemed so promising for international cooperation in the nineteenth century. Effective universalism is still an elusive ideal.—Willard Range, *University of Georgia*.

The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs with Special Reference to International Politics. By Harold and Margaret Sprout. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. xi, 236. $5.50.)

In 1956 the Center for International Studies at Princeton University circulated an essay by Harold and Margaret Sprout, entitled "Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics." Its reception encouraged the authors to expand and refine their original enquiry. The results are embodied in the present volume. The focus is still on international politics, but, as the new title suggests, the ecological approach has been applied to many aspects of "human affairs." There is a greater emphasis on theories and concepts, and on their application to political and social issues.

Essentially, then, this is an essay in semantics. The authors' primary purpose is "to identify and clarify the various modes of thinking and speaking about environment and environmental relationships." A subsidiary purpose is "to exemplify the utilities and limitations of ecological concepts and theories in various social contexts, but especially in the context of international politics."

Semantic and conceptual exercises are usually not exciting contributions to human knowledge, and they can bog down in a morass of terminology. This volume does not escape these common pitfalls. Most of the chapters are rather abstruse discussions of various philosophical postures toward the man-milieu relationship, including "environmental determinism, free-will environmentalism, possibilism, probabilistic behavioralism, and cognitive behavioralism." But they do bring home the pervasiveness of the ecological perspective, and they suggest new dimensions for an analysis of political systems and international behavior.

The study of the factors of national power, for example, has progressed well beyond the approach of the authors in the book which they wrote on the subject more than twenty years ago; and to this development the authors' own later studies, especially this latest work, have made a major contribution. As they point out, the study of the factors of power, and capability analysis, must be set in a policy-contingency framework, which, contrary to the assumptions of certain "realists," need not necessarily be that of recurrent military war. They make a useful distinction between a policy analysis and a capabilities analysis, and they call attention to the "distinction between the individual's psycho-milieu to which his self-conscious behavior is related, and the operational milieu in which his decisions are executed." This is an important distinction which Walter Lippmann made many years ago in his classic treatise on public opinion and in other writings. It helps to explain some of the aberrations and unrealities of policy decisions by men in the highest seats of power.

The authors are especially critical of the common tendency of writers on political subjects to discuss such abstractions as the state as if these abstractions were "*capable of responding in human-like ways*." Psycho-ecological concepts, they argue, "cannot be sensibly employed with reference to high-level abstractions such as the state and the international system, *unless* it is made explicitly clear that the reference is not to the system, *qua* system, but *only* to the human agents of the system." This practice of verbal personification, they contend, should be avoided, and "alternative vocabularies" should be invented. But one could take precisely the contrary point of view. If students of international affairs took this advice literally, they would soon find that they face other risks, such as those of excessive verbiage and colorless pedantry.

This is not an exciting book, but it does present conceptual themes, with some references to practical application, which should be of interest and value to all serious students of international politics, and indeed of human affairs generally.—NORMAN D. PALMER, *University of Pennsylvania.*

Functionalism and World Politics: A Study Based on United Nations Programs Financing Economic Development. BY JAMES P. SEWELL. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. xii, 358. $6.50.)

Sewell's valuable study falls into two parts: (1) an examination of functionalist theories of world politics and (2) a test of those theories in the light of U.N. experience in the financing of development.

In the first section, Sewell pierces through what first seems an elementary error in the use of language: the attempt of functionalists to use an extrinsic term ("functional") as though it possessed intrinsic meaning. Sewell's analysis reveals that the major functionalist theories are founded more on philosophic dogmatism than on linguistic confusion, the basis being an "irrational Lockean" consensus among theorists as to the standards and values by which a political event or process may be judged "functional."

International functionalism rests on the premise that in the "last analysis" the real problems of international politics are those of material well-being, and that the proper goal of policy "rightly understood" is an international "community" organized along "functional" (read: economic) lines.

Yet the rhetoric of community is empty within the structure of functionalist theory. Functionalists do not understand community because they either deprecate or do not understand human affection, the bond of men to what is "close," within the limited range of their senses and emotions (for this reason, functionalists do not treat territorial problems as "real" unless they have economic implications). The "organic" metaphor of functionalism creates the image of a human "whole" which loses the concrete organism that is man—and hence, any understanding of community between men.

International functionalism is, in fact, a form of utilitarianism, adapted to a world of states and large-scale organizations. It lacks the old liberal confidence in the free play of market forces and competition. "Functional" evolution is no longer conceived of as automatic: it requires a "vanguard" of experts to supervise and manage it. As Sewell suggests, the expert becomes the conscious mind of the human "organism"; politics is relegated to the sphere of emotion and unreason which will gradually be subordinated as the discretion of the technocrats declines. The ultimate vision of functionalism is identical with what Dwight Waldo called the "heavenly city of the 19th century public administrators" and Sheldon Wolin characterized as the neo-liberal attack on politics: the elite guides a sluggish humanity toward a utopia administered on the basis of the "felicific rule."

The great merit of Sewell's study is the care and detail with which this doctrinal basis of functionalism is tested in relation to the empirical data. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development seems to confirm many functionalist theories. Yet, Sewell demonstrates, this is due to the "moral code" and the structure of power built into the IBRD of the nations which established it and the leaders who first gave form to its organizational routines. Since this "moral code," still at the core of IBRD organizational values, happened to coincide with much of functionalist ideology, it is no surprise that the bank moves in the direction predicted by functionalism. As Sewell comments, there is as much support for an "apocalyptic" theory in the IBRD as for the organizational evolution on which functionalism relies. That organizational processes rarely become irrevocable —because states guard themselves against such commitments—only strengthens the case.

The major criticism of functionalism which emerges from Sewell's analysis is that the expansion of international development financing has come because of, not at the expense of, politics. In the context of international conflict, the political bargaining power of developing states can win concessions which technicians would be unwilling to concede (witness the fact that the beneficiaries of aid are the first to urge inter-governmental committees rather than groups of experts). Much is summed up in a single citation: an American official explained that, although the U.S. remained suspicious of the International Finance Corporation it was "too insignificant" to oppose, given the "important political grounds" on which others favored it. (P. 220.)

Nor is Sewell wrong in speculating that the logic of international financing, working to strengthen national agencies of planning and control, may strengthen nationalism rather than the reverse. That possibility may say more about the ways in which men, through politics, seek community than functionalism can possibly foresee or understand.—Wilson Carey McWilliams, *Oberlin College.*

Thailand and the United States. By Frank C. Darling. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965. Pp. 243, $6.)

In the Introduction of this book, Professor Hans J. Morgenthau warns against foreign policy thinking that transforms pragmatic considerations into dogmas which remain fixed while the facts change. Dr. Darling's painstaking analysis of American-Thai relations is a timely illustration of the process. Much discussion of Thailand as an ally of the Western powers has rested on a kind of *ignoratio elenchi.* Thailand is free, but a dictatorship; its Thai-ist policies are supple, its foreign policy traditionally neutral, yet it is held to be a bulwark against Communism. And, as Dr. Darling persuasively argues, the American military assistance to Thailand has been employed to perpetuate military oligarchies—a development which tends to defeat the purpose of other forms of American aid, or at least, to make absurd the official pabulum about Thai democracy. The priorities of foreign aid have been at cross purposes, and in order to carry some of the Cold War objectives of American foreign policy in Asia it has apparently been necessary to indulge in the dubious rhetoric which terms Thailand a fellow democracy: as the Bank of America expressed it, presumably in all seriousness, "In both Thailand and America Democracy has gone hand in hand with National Sovereignty."

Policy and comment on policy have both been confused; but the scholarly literature on Thailand which is dispelling some of the shibboleths is growing impressively. This new book is a useful addition to the contributions of Walter F. Vella, David A. Wilson, and Donald E. Nuechterlein. The particular merit of Dr. Darling's study is that he has set himself the important and subtle task of assessing "the interaction of American foreign policy on the domestic policies of Thailand," particularly after 1945. It is for the most part a depressing theme. The enquiry is placed in an historial context, so that the development from a benevolent missionary American interest in the 19th century to a crusading policy in the 20th can be traced in some detail. As Dr. Darling writes in chapter 2, "The Americans . . . became less interested in assisting the evolution of constitutional democracy and more concerned with opposing the spread of Communism."

In this setting, the concept of "interaction" has certain curious and disturbing features. Most striking, perhaps, is the mythopoeic element which is clearly marked in the fraternal utterances of Thai and American politicians and diplomats. It is disturbing because the myths of the relationship are employed as a device to blur the realities of power and to justify policy itself. One feels that the Thai have been more successful and skillful at this (because more critical), while American statesmen have been more earnestly platitudinous, tending to accept Thai values as a basis for American policy. It is natural enough for the Thai to laud their freedom, with much iteration of the semantic significance of their name—as if the one demonstrated the other. It is less realistic to regard Thailand, in the fervent language of the Cold War, as "the free world's strongest bastion in Southeast Asia" (General Donovan, 1955)—which, if true, is hardly reassuring, And it is surely specious to assure the Thai, as Vice President Johnson did in Bangkok in 1961, that "Nothing is more important to the United States than the integrity of your great country."

As Dr. Darling explains, the three American ambassodors to Thailand between 1946 and 1955 accepted Thai analyses of the need to expand the armed forces against the Communist threat; with the result that they "failed to recognize the antithetical nature of the military and non-military aid programs sponsored by their government." In this manner he shows Thailand to be an excellent example of a more general problem of American Asian policy—the lack of clear distinctions between the short term use and the long term value of American aid.

The author's experience most appropriately equips him to analyze the problems of both countries, and he does so with insight and sympathy. He presents the materials for a much more stringent overall criticism of American policy than he in fact offers, though the individual criticisms (as on pages 43–4, 53, 83, 90, 221) are well taken. In places the argument is somewhat loose in texture, and the reader looks for a firmer personal judgment from the author. For example, on page 145, the paragraph about the reasons for Phibun's "sudden democratic reforms"— a sop to the Americans?—proceeds through an "undoubtedly," a "probably," a "possibly" and a "perhaps," to a culminating quotation which rests upon a "seemed"; though the argument in the paragraphs immediately following gathers weight. The "enthusiastic liberal-minded Thai" emerging by 1952 are vaguely identified as a "generation" and a "group" (page 95). Why should the brand of neutralism of countries like India, Burma and Indonesia be termed "distasteful" (page 67)? The author's commendable zeal to provide information leads him at times to approach self parody; as when Cecil B. de Mille and Marlon Brando are listed amongst American visitors, in a section beginning with the words, "Resident and visiting Americans continued to emphasize the Communist threat to the country."—D. E. Kennedy, *University of Melbourne.*

British Policy in India: 1858–1905. By Sarvepalli Gopal. (Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 1965. Pp. xii, 423, $13.50.)

This is a sound, well documented account of the personalities and policies of the eleven men who ruled India as Governors General during those years. Gopal's approach demonstrates an instinctive awareness of the importance of personality in a situation in which the power of the Governor General was unchecked by any institutional restraints within India. The sole formal check on the Governor General was the Secretary of State for India in London. It is the relations between the Governor General and London which provide the focus for this study. It was an amorphous relationship. The Cabinet as a whole was neither knowledgeable nor concerned about India's internal affairs. Only in foreign policy did the home government have consistently strong opinions, and even in this area a determined Governor General could lead London by the nose. For the most part, decisions were made on the basis of discussions between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy. The outcome depended on such intangibles as the force of personality each possessed, their respective prestige with the Cabinet, and the congruity of their opinions. Gopal does an admirable job of tracing how the policies of the Government of India emerged from the interaction of these two officials.

Gopal's treatment of the attitude of the Government toward the English community in India on the one hand and the Indians themselves on the other is of particular interest. The Government of India viewed each group as harboring a potential threat to the authority of the regime, but was equally concerned over the deterioration of relations between the two communities. His discussion of the communal question is less extensive, but contains a balanced interpretation of British "divide and rule" policy.

The book also brings into focus British thinking on the nature of the raj and its ultimate objectives. It explains the key roles of an imperial ideology and racism in determining the Government's response to Indian demands for greater access to public office. The study reveals the Government's unfortunate shortsightedness in establishing itself on the support of the "feudal elements" in Indian society. Indeed, Gopal's overall assessment of each Governor General is strongly influenced by the extent to which each was able to break out of the imperial mentality, with its concern for stability, and to envision a new India with a new governing elite. Naturally, only Ripon meets the test.

Gopal's analysis of foreign policy suffers from its complete dependence on British sources in that no attempt is made to analyze Russian motives in Central Asia, and the reader is left without any basis to judge the debates between Calcutta and London over policy in the region. Nor does he make any systematic attempt to explain the consistently more aggressive attitude of the Government of India toward border problems.

Gopal provides valuable insights into the official lives of India's Governors General during the period. The book concentrates on official India and is concerned only peripherally with the environment in which policy was made, but within this framework it is an excellent study.—NORMAN K. NICHOLSON, *Northern Illinois University.*

The Clash and Attraction of Two Cultures. BY ANGEL DEL RIO. Translated and edited by James F. Shearer. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965. Pp. xiii, 125. $5.00.)

This book by the late Professor Angel del Rió of Columbia University carries the appropriate subtitle, "The Hispanic and Anglo-Saxon Worlds in America." Consisting of two lectures given in various cities of South America in 1959, under the auspices of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, its aim is cultural interpretation. But it is the kind of interpretation which is, in fact, cultural exchange, which does not try to disseminate an ideological position, though the author obviously has one, but seeks a higher degree of understanding of the nature and significance of cultural differences.

For this task of interpreting the Americas to each other, Angel del Rió had unusual qualifications, for he was in some respects a citizen of both the Hispanic and the Anglo-Saxon worlds. One of the remarkable band of Spanish intellectuals who saw their hopes for a liberal and progressive Spain dashed by the defeat of the second Spanish Republic, he found an intellectual haven in the New World, as so many of his colleagues did. Thus he contributed to the age-old process by which America has profited, intellectually and morally, from the frustrations and failures of the Old World. The United States and Mexico were special beneficiaries in this case. But whether in New York, Mexico City, Lima, or Buenos Aires, Spanish intellectual emigres like Angel del Rió could never forget the tortured soul of Spain. Possibly because he was so keenly aware of it, he was able to sense at once (if he had previously been aware of it, to sense even more) the ambivalence of attraction and repulsion which characterizes the relations of Anglo-America and Hispanic America.

This intuitive understanding is what gives special point to this book. For, as Jacques Barzun writes in the Foreword, it is "The Voice of the Man," much more than that of the historian or literary critic which gives this work its rather special value. The historian will quickly discover many shortcomings in accuracy of fact and in knowledge of the varied interpretations historical scholarship has given to the developments the author discusses. The literary critic may find less to criticize, for in this field the author was much more at home. But the literary critic, too, will be disappointed if he looks for results of new research or any new depth in critical analysis. In his Introduction, the author clearly disclaimed any such purpose, saying he did not "attempt to engage either in original investigation or to produce a work of historical or critical erudition." (P. xi.)

With more modesty than he should, Angel del Río gives credit to the work of two authors, José de Onís and Stanley T. Williams, for many of the ideas he advances. Yet for the scholarly reader, the author's comments on these two works may be the chief value of the books. These two works are José de Onís, *The United States as Seen by Spanish American Writers, 1776–1890* and Stanley T. Williams, *The Spanish Background of American Literature.* It is unfortunate that the still unpublished study by John T. Reid of anti-Americanism in Spanish American writers subsequent to those studied by Onís could not have been used and criticized in the same way.

Angel del Río was thinking of a Spanish American audience in these lectures, but his brilliant interpretations of the views which Spaniards and Spanish Americans hold of themselves, of their psychology and ways of thinking, and above all of their understanding and misunderstanding of the United States, give his work unusual value for the general reader in both of the "worlds" he discusses.—HAROLD EUGENE DAVIS, *India School of International Studies, New Delhi.*

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Sosin, Jack M., *Agents and Merchants: British Colonial Policy and the Origins of the American Revolution, 1763–1775*. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965. Pp. xvi, 267. $5.50.)

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Weaver, Richard, *Life Without Prejudice and Other Essays.* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1965. Pp. xvii, 167. $4.50.)

Webster, Sir Charles, *The Congress of Vienna, 1814–1815,* reprint. (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1966. Pp. 213. $1.95, paper.)

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Westwood, Andrew F., *Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy Framework.* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1966. Pp. 115. $1.95, paper.)

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Wionczek, Miguel S., *Latin American Economic Integration: Experiences and Prospects.* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publ., 1966. Pp. xiv, 308. $7.50.)

Wolfers, Arnold, *Britain and France Between Two Wars: Conflicting Strategies of Peace from Versailles To World War II,* reprint. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1966. Pp. 467. $2.45, paper.)

Woodward, C. Vann, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow,* 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. xiii, 205. $4.50.)

Woodward, David, *The Russians At Sea: A History of the Russian Navy.* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publ., 1966. Pp. 254. $6.95.)

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Yellowitz, Irwin, *Labor and the Progressive Movement in New York State, 1897–1916.* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965. Pp. ix, 288. $6.50.)

Zawadski, K. K. F., *The Economics of Inflationary Processes.* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publ., 1966. Pp. 288. $10.00.)

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

IN UNIVERSITIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA*

COMPILED BY WILLIAM C. SEYLER

Deputy Secretary, Department of Internal Affairs, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

I. DISSERTATIONS IN PREPARATION

ADDITIONS, CHANGES, AND DELETIONS SINCE THE 1965 LISTING

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Additions

Chee Soon Ahn, A Comparative Study of the Political Ideas of Two Contemporary Theologians: Reinhold Niebuhr and Jacques Maritain. *Florida State.*

Santa M. Algeo, Electoral Competition and Public Ideological Behavior. *Michigan.*

Dennis M. Anderson, Adolescent Political Socialization and Political Rebellion. *Northwestern.*

Hadley P. Arkes, Bureaucracy, Regime, and Presumption. Chicago.

Arthur S. Banks, A Cross Polity Survey: Analysis and Interpretation. *George Washington.*

David Broyles, Political Rhetoric Among Occupational Subgroups. *California* (Los Angeles).

Jacob Carruthers, The Theory of Nonviolent Civil Disobedience. *Colorado.*

Wee Don Chang, Toward a Theory of Political Development. *Oregon.*

Ernest E. Chapman, Contemporary Theological Approaches and the Political Role of the Traditional Protestant Denominations in an Urban Complex. *Southern California.*

Terrence Cook, The Relationship of Educational and Political Philosophies in Locke, Rousseau and Helvetius. *Princeton.*

Fred S. Coombs, Development Patterns of Political Behavior: The Role Performance of American Children in a Simulated Political System. *Illinois.*

Jerome I. Cooperman, A Critical Comparative Analysis of Three Positions in Contemporary Political Thought: Weldon, Strauss, and Camus. *Rutgers.*

Francis E. Devine, Stoic Philosophy and Natural Law. *Syracuse.*

Patricia B. Edmondson, Jean-Paul Sartre: An Existential Perspective of Freedom. *Duke.*

Eldon Eisenach, Nineteenth-Century Legal Philosophy as It Relates to Theories of the State and Politics, with Special Emphasis on German and English Law. *California* (Berkeley).

J. Peter Euben, The Destructive Understanding of Politics. *California* (Berkeley).

Louis B. Fike, The Political Philosophy of Herbert Spencer. *Brown.*

John G. Fraser, Ideology in Mass Publics. *Illinois.*

Barry W. Greenberg, America's New Radicals: An Existential Analysis. *Stanford.*

Magnus Gunther, Personality and Attitudes Toward Democracy: A Study of the Development of Attitudes Toward Democracy in High School Children. *North Carolina.*

Ken Harris, The Political Thought of Albert Camus: The Limits of Liberalism. *Kansas.*

Kenneth Hayes, The Political Behavior of Specialized Occupations: A Comparative Analysis of the Politics of Professionals in a Small Community. *Massachusetts.*

Nannerl O. Henry, The Liberal Order in the Political Thought of Benjamin Constant. *Yale.*

Dorina G. Hermann, Power and Its Corrupting Influence. *California* (Los Angeles).

Benjamin G. Hoffman, The Political Thought of James Burnham. *Michigan.*

Joyce M. Huntley, The Just War Theory in Contemporary Thought: A Critique of American Military Policy. *Duke.*

John R. Kayser, Introduction to Plato's Republic. *Claremont.*

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* Similar lists have been printed in the REVIEW annually since 1911, except for 1915–19, 1921 and 1923–24; full citations are given in the 1955 list, XLIX 792.

Items which appeared in the September, 1965 list and which are still in preparation *without change* are *not* repeated in this listing. The present listing contains only additions, changes, and deletions. Additions are those items which were reported in preparation for the first time; changes are those items which have had a change in name, title, or classification; and deletions are those items which are no longer in preparation.

The lists printed in the REVIEW are based on information from departments giving graduate instruction in political science; to avoid misunderstandings, entries are not accepted from individual candidates for degrees. The subject matter classification of an entry by the department concerned, if given, is followed. Each entry is listed under one classification only.

For a fuller note about coverage and subject matter classification, and for references to dissertation lists in cognate fields, see the 1960 list, LIV, 816.

For a chart which classifies, by subject category, the numbers of dissertations completed and in progress, 1951 through 1957, see this REVIEW, LXX, 916.

Abstracts of some of the theses listed as completed may be found in "Dissertation Abstracts," published bi-monthly by University Microfilm, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Edward N. Kearney, Of Ideals and Institutions: The Political and Social Philosophy of Thurman Arnold. *American.*

Harper B. Keeler, Freedom and Control: the Dilemma of Creativity in the Organizational Environment. *M.I.T.*

Roger Langlois, A Critical Analysis of Valuation in American Political Theory. *Massachusetts.*

Trudi M. Lucas, The Influence of Symbols in the Formation of Opinion. *North Carolina.*

Kent McCallum, Authority and Legitimacy in Anthropological Conceptions of the Political System. *Claremont.*

Frank N. Marini, The Impact of Certain Empirical Findings upon Democratic Theory and the Special Function of Theory of Democratic Government. *California* (Berkeley).

Jerry Medler, Negative Sanctions: Their Perception and Their Effect in the Political System. *Oregon.*

Stanley Moore, American Protestantism and the Welfare State Concept. *Claremont.*

Richard W. Murray, The Political Thought of Moisei Ostrogorski. *Minnesota.*

Paul E. Nelson, The Nature and Significance of Farmer Virtue in American Political Thought. *Chicago.*

Richard G. Niemi, A Methodological Study of Political Socialization in the Family. *Michigan.*

James M. Nickell, The Philosophy of Hannah Arendt: A Post-Critical Perspective on Politics. *Duke.*

Walton H. Owens, An Operationalized Conceptualization of Selected Ideological Variables in the Perspective of Liberalism and Conservatism. *Florida State.*

James M. Rhodes, Moeller Van Den Bruck. *Notre Dame.*

David Ricci, Foundations of Fabian Socialism. *Harvard.*

Rozann C. Rothman, Acts and Enactments: The Constitutional Convention of 1787. *Illinois.*

Jerrold G. Rusk, The Impact of Institutional Factors on Voting Behavior: An Historical Analysis. *Michigan.*

Michael J. Shapiro, The House and the Expansion of the Federal Role: A Computer Simulation. *Northwestern.*

L. Earl Shaw, Jr., Reinhold Niebuhr as a Political Theorist. *North Carolina.*

Roger W. Smith, Politics and Guilt: A Study in Contemporary Political Theory. *California* (Berkeley).

Whitney Smith, Political Symbolism. *Boston University.*

Judith Stiehm, Non-violent Resistance: Act of Conscience or Calculation? *Columbia.*

Michael Stratford, Nonviolence Theory and the Abolition of War. *Minnesota.*

Sandra Sutphen, The Use of Simulation in Generalizing Theory: A Case Study in Community Conflict. *Rutgers.*

David Tabb, Attitudes Toward Equality: A Study of the Political Ideology of the Poor. *North Carolina.*

Mrs. Corey B. Venning, The Political Writings of Joseph Alsop. *Chicago.*

Sidney Waldman, Communications Structure, Information Distribution, and Power. *North Carolina.*

Robert D. Wrinkle, Keynes' Theory of Government Intervention in Economic Affairs. *Arizona.*

Levio E. Zeni, Patterns of Conflict, 1945–1964; An Empirical Analysis. *Fletcher School.*

Changes

Darryl H. Baskin, The Pluralist Vision in American Political Thought: Adams, Madison, and Calhoun on Community Citizenship and the Public Interest. *California* (Berkeley).

Harris Mirkin, The Revolutionary Republic: The American Domestication and Sublimation of the Doctrine of a Right of Revolution against Tyranny. *Princeton.*

James S. Nyman, Edmund Burke's Esthetic and his Political Role. *California* (Berkeley).

Abdelmonem Shaker, Individual and Social Responsibility in Islamic Thought. *New York University.*

Deletions

Richard H. Schweitzer, Jr., The Federalizing Process and Political Integration: A Quantitative Analysis. *California* (Los Angeles).

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

Additions

Madeline W. Adler, Case Study—Monroney Resolution. *Wisconsin.*

Robert J. Art, The TFX Story: McNamara, The Military, and Advanced Weapon Procurement. *Harvard.*

John W. Bulkley, Simulation of Political Interaction in Multiple Purpose River Basin Development. *M.I.T.*

Bradley Canon, The FCC's Fairness Doctrine: Its Enforcement and Impact. *Wisconsin.*

Thomas E. Carpenter, III, The Influence of the Institute of Pacific Relations on American Policy Toward China, 1934–1950. *Fletcher Schoool.*

Ernest A. Chaples, Jr., The Voting Behavior of U. S. Senators, 1953–1964: A Longitudinal Analysis. *Kentucky.*

James W. Chapman, II, Overseas Bases and American Foreign Policy. *Princeton.*

Richard Chapman, The Decision to Go Operational: The Critical R & D "Gray Area" (The TIROS–NIMBUS Weather Satellites Controversy). *Syracuse.*

Cleo H. Cherryholmes, The House and Foreign Aid: A Computer Simulation. *Northwestern.*

Paul C. Cline, Conflict between the "Plain People" and Government in the United States. *American.*

Thomas E. Cronin, The Urban Governors in the Metropolitan Crucible: Intergovernmental Policy Orientations of City Legislators. *Stanford.*

Frederick H. Damaske, A Study of the Political Attitudes and Behavior of "Fundamentalist" Protestants. *Minnesota.*

James Delahanty, Limitations of Precinct Organizations. *California* (Los Angeles).

Robert L. Donaldson, Top and Middle Level Party Leaders: The United States and West Germany. *California* (Los Angeles).

Henrik Dullea, The War on Poverty and Local Party Politics: A Comparison of the Responses of Four Upstate New York Party Organizations to Community Action Programs. *Syracuse.*

George E. Dyer, Military Isolation in the United States, 1939–1966: A Comparative Study of Isolationism and Isolationists. *Texas Technological College.*

Jon Fuller, The Influence of Congress on Defense Policy. *Princeton.*

Judith D. Gething, Interest Groups, the Courts, and Reapportionment in Michigan. *Michigan.*

Charles R. Grader, Food for Peace: Policy Considerations Regarding the Utilization of U. S. Surplus Agricultural Commodities. *Fletcher School.*

Clinton E. Grimes, The American Civil Liberties Union and the Rules of the Game. *California* (Los Angeles).

Stephen I. Grossbard, The Impact of Military-Civilian Relationships on N.A.S.A. Operations. *Michigan.*

Percy E. Haley, U. S. Attitude Toward Revolution since World War II. *Johns Hopkins.*

Donald R. Hall, Intergroup Lobbying Among Certain National Interest Groups. *Colorado.*

B. Douglas Harman, The National Capital Planning Commission and the Land Use Planning Process. *American.*

Edwin L. Harper, The Policy-Making Role of Federal Political Executives: The Case of the Comptroller of the Currency. *Virginia.*

Frances L. Harper, United States Diplomacy Concerning the Indian Independence Movement. *Fletcher School.*

Joseph S. Harrelson, Jr., The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security. *American.*

Stanley L. Harrison, Problems of Arms Control: U. S. Policy and the Defense of NATO Europe via the Changing Roles of General Purpose Ground Forces. *American.*

William Hartman, The Separation of Powers in Theory and in the American Regime. *Chicago.*

David A. Heslop, A Critique of Recent Theories of Executive Power. *Texas.*

Katherine A. Hinckley, Decision-Making in Small Groups: The Fabric of Urban Representation. *Stanford.*

Joseph J. Jasinski, Business Communications on East-West Trade: Implications for Group Theory. *Chicago.*

James P. Johnston, The Micro-Dynamics of Conflicting Partisan Orientations: Party Orientation and the "Acceptableness" of Issue Positions. *North Carolina.*

Endsley T. Jones, The House of Representatives and Keynesian Economics, 1946–1964. *Georgetown.*

Edward Keynes, A Study in Legislative Strategy and Tactics: The Dirksen Amendment. *Wisconsin.*

Frederic Kirk, Political Structure and Differential Status: A Study of the Political Behavior of Socio-Religious Groups in America. *North Carolina.*

Jonathan Knight, The Secretary of State and Congress, 1933–1959. *Columbia.*

Byron G. Lander, The Emergence of Poverty as a Political Issue in 1964. *Missouri.*

Anne L. Lewis, Congressional Committees and Their "Effectiveness"; An Exploratory Study of the Senate. *North Carolina.*

Lawrence D. Longley, The Politics of Broadcasting: Industry, Congress, and the F.C.C. *Vanderbilt.*

Richard Loss, Secretary Acheson's Leadership and the Test of Politics. *Cornell.*

William A. Lucas, Political Socialization of United States Military Affairs. *North Carolina.*

Quentin Ludgin, Civil Defense: A Study in Civil-Military Administration. *North Carolina.*

Peter A. Lupsha, Swingers, Isolates and Coalitions: A Study of Interpersonal Relations and Coalitional Politics in Natural-State Small Groups. *Stanford.*

Andrew McFarland, Power and Pluralism. *California* (Berkeley).

M. Frances B. Mamolito, The Transfer of the Community Relations Service from the Department of Justice: A Case Study of Decision in the Executive Branch. *Georgetown.*

David Mervin, The Senate and the League of Nations. *Cornell.*

Ruth Morgan, The Presidential Executive Order as an Instrument for Policy Making. *Louisiana State.*

Anne A. Murphy, Involving the Poor in Policy Making. *North Carolina.*

David J. Peterson, Longitudinal Analysis of Senate Behavior: A Methodological Inquiry. *Michigan State.*

Paul E. Peterson, The Implementation of the Poverty Program in Three American Cities. *Chicago.*

Sophia Peterson, A Study of Selected Arms Control Policies in the Department of State, Defense, and the Arms Control of Disarmament Agency. *California* (Los Angeles).

Douglas Rae, Electoral Law and Party System: An Analysis of General Elections in Twenty Western Democracies. *Wisconsin.*

Robert G. Seddig, Administrative Law and Transportation Regulation: the Case of the ICC and CAB. *Princeton.*

Sara Shumer, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the Rebirth of Politics. *California* (Berkeley).

Eleanor C. Smeal, A Dimension of New Federalism: Intergovernmental Relations and the Anti-Poverty Program. *Florida.*

Bernard Weiner, The Truman Doctrine: Background and Implication. *Claremont.*

Allen B. Wilcox, Political Change in the American States. *Northwestern.*

Hall T. Wilson, Public Interest, Competition, and the Federal Communications Commission: A Study in Policy. *Rutgers.*

Arthur C. Wolfe, The Direct Primary in American Politics. *Michigan.*

Harold L. Wolman, The Power Structure of the Federal Executive—A Study of the Attitudes and Characteristics of Federal Decision Makers. *Michigan.*

Changes

Owen de Long, The Origins of Dean Acheson's Conception of International Politics. *Harvard.*

Donald Fairchild, Voluntary Organizations and Opinions on World Affairs: The Role of the Methodist Church in Determining and Transmitting Opinions on World Affairs. *California* (Los Angeles).

Jackson A. Giddens, American Foreign Propaganda in World War I. *Fletcher School.*

Fred W. Grupp, Social Correlates of Political Activists: The John Birch Society and the Americans for Democratic Action. *Pennsylvania.*

Ralph Guzman, The Mexican-American Voter: A Functional Analysis of the Voting. *California* (Los Angeles).

Louis Higgs, Defense Policy in the Kennedy Administration. *California* (Los Angeles).

Orville Schmidt, An Examination of Certain Regulatory Problems Arising Out of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. *West Virginia.*

John G. Stewart, The Burden of Senate Leadership: A Study of Congressional Politics. *Chicago.*

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

Additions

James D. Carroll, The Development by NSF, NIH, NASA, AEC, and DOD of Alternatives to the Project System for Supporting Research and Creating Research Capability in Universities. *Syracuse.*

Harry J. Clor, Censorship of Obscenity. *Chicago.*

William E. Coyle, The Ninth Amendment and the Right to Privacy. *Florida State.*

Mary H. Curzan, A Case Study in the Selection of Federal Judges: The Fifth Circuit, 1953–1963. *Yale.*

Donald D. Dahlin, The Public Defender's Office. *Claremont.*

David F. Dickson, Florida Law in the Federal Courts: One State's Experience in the Federal Judicial System, 1940–1965. *Florida State.*

James Eisenstein, Counsel for the United States: An Empirical Analysis of the Office of U. S. Attorney. *Yale.*

John T. Elliff, The United States Department of Justice and Individual Rights, 1937–1962. *Harvard.*

William Gangi, The Evolution of the Involuntary Confession Rule by the United States Supreme Court. *Notre Dame.*

Robert Gerstein, The Judicial Process. *California* (Los Angeles).

Sr. Mary Evangeline Gosnell, Ad. PP.S., The Judicial Philosophy of John Marshall Harlan II. *Catholic University.*

Rodney A. Grunes, The Warren Court and the Problem of Obscenity. *Duke.*

Marie E. Hallion, The Impact of the Supreme Court's Decisions with Respect to the Right of Counsel in Maryland. *Maryland.*

Peter J. Henriot, One Man-One Vote, One Vote-One Value: The Numerical Theory of Representation. *Chicago.*

Robert C. Jacobs, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. *Columbia.*

Thomas C. Laughlin, The Right to Bail: A Reappraisal. *Florida State.*

Joel P. McBride, The Natural Law Content of Due Process of Law. *California* (Los Angeles).

Gene L. Mason, Judges and their Publics: Role Perception and Role Expectation. *Kansas.*

Charles A. Miller, History as a Principle of Adjudication in American Constitutional Law. *Harvard.*

Roald Mykkeltvedt, Nationalization of the Bill of Rights: Impact on the Administration of Criminal Law in Florida. *Florida State.*

Anni P. Nalbandian, The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act: Application, Administration, and Enforcement. *American.*

Cecile R. Stolbof, The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on Criminal Administration in New Jersey, 1961–1966. *Rutgers*.

Elmer W. Williams, The Advisory Opinion in American Law. *Missouri*.

Richard M. Yearwood, The Law and Administration of Subdivision Regulations: A Study in Land Use Control. *Florida*.

Changes

Howard Ball, Political Equality as a Manifestation of the Logic of Democracy: An Analysis of the Logical Quality of the Supreme Court Reapportionment Decisions, 1946–1964. *Rutgers*.

William J. Daniels, Public Perception of the United States Supreme Court. *Iowa*.

AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Additions

Joel D. Aberbach, The Political Implications of Race: An Analysis of the Roots and Consequences of Political Alienation. *Yale*.

Harold L. Bell, The Office of State Attorney General in the South. *Illinois*.

Jack E. Bizzel, Automating the Courthouse: A Limited Study of County Governments to Establish Criteria Relative for the Justification, the Procurement, the Installation and the Operations of Electronic Data Processing Equipment. *Southern Illinois*.

David Boesel, The Politics of Poverty: Community Action Programs in New York, Newark, Syracuse, and Boston. *Cornell*.

Gerald Church, Reform Politics in American Local Government: The Success or Failure of Reapportionment. *Claremont*.

Constance F. Citro, Social Backgrounds of State Judges: A Study in Historical Change. *Yale*.

Charles Cnudde, Consensus, "Rules of the Game" and Democratic Politics: The Case of Race Politics in the South. *North Carolina*.

Phyllis L. Cohan, The Representative Spirit in California State Government. *California* (Los Angeles).

Robert E. Craig, The Political Party and Other Social Referents: The Influence of Groups and Individuals on the Formation and Change of Party Identification. *North Carolina*.

Charlotte S. Davis, Lobbying in the State Legislative Process: A Systematic Study of Pennsylvania, 1965. *Pittsburgh*.

Bryan T. Downes, Political Leadership and City Council Decision-Making: A Comparative Analysis of Factors Affecting Public Policy Decisions in Suburban Communities. *Washington* (St. Louis).

Lawrence G. Flood, The Voter in Primary Elections. *North Carolina*.

Douglas Fox, Power Structure in Two Suburban Communities. *Columbia*.

Thomas Garcia, A Study of Direct Democracy. *Massachusetts*.

John J. Gargan, Politics and Water-Pollution in New York State. *Syracuse*.

Orvis J. Gibson, Republican Nomination in California: A Case Study of the Ronald Reagan Primary Campaign. *Claremont*.

Lela S. Gilbert, Employment Opportunities for Women in Colorado. *Colorado*.

Harold Griffin, The Politics of Major State Tax Reform in California, 1957–66: A Comparative Study in Decision-Making *California* (Los Angeles).

Mary M. Grow, The Role of the State of Maine in the Northeast Boundary Controversy: A Larger View. *Fletcher School*.

Alan Hahn, City Planning and the Less Privileged. *Indiana*.

J. Edward Hale, Newsmen and Government Men: Role Interaction in the Transmission of Information Between Executive Agencies and Newspaper Audiences in New York State. *State University of New York*.

Vincent Hauge, Political Roles and Constituency Variations: A Comparative Study of the Impact of Ward and At-Large Elections on City Councilmen's Roles as 'Representatives.' *Pennsylvania*.

Edward C. Hayes, Politics in Oakland, California. *California* (Berkeley).

Stephen Herzog, Modern Business Ideology: A Study in Diversity. *California* (Los Angeles).

Edward R. Jackson, The Role of the Catholic Church in the Civil Rights Movement in Southern Louisiana. *Iowa*.

Paul J. Kingston, State Administrative Programs in South Carolina. *North Carolina*.

James B. Kweder, The Effect of Ideology on Decisional Preference on North Carolina Municipal Officials. *North Carolina*.

Michael Lamanna, The Interstate Compact in New York State: The Compact as an Element of Inter-governmental Relations. *State University of New York*.

F. Donald Laws, The Recruitment of Legislative Candidates in Oregon. *Oregon*.

Robert D. Lee, Educational Ideology and Decision-Making in the San Francisco Public School 1955–1965. *Syracuse*.

Robert E. Lyke, Suburban School Politics. *Yale*.

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John D. Fox, Political Control within the NATO Alliances. *Cornell.*

Le Compte Garé, Soviet Central Asia as an Instrument of Soviet Foreign Policy in the Middle East. *American.*

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Edward Gonzales, Soviet Strategy and the Cuban Revolution, 1959–1963. *California* (Los Angeles).

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Muhammad Hallaj, Afro-Asian Politics in the U. N. *Florida.*

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Anton A. Naher, The Arab-Israeli Water Conflict. *American.*

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James F. Revard, The Revolutionary Foundations of Indonesian Education. *American.*

Alvin Richman, The Changing American Image of the Soviet Union. *Pennsylvania.*

Chun Whang Ro, Mutual Defense of the United States and Japan. *Southern Illinois.*

Lillian D. Robbins, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Work of the United Nations in the Social Field. *Columbia.*

Bernard A. Romundo, Peaceful Coexistence: International Law in the Building of Communism (A Commentary on the Soviet Approach to Contemporary Problems of International Law). *American.*

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Michael Ross, Mr. Herbert Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy: The Development of Political Sociology in the English Tradition. *Columbia.*

William A. Rust, Jr., Members of Parliament and the Struggle for Information Relevant to British National Security Policy. *Columbia.*

John Ryan, The Process of Regional Integration. *Massachusetts.*

Halil Ibrahim Salih, A Study in Strategic Interactions. *American.*

Elias Sam'o, The Arabs in the United Nations. *American.*

Perry M. Smith, Wartime Planning for Postwar Contingencies: The Army Air Force Example 1943–1946. *Columbia.*

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Steven Spiegel, The Soviet-American Role in the Current International System: A Theoretical Analysis. *Harvard.*

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Barry H. Steiner, Arms Race Processes and Hazards. *Columbia.*

William Stewart, The European Defense Comnity. *California* (Los Angeles).

Edwin Strong, Underlying Tensions of the North Atlantic Treaty. *Kansas.*

Maynard J. Toll, International Systems in the Pacific Islands since 1800. *Johns Hopkins.*

Tai-Hsun Tsuan, United States Decision on Taiwan After the Outbreak of the Korean War. *Pennsylvania.*

Robert S. Walters, Soviet and American Foreign Economic Aid: A Comparative Analysis. *Michigan.*

Paul E. Wehr, Leadership Values, Integrative Decisions and Political Integration in Algeria. *Pennsylvania.*

E. S. Wellhofer, The Political Role of Italian Migrants in Argentina. *Columbia.*

Irvin L. White, An Analysis of the Applicability of the Analogies of International Sea and Air Law to the Legal Problems of Outer Space. *Arizona.*

Thomas C. Wiegle, The United States and the Multilateral Nuclear Forces: A Study in Policy Formulation. *Pennsylvania.*

John A. Witherspoon, International Law Concerning Prisoners of War during the Korean Conflict, 1950–1954. *Duke.*

Clyde C. Wooten, The Empirical Foundation for Chinese and Communist World Strategy. *Georgetown.*

Alexander G. Yang, The Role of Japanese Interest Groups in Japan's Policy toward China, 1958–1962. *Columbia.*

Michael A. Zinovieff, Limited Military Coercion: Claims, Counterclaims, and Two Third-Party Views (India and Sweden). *Georgetown.*

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Martin Heisler, Benelux and European Integration. *California.* (Los Angeles).

Roger E. Kanet, The Soviet Union and Africa: Communist Policy Toward Africa, 1917 to the Present. *Princeton.*

John Ladenburger, The Philosophy of John Foster Dulles—1919 to 1952. *Connecticut.*

Donald E. Milsten, Canadian Peacekeeping Policy: A Meaningful Middle Power Role. *Michigan.*

David Mozingo, Chinese Communist Policy in Relations with Indonesia. *California* (Los Angeles).

William A. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam, 1962–1965. *American.*

Yu San Wang, Sino-Japanese Peace Making and Settlement. *Pennsylvania.*

II. DISSERTATIONS COMPLETED SINCE THE LAST LISTING

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Adele B. Anderson; B.A., Pomona College, 1959; M.A., Claremont, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. The Political Implications of Jean-Paul Sartre's Concepts of Freedom and Responsibility. *Claremont.*

Askoe Kumar Basu; B.A., West Virginia, 1962; M.A., Oklahoma, 1963; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. Model-Building in Political Science; A Methodological Analysis. *Oklahoma.*

Robert D. Burrowes; A.B., Dickinson College, 1957; M.A., Princeton, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966, A. A. Berle, Jr.—A Brandeis of the Future. *Princeton.*

Phillip Chapman; B.A., San Jose State, 1957; M.A., California, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. The Image of the Mass. *California* (Berkeley).

William E. Connolly; A.B., Michigan, 1960; A.M., *ibid.*, 1962; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. Responsible Political Ideology: Implications of the Sociology of Knowledge for Political Inquiry. *Michigan.*

Jean Marie Danielson; A.B., Southern Illinois, 1956; M.A., *ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., Kansas, 1965. The Evolution of the Political Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr. *Kansas.*

Lyle A. Downing; B.A., San Francisco State, 1958; M.A., California, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. Existentialist Political Theory. *California* (Berkeley).

Stephen Ellenburg; A.B., Washington University, 1959; Ph.D., *Harvard*, 1965. The Political Thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. *Harvard.*

Winston P. Fan; Diploma, Chung Chi College, 1958; M.A., Michigan State, 1964; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. The Political Philosophy of K'ang Yu-Wei: A Sociological Study of Religious Syncretism. *Michigan State.*

Fred Frohock; B.A., Florida, 1960; M.A., *ibid.*, 1961; Ph.D., North Carolina, 1966. The Relationship between Classical Political Philosophy and Contemporary Behavioral Theory. *North Carolina.*

George J. Graham, Jr.; B.A., Wabash, 1960; Ph.D., Indiana, 1965. Consensus: An Explanation for Normative and Empirical Political Theory. *Indiana.*

Joseph Haberer; B.A., San Francisco State, 1951; M.A., Columbia, 1954; Ph.D., California, 1965. The Community of Science and the Community of Politics. *California* (Berkeley).

Donald W. Hanson; B.A., Utah, 1957; B.A., & M.A., Oxford, 1959; M.S., Utah, 1961; Ph.D., Harvard, 1965. The Birth of Public Philosophy. *Harvard.*

Robert S. Hill; A.B., St. John's College, 1951; A.M., Chicago, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. The Political Philosophy of David Hume. *Chicago.*

Dean R. Jaros; B.S., Lawrence College, 1960; M.A., Vanderbilt, 1962; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. Children's Orientations Toward Political Authority: A Detroit Study. *Vanderbilt.*

Wilmer M. Kendrick; A.B., Louisiana State University, 1957; A.M., Duke, 1958; A.M., Chicago, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. Xenophon's Political Philosophy. *Chicago.*

Youngnok Koo; A.B., Kentucky Wesleyan, 1956; M.A., Vanderbilt, 1958; Ph.D., Michigan, 1966. Dissenters from American Involvement in World Affairs: A Political Analysis of the Movement for the Bricker Amendment. *Michigan.*

Paul M. Leary; A.B., Seton Hall, 1959; M.A., Rutgers, 1963; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. The Romantic Reaction: Politics and Utopia in Contemporary Social Criticism. *Rutgers.*

Joseph Metz; A.B., Catholic University, 1963; M.A., *ibid.*, 1965; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. A Critical Analysis of the Theory of Democracy in the Philosophy of John Dewey. *Catholic University.*

Alasdair A. Morrison; A.B., Oxford, 1952; A.M., *ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., Chicago, 1965. Individuals and Collectivities. *Chicago.*

R. William Nary; B.A., William and Mary College ,1951; M.A., Cornell, 1952; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1966; Church, State, and Religious Liberty: The Views of the American Catholic Bishops of the 1890's in Perspective. *Georgetown.*

John F. Newman; B.A., Maryland, 1946; M.A., Georgetown, 1958; Ph.D., Florida, 1966. Conceptualizations Used in American Local Political Community Studies, 1953–1964. *Florida.*

Walter J. Nicgorski; A.B., Georgetown, 1960; A.M., Chicago, 1962; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. Cicero's Rhetorical Writings and Political Philosophy. *Chicago.*

John C. Norton; B.A., St. Ambrose College, 1956; A.M., Illinois, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. The Politics of Pragmatism. *Illinois.*

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Thomas A. Quaynor; A.B., Philander Smith College, 1961; M.A., Southern Illinois, 1962; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. Negritude. *Southern Illinois.*

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Alan I. Ritter; A.B., Yale, 1958; M.C.P., Harvard, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. Proudhon: Realist, Radical, Moralist. *Harvard.*

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John J. Agria; A.B., Kalamazoo College, 1959; A.M., Chicago, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. The American Library Association and the Library Services Act. *Chicago.*

Weldon V. Barton; B.A., Southwest Texas State Teachers College, 1962; M.A., Florida State, 1963; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. Interstate Compacts in the Policy Process. *Florida State.*

Lawton E. Bennett; B.A., Oregon, 1953; M.A., *ibid.*, 1961; Ph.D., North Carolina, 1966. Social Protest and Social Structure; Southern Negro College Student Participation in the Protest Movement. *North Carolina.*

James J. Best; B.A., Chicago, 1960; M.A., Tufts, 1962; Ph.D., North Carolina, 1966. Citizen Support for the American Political System. *North Carolina.*

Robert E. Cecile; B.S., Southern Mississippi, 1961; M.A., Oklahoma, 1963; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. Crisis Decision-Making in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administration: The Applications of an Analytical Scheme. *Oklahoma.*

Charles Clapp, Jr., A.B., Tufts, 1945; M.A., Harvard, 1947; Ph.D., California, 1965. The Congressman: His Job and His World. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert P. Clark, Jr.; B.A., Tulane, 1962; M.A., Johns Hopkins, 1964; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. Venezuelan Policy-Making and the Latin American Free Trade Association Controversy. *Johns Hopkins.*

James R. Cobbledick; A.B., Wesleyan, 1957; A.M., Fletcher School, 1959; M.A.L.D., *ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. Anti-Imperialism in the United States. *Fletcher School.*

Charles W. Dunn; B.S., Illinois State, 1962; M.S., Florida State, 1963; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. The Interrelations of the Congress and the Presidency During Crisis Situations: A Communications Model. *Florida State.*

Jack D. Edwards; B.A., Harvard, 1955; Ll.B., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., Vanderbilt, 1966. Role Concepts of Federal Regulatory Officials. *Vanderbilt.*

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Victor C. Hobday; B.A., Kentucky, 1936; M.P.A., Syracuse, 1941; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. Sparks at the Grass Roots: A Study of the Municipal Distribution of TVA Electricity in Tennessee. *Syracuse.*

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Lynne B. Iglitzin; B.A., Barnard College, 1953; M.A., Minnesota, 1957: Ph.D., Bryn Mawr, 1966. The Function of Violence in the American Democratic Polity. *Bryn Mawr.*

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Bernard W. Klein; A.B., Brooklyn, 1950; A.M., Missouri, 1954; Ph.D., Michigan State, 1965. Political Participation in Four State Legislatures. *Michigan State.*

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Jim L. Munro; A.B., Texas Technological College, 1959; M.A., *ibid.*, 1963; Ph.D., Kansas, 1965, Organized Labor and Metropolitan Politics. *Kansas.*

William R. Nelson; LL.B., Utah, 1949; LL.M., New York University, 1958; M.A., Miami University (Ohio), 1959; Ph.D., Colorado, 1965. Case Study of a Pressure Group: The Atomic Scientists. *Colorado.*

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Alan Schechter; A.B., Amherst, 1957; Ph.D., Columbia, 1965. The Business in Government: Perspectives on Public Service. *Columbia.*

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Jerry B. Waters; B.S., Kansas State, 1954; M.A., Michigan State, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. The Agricultural Policy Stalemate: A Study in the Conflict of Beliefs and Values. *Michigan State.*

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Richard H. Yang; B.A., National Central University, Nanking, China, 1947; M.A., Oregon, 1955; Ph.D., New School, 1966. The Role of Chairman Arthur H. Vandenberg of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the 80th Congress, 1947–48. *New School.*

Harvey G. Zeidenstein; B.S., Northwestern, 1954; M.A., Chicago, 1957; Ph.D., New York University, 1965. Public Images of the President: A Study of Leadership. *New York University.*

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

William E. Brigman; B.A., North Carolina, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. The Role of the Office of the Solicitor General of the United States in Judicial Process. *North Carolina.*

Kenneth M. Dolbeare; A.B., Haverford, 1951; LL.B., Brooklyn Law School, 1958; Ph.D., Columbia, 1965. Local Courts in the Governmental Process: Policy-making Functions in the Metropolitan County. *Columbia.*

Robert H. Gordon; B.A., Syracuse, 1957; M.P.A., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. The Relationship Between the Attorney-General and the Agency Counsels in New York State. *Syracuse.*

Ernest R. Griffin; B.S., North Texas State, 1942; M.S., *ibid.*, 1947; Ph.D., Duke, 1966. The Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its Development and Its Application to Divorce Decrees. *Duke.*

Jerome J. Hanus; B.A., Seattle University, 1959; M.A., University of Washington, 1961; Ph.D., Maryland, 1966. The Writ of Certiorari as a Political Instrument. *Maryland.*

Michael J. Horan; B.S.F.S., Georgetown, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. The "No State" Limitations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments: The Evolution of a Constitutional Doctrine. *Georgetown.*

Joseph F. Schuster; B.A., St. Benedict's College (Atchison, Kansas), 1953; M.A., St. Louis University, 1959; Ph.D., Penn State, 1965. Electronics Eavesdropping and the Fourth Amendment. *Penn State.*

Myles C. Stenshoel; B.S., Concordia College, 1948; M.A., Colorado, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. Religious Neutrality under the Constitution: An Analysis of Alternative Rationales of the First Amendment Religion Clauses. *Colorado.*

AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Harry A. Bailey, Jr.; A.B., Florida A and M; M.A., Kansas, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. The State Corporation Commission: A Study of the Law and Practice of Public Utility Regulation in Kansas. *Kansas.*

John W. Cook; B.S., Concord College, 1962; M.G.A., Pennsylvania, 1964; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. County Financial Administration in Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania.*

John E. Crow; B.A., Washington (Seattle), 1957; M.A., Chicago, 1959; Ph.D., Washington (Seattle), 1965. Lawyers and Politics: A Behavorial Analysis. *Washington* (Seattle).

Richard C. Curry; A.B., Eastern Michigan, 1960; A.M., Michigan, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965.

Implementing Michigan's 1963 Constitution: A Special Legislative Function. *Michigan.*

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Herbert Weiss; A.B., New York University, 1952; M.A., Columbia, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. Case Study of a Congolese Party: The Parti Solidaire *Africain. Columbia.*

Howard J. Wiarda; B.A., Michigan, 1961; M.A., Florida, 1962; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. The Aftermath of the Trujillo Dictatorship: The Emergence of a Pluralist Political System in the Dominican Republic. *Florida.*

Joel M. Woldman; A.B., Brandeis, 1959; A.M., Michigan, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. Changing Patterns of Local Government in a North Indian District. *Michigan.*

Murray B. Woldman; A.B., Brandeis, 1959; A.M., Michigan, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. District Administration in India: Dehra Dun, A Case Study. *Michigan.*

William E. Wright; B.A., Millsaps, 1954; M.A., Vanderbilt, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. Local Leadership in Two West Berlin Political Parties. *Vanderbilt.*

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION POLITICS AND LAW

Jon Alexander; A.B., Southern Illinois, 1961; M.A., *ibid.*, 1962; Ph.D., Kansas, 1966. The National Interest: A Reappraisal. *Kansas.*

Heino Ambros; B.A., Teaxs Christian, 1952; M.A., Southern Methodist, 1955; Ph.D., New York University, 1965. Nonrecognition: Its Development in International Law and Application by the United States with Particular Reference to the Baltic States. *New York University.*

Mirza A. Beg; A.B., Allahabad, 1938; M.A., *ibid.*, 1940; Ph.D., Columbia, 1965. The Attitude of United Nations Members Towards the Use of Advisory Opinion Procedure (1945–1963). *Columbia.*

William H. Brill; B.A., Penn State, 1957; Ph.D., Pennsylvania, 1965. Military Civic Action in Bolivia. *Pennsylvania.*

John H. Burnett, Jr.; A.B., West Virginia Wesleyan College, 1958; M.A., Emory, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. Soviet-Egyptian Relations During the Khrushchev Era: A Study in Soviet Foreign Policy. *Emory.*

Howard J. Burnett; B.A., Amherst College, 1952; M.A., Oxford, 1958; Ph.D., New York University, 1965. The United Nations and Commodities: A Study of UN Promoting of Economic Cooperation in Fulfilling its Basic Purposes. *New York University.*

Joan C. Carver; B.A., Barnard, 1953; M.A., North Carolina, 1956; Ph.D., Florida, 1966. The Non-Fighting Forces of the U.N.: An Instrument for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes. *Florida.*

William Yen Chuko; M.A., New York University, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. Concept of Regionalism in Southeast Asia. *New York University.*

Edward Matthew Collins; B.S., Maryland, 1952; M.A., Georgetown, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. The Evolution of Soviet Strategy under Khrushchev. *Georgetown.*

Richard Cornell; A.B, Ohio State, 1952; M.I.A., Columbia, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. The Origin and Development of the Communist Youth International: 1914–1924. *Columbia.*

Joseph J. Darby; B.S., Georgetown, 1952; Ph.D., Columbia, 1966. Soviet Trade with a member of the Common Market: A Survey with Special Reference to the Commercial Aspects of Private International Law. *Columbia.*

Lawrence B. Ekpebu; B.A., Harvard, 1960; M.P.A., Princeton, 1962; Ph.D., Harvard, 1965. The Congo at the United Nations. *Harvard.*

Yassin El-Ayouty; B.S., Trenton State College, 1953; M.A., Rutgers, 1954; Ph.D., New York University, 1966. The Afro-Asian Contribution to the Broad Interpretation of the United Nations Charter's Concept of Dealing with Non-Self-Governing Territories: 1945–1963: A Study of the Effects of Bloc Action on the Evolution of Chapter XI of the Charter. *New York University.*

William W. Ellis; B.A., Oberlin College, 1961; Ph.D., New York University, 1966. National Configuration and International Policies: African Voting in the United Nations General Assembly, A Case Study. *New York University.*

Alejandro M. Fernandez; A.B., University of the Philippines, 1952; M.A., Cornell, 1955; Ph.D., Duke, 1966. International Law in Philippine Relations: 1898–1946. *Duke.*

Mona H. Gagnon; B.A., Massachusetts, 1957; L.L.B., Harvard Law School, 1960; Ph.D., Harvard, 1965. The Law of United Nations Activity in Civil Disputes. *Harvard.*

Narayan M. Ghatate; B.A., Nagpur University (India), 1957; M.A., American, 1962; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. Disarmament in India's Foreign Policy. *American.*

Ahmad Ghoreichi; B.A., Colorado, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. Soviet Policies in Iran. *Colorado.*

Sanford D. Greenberg; A.B., Columbia, 1962; Ph.D., Harvard, 1965. United States Policy toward the Republic of South Africa, 1945–1964. *Harvard.*

Ted R. Gurr; B.A., Reed College, 1957; Ph.D., New York University, 1965. The Genesis of Violence: A Multivariate Theory of the Preconditions. *New York University.*

Choong-Shick Hong; B.A., Yonsel University, 1958; Ph.D., New York University, 1965. Politics of Economic Regionalism: A Comparative Study of the United Nations Regional Economic Commissions. *New York University.*

Lukas E. Hoska, Jr.; B.S., U.S. Military Academy, 1937; M.S.P.A., Syracuse, 1949; M.A., Maryland, 1951; M.A.I.A., George Washington 1963; Ph.D., Maryland, 1966. Summit Diplomacy During World War II: The Conferences at Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam. *Maryland.*

James H. Johnson; B.A., Oklahoma State, 1951; M.A., *ibid.*, 1956; Ph.D., Oklahoma, 1966. The Marshall Plan: A Case Study in American Foreign Policy Formulation and Implementation. *Oklahoma.*

Natalie J. Kaufman; A.B., Pennsylvania, 1963; Ph.D., Virginia, 1966. The International Law Commission of the United Nations: A Critical Appraisal. *Virginia.*

Mirza H. H. Kizilbash; A.B., University of Punjab, 1959; M.A., Duke, 1962; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. International Law in United Nations Discussions on Human Rights. *Duke.*

Christopher N. Kornaros; B.A., New York University, 1959; M.A., *ibid.*, 1962; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. Cooperative Administration Between Greece and the United States 1947–59. *New York University.*

Unja Lee; B.A., E.W.H.A. Women's College, Korea, 1941; M.A., Claremont, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. Chinese-Soviet Relations 1956–1960. A Study of Inter-Party and Inter-State Relations. *Claremont.*

Barbara D. McFadyen; B.S., Denver, 1944; M.A., *ibid.*, 1945; M.A., *ibid.*, 1957; Ph.D., Colorado, 1965. The Truman Doctrine: Its Origin and Evolution. *Colorado.*

James F. McGarry; B.S., Pennsylvania, 1946; M.A., *ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. A Study of Decision Making in Japan's Post War Foreign Economic Policy. *Pennsylvania.*

Julie K. McGuire; B.A., Scripps, 1959; Ph.D., Claremont, 1965. Political Preconditions for Regional Economic Integration: The Association of Southeast Asia. *Claremont.*

Josette Maxwell; B.S., Kansas State University, 1961; Ph.D., Claremont, 1965. The European Coal and Steel Community: An International Government? *Claremont.*

Linda Miller; A.B., Radcliffe, 1959; M.A., Columbia, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. The United Nations and Internal Disorders. *Columbia.*

Clovis C. Morrisson, Jr.; B.S., Texas; LL.B., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., Colorado, 1965. The Developing European Law of Human Rights. *Colorado.*

Byung Koo Pak; B.A., Union College (Kentucky), 1961; M.A., Florida State, 1963; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. The Cuban Problem in the Organization of American States: A Model for Collective Decision-Making. *Florida State.*

Robert Randle; A.B., Cornell, 1962; Ph.D., Columbia, 1966. Concepts of Power in Contemporary International Political Science: An Analysis and critique of the uses of ideas of power. *Columbia.*

Lillian R. Randolph; B.A., Washington, 1953; M.A., *ibid.*, 1956; Ph.D., California, 1965. A Study of the Nature, Process, and Results of International Bargaining, Including that Between and Among Nations as Well as Among Members of Alliances. *California* (Berkeley).

Kwang Hai Ro; B.A., La Grange College, 1958; M.A., Oklahoma, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. Power Politics in Korea and Its Impact on Korean Foreign and Domestic Affairs, 1882–1907. *Oklahoma.*

Arthur W. Rovine; A.B., Pennsylvania, 1958; Ll.B., *Harvard*, 1961; Ph.D., Columbia, 1966. The Top-Level Structure of the United Nations Secretariat. *Columbia.*

Jack D. Salmon; A.B., Kansas, 1961; M.A., Yale, 1962; Ph.D., Kansas, 1965. Limited War and Tactical Nuclear Weapons in East Asia. *Kansas*

Roberto E. Socas; A.B., Columbia, 1950; M.I.A., *ibid.*, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. France, Naval Armaments, and Naval Disarmaments: 1918–1922. *Columbia.*

Arthur M. Stillman; A.B., Brown, 1948; B.L., Harvard, 1953; A.M., George Washington, 1956; Ph.D., American, 1965. The United Nations and the Suez Canal. *American.*

C. Frederick Stoerker; A.B., Baker University, 1939; S.T.B., Boston, 1942; Ph.D., Missouri, 1966. Triangularity in Church and State Relations as Developed in Public Law 480, Title III Programs in India. *Missouri.*

A. Paul Theil; B.A., Eastern New Mexico, 1959; M.A., Claremont, 1960; Ph.D., Oklahoma, 1966. The Politics of Nationalizing: Ceylon. *Oklahoma.*

Robert T. Vance; B.S., U.S.Naval Academy, 1937; AM., George Washington, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. Inspection: Essential Element of Arms Control and Disarmament. *George Washington.*

Carl E. Wasmuth, Jr.; A.B., Virginia, 1962; Ph.D. *ibid.*, 1966. Program and Budgetary Coordination in International Peacekeeping and Development Operations: A Study in Contrasts. *Virginia.*

Robert L. Wendzel; B.A., Kalamazoo, 1960; M.A., Florida, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. United States National Interests and the Middle East, 1955–1958. *Florida.*

David O. Wilkinson; A.B., Harvard, 1960; M.A., Columbia, 1962; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. A Field-of-Conflict Approach to the Theory of International Politics. *Columbia.*

Robert K. Wolthuis; B.A., Utah, 1960; M.S., *ibid.*, 1963; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins, 1966. American Foreign Policy Towards the Netherlands East Indies-Indonesia, 1939–1949. *Johns Hopkins.*

Mohamad Z. Yakan; B.A., American University (Beirut), 1960; M.A., *ibid.*, 1961; Ph.D., Michigan, 1965. Lebanon's Politics in Inter-Arab Relations, 1963–1964. *Michigan.*

Jon A. Yinger; B.A., Whittier College, 1962; M.A., Claremont, 1965; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. Cuba: American and Soviet Core Interest in Conflict. *Claremont.*

Mark W. Zacher; A.B., Yale, 1961; MA., Columbia, 1963; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1965. Dag Hammarskjold's Conception of the Political Role of the United Nations. *Columbia.*

William Zimmerman, IV; A.B., Swarthmore, 1958; M.A., George Washington, 1959; Ph.D., Columbia, 1965. Soviet Perspective on the International System, 1956–1964: An Inquiry into Changes in the Soviet Appraisal of International Relations. *Columbia.*

NEWS AND NOTES

NOTICE

All News and Notes correspondence should be addressed in the future to

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Missoula, Montana 59801

The sixty-third Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 5–9, 1967 at the Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago.

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

A conference on problems of research and publication in comparative politics was held at the International Studies Center of the State University of New York at Oyster Bay, April 29–30, 1966. The conference was sponsored by the City University of New York in cooperation with the State University of New York and the Office of Foreign Area Studies of the New York State Department of Education. Papers were presented by Bernard E. Brown, Roy C. Macridis, Michael Hudson, Norman A. Bailey and Henry W. Morton. Among the topics discussed was the advisability of founding a journal of comparative politics.

The Kentucky Conference of Political Scientists held its fifth annual meeting on the campus of Western Kentucky University, Bowling Green, Kentucky, March 26, 1966. The Conference was attended by more than forty members of college and university faculties as well as students. Two major features of the session were a talk by Frank A. Santopolo of the University of Kentucky about the Center for Developmental Change, and a panel discussion on the proposed New Constitution for the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

The following officers were elected: Dwynal B. Pettengill, Eastern Kentucky University, president; S. Sidney Ulmer, University of Kentucky, vice-president; Henry E. Cheaney, Kentucky State College, secretary; and Herbert Drennon, University of Kentucky, continued in office as treasurer.

The 1967 meeting is scheduled to be held at Centre College, Danville, Kentucky.

The Western Political Science Association held its 20th annual meeting on the campus of the University of Nevada, Reno, March 24–26. New officers for 1966–67 are: president, Norman Meller University of Hawaii; vice-president, Robert L. Morlan, University of Redlands; secretary-treasurer, Don W. Driggs, University of Nevada. Members of the Executive Council are: Eleanore Bushnell, University of Nevada; Edgar Efrat, University of Victoria; John T. Thompson, University of Wyoming; Heinz R. Hink, Arizona State University; Fred Krinsky, University of Southern California; Paul R. Murray, Sacramento State College; Maure Goldschmidt (ex officio), Reed College; Ellsworth E. Weaver (ex officio), University of Utah.

Asian Studies on the Pacific Coast held its inaugural meeting in San Francisco, June 16–18, 1966. Nobutaki Ike, Stanford University, is a member of the organizing committee.

The Northern California Political Science Association held its eighteenth annual meeting at the University of California (Berkeley) on April 30, 1966. Panels discussed "The Rights of the Criminal Defendant: Some Different Prospectives" and "The Development of Foreign Policy: What Role for Congress?" Judge Bruce Sumner, Chairman, Constitution Revision Commission, gave a luncheon address on "The Politics of Constitution Revision in California." Officers elected for 1966-1967 were: president, Donald W. Brandon, University of San Francisco; vice-president, Louis Wasserman, San Francisco State College; secretary-treasurer, John M. Selig, City College of San Francisco. The following were elected to the council: Darryl Taskin, Stanislaus State College Eleanore Bushnell, University of Nevada; Karl A. Lamb, University of California (Santa Cruz); Eugene C. Lee, University of California (Berkeley); John Livingston, Sacramento State College; Eve Wallenstein, Merritt College; Raymond E. Wolfinger, Stanford University.

The Midwest Conference of Political Scientists held its annual meeting at the Center for Continuing Education, University of Chicago, April 28–30, 1966. The next annual meeting will be held at Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, April 27–29, 1967. At the meeting just concluded Vernon Van Dyke, University of Iowa, was elected president; Byrum Carter, Indiana University, was elected vice-president; and Harry Davis, Beloit College, and Harold Spaeth, Michigan State University, were elected members of the Executive Council of the Conference for terms of three years.

The Southwestern Political Science Association held its annual meeting April 7–9, 1966, in the Jung Hotel in New Orleans, Louisiana. The meeting was highlighted by a banquet address by President Gabriel Almond of the American Political Science Association. Emmette Redford of the University of Texas was elected president for the forthcoming year. Next year's meeting will be held in Dallas, Texas, at the Statler Hilton Hotel on March, 23–25, 1967.

The California Conference on Education for Public Administration was organized at Fresno, California, March 3, 1966. The purposes of this organization shall be to provide a forum for discussion and a vehicle for advancing the development of educational programs that respond to the needs of all levels of government. This broad mission shall be elaborated upon and refined by the Executive Committee.

Pending the implementation of the full organization of this Conference, the Executive Committee shall be empowered to act for the membership in pursuit of the purposes outlined above.

Members of the Executive Committee are:

James Ballard, San Jose State College
Ernest A. Engelbert, University of California, Los Angeles
Lloyd Musolf, University of California, Davis
Frederick C. Mosher, University of California, Berkeley
Henry Reining, Jr., University of Southern California
Cy Roseman, San Francisco State College
John Vieg, Claremont Graduate School
Robert F. Wilcox, San Diego State College, Chairman
Assoc. Member—Brewster Denny, University of Washington

The Fresno meeting was devoted to a discussion of the topic "The Future of Graduate and Professional Training in Public Administration in California". The chairman of the convening committee was Professor Ernest A. Engelbert of the University of California, Los Angeles. The meeting was organized on a seminar basis and devoted its deliberations to the following three topics: the academic content of public administration, professional training and manpower needs in public administration. Present as resource persons were representatives of the California State Personnel Board, the California League of Cities, the County Supervisor's Association of California, and the Department of Finance of the State of California. Visitors from out of state universities were Professors Brewster Denny, University of Washington; Leo Reithmeyer, University of Colorado; and Bruce Mason, Arizona State University.

The general theme of the professor's meeting was carried over into the program of the statewide ASPA meeting in panels entitled *What Practitioners Expect from Training Programs in California* on March 4 and *Where Public Administration is Going in California* on March 5.

The Conference will hold its next meeting in May of 1967, preceding the national conference of ASPA in San Francisco.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

SSRC PROGRAMS

During the coming year the Social Science Research Council will administer or co-sponsor the several fellowship and grant programs listed below. A more definitive announcement will be available in September on request addressed to Social Science Research Council Fellowships and Grants, 230 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017. For further information about certain of the co-sponsored programs, however, inquiries should be addressed to the other offices indicated. To avoid missing deadlines, correspondence should be initiated no later than early October.

Research Training Fellowships will be offered to postdoctoral and advanced predoctoral candidates who desire special research training that is outside the scope of the usual doctoral programs in their fields. These fellowships are no longer offered in support of regular doctoral studies and preparation of dissertations.

Foreign Area Fellowships for multi-disciplinary pre-doctoral or post-doctoral training relating to Asia and the Near East, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America, or Western Europe, are administered by a separate staff under the joint auspices of SSRC and ACLS. The address of the Foreign Area Fellowship Program is 444 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.

Faculty Research Grants will be offered by SSRC to mature social scientists holding the Ph.D. degree or its equivalent, who need relatively small grants to meet expenses of research and in some cases to replace their regular salaries for periods of leave not longer than 6 months. Projects within the purview of the more specialized grant programs listed below may not be supported through the Faculty Research Grant Program.

Grants for Research on Governmental and Legal Processes will be offered by SSRC to legal scholars and to social scientists holding the Ph.D. degree or its equivalent. Proposals may include support for collaborating junior colleagues and student assistants. The program is limited to American governmental, political, and legal processes.

Grants for Research on Foreign Areas will be offered by joint committees of SSRC and ACLS, to social scientists and humanistic scholars holding the Ph.D. degree or its equivalent. With certain exceptions, grants may be sufficient for upto a full year's research. Grants for research on Africa, Contemporary China, Latin America, and the Near and Middle East are administered by the Social Science Research Council. Grants for Asian and for Slavic and East European Studies are administered by the American Council of Learned Societies, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.

A new Department of Political Science has been established at the Federal University of Minas Gerais in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. The aims of the Department are to improve teaching and research in systematic, empirically-based political science in Brazil. The primary emphases within this context are comparative politics, political science methodology, and Brazilian politics. Both undergraduate and graduate teaching programs are being started.

The Department is being supported jointly by the Federal University of Minas Gerais (FUMG) and by a substantial five-year grant from the Ford Foundation. The grant funds will be used for visiting professors from the United States and Europe; for graduate work for Brazilian students and professors in the United States; and for research, library acquisitions, equipment, and seminars.

The United States Coordinators for the grant activities are Professors Gabriel A. Almond and Robert A. Packenham of the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. Their responsibilities are to assist the Brazilians in recruiting visiting professors to go to Brazil, to place Brazilian graduate students and younger faculty for graduate work and advanced study in North American universities, and generally to promote the objectives of the grant and the Department.

A variety of forms of visiting professorships to Brazil and scholarships for study in the United States are planned. Grant funds are available for about eight year-long visiting professorships in Brazil, five visiting graduate researchers, twelve man-months of visiting consultantships, fourteen year-long fellowships for Brazilian graduate students, and five fellowships for Brazilian professors to study and do research in the United States.

Metropolitan Area Problems: News and Digest has changed its name to *Metropolitan Area Digest*. It is published by the Graduate School of Public Affairs, State University of New York at Albany. Copies are available upon request.

JOHN CLARKE ADAMS has returned to the Maxwell School at Syracuse after an absence of 30 months. For the first two years of this period, he served as resident director of the Syracuse semester in Italy. For the fall term of 1965 he was visiting professor at the American University, Beirut.

MARVIN ALISKY, Arizona State University, has been appointed director of the University's newly established Center for Latin American Studies.

HANS H. BAERWALD, UCLA, continues as director of the Study Center of the University of California, Mitaka-Tokyo.

JOHN H. BADGLEY, Miami University (Ohio), has been named an associate of the Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Studies.

DENNIS C. BELLER, Miami University (Ohio), has been granted a leave of absence for 1966–67.

VACLAV BENES, Indiana University, will be on leave during the second semester, 1966–67.

ELIOT S. BERKLEY has been appointed executive director of the International Relations Council, Kansas City, Missouri.

PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK, University of California, will spend 1966–67 on leave in Germany.

PAUL R. BRASS, University of Washington, has been awarded a post-doctoral research grant by the American Council for Learned Societies.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Columbia University, will be on extended leave to become a member of the Policy Planning Council of the State Department in charge of Soviet and East European Affairs.

Hugh A. Bone, University of Washington, has been elected secretary of the Constitutional Advisory Council for the State of Washington. Paul R. Castleberry, Washington State University, also serves on the committee as an ex officio member.

Anthony T. Bouscaren, Le Moyne College, served as director of Westminster College's Institute on Communism and Constitutional Democracy during the summer, 1966.

Eldon G. Bowman, formerly of the College of Wooster, spent 1965–66 in Scotland under a Leverhulme visiting fellowship.

William R. Campbell has been granted a year's leave of absence from the University of Rhode Island for study in Italy.

Robert E. Cleary, American University, will serve as assistant director of the American Political Science Association during 1966–67.

William M. H. Collins, Jr., University of Georgia, has been named administrative director of the University's new graduate program in public administration.

Robert H. Connery, Columbia University, is serving as executive director of the Academy of Political Science.

Orville Cope, University of Wisconsin/Milwaukee, spent the summer in Chile.

Michael N. Danielson, Princeton University, has been appointed Bicentennial Preceptor, 1966–69.

Mary T. Delahanty, Marymount Manhattan College, has been awarded a faculty fellowship for 1966–67.

Alfred Diamant, Haverford College, will spend a sabbatical leave in Europe during 1966–67.

John T. Dorsey, Jr., Vanderbilt University, was his institution's representative at the UNESCO conference in Kansas City, November, 1965.

Eleanor Dougherty, College of Great Falls, Montana, was honored by the state and the city when Governor Babcock and the Mayor of Great Falls, proclaimed February 10, 1966 as Dr. Eleanor Dougherty Day in recognition of her contribution to education.

H. Sydney Duncombe, University of Idaho, served during the summer of 1966 as special consultant in the Division of the Budget, State of New York.

JeDon A. Emenhiser, Utah State University, is directing the study of legislative reform in Utah for the State Legislative council.

Alona E. Evans, Wellesley College, has been elected president of the New England Political Science Association. She is also chairman of the Committee on Legal Problems of Asylum of the International Law Association and a member of the Executive Council of the American Society of International Law.

J. Leiper Freeman, Vanderbilt University, directed a series of seminars in practical politics for high school teachers. This was a joint undertaking of Fisk and Vanderbilt Universities.

Robert L. Friedheim, Purdue University, will be on leave of absence for the 1966–67 academic year to conduct research for the Institute of Naval Studies.

William T. R. Fox, Columbia University, was Fulbright lecturer at the Instituto Rio Branco and at Pontifical Catholic University, Rio de Janeiro, spring term, 1966.

Dante L. Germino, Wellesley College, has resigned from Wellesley in order to continue teaching and research in the Philippines and Chile under the auspices of the Rockefeller Foundation.

Robert A. Goldwin, Kenyon College, will study in England under a Guggenheim grant.

Robert T. Golembiewski, University of Georgia, is participating in an inter-university research program in the Department of State. He has also been named academic director of the University's graduate program in public administration.

Lazlo Gorgey, University of South Carolina, spent the summer in Europe on a grant from the Institute of International Studies.

Lawrence Graham, University of Texas, conducted research in Mexico during the summer of 1966. The study was carried out under an appointment with the Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Texas.

Franz B. Gross, Pennsylvania Military College, will spend 1966–67 in Senegal on the faculty of the University of Dakar.

John Grumm, University of Kansas, has been appointed research director of the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures.

Harlan Hahn has been awarded a Public Health research grant.

Bertil L. Hanson, Oklahoma State University, is spending the 1966–67 year at the University of Oslo on a Fulbright grant.

Royce Hanson, American University, will be on leave during the fall term and will campaign for election to the U. S. House of Representatives.

John N. Hazard, on his sabbatical leave from Columbia, will be teaching in the Faculty of Law, University of Teheran and of the University of Canberra. He will complete the year with 4 months of research at the East-West Center in Hawaii.

Nish Jamgotch, Jr., University of North Carolina/Charlotte, was awarded a research fellowship by the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace for the summer, 1966.

David C. Jordan, University of Virginia, received a Wilson Gee award from the University for summer research.

Ravi Kapil, University of Wisconsin/Milwaukee, is on leave during 1966–67 and is serving as director of the U. S. Peace Corps program in the Republic of Somalia.

Edward A. Kolodziej, University of Virginia, received a Wilson Gee award from the University for his summer research.

Alex B. Lacy, Jr., Tulane University, has been appointed director of the Stern Undergraduate Summer Internship in State and Local Government at Tulane.

Walter H. C. Laves has received an honorary LL.D from Washington and Jefferson College. He will be on leave from Indiana University during 1966–67.

Roy D. Laird, University of Kansas, has received an NSF research grant for 1966 and NDEA-Hays-Fulbright research grant for 1967. Field work will be carried out in Mexico in the summer of 1966 and in Eastern Europe and the USSR in 1967.

Lee Layport, Jr., Santa Ana College, studied at American University/Cairo during the summer under a Fulbright award.

Audrey D. LeBlanc, Southern University, served as research associate with the Greater Cleveland Association during the summer.

Carl Leiden, University of Texas, has been awarded an NDEA-Fulbright-Hays award and conducted research in Iran and Afganistan during the summer.

Avery Leiserson has been named the Harvie Branscomb Distinguished Professor at Vanderbilt University. This award, carrying a cash prize of $1,000, is made annually to the professor who, in the opinion of his colleagues, has made an outstanding contribution to the University.

J. Gus Liebenow, Indiana University, will be on leave during the second semester, 1966–67.

Herman D. Lujan, University of Kansas, has received a University research grant for 1966–67.

John H. Lunde is on leave from Valparaiso University.

Roy C. Macridis, Brandeis University, has been appointed director of the University's new graduate program in politics.

Albert A. Mavrinac has been granted a two-year leave from his duties at Colby College. He will serve as advisor to the Egyptian government on behalf of the Institute of Public Administration and the Ford Foundation on the development of systems for the in-service training of ministers, deputy ministers, provincial governors, and other senior Egyptian officials.

Charles Merrifield, California State College at Hayward, is on sabbatical leave.

Robert F. Miller, Washington University, will be on leave during the fall term.

Herbert J. Muller, Indiana University, will be on leave during 1966–67.

Ernest A. Newman, Baylor University, will be on leave during the fall term.

Norman D. Palmer, University of Pennsylvania, will be on leave of absence during the academic year 1966–67. He will spend 5 months at the East-West Center in Hawaii as a Senior Specialist in the Institute of Advanced Projects, and approximately seven months in India as a Faculty Research Fellow of the American Institute of Indian Studies.

Michael Parenti, Sarah Lawrence College, has received a research grant from the Louis Rabinowitz foundation.

Jaroslaw A. Piekaliewicz, University of Kansas, was awarded a 1966 summer faculty fellowship and a university research grant for 1966–67.

Rene Peritz is on leave from Indiana State

University on American Philosophical Society and institutional grants to Malaysia.

Phyllis Peterson, Indiana University, has received a Ford Foundation Post-Doctoral Fellowship for 1966–67 to study in Brazil and Argentina.

Bhagwati P. K. Poddar, formerly of Illinois State University, spent part of 1965–66 in research in India under a Relm Foundation grant.

Mojmir Povolny, Lawrence University, will spend his 1966–67 sabbatical leave in London. His work will be in part supported by a grant from the Associated Colleges of the Midwest.

Jewel L. Prestage, Southern University, served as director of NDEA Institute in American Government and Politics, June 20–July 30, 1966.

C. Herman Pritchett, The University of Chicago, has been appointed as a member of the American Bar Association Commission on Electoral College Reform.

Harry Howe Ransom, Vanderbilt University, was elected vice-president, International Studies Association, Southern Region, for 1966.

Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, University of Virginia, received a Wilson Gee award from the university for his summer research, 1966.

Fred W. Riggs, Indiana University, will spend the academic year, 1966–67, at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences at Palo Alto, California.

Alan I. Ritter, University of Virginia, is on leave for the fall semester 1966 for research assisted by a grant from the American Philosophical Society. He also received a Wilson Gee award from the University for research in summer, 1966.

James Roach, University of Texas, has been given leave and a grant by his graduate school. He will spend the fall semester, 1966, in India.

Harold H. Roth, American University, will be on sabbatical leave, 1966–67.

Wallace S. Sayre has returned to his duties as chairman of the department at Columbia.

Ronald M. Schneider, Columbia University, has received a Fulbright-Hays Grant to conduct research in Brazil from June 1966 to January 1967.

Morley Segal, California State College at Hayward has been awarded an APSA Congressional Fellowship for 1966–67.

A. Don Sorensen, Indiana University, has received an SSRC grant.

James Soukup, University of Texas, has been serving for the past three years (the latter two as chairman) on the National Screening Committee for Fulbright-Hays awards to conduct graduate study in Asia. From July to September, 1966, he will be conducting research in Japan.

Herbert J. Spiro, University of Pennsylvania, was scholar in residence at Florida Southern College during the annual International Relations Institute of the Associated Mid-Florida Colleges.

Edwin O. Stene, the University of Kansas, served on the staff of the Advanced Management Training Program conducted by the International City Managers Association.

Clarence N. Stone, Emory University, is a Congressional Fellow, APSA during 1966–67.

John E. Stoner, Indiana University, has received research grants from the Insurance Institute of Highway Safety and the Indiana Highway Commission.

Edward Taborsky, University of Texas, has received a research grant for the academic year 1966–67 from the Social Science Foundation and the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver. This grant will be supplemented by a grant from the University of Texas Research Institute for the spring and summer of 1967. His research will be carried out in Austin, Texas, Munich, Vienna, Harvard and Columbia Universities, the Library of Congress, and in brief visits to several of the developing nations.

Albert R. Trost, Jr. continues on leave from Valparaiso University.

Jan F. Triska, Stanford University, taught the spring and summer at the Stanford campus in Italy. At present on a year's leave of absence, he is touring Eastern Europe and the USSR visiting the centers of opinion research there. In his absence, David D. Finley of Colorado College is the acting director of the Studies of the Communist System in the Institute of Political Studies.

Arthur C. Turner, University of California, Riverside, attended a British Foreign Office conference held at Wiston House, Steyning, Sussex, 19 June–2 July 1966. He presented a paper to the conference.

S. Sidney Ulmer, University of Kentucky, has been elected to the Executive Council of the Southern Political Science Association for 1966–69. He has also received a research grant from the Institute on American Freedoms.

VERNON VAN DYKE, University of Iowa, has been elected president of the International Studies Association.

ALAN F. WESTIN, Columbia University, will be on sabbatical leave during 1966–67.

LEA E. WILLIAMS, Brown University, has been awarded a post-doctoral research grant by the American Council for Learned Societies. He will conduct research in Malaysia.

YORK WILLBERN, Indiana University, will be on leave during the fall semester, 1966–67.

JAMES R. WOODWORTH, chairman of the department at Miami University (Ohio), has been awarded a faculty research fellowship for study in England.

STAFF CHANGES

NEW APPOINTMENTS

MADELEINE WING ADLER, instructor, American University.

CHARLES R. ADRIAN, professor, University of California, Riverside.

CLAUDE AKE, instructor, Columbia University, 1966–67.

EVELYN ALIGWEKE, assistant professor, American University in Cario.

ALAN ALTSHULER, associate professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; formerly of Cornell.

CHESTER W. BAIN, Johnston Professor, University of South Carolina.

HOWARD BANOW, instructor, Wellesley College.

ABRAHAM BARGMAN, professor, Brooklyn College, CUNY, formerly of the U. N.

RODERICK BELL, assistant professor, University of Texas; formerly of Indiana University.

ROGER W. BENJAMIN, assistant professor, University of Minnesota.

JOHN F. BIBBY, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1966–67.

HENRY S. BIENAN, assistant professor, Princeton; formerly of University of Ohio.

JAMES A. BLESSING, instructor, Susquehanna University.

ELDON G. BOWMAN, associate professor, Northern Arizona University; formerly of College of Wooster.

BERNARD L. BRAY, instructor, Bradley University, Peoria.

SAUL BRENNER, instructor, University of North Carolina.

BERNARD BRODIE, professor, University of California at Los Angeles.

W. DEAN BURNHAM, associate professor, Washington University

BLAIR CAMPBELL, assistant professor, University of California at Los Angeles.

REV. FRANCIS CANAVAN, S. J., associate professor, Fordham University; formerly associate editor of *America*.

BRADLEY CANNON, assistant professor, University of Kentucky.

LOUIS CANTORI, assistant professor, University of California at Los Angeles.

TERRENCE J. CAREW, instructor, Valparaiso University.

MARY U. CARLSON, instructor, Valparaiso University.

RONALD C. CEASE, associate professor, Portland State College.

HENRY C. CHRISTOPHER, assistant professor, St. Louis University; formerly of Kent State.

JAMES COCHRANE, assistant professor, Tulane; formerly of Western Michigan University.

ROBERT H. CONNERY, professor, Columbia University.

THOMAS I. COOKE, Benedict professor of government, Texas Western College; formerly of Johns Hopkins University.

DON STEPHEN CUPPS, instructor, Princeton University.

JEAN DANIELSON, Newcomb College/Tulane; formerly of Kansas University.

HAMPTON T. DAVEY, instructor, Vanderbilt University.

SAMUEL DECALO, assistant professor, University of Rhode Island; formerly of Pennsylvania Military College.

Robert A. DeLapp, instructor, Miami University (Ohio).

William Eaton, lecturer, San Jose State College.

Charles S. Edwards, assistant professor, Baylor University.

Jack D. Edwards, associate professor, College of William and Mary.

John Esseks, assistant professor, Wisconsin State University at Oshkosh.

Peter Fish, instructor, Princeton.

James Farganis, assistant professor, Brooklyn College, CUNY.

Jeff Fishel, instructor, American University.

Murray Fishel, assistant professor, Kent State University; formerly of University of Denver.

H. George Frederickson, assistant professor, Maxwell School/Syracuse University.

George Gadbois, assistant professor, University of Kentucky.

John Gallagher, assistant professor, Baruch School of Business and Public Administration, CUNY.

Lela Garner, assistant professor, San Jose State College.

Robert S. Gerstein, assistant professor, University of Minnesota.

George Ginsburgs, associate professor, Graduate Faculty, The New School.

G. Morton Gordon, University of Pennsylvania; formerly of MIT.

William J. Gore, professor, University of Washington; formerly of University of Indiana.

Laszlo Görgey, assistant professor, University of South Carolina.

Joseph B. Graves, assistant professor, Western Texas College of University of Texas; formerly of Housing Home Finance Agency.

Clint E. Grimes, instructor, University of Idaho; formerly of UCLA.

Craig G. Gunter, assistant professor, Wisconsin State College/Oshkosh; formerly of Concord College.

Joseph Haberer, assistant professor, Rutgers University.

Jerome J. Hanus, assistant professor, American University; formerly of Mankato State College.

B. Douglas Harman, San Diego State College.

Louis Hayes, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin/Milwaukee.

Clyde V. House, assistant professor, College of William and Mary.

Lynne B. Iglitzin, instructor, Beaver College.

Ronald F. Inglehart, assistant professor, University of Michigan; formerly of Roosevelt University.

William Jackson, Jr., assistant professor, The Catholic University of America.

Nish Jamgotch, Jr., assistant professor, University of North Carolina; formerly of Scripps College.

Dean Jaros, assistant professor, University of Kentucky; formerly of Wayne State University.

Lloyd Jensen, associate professor, University of Kentucky; formerly of Northwestern.

Bernard K. Johnpoll, associate professor, State University of New York/Albany; formerly of University of Saskatchewan.

Roger Kanet, assistant professor, University of Kansas.

Don E. Kash, associate professor, Purdue; formerly of University of Missouri.

Daniel Yinmaw Kau, instructor, Brown University; formerly of Cornell.

E. W. Kelley, assistant professor, University of Kentucky.

Lyman A. Kellstedt, professor, assistant State University of New York/Buffalo.

Edward Keynes, assistant professor, Pennsylvania State University.

Issac Kramnick, assistant professor, Brandeis University.

Yasumasa Kuroda, associate professor, University of Hawaii.

James D. Laing, assistant professor, Stanford.

W. Henry Lambright, assistant professor, Maxwell School/Syracuse University.

CARL LANDE, associate professor, University of Kansas.

CHAE JIN LEE, assistant professor, University of Kansas.

JEAN-ROBERT LAGUEY-FEILLEUX, assistant professor, St. Louis University; formerly of Georgetown University.

TILDEN J. LEMELLE, assistant professor, Fordham University; formerly of Northern Illinois University.

EDWARD A. LEONARD, assistant professor, Texas Western College of University of Texas; formerly of Emory University.

JAMES W. LINDEEN, assistant professor, Central Missouri State College; formerly of University of Nebraska.

MILTON LODGE, University of Iowa.

RONALD O. LOVERIDGE, assistant professor, University of California, Riverside.

SCHLEY R. LYONS, assistant professor, University of Toledo.

FRANK MARINI, assistant professor, University of Kentucky.

GENE MASON, assistant professor, University of Kentucky.

GEORGE J. MAUER, assistant professor, Oklahoma State University.

STEVEN J. MAZURANA, instructor, Valparaiso University.

CARROLL R. MCKIBBAN, instructor, Drake University, for 1966–67.

EUGENE J. MEEHAN, associate professor, Brandeis University.

RICHARD MERELMAN, assistant professor, University of California, Los Angeles.

ALFRED G. MEYER, professor, University of Michigan; formerly of Michigan State University.

ELIJAH MILES, San Diego State College.

RICHARD MILLS, assistant professor, Fordham University; formerly of Brown University.

VAL MIXON, instructor, Emory University.

ROBERT A. MORTIMER, assistant professor, Haverford College.

ROBERT M. MOUNT, instructor, University of South Carolina.

MOHAMMED ANSORI NAWAWI, instructor, Wellesley College.

BRUCE F. NORTON, instructor, American University.

MICHEL C. OKSENBERG, assistant professor, Stanford University.

EUGENE A. OLSEN, instructor, Purdue University.

BURTON W. ONSTINE, assistant professor, Portland State College.

DENNIS PALUMBO, associate professor, Brooklyn College/CUNY; formerly of University of Pennsylvania.

RICHARD L. PARK, professor, University of Michigan; formerly Dean of Social Sciences, University of Pittsburgh.

ELLEN B. PIRRO, assistant professor, University of Minnesota.

MARTIN J. PLAX, lecturer, State University of New York/Buffalo.

CHRISTIAN P. POTHOLM, instructor, Dartmouth College.

ROBERT H. PUCKETT, assistant professor, Michigan State University; formerly of University of Virginia.

DOUGLAS RAE, assistant professor, Maxwell School, Syracuse University.

ANGELO T. RANDAZZO, instructor, University of North Carolina.

JORGEN RASMUSSEN, associate professor, Vanderbilt University; formerly of University of Arizona.

INEZ SMITH REID, instructor, Brooklyn College, CUNY.

EDMOND F. RICKETTS, lecturer, Miami University (Ohio); formerly of Public Administration Service.

HAROLD RIEHM, assistant professor, University of Kansas.

JOSEPH ROBERTS, associate professor, University of Saskatchewan/Regina; formerly of Michigan State University.

ROBERT RODES, Drew University; formerly of University of Kentucky.

RAYMOND SPENCER RODGERS, associate professor, University of Southwestern Louisiana.

Yosal Rogat, associate professor, Stanford University.

Diane S. Rothberg, assistant professor, American University.

Robert Russell, instructor, Bowdoin College.

Gerry Ruth Sack, assistant professor, University of Rhode Island; formerly of Ball State University.

Harvey Sapolsky, assistant professor, MIT.

Harold Schellinger, Jr., assistant professor, San Jose State College.

Robert A. Schoenberger, assistant professor, University of Michigan.

John E. Schwarz, assistant professor, Indiana University.

Robert Scigliano, professor, State University of New York/Buffalo.

Donald B. Seney, assistant professor, University of Denver.

Michael J. Shapiro, assistant professor, University of Hawaii.

L. Earl Shaw, Jr., assistant professor, University of Minnesota.

Sheldon Simon, assistant professor, University of Kentucky.

Zdenek Slouka, assistant professor, Columbia, 1966–67.

Bruce Lee Raymond Smith, assistant professor, Columbia, University; formerly of RAND Corporation.

Willard Smith, assistant professor, Wisconsin State University/Oshkosh; formerly of Mankato State College.

Robert W. Spencer, lecturer, State University of New York/Buffalo.

Steven Spiegel, assistant professor, UCLA.

Edward A. Stettner, instructor, Wellesley College.

C. Dale Story, associate professor, American University; formerly of Iowa State University.

John H. Strange, assistant professor, Duke University.

Ronald J. Stupak, instructor, Miami University (Ohio); formerly of Ohio State University.

Istvan Szent-Miklosy, lecturer, Columbia University.

Patricia Taylor, assistant professor, State University, Brockport, New York.

Ivan Volgyes, instructor, University of Nebraska.

Joan Wadlaw, assistant professor, University of Nebraska.

Harrison Wagner, assistant professor, University of Texas; formerly of Duke University.

John C. Wahlke, professor, University of Iowa; formerly of State University of New York/Buffalo.

Sidney R. Waldman, assistant professor, Haverford College.

Kenneth N. Waltz, professor, Brandeis University.

Gary L. Wamsley, San Diego State College.

Stephen Weisman, instructor, Fordham University.

Joseph Weizenbaum, associate professor, MIT.

Peter Wengert, lecturer, Baruch School of Business and Public Administration, CUNY.

Manfred Wenner, assistant professor, Wisconsin State University/Oshkosh.

George L. Willis, associate professor, Wisconsin State University/Oshkosh; formerly of University of Kentucky.

Howard Wriggins, professor, Columbia University; formerly of Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research.

Dean Yarwood, assistant professor, University of Kentucky; formerly of Coe College.

Oran Young, lecturer, Princeton.

Donald A. Zoll, associate professor, University of Saskatchewan/Regina; formerly of Kansas State University.

Norman L. Zucker, associate professor, University of Rhode Island; formerly of Tufts College.

Visiting Appointments

Remigio Agpalo, University of Philippines: University of Hawaii, East-West Center, 1966–67.

Jon Alexander, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions: visiting assistant professor, Emory University.

JURIJI BORYS, University of Alberta: visiting professor, University of Washington, summer, 1966.

DOUGLAS A. CHALMERS, Douglass College; visiting associate professor, Columbia, 1966–67.

FRANK B. COLLINGE, San Francisco State College: visiting professor, University of Washington, summer, 1966.

KARL W. DEUTSCH, Yale: visiting lecturer, University of Mississippi, March, 1966.

EDGAR S. EFRAT, University of Victoria: visiting professor, University of Washington, summer, 1966.

BURT ENGLISH: visiting assistant professor, University of Kansas.

IVO K. FEIERABEND: visiting associate professor, Washington University, 1966–67.

DAVID D. FINLEY, Colorado College: visiting assistant professor, Stanford.

JULIAN R. FRIEDMAN, Syracuse University: visiting professor, University of Washington, summer, 1966.

ALBERT GORVINE, Brooklyn College, CUNY: visiting professor, University of Philippines, 1966–67.

JOHN HERZ, CUNY: visiting professor, Columbia University, spring 1966.

JACK D. HOPKINS, Georgia Institute of Technology: visiting assistant professor, Emory University, summer, 1966.

HELIO JAGUARIBE, Brazilian Institute for Studies of Development: visiting lecturer, Stanford.

HARVEY G. KEBSCHULL, University of Montana: visiting professor, Vanderbilt University, 1966–67.

SAMUEL KRISLOV, University of Minnesota: visiting associate professor, Columbia, autumn, 1966; Russell Sage Resident, Northwestern University, 1967.

EDWARD A. LEONARD, Texas Western College: visiting assistant professor, Emory University, summer, 1966.

T. J. LEONARD, West Texas State College: lecturer, University of Texas, summer, 1966.

BENJAMIN E. LIPPINCOTT, University of Minnesota: visiting professor, Johns Hopkins, 1966–67.

LOUIS S. LOEB, American University: visiting lecturer, University of California/Davis, 1966–67.

NORTON E. LONG, Brandeis University: visiting professor, University of Washington, summer, 1966.

CHARLES H. MCLAUGHLIN, University of Minnesota: visiting professor, University of Hawaii, 1966–67.

WAYNE C. MULLER, Western Washington State College: visiting professor, University of Washington, summer, 1966.

THOMAS P. PEARDON, Barnard College: distinguished visiting professor, Swarthmore, 1966–67.

KLAUS PRINGSHEIM, California State College: visiting associate professor, McMasters University, Hamilton, Ont., 1966–67.

SHEIKH ABDUR RASHID, University of Punjab, Lahore, India: visiting assistant professor, University of South Carolina, winter, 1966.

HOZAIN RAZI, University of Houston: visiting lecturer, University of Texas, summer, 1966.

RUDOLPH RUMMEL: University of Hawaii, 1966–67.

GLENDON SCHUBERT: visiting professor, University of Hawaii, 1966–67.

HERBERT J. SPIRO, University of Pennsylvania: visiting professor, Princeton University, spring, 1966.

DENNIS G. SULLIVAN, University of Illinois: visiting associate professor, Stanford University.

ROBERT D. TOMASEK, University of Kansas: visiting associate professor, Indiana University, 1966–67.

ALDEN VOTH, San Jose State College: visiting assistant professor, American University in Cairo, 1965–67.

JOE E. WALKER: visiting instructor, Tulane University.

DONALD E. WEATHERBEE, University of South Carolina: visiting assistant professor, University of Rhode Island, summer, 1966.

DAVID O. WURFEL, University of Missouri: visiting associate professor, University of Michigan.

FRANK P. ZEIDLER, former mayor of Milwaukee, Wis.: visiting lecturer, University of Saskatchewan.

OTHER APPOINTMENTS

CHRISTIAN Bay, University of Alberta, Edmonton: professor and head of the department; formerly of Stanford University.

W. G. BOLSTAD, University of Saskatchewan: director, School of Administration.

BERNARD C. COHEN, University of Wisconsin: chairman.

HERBERT A. DEANE, Columbia University: vice-dean, Graduate Faculties, 1965–66.

DAVID R. DEENER, Tulane University: dean of Graduate School.

ROLAND H. EBEL, Tulane University: associate director Latin American Studies Program.

ALAN S. ENGEL, Miami University (Ohio): acting chairman, summer, 1966.

JOHN T. EVERETT, State University College, Fredonia, New York: professor and chairman; formerly of Texas Christian University.

GERALD E. FITZGERALD, St. Johns University, Jamaica, New York: reappointed as chairman.

HARVEY GLIDSMAN, Haverford College: acting chairman, 1966–67.

ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, Kenyon College: associate professor and director of Public Affairs Conference Center.

FRANCIS HELLER, University of Kansas: associate dean of Faculties, July 1, 1966.

THOMAS KARIS, City College CUNY: chairman.

WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON, University of Texas: chairman.

LEO B. LOTT, University of Montana: professor and chairman; formerly of Ohio State University.

HARRY MANLEY, Muskingum College: president.

HENRY L. MASON, Tulane University: university chairman of political science.

WARREN L. MASON, Miami University (Ohio): assistant dean, College of Arts and Sciences.

CHARLES A. MCCLELLAND, University of Michigan: professor and director of Center for Research on Conflict Resolution.

MAX MILAM, University of Arkansas: chairman.

WALTER MURPHY, Princeton University: chairman.

LYNDON R. MUSOLF, Portland State College: professor and director of Urban Studies.

MARTIN C. NEEDLER, University of New Mexico: director, Division of International American Affairs; formerly of Harvard Center for International Affairs.

JOSEPH L. NOGEL, University of Houston: professor and chairman.

PERTTI PERSONEN, Tempere University, Finland: professor and dean of Faculty of Social Sciences; formerly of University of Helsinki.

BENJAMIN RIVLIN, Brooklyn College CUNY: chairman.

ROBERT H. SALISBURY, Washington University: chairman.

J. MALCOLM SMITH, California State College/Hayward: acting chairman, 1966–67.

REED M. SMITH, Bradley University, Peoria: head.

ALBERT SOMIT, State University of New York/Buffalo: professor and chairman.

FRANK J. SORAUF, University of Minnesota: chairman.

GEORGE WASHINGTON SPICER, University of Virginia: chairman, 1966–67.

JOHN L. SUTTON, Indiana University: dean of Faculties.

LOREN E. TESDALL, American University/Cairo: acting chairman.

HANS B. THORELLI, School of Business, Indiana University: chairman, Marketing Department.

HERBERT WALTZER, Miami University (Ohio): acting chairman, spring, 1966.

PROMOTIONS (with new rank)

RAMON ARANGO, Kenyon College, associate professor.

DONALD D. BARRY, Lehigh University, associate professor.

DONALD BRANDON, University of San Francisco, professor.

RICHARD A. BRODY, Stanford University, associate professor.

LEONARD CARDENAS, Jr., Texas Western College of University of Texas, associate professor.

DAVID CATTELL, UCLA, professor.

Soon Sung Cho, University of Nebraska, associate professor.

Jack Crowell, California State College at Hayward, associate professor.

Richard E. Dawson, Washington University, associate professor.

Charles A. Drekmeier, Stanford University, professor.

Robert L. Friedheim, Purdue University, associate professor.

Michael P. Gehlen, Purdue University, associate professor.

William Gerberding, UCLA, associate professor.

Robert T. Golembiewski, University of Georgia, professor.

Leon Gordenker, Princeton University, professor.

William Griffith, M.I.T., professor.

Martin Gruberg, Wisconsin State University/Oshkosh, associate professor.

Malcolm Jewell, University of Kentucky, professor.

Clifford Kitzel, University of Kansas, professor.

Ray D. Laird, University of Kansas, professor.

L. Larry Leonard, Wisconsin State University/Oshkosh, professor.

Paul Leary, Dartmouth College, assistant professor.

John Merriam, American University/Cairo, assistant professor.

Ruth A. Miller, Whittier College (California), assistant professor.

Sandra S. Powell, American University, assistant professor.

Robert Pranger, University of Kentucky, associate professor.

John Rensenbrink, Bowdoin College, associate professor.

Harry Scoble, UCLA, associate professor.

Eugene B. Skolnikoff, M.I.T., associate professor.

Melvin P. Straus, Texas Western College of University of Texas, professor.

Donald A. Strickland, Purdue University, associate professor.

David W. Tarr, University of Wisconsin, associate professor.

Kenneth N. Vines, Tulane University, professor.

Michael Waltzer, Princeton University, associate professor.

Herbert Waltzer, Miami University (Ohio), professor.

Robert Warren, University of Washington, associate professor.

O. Douglas Weeks, University of Texas, professor emeritus.

Alan F. Westin, Columbia University, professor.

Wayne A. Wilcox, Columbia University, associate professor.

Raymond E. Wolfinger, Stanford University, associate professor.

M. Crawford Young, University of Wisconsin, associate professor.

Resignations and Retirements

Alfons J. Beitzinger has resigned from the Catholic University of America.

Harold L. Childs, Princeton University, retired from active teaching in July, 1966. He will continue as editor of the *Public Opinion Quarterly*.

Walter C. Clemens, Jr., has resigned from M.I.T.

James F. Creagan has resigned from St. Mary's University, San Antonio, to accept a position as Foreign Service Officer with the Department of State.

Paul T. David has resigned as chairman of the department at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville.

Harold M. Dorr, University of Michigan, will begin his retirement furlough at the University of Michigan in the summer of 1966.

Richard Gool has resigned from the University of Saskatchewan.

Carl L. Heyerdahl has retired from the faculty of Purdue University after a thirty-eight year period of service there. Upon retirement he was made professor emeritus of political science.

L. Vaughan Howard, chairman from 1947–1964 at Tulane University, retired in June.

Erich Hula, The New School, will retire spring term, 1967.

Lawrence M. Lew has resigned as head of the department at Bradley University. He will continue on in the department.

Carl A. McCandless retired as chairman at Washington University at the close of the 1965–66 academic year. He will be on sabbatical leave during 1966–67.

Ralph A. Norem, Wisconsin State University/Oshkosh, has retired after 45 years of teaching, 27 of which were spent at Oshkosh.

Thomas Payne, University of Montana, has resigned his administrative duties as departmental chairman and will devote full time to teaching and research.

E. G. Trimble, University of Kentucky, retired on June 30 after 35 years of service.

Arthur C. Turner, University of California, Riverside, chairman of the Department of Political Science (1961–1966), has resigned his administrative duties to return to full-time teaching and research.

John S. Waggaman has resigned as research associate at the Institute of Public Administration at Indiana University to become director of research of the Indiana Legislative Advisory Commission.

IN MEMORIAM

Harold Stein, Professor of Public and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, passed away on May 8 after an extended illness. He was 63 years old.

Harold Stein had the best of four worlds. He began his professional career as a teacher and subsequently was headmaster in a secondary school. Later he received his Ph.D. in English Literature at Yale University, and established a brilliant reputation in the humanities faculty of the University of Wisconsin. In 1934 he turned to government service, where over a period of fourteen years he reached the topmost ranks of the civil service as Deputy Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion and as a member of the commission which developed the Marshall Plan. His fourth career was in academic political science, in which his talents as director of research, author, editor, and teacher quickly brought him to the top of the profession.

Harold Stein left the service of the United States government in 1948 to become staff director of the Inter-University Case Program. His achievements in altering the nature and multiplying the applications of the case method wrought far-reaching changes in the study of public administration. It was his emphasis upon the administrator's adjustment to his political environment which changed the conventional view of public administration as simply the mechanics of governmental action and created the richer and infinitely more meaningful study of the methods and conditions of political consent. The magistral essay introducing his book, *Public Administration and Policy Development*, published in 1952, has been more frequently translated and more widely circulated than any other document in the field of public administration in our time.

Harold Stein came to Princeton in 1953 as Research Director of the Study of Civil-Military Relations, sponsored by the Twentieth Century Fund. From that year until 1958, he was a visiting lecturer and visiting professor in the Woodrow Wilson School, and from 1958 on, a full-time professor. During his years at Princeton, he and his associates produced two important works, *Arms and the State* in 1958, and *American Civil-Military Decisions* in 1963.

Harold Stein was a humanist in politics who combined qualities rarely found in one man. He had an unusual capacity for the art of getting worthwhile things done in the political world. His talent for political strategy and for recognizing the limits of political possibility gave him a gift for political pragmatism which was exceeded by few practicing politicians. He had great sensitivity to the use of language, especially for purposes of political and administrative persuasion. He was an unusual kind of nonconformist: imaginative and original in his thinking about problems of policy and political and administrative organization and strategy, but conservative in his respect for the traditional proprieties of society and for esthetic values. In a time of increasing specialization in academic life, he upheld the Renaissance ideal of the universal man, and his exceptionally broad interests were always grounded in historical knowledge.

Throughout his life, Harold Stein had a sense of engagement with politics and a joy in being involved in political affairs, which were shared by all his immediate family. His combination of historical knowledge and humanistic values played its part in practical political affairs, too. During his Princeton years he served as the trusted adviser of Democratic party chieftains in New Jersey.

During twelve years of illness, Professor Stein was sustained by almost unbelievable courage. Pain did not destroy his love of life, nor dim his lively interest in politics. Throughout those years, if he ever yielded to self-pity, no one knew it, and he made every effort not to let even his closest friends know that he was suffering.

One of his most attractive qualities was his way with younger people: students of other disciplines, men whose work he edited and improved. He sought them out and drew them into discussion. He liked to share his relations with eminent men of affairs with younger people. He wanted his colleagues and friends of all ages to talk back for he never wanted deference and passive acceptance.

For several years Harold Stein had planned to undertake a study of Walter Bagehot and the art of political oratory. Had he been able to complete it, this study would have been a subtle blend of all the elements that characterized his personal and professional life: a great capacity to enjoy life; penetrating historical scholarship; awareness of the complexities of men and their institutions and the practices of their governments; grace, simplicity, and vitality in expression; subtlety in analysis; ability to impart the richness of his experience; and above all, that understanding and wisdom for which we all remember him.

Marver H. Bernstein
Rowland A. Egger
Stanley Kelley, Jr.

HILTON P. GOSS, Professor of Political Science at the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, until 1957, died of cancer in Santa Barbara, California, on May 26, 1966. Professor Goss received his A.B. at Harvard and his Ph.D. at the University of California, Berkeley. During his distinguished teaching career, he taught at Berkeley, at Washington State College, at the Air University and was a visiting lecturer at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 1963–1964. From 1957 until 1965, he was a member of the professional staff TEMPO (General Electric Co.) in Santa Barbara.

During World War Two, Professor Goss served in the U. S. Air Force where he attained the rank of captain. From 1955 to 1957 he chaired the board of editors of the Air War College Studies Series. During his years in Santa Barbara he generously gave his time and his inspired effort to various civic organizations, including the United Nations Association which he served as president and board member.

From his lifelong interest in American foreign policy grew a series of books including *American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action* (first published in 1952, revised in 1955 and 1958), and *The Scope and Character of U.S. Foreign Policy* (1958). In his later years he became particularly interested in Africa and wrote *Africa: Present and Potential* (1958), *The Political Future of the Independent Nations of Africa* (1960), and *Africa as an Area for Planning* (1965). He also edited *1970—A Challenge to Planners* (1959) and *A World in Transition* (1960). The profession has suffered a great loss with the death of this able scholar.

PETER MERKL

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

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

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

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

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

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

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